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
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THE FORWARD POLICY

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RICHARD I. BRUCE, C.I.E.

THE FORWARD POLICY

AND ITS RESULTS

OR

THIRTY-FIVE YEARS' WORK AMONGST THE TRIBES
ON OUR NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER
OF INDIA

BY

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WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND A MAP

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DEDICATED

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AND IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE

TO

LADY SANDEMAN

BY THE AUTHOR

MEMORANDUM

It was my intention to publish these Memoirs long since, but frequent and serious illnesses after I retired from the Service prevented my completing them earlier. The delay may not, however, I hope, weaken my cause, as the question of the best means of remedying the defects in our relations with the border tribes is one that is ever present with us. It may slumber for a time, but will inevitably crop up again, and even now tokens are not wanting to show that the time may not be far distant when the problem of the merits or demerits of the Forward Policy will be again prominently to the front.

RICHARD I. BRUCE.

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THE FORWARD POLICY

INTRODUCTORY

I HAVE always felt more at home in the saddle than at the desk, and am not blessed with the pen of the ready writer. I must therefore ask my reader's forbearance for any literary shortcomings there may be in these memoirs. I would not, indeed, have ventured to commit myself to paper but for my great desire to be able to throw some small contribution of light on the much-vexed question of the best system of management of the tribes of our North and North-Western frontiers of India, particularly as to the merits of the Forward Policy in our dealings with them, as compared with the old Close Border System. I also venture to hope that an account of my experiences during an exceptionally long frontier career may prove in some measure useful to my successors, entrusted with similar responsible and most absorbing duties. If I can, by a plain unvarnished tale of what has come under my own observation and the conclusions I have drawn, succeed in these objects, and in enlisting the sympathies of my readers in the noble and worthy cause of the civilisation of the frontier tribes, which cannot possibly be brought about except by a Forward Policy, I shall be more than repaid for my trouble.

The extraordinary and practical interest evinced in the civilisation of the Soudanese consequent on the Sirdar's grand victory at Omdurman would naturally lead to the hope that the late successes of our arms on the Malakand-Chitral line and the Kohat-Peshawar border may prove the precursor of the spread of similar influences among our brave Indian Border races, who have certainly a prior claim to our regard and interest, and who are equally sunk in barbarism, a prey to evil intrigues, and whose law is the dagger.

The worst of it is we are a people who follow fashion. Soudan and the Soudanese are now the fashion, and the victory of Omdurman must be immediately utilised by extending the blessings of civilisation to the Soudanese. 'The Times' writes: 'The position which circumstances have forced upon us in the Soudan imperatively requires of us that we should at once undertake the task of civilising, educating, and developing the races brought under our control.' But the Waziris, Afridis, and Swatis may be allowed to continue in a depth of barbarism few realise the extent of, in degradation and strife, till a more convenient season.

The Sirdar asks for 100,000*l.* to found the Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum, and he has only to ask for and he will get double that amount; while all that is forthcoming for the Indian Heroes Fund is a few paltry thousands.

I am further emboldened to place my views before the public by the fact that I have had, I believe, more to do with the practical executive carrying out of the Forward Policy among the tribes than any man in India, not even excepting my dear and lamented chief, the late Sir Robert Sandeman. He it was, no doubt, who gave its death-blow to the Close Border System and initiated the Forward Policy

on its true lines when he boldly crossed the Dera Ghazi Khan border in 1866; but from that time, except for short intervals, until the Afghan war of 1878, as well as in his subsequent most important measures connected with the occupation of the Khetran country, the Harnai line, Thal-Choteali, Bori, and Zhob, and in his last great work, the opening of the Gomal Pass, I was his right-hand man and chief executive officer.

There is one most important point to which it seems at the outset desirable to draw attention, as it is generally either misunderstood or lost sight of, which is this—that the true Forward Policy which has added so greatly to our empire and prestige on the frontier was that introduced by Sandeman, and which may be considered as synonymous with what is now generally known as the Sandeman System. This system is precisely on the same lines as that so forcibly and accurately described by Lord Roberts[1] in his 'Forty-one Years in India.' In alluding to Lord Lytton's scheme for the appointment of a Chief Commissioner for the frontier (which his lordship intended to offer to Sir Frederick Roberts, as he then was), he writes:

> It was above all the appointment I should have liked. I delighted in frontier life and frontier men, who with all their faults are men, and grand men too. I had felt for years what an important factor the trans-Indus tribes are in the defence of India, and how desirable it was that we should be on better terms with them than was possible so long as our policy consisted in keeping them at arms' length, and our only intercourse with them was confined to punitive expeditions, or the visits of their headmen to our hard-worked officials, whose whole time was occupied in writing long reports or in settling troublesome disputes to the satisfaction of no one. I now hoped to be able to put a stop to the futile blockades and inconclusive reprisals which had been carried on for nearly thirty years with such unsatisfactory results,

[1] Field-Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

and I looked forward to turning the wild tribesmen from enemies into friends, a strength instead of a weakness to our Government, and to bringing them by degrees within the pale of civilisation.

And again he writes:

Moreover, our position with regard to the Border tribes had gradually come to be better understood, and it had been realised that they would be a powerful support to whichever side might be able to count upon their aid; the policy of keeping them at arms' length had been abandoned, and the advantages of reciprocal communication were becoming more appreciated by them and by us.

This policy is a really civilising one and worthy of a great Government like ours. It was the one steadfastly pursued by Sandeman, and the eminent success which he achieved was contributed to in no small degree by the sympathy and support he received from Sir Frederick Roberts, who, I believe, more thoroughly understood and appreciated the system than any man in India. Who would venture to affirm that if Sir Frederick Roberts had been appointed Chief Commissioner of the frontier in 1877 he would not have ere now, under the policy in which he believed, have extended friendly and civilising influences over the Orakzais, Afridis, Mohmands, and Swatis of the same nature as had proved so successful under Sandeman's direction from Chageh to Waziristan? Sandeman invariably put his conciliatory measures in the forefront of his negotiations with the tribes, and in his subsequent steps he always succeeded in the end in carrying them with him. I believe if those who point to the recent disturbances at Malakand, the Samana, and the Khyber as showing the breakdown of the Forward Policy would first ascertain how far that policy as carried out in these regions differed from the lines pursued by Sandeman and advocated by Sir Frederick Roberts, they would find reason to modify their views. In fact, the forward

movements on the Northern frontier appear to lack the essential principle, the carrying of the tribes with us. The Sandeman System should not at any rate be confounded with a policy which may either have been only an imperfect imitation of it, or with one which was totally different, as was that in the Khyber. But I will allude to this hereafter, and must now proceed with my narrative.

CHAPTER I

CONDITION OF FRONTIER AND TRIBES, 1862 TO 1868

My father and most of my relations occupied the unenviable position of Irish landlords. They had estates in Miltown Castle, Ashhill, and other parts of the counties of Cork and Limerick. The famine of 1848 gave us a foretaste of the general collapse which under Mr. Gladstone's land legislation was to overtake us later on. Many of my father's tenants either could not or would not pay their rents, and emigrated with their families to America, leaving large arrears due. On this and other accounts he lost heavily, and as I was the youngest of a large family of six sons he could not afford to give me a profession, and, after casting about in different directions for some suitable employment, eventually I turned my eyes to the East.

One of my brothers, the Reverend[1] Robert Bruce, had gone out to India in 1858 under the Church Missionary Society, and subsequently in 1861 he had, in co-operation with the Reverend Valpy French, afterwards Bishop of Lahore, established a new branch of the mission at Dera Ismail Khan. To him I am indebted for the start in my Indian career. He was a great friend of Sir Robert Montgomery, then Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and Sir Robert promised him that if I came out to India and passed an examination in Hindustani, he would give me an appointment in the Uncovenanted Civil Service as Extra Assistant Commissioner.

[1] Now Canon Bruce, D.D., Rector of St. Nicholas, Durham.

I jumped at the kind offer, and on July 21, 1862, set sail in one of the Peninsular and Oriental steamers from Southampton. Journeys to the East have been so often described much better than I could attempt to describe them that I will only mention a few incidents which will show how very different the journey was in those days from what it is at present.

What between the miseries of home sickness and sea sickness, the time I spent between Southampton and Gibraltar, mostly I believe in my berth, is to me a perfect blank. I woke up to life again, however, at Gibraltar. I cannot describe the delights I experienced in my visits to Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Cairo, and the Pyramids. I was in the most exuberant health and spirits, and took delight in everything from the cosmopolitan inhabitants in their divers gay, and to me strange, costumes, their peculiar ways, manners, and customs, the donkey rides at Cairo, and the Somali boys at Aden, with their cry, now familiar to so many—'Heave, sir, heave, sir, heave for a dive, sir.' I put up at Watson's Hotel in Bombay. This hotel had recently been started on strictly European lines, and included a staff of English housemaids and waitresses. They had developed a fine crop of prickly heat, and the poor girls, with their faces like boiled lobsters, looked thoroughly unhappy.

I found a letter waiting for me at Bombay from my brother, advising me to come on at once to Dera Ismail Khan by Karachi and Mithankote, and giving me all the information he could about the journey. Those who remember the India of that time, when there was no railway on the frontier except for the few miles between Karachi and Kotri, and that this was in the month of August, the height of the Monsoon and the hot season, will admit that the prospect before me was a somewhat formidable one. After

a few days' stay at Bombay I took my passage to Karachi in a wretched little steamer of about four hundred tons, called the 'Windsor Castle,' for which I was charged the exorbitant sum of one hundred and twenty rupees. I shall never forget the miseries of that voyage, which took us, I think, four days and three nights to accomplish. There were four or five young officers on board on their way to Hyderabad in Sind to join their regiment, as well as I can remember the 109th. There was a heavy Monsoon sea the whole way. The wretched apologies for cabins were cramped, dirty, and stifling, so that we all lived and slept on the little bit of a quarter-deck. We could not change our clothes or get a decent wash, let alone a bath, during the voyage, and as we were all very sea-sick, we lived mostly on biscuits and champagne, which I remember made the captain angry, as he said we finished all his champagne, and our passage-money included liquors! My quarter was the top of two boxes or lockers fastened on the side of the deck. There was about an inch or so difference in the height of the two boxes, and to this day I can recall the agonies it cost me trying to accommodate myself to the unevenness. The position, however, was not without its advantages, as it was close to the side and I could always hold on to the rail. One night I had unfortunately let go of my rail, and on the ship giving one of her abominable lurches I was precipitated on to the head of one of the officers of the 109th who was sleeping on the deck just below me. I apologised, but he did not seem to realise that anything unusual had happened. We had in fact got past minding ordinary things, the general impression being that nothing signified and that we should never reach Karachi! We did, however, arrive there at last. I collected my baggage, and on landing drove off at once to the dak-bungalow, where I experienced again the delights of a really good wash and change.

The next afternoon I went by train to Kotri, at that time the headquarters of the Indus steamships flotilla. For real unmitigated torture few things could, I think, beat a long voyage up the Indus on one of those flotilla steamers in the month of August. Everything you touched was red hot. In the daytime you could not go below, and the heat under the awnings on the deck was something appalling. Somehow I did not seem to mind it. The endless jungles we passed by on the banks had a kind of fascination for me, and I used to tie wet towels round my head and just watch and watch the jungles, in the hope of seeing some of the game with which I was told they abounded. However the tigers, of which there was a good number in those days, would not oblige me, and I only succeeded in seeing an occasional black or grey partridge and a few wild pigs. In the evening we fastened to the bank, starting again at daybreak. We could always get a good sleep at night, as a coolish breeze generally sprang up on the river, and the early mornings were pleasant.

On the twelfth day we reached Mithankote, and there I made my first acquaintance with those best of good soldiers, the Piffers, an acquaintance destined to last over thirty-five years, and from which sprang some of the warmest friendships of my life.[1] The steamer drew up to the landing-place, and I was delighted to see among the crowd of natives two Englishmen. I went up and spoke to them, and to my intense relief they told me they knew all about me and then and there took possession of me. They were John Gillespie and Pat Clifford, of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, which was quartered at Rajanpur. They had heard from my brother of my coming, and said that I would find a horse *dak* laid for me the whole way from Rajanpur to Dera Ismail Khan, a distance of over two hundred miles. In those days when

[1] The officers of the Punjab Frontier Force were styled the 'Piffers.'

communications were so bad, with no railways or public conveyances of any kind, officers were greatly dependent on one another, and there was a grand spirit of good-fellowship among all Englishmen on the frontier. When going long distances, on word being sent round they used to lay out regular relays of their own horses, and this is what they were now doing for me. On the next morning, after taking *chota-hazri*, we rode into Rajanpur before breakfast, where I was hospitably entertained by the mess of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, at that time commanded by Colonel W. Hughes.[1]

After a few pleasant days at Rajanpur, while the arrangements for my *dak* were being completed, I started in the afternoon from Rajanpur, taking the Hajipur-Dajal route, as parts of the lower road were under water, and reached Dera Ghazi Khan the next morning. I rested for the day at Dera Ghazi Khan, and continued my ride in the evening. My adventures on the road were not many or important. When I reached Taunsa I found my brother's pony, which he had sent for my next stage, lame and hardly able to put his foot to the ground. He had broken loose and cut his frog with a stake in the jungle. The pony I had come the last stage on had returned, and I found myself in a fix. I could not speak a word of the language, but at length succeeded in getting a man to show me the way to the police *Thana*.[2] I led the pony myself to the *Thana*, and pointed out to the Thanadar the state of his foot, and succeeded in making him understand the dilemma. He very kindly lent me his own horse, and I left my brother's pony under his care.

During the great heat of the day I rested for a few hours at Futteh Khan, and in the afternoon pushed on again. The next morning on arriving on the bank of the Gumal Nullah I recognised my brother in the distance riding along to

[1] The late General Hughes, C.B. [2] Police Station.



Photo, London Stereoscopic Co.

REV. CANON BRUCE, D.D.

meet me. I do not think I was ever in my life so glad to see anyone. The difficulties of my voyage and journey at that season of the year to me, a perfect *griff* who did not know a word of the languages, were considerable, and the consequent tension on my mind was very great. This all seemed to completely give way and vanish in a moment at the sight of my brother's cheery face, and I felt like a different being. We were now within a few miles of Dera Ismail Khan, and we arrived at my brother's house in time for breakfast. I thus accomplished my ride of over two hundred miles in three days in the hot season, which was reckoned a respectable performance even for a Piffer. As I had been used to riding from a child, and always loved horses, that part of my journey did not present any great hardship to me.

Immediately on my arrival at Dera Ismail Khan I hired a Munshi and settled down steadily to the study of Hindustani. I could not have been more favourably placed for this, or have had a better training for my future work than I had while living with my brother. He is a first-rate linguist, loved the frontier people and tribes, and spent most of his time travelling among them. He was energetic and active to a degree, and indefatigable in his work. It was he who afterwards started the mission at Julfa in Persia, and Lord Curzon,[1] in his work on Persia, in describing the mission, thus writes of him:

> This mission is under the control of the well-known and greatly respected Dr. Bruce, of whom it may be said that he is as good a type as can anywhere be seen of the nineteenth-century Crusader. In an earlier age the red cross would have been upon his shoulder, and he would have been hewing infidels in conflict for the Holy Sepulchre, instead of translating the Bible and teaching in schools at Julfa.

[1] Lord Curzon of Kedleston, now Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

When the cold season set in we made a tour, living in small tents, through the districts of Kolachi, Tank, Takwara, Peharpur, and Marwat, and I was constantly with natives and heard Hindustani talked all day. I was therefore very soon able to pick up enough to make myself understood. It was not, however, all work and no play, as I had my gun and rifle, and set myself diligently to learn to shoot, and I well remember my feeling of exultation on bagging my first couple of duck at Peharpur. In mixing thus freely among the people I acquired a great liking for the fine manly races on the Border, and thus, stimulated no doubt by my brother's spirit, I formed my resolve to adopt a frontier career, from which I never afterwards wavered; little did I dream when living there as an *Ummedwar*[1] that by the turn of Fortune's wheel I should one day return as Commissioner of the Derajat division. The life of a frontier civilian possessed special charms for me, and I felt impatient to get a start in the work. At that time the gallant but ill-fated Cavagnari[2] was Assistant Commissioner at Dera Ismail Khan, and I used to hear much about the work from him.

In December 1862 my brother went to attend a missionary conference at Lahore and I accompanied him. We stayed with that delightful man and host Mr. Macleod,[3] and there I made the acquaintance of my kind patron Sir Robert Montgomery. I also met many men whose names were household words in the Punjab, among them Edwardes, Lake, Neville Chamberlain, and Reynell Taylor.

Shortly after my return to Dera Ismail Khan I received a letter from Mr. (afterwards Sir Douglas) Forsyth offering me an appointment as Assistant District Superintendent of

[1] Native term for one looking out for an appointment.
[2] Afterwards Sir Louis Cavagnari, K.C.B., murdered at Kabul.
[3] Afterwards Sir Donald Macleod, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

Police in the Punjab, which I gratefully declined, as I said I would prefer to wait for an Extra Assistant Commissionership. I had not long to wait for this. I passed the required examination in the language, and in May 1863 I was appointed an Extra Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab, and was posted to the Googaira (afterwards Montgomery) district. I was given to understand that on passing the departmental examination I should be posted to a frontier district. I therefore worked my hardest, passed my examination, and on the 17th March, 1864, was transferred to Dera Ghazi Khan. I remained there for nearly two years learning my work, and in January 1866 I was appointed to the charge of the Rajanpur subdivision of that district.

Early in the same year Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Robert) Sandeman came to Dera Ghazi Khan as Deputy Commissioner. This was the commencement of my official connection with him, which, one time with another, extended to a period of over eighteen years.

From the first his attitude towards me was not that usually adopted by a superior officer towards his subordinate, but was more that of an elder brother. He consulted me in all matters connected with the management of the tribes, and was ever ready to give the most patient consideration to whatever I might have to urge. We were constantly together, lived mostly in the saddle, and had little necessity for letter-writing, as we settled most questions in personal communication on the spot. In this way the warmest and closest friendship sprang up between us, and our official relations were on the happiest footing, which added immensely to my interest and pleasure in my work.

In order to appreciate the nature of the great changes which were gradually brought about, it is necessary to describe the actual state of affairs which existed on the frontier in

general, especially on the Dera Ghazi Khan-Rajanpur border, when Sandeman received charge of the district. The system known as the Close Border System was in force. The term does not seem quite an appropriate one. If the Border had been closed from both sides it might have been so, but this was not the case. On our side it was in a measure closed; our officers were forbidden to go beyond the red line, our troops were forbidden to patrol beyond the mouths of the passes, and even parties in hot pursuit of robbers were cautioned against following them up into the hills. On the other hand, hill men were not prevented crossing the Border into the district, while murders, highway robberies, and thefts, perpetrated by these men, were rampant in our territories, causing grievous loss to our subjects; for whom it was to all intents and purposes practically impossible to obtain any adequate redress. They naturally disliked and despised a policy that could not effectually protect their lives and property.

I have now before me lists of some of the heinous offences committed by hill men in our district before Sandeman took the matter in hand. They are too lengthy to detail here, but I will later on quote some authorities which will show the true state of things which then existed. Our district officers did indeed endeavour to obtain some redress for our plundered subjects by employing as intermediaries a chief or chiefs among our own people, who through marriage connections or otherwise had influence with the hill tribes. This gave rise to a pernicious system of middlemen, the evil of which was not so much due to our officers as that it was inherent in the system itself. As our officers were debarred from entering the hill country, or from holding any practical relations or communications with the hill chiefs and people, the middle-men, making use of their name and of the *Sirkar*, represented things just as best

suited their own books, and there was no possible means of preventing this or of checking and controlling them. In this way they acquired immense power beyond the Border, which unfortunately they frequently used for their own aggrandisement, carrying on intrigues and fomenting disturbances, not seldom with the simple object of getting the credit of quelling them again.

Thus it was that when Sandeman took charge of the district he found that Sirdar Jamal Khan, Tumandar of the Legari tribe, who had long been employed as a middle-man, had acquired a most dangerous influence on the Border. There was at that time a notorious hill freebooter named Gholam Hosein, of the Bugti tribe, who had collected to himself a formidable band of the most desperate characters and outlaws from among all the neighbouring tribes, Marris, Bugtis, and Khetrans, and carried out a wholesale system of plunder all along the Border, perpetrating numerous raids and murders on the Upper Sind and Katchi frontiers, as well as in the Dera Ghazi Khan district. In one raid alone he murdered seven Khosas, British subjects, near Jacobabad, for which as well as other offences he was proclaimed by the Sind authorities and a large reward offered for his capture. It was found that Sirdar Jamal Khan maintained in the hills, for this scoundrel Gholam Hosein and his followers, a regular asylum among his relations and friends the Haddianis [1] and Khetrans, whence they used to issue forth on their raids and forays. Another most serious factor in the situation was that Sirdar Jamal Khan had brought under his influence the executive engineer in charge of the irrigation canals along the frontier district, which vastly enhanced his power. As is invariably the case with natives, this 'put wind in his head' and made

[1] The Haddianis were a section of Sirdar Jamal Khan's own tribe, the Legaris; but they resided in the hills beyond what was then our Border line.

him overbearing and rude in his manner. Sandeman used to say that when he came for interviews he used to sit with his tongue in his cheek looking superbly insolent. He was a fine handsome-looking man with a commanding presence.

Sandeman, however, proved himself equal to the occasion by the remarkably short time it took him to see completely through the whole conspiracy. In one of the letters I received from him at that time he wrote: 'Pat, my boy, until we can smash up Jamal Khan and his little game we shall never do any good either in the district or with the Border tribes.' This was therefore the first task he set himself to accomplish, and I believe in the whole course of his eventful career he never set himself a tougher one. He did eventually succeed, but not without a long and hard battle in which Jamal Khan managed to give an infinity of trouble and do much harm before he was finally brought to his bearings. It would take me too far afield if I were to give a full account of how this defeat was brought about, though to us, who were working matters on the spot, it was throughout full of the most interesting and exciting incidents. I will therefore here only give a very brief account of the breaking up of that part of the plot more particularly connected with the district; in doing this I must anticipate events a little, but will return to give a detailed account of the more exciting ramifications of it, which extended to the frontier tribes.

On receiving information that large sums of money paid by Government for the maintenance of the irrigation canals were being misapplied by the Executive Engineer Mr. ——, in league with Sirdar Jamal Khan, and that Jamal Khan had paid large bribes to Mr. ——, Sandeman, who was staying at Rajanpur, sent me secretly to Dera Ghazi Khan with directions to seize and examine the books of certain agents of Sirdar Jamal Khan. I rode through

during the night from Rajanpur, arriving at the town of Dera Ghazi Khan before daybreak. I at once took with me a party of police, and, seizing the account books of these agents, took them back with me to Rajanpur. An examination of these disclosed many entries tending to incriminate Mr. ——, showing that he had received bribes, and had, in league with Jamal Khan, misappropriated Government money.

Sandeman laid this information before the Punjab Government, and the Government Advocate, Mr. (now Sir Henry) Plowden, was deputed to Dera Ghazi Khan to examine the documents and other evidence, and on his recommendation Mr. —— was arrested and committed for trial to the Chief Court at Lahore on charges of receiving bribes. On the case coming up for trial at the Chief Court the chief witnesses, who were really Sirdar Jamal Khan's servants, turned round and perjured themselves, causing the case to break down. The conspiracy between Sirdar Jamal Khan and Mr. —— was, however, so clearly shown, and the misuse of Government funds proved, that the Government of India dismissed Mr. —— from their service and deprived Sirdar Jamal Khan of his powers as a Magistrate, and his seat in Durbar was taken away from him. This was a terrible degradation to the Sirdar.

I was deputed to Lahore to prosecute the witnesses who had perjured themselves, and Jamal Khan's agent, Harri Ram, was found guilty and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000. I received the thanks of the Punjab Government for my work in connection with the proceedings.

But I have been, as I said, anticipating events, and must now go back to describe the ramifications of the plot as directly connected with the Border, as well as the general condition of the tribes and frontier when Sandeman 'took

off his coat' to the work in 1866. I think it is necessary to do this, as there is no one now in the service acquainted with what the condition of the Beluch Border was in those days, and it is frequently asserted, even up to the present day, that Sandeman could not have succeeded with the Pathan tribes higher up the frontier to the same extent that he did with the Beluches, because, it is said, Pathans are so much more democratic and not so amenable to the authority of their chiefs. This argument may have been very well before Sandeman turned his attention to the Pathan tribes themselves; but in the face of the subsequent remarkable success of his policy in Harnai, Quetta, Peshin, Thal-Choteali, Bori, and Zhob, all inhabited by Pathan tribes, some of them the most fanatical of our whole Border, it falls to the ground. The population of these districts is far greater than that of the Beluch tracts which were first brought under our influence. Too much is also made of the argument that, because the Beluches were so much more subservient to their chiefs, they were easier to deal with. I can from my own personal experience say that when we first tackled the Marris, Bugtis, and Khetrans they were not more subservient to their chiefs Ghazzen Khan, Gholam Mortaza, and Beluch Khan than were the Zhobis to Shahjehan, the Lunis to Paind Khan, the Panizais to Faizu, the Sarangzais to Bhaikhan, the Musakhels to Jamal, as well as other Pathan tribes I could name, were to their respective chiefs. Take them all round, I do not believe there is a single tribe with whom we have had intimate dealings up to the present, including the great Waziri tribe, so difficult to manipulate as were the Marris and Bugtis when we went at them in 1866. I remember Sir Henry Green,[1] who knew the Beluches well, laughing at the idea of the Beluch chiefs having any power

[1] Political Superintendent, Upper Sind frontier.

for good over their tribes. He said one day to Gholam Mortaza, the Bugti chief, when Sandeman and I were present: 'You have no power in your tribe; if you had, you could prevent Gholam Hosein and other bad characters committing offences;' to which the Sirdar replied: 'No, Sahib, I have no power because the *Sirkar* does not support me; but if you put your hand on my back [i.e. support me] I will have power, and can restrain the evil-doers.' This is the true secret of the whole thing. It is the *Sirkar* who makes or unmakes these men. As a matter of fact, the greatest of all changes brought about under Sandeman's *régime*—and this not alone with regard to the tribes beyond our Border line, but to those within it as well—was the setting on their legs of the hereditary chiefs and maliks, Pathan as well as Beluch, supporting them and working through them, and bringing them into line with ourselves in all matters connected with the good administration of the frontier; at the same time that he exercised a healthy control and supervision over their actions. It is to this policy that they owe the influence they at present possess, and were our support to be withdrawn their power and authority would soon dwindle away again.

For my own part, in working on Sandeman's system, I have never experienced any essential difference between Beluch and Pathan. One clan may require more attention than another, one may be more fanatical than another; but it is only a matter of degree, and I believe they are all open and amenable to the same influences. It would take up too much space to give a full description of the formidable condition of the Marris and Bugtis at this time, and of the numerous raids and other heinous offences committed by them on the frontier districts of Dera Ghazi Khan and Upper Sind. Captain[1] Jacob thus wrote of them on

[1] Afterwards the distinguished General John Jacob, C.B.

April 16, 1853, and they bore the same reputation at the time I am writing of:

It is certain that these Marris are the worst enemies of the Khan of Khelat; that they have for many years past laid waste the best part of this country, and plundered the whole province of Kachi. For many years past the Khan repeatedly and urgently begged for assistance from the British Government to enable him to reduce this rebellious tribe, and put a stop to its predatory inroads. Without assistance from us it is totally out of his power to control these robbers, as he has so often represented, and it is useless to call upon him to do so.

The British territory has already been violated by the Marris in the instance of the attack on Kusmor in April 1853; while in innumerable instances, mentioned in my former letters, the Marris have assembled in arms for hostile purposes near the British Borders, and on all these occasions have only been prevented invading the British territory by finding the troops on the frontier moving against them: all is disorder, rapine, and plunder on the Kachi side of the desert.

One of the greatest obstacles now existing to the establishment of an extensive and most valuable trade between Central Asia and the sea is the total want of protection for life and property on the journey through the Bolan and the plain of Kachi. No goods can be brought through that country save by the traders congregated in considerable numbers for mutual protection, and hiring parties of armed men to protect them. Even then they are not safe, for the Marris plunder in such strong parties that they hesitate not to attack the largest kafilas, frequently overpowering the guards, and not seldom murdering as well as robbing the merchants. The weak and disreputable state of the Khelat Government, also, as shown by its total inability to crush these robbers, enables all manner of petty marauders to raid with impunity, and enables every contemptible chief of a village to demand and extort payment from all traders under the name of transit dues of which not a farthing reaches the coffers of the State.

These appear to me to be some of the evils caused by allowing the Marris to plunder at their will with impunity. It is certain also that these mountaineers think that the British Government

is afraid of them. This was the case, as I informed Sir Charles Napier at Polaji in 1845, when the Marri Vakils were with him, and the belief has certainly not since been removed.[1]

Colonel (afterwards Sir Charles) Macgregor, in his 'Gazetteer of the Frontier,' in writing of what he calls this irrepressible tribe (the Bugtis), has given a detail of some of the offences perpetrated by them on the Upper Sind frontier. I also gave particulars of some in a memorandum I wrote in 1884 on the Marris and Bugtis, which was published by the Punjab Government. Dr. Thornton, in writing of the Marris and Bugtis, recorded that they had been 'for long the terror of the Border.' Mr. (now Sir Lepel) Griffin thus describes the Bugtis:

> Like the Marris, this was a tribe absolutely devoted to robbery. Their allegiance to the Khan of Khelat was, like that of the Marris, nominal, and the greater portion of their robberies and raids were committed in Khelat territory. With the Marris they have been continuously at war, only uniting with them to commit raids on the lands of their neighbours.

This is a very concise and true picture of the Bugti tribe and its relations with the Marris at that time. I could multiply proofs indefinitely, but the above, coming from such unquestionable authorities, will suffice.

The Marris were considered absolutely incorrigible, and were proclaimed, outlawed, and blockaded on all sides. A proclamation was issued on the Sind frontier offering a reward of ten rupees for the capture of 'any Marri.' The Bugtis were really as bad, if not worse. The Sirdar, Gholam Mortaza, who had himself been always loyally disposed towards the British Government, had not sufficient power or influence to enable him to put a stop to their offences. He had great influence with his tribe in their tribal wars and disputes with the Marris and others, as he was the beau-

[1] Also see *Life of General John Jacob*, by Alex. I. Shand, p. 291.

ideal of a leader, and the tallest and handsomest Beluch on the Border. Brave to rashness, he had always led his clan in person and had been several times severely wounded in many a hard-fought battle. But this was a different matter. The authorities on the Upper Sind frontier did not believe in him, and he had never received the confidence of, or any material support from, the British authorities either in the Punjab or Sind. On the contrary, by dealing direct with the minor men in the tribe we had undermined his authority, so that it was not possible for him to control the turbulent spirits, whose heads had been completely turned by their ill-gotten wealth. Moreover, the notorious robber, Gholam Hosein, with his band of desperadoes, had through Sirdar Jamal Khan obtained an asylum with the Haddianis and Khetrans, where he was almost entirely free of any control by his own chiefs. His raids and robberies both in Sind and on the Rajanpur-Hurrund Border were of everyday occurrence, and gave us all a very lively time of it, the cavalry garrison at Rajanpur being continually kept on the move. Not a day passed that I did not receive urgent messages about the movements of and offences committed by these hill robbers. I will relate an instance of the sort of thing that went on. I got information that appeared reliable that a party of Gholam Hosein's band were starting to commit depredations in the Rajanpur district. I was at Rojhan, the head-quarters of the Mazari chief, when the news came, and by good luck Captain (now General) William Paget, commanding the Rajanpur garrison, was there also. I at once communicated the news to him, and we sent for Sirdar Emam[1] Baksh Khan, the Mazari Tumandar, and laid out a little plan of campaign. Paget warned the different cavalry outposts to be on the alert, and the Sirdar in an incredibly short space of time mustered about seven hundred of his

[1] Now Nawab Sir Emam Baksh Khan, K.C.I.E.

clansmen, mounted on their celebrated little Beluch mares, and started off to post them in the positions he considered best along the Border to watch the passes, and make sure that the raiders should not escape if they came down. In the afternoon another express messenger arrived to inform me that the tracks of a band of about twenty hill robbers had been seen in the Pitok Pass coming out of the hills and going down into the plains. Everything seemed, therefore, to promise well for our plans.

After dinner Paget and I started with a party of the 5th Punjab Cavalry to ride along the frontier. Sirdar Emam Baksh Khan, after cleverly posting his men in concealed positions, joined us at Tozeani. The night was very dark and we could not see for any distance, and when we had proceeded for a few miles further along the frontier road we heard a man galloping towards us, who had been sent to bring the news that one of the Sirdar's parties had intercepted the robber band on the bank of the Pitok nullah, as they were returning to the hills with a herd of camels they had stolen, and that they had rescued the stolen animals and killed four of the robbers, while the others had escaped in the darkness. We pushed on at once to the scene of the fight, and found the facts were as stated by the Sowar. The four robbers were lying dead on the ground, and were identified as three Mussoorie Bugtis belonging to Gholam Hosein's band, and a Marri. There was a very curious coincidence connected with this affair. After daybreak one of the Mazaris, while looking around the scene of the fight, discovered concealed under the bank of the nullah the body of a man who was identified as one of our levy Sowars. The body was covered with sword-cuts, and the man had evidently been quite recently murdered. It was subsequently ascertained that this same band of robbers when passing down the day before had met this Sowar, and had

murdered him and concealed the body, and it certainly was a remarkable instance of retributive justice that they should have been intercepted and four of them killed not fifty yards from the spot where they had committed this cold-blooded crime.

Only one of the Mazaris got a slight wound in the encounter, and the Mazari commandant of levies, Alisher, who was in charge of the party, had his mare's ear cut off. For this successful little affair Paget and I received the thanks of the Punjab Government, and the Sirdar and his men were handsomely rewarded. We were not, however, always so successful as on this occasion, and the robbers often got the best of us, though we did manage to make it unpleasant for them.

I found that the hill robbers used also to work in league with our own subjects, the Pitafi, Leshari, and Durkani, (Gurchani) bad characters, and come down through the hills on the Hurrund border, and commit murders and highway robberies in Rajanpur; and I saw that unless I had charge of Hurrund it would be most difficult to circumvent them. I represented this to Sandeman, and he added the Hurrund Thana to my jurisdiction, which strengthened my hands greatly.

When Sandeman had thoroughly grasped the situation, he addressed Sir Henry Green, the Political Superintendent of the Upper Sind frontier, who always accorded him cordial support, and, having obtained his concurrence, one of his first steps was to try to establish relations with the Bugti Tumandar, Sirdar Gholam Mortaza Khan. In this he employed as a go-between the Mazari Tumandar, Sirdar Emam Baksh Khan. Before passing on I think it may be useful to make a few remarks on the subject of go-betweens, as it is rather a vexed question and a very important one. The dangerous position acquired by Sirdar Jamal Khan

and some others, who had been similarly employed in the Punjab during the time of the Close Border System, led some to condemn the employment of go-betweens at all; but this is, I think, a very great mistake. Sandeman in all his tribal arrangements from start to finish employed go-betweens with the best results. He, however, took very great care to control and direct all their operations, and not to allow himself to be made a tool of by them. This became to him under his Forward Policy comparatively easy, as he communicated with and interviewed all the hill chiefs, as well as our own, and, hearing for himself every side of a question, was in a position he could not have enjoyed under the Close Border System. It was, in fact, with him a case of the 'dog wagging the tail,' instead of 'the tail the dog.' The rewards and honours bestowed on Sirdar Emam Baksh as well as on many others I could name were bestowed in consideration of good services rendered as go-betweens. I have noticed that it is generally those officers who are under the influence of their underlings who are most ready to condemn go-betweens. As a matter of fact, they employ their Munshis as go-betweens; but I believe it to be a better and safer policy, and one for which the tribes have more respect, to employ a man like Sirdar Emam Baksh Khan with a position to keep up and a large stake in the country as go-between, than Munshis on small salaries, most of them corrupt, and often willing to intrigue and sell their services to the highest bidder. I do not, of course, say that no officials should be employed as go-betweens. Sandeman constantly employed Rai Bahadour Hittu Ram, and so have I, with the most valuable results; but he was an official of high rank drawing large pay, and with a wonderful character for impartiality.

Certain it is that the confidence reposed in Sirdar Emam Baksh Khan was not misplaced, and in a very short time

he brought Sirdar Gholam Mortaza Khan to Rajanpur to meet and pay his respects to Sandeman. Thus commenced an alliance destined to work an influence for good on the Border which has lasted till the present time. Sirdar Gholam Mortaza Khan's son, Sirdar Shahbaz Khan, was subsequently made a Nawab[1] by Government for good service, and is one of the most useful and trustworthy allies we have on the whole Border. The illustration, for which I am indebted to Lady Sandeman, represents Sirdar Gholam Mortaza and his two sons, Nawab Shahbaz Khan and Gohur Khan. I have had four generations of the Bugti Tumandar's family present with me at the same time—namely, the Tumandar, Gholam Mortaza, his father Islam Khan, and his son and grandson. Islam Khan was a grand-looking old man with a long white flowing beard nearly down to his waist. They certainly did form a fine group, and I often wished that I could have taken a photograph of them.

It was at this time that Sandeman took that momentous step, which was the death-knell of the Close Border System, of boldly crossing the Border line into the hills, escorted only by certain of the Beluch Sirdars and their followers. This was undoubtedly the commencement of the true Forward Policy, and no one could, I think, correctly appreciate its far-reaching results without a careful study and comprehension of the map of our whole North-Western frontier; noting where our frontier line then was and where it now is, the different tribes inhabiting the intermediate space, and the steps taken by which our influence was extended over them. Some people talk and write as if it were still a question at issue as to the respective merits of the two systems, and which of them should be adopted; but this is not the case. Sandeman by the step he took gave the Close Border System its *coup de grâce*, and it has been

[1] Now Nawab Shahbaz Khan



Photo, Bremner, Quetta

GHOLAM MORTAZA KHAN, BUGTI TUMANDAR, AND HIS TWO SONS

long since dead and buried; and no one who studies the map can doubt that the Forward Policy is now a recognised fact, though some areas, comparatively small, still remain to be brought into line. In the same manner that Sandeman identified the interests of the Beluches, Brahoes, Kakars, and Tarins with our own, in like manner have we identified ourselves with the Waziris, the Dauris, and the people of Kuram, and have extended pledges of such a nature to them that we dare not, even if we would, recede or sacrifice them.

But I am digressing, and must return and give a short account of our tours in the Beluch hills. We were escorted by the Tumandars of the Mazari, Drishak, Gurchani, and Tibbi-Lund tribes, each accompanied by a party of their clansmen, numbering in all about three hundred men. After entering the hills, the Bugti Tumandar, Gholam Mortaza Khan, met us with a large following, and we visited the Shum plain, Murrunj, and Vitakri. We took with us only one small shuldari tent—which, with a few small necessaries, we carried on a riding camel—and we slept on the ground. I remember, either in our first or second expedition, we were encamped after our march at Kulchas, in the Shum plain. Sandeman and I were sitting on the ground in our shuldari, eating *sijji* (meat cooked on stakes after Beluch fashion), when we observed some little excitement in the camp. On inquiring the cause of it, we found that a strong *lashkar*[1] of Bugtis had committed a successful raid on the Musa Khel Pathans, and had carried off a large number of cattle. They were now returning home with their booty, when they observed our camp at Kulchas, and sent in a few of their men to find out who we were and what we were doing there. On ascertaining this, they at first seemed inclined to resent our coming, but on

[1] 'Lashkar' is the name given to a strong armed force, or army.

being assured that we did not intend to interfere with them they moved on and did not molest us. I can at this moment recall Sandeman's half serious, half amused expression as we discussed the situation. We certainly felt relieved when the *lashkar* took their departure, because, although we believed from the constitution of our tribal escort nothing very serious was imminent, we feared that even a small row might have spoiled our plans.

About this time Sir Robert Napier, Commander-in-Chief at Bombay,[1] came on a tour of inspection to Jacobabad. We heard that his Excellency contemplated marching with a force into the Bugti hills. Sandeman, thinking that this might prove a favourable opportunity of coming to some settlement with the Bugti tribe, wrote to Sir Henry Green and suggested meeting him at Sihaf, the headquarters of the Bugti tribe. In reply, Sir Henry gave him a warm invitation to come by all means. We accordingly collected our Beluch contingents and, entering the hills at Loti, under the Gehundari mountain, we marched straight for Sir Robert Napier's camp. Sir Henry Green was surprised when he heard we had come direct through the Bugti hills with only an escort of *Catch-'em-aliveos*.[2] They had come from Jacobabad with a strong force of all arms, and marched as if through an enemy's country. We were accompanied by Major Paget, commanding at Rajanpur, Lieutenant Carr, 5th P.C., and Lieutenant Ramsden, 3rd Sikhs. Sir Henry Green gave us all a most cordial reception, and insisted on making us all his mess guests, where we had the best of good cheer. Sir Robert Napier seemed to take great interest in Sandeman's plans, while Sir Henry gave him warm support, and warned the Bugti head men that he would consider any depredations committed by them in Punjab

[1] Afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala.

[2] Name by which tribal levies are known.

territory in the same light as if committed in Sind. Sandeman had requested Sirdar Gholam Mortaza to assemble the Bugti head men at Sihaf in view of coming to some arrangement for the return of stolen property. All the head men did come in except Gholam Hosein, who excused himself on the plea that he was afraid Sir Henry Green would not allow him to come to Sihaf. The Sirdar and the head men present, however, undertook to bring Gholam Hosein to Rajanpur on receiving a safe-conduct for him. We also concluded arrangements with the Bugti Sirdar for his sending in timely information of the movements of Gholam Hosein and his followers. After visiting Trukki, the celebrated natural stronghold in the Bugti hills where Sir Charles Napier had besieged the Jakranis and Domkis, we bade adieu to our kind hosts and returned to Rajanpur.

Gholam Mortaza was as good as his word, and very shortly afterwards arrived at Rajanpur accompanied by all the Bugti head men, including Gholam Hosein. Sandeman held a durbar at Jampur, and put before the tribe the terms he required at their hands, which included the restoration of stolen property. All agreed to the terms with the exception of Gholam Hosein, who flatly refused either to restore the stolen property or to return to his tribe. He still had an asylum with the Khetrans and Haddianis. Sandeman on this ordered him to leave the durbar and return to the hills, warning him that for all his misdeeds he would one day have his head. He got up immediately, mounted his mare, and went straight off to the hills. He was without exception the most ill-favoured looking scoundrel in all the Beluch hills. As nothing more remained to be done, the Bugti Sirdar and head men returned to their homes.

Gholam Hosein, on returning to the hills, lost no time in continuing his depredations, but under the new arrangements our own chiefs, Mazari, Drishak, Gurchani, and

Tibbi-Lund, were co-operating vigorously in frontier matters, and he did not find plundering quite such an easy and lucrative means of livelihood as before. He therefore determined to make a supreme effort to rid himself of the yoke, and collected a large force composed of the most notorious characters, outlaws, and evil-disposed from among the Marri, Bugti, and Khetran tribes.

Sirdar Gholam Mortaza rendered the most valuable service at this time by supplying me with timely information of all Gholam Hosein's movements and proceedings. On January 23, 24, and 25, 1867, several urgent messengers arrived from him informing me that Gholam Hosein had collected this large force, and warning me to be prepared. This news proved of the utmost value, as I conveyed it at once to Major Paget, who warned all his outposts along the frontier to be on the alert. I also warned the Gurchani, Tibbi-Lund, Drishak, and Mazari Tumandars to collect their followers, and place them in the best positions along the frontier for watching the passes. This they did, and they had large forces of their tribesmen assembled, the Gurchanis and Tibbi-Lunds at Thul-Ali-Mahomed, Drigree, and Thul Wazir; the Drishaks at Subzil-Kote; and the Mazaris at Tozeani; about five to six hundred men in each gathering. It was impossible to foretell by which pass Gholam Hosein might issue from the hills, but we were prepared at all points.

Before daybreak on January 26, 1867, Gholam Hosein with a force numbering twelve hundred men, and composed in about equal parts of Bugtis, Marris, and Khetrans, issued from the hills by the Kosrah Pass, north of Hurrund Fort, and swept round through the plains by Thul-Ali-Mahomed; but, as the people were all prepared and had locked themselves with their cattle into their *Thuls* (fortified enclosures), the raiders were not able to do much harm.

They did succeed in intercepting three unfortunate Gurchanis and murdered them, and they afterwards set fire to two hamlets and drove off a herd of cattle. The fire of the burning hamlets was seen by the garrison of the Hurrund Fort, and a detachment of forty troopers of the 5th Punjab Cavalry galloped to the spot. They were joined at Thul-Ali-Mahomed by Gholam Hyder Khan, Tumandar of the Gurchanis, and Mazar Khan, Tumandar of the Tibbi-Lunds, with five hundred of their clansmen. The combined force then followed up the raiders, and fortunately succeeded in overtaking them at the mouth of the Koombee Pass, before they could get into the hills. Gholam Hosein and his *lashkar* then attempted to make a stand; but the cavalry with their Beluch allies first gave them a volley, and then charged them, on which they broke and fled up the Koombee Pass. A running fight continued for some distance into the hills, the final result being that Gholam Hosein and two hundred and fifty-seven of his followers (ninety-two Bugtis, seventy Marris, and ninety-five Khetrans) were killed, and twenty-four prisoners were taken. On our side three cavalry troopers and fifty Beluches were wounded, among the latter being Sirdar Khan, brother of the Tibbi-Lund Tumandar, who afterwards died of his wounds. Immediately on hearing what had occurred I telegraphed the news to Sandeman at Dera Ghazi Khan, who started at once for Hurrund, having arranged that Major Paget and I should meet him there. Accordingly on the morning of the 28th we all met at Hurrund, and set out for the scene of the fight, accompanied by the Tumandars. We counted twenty-five dead bodies at the spot where the cavalry and Beluches first charged. We also saw the headless trunk of Gholam Hosein, and the dead bodies of four of his followers on the summit of one of the hills, where they had erected a small *sungar* (stone

breastwork) to protect themselves, and died fighting to the last.

It was a very ghastly spectacle. As Sandeman was riding out to Hurrund he had been met by a Gurchani Sowar, who galloped up to him in a great state of excitement. He could hardly speak, but stammered out, 'Here is the head of Gholam Hosein,' and, holding up the end of his mare's nose-bag, out rolled the head of a man on to the road. On being questioned he said he was afraid that it might not be believed that he had really killed this notorious murderer and robber unless he had brought in his head to be identified. The man was himself a wild hill man living beyond the Border, and thought it the correct thing to do.

Sandeman was much displeased, and sent the man to Jampur, with directions to the Tahsildar to have the head properly buried; and, by a curious coincidence, the spot selected by the Tahsildar for burial was just in front of the place where Sandeman had held the durbar in which Gholam Hosein had defied his authority and gone off again to the hills. There it remained for some time, with a little masonry pillar to mark the spot, until the general peace was established, when his relations took it to the hills and buried it with his body; but the natives always regarded it as a remarkable instance of retributive justice, and put it down in their superstitious way to Sandeman's lucky star or *Kadam mobarek* (blessed footsteps).

This narrative about Gholam Hosein's head puts me in mind of a curious case which occurred shortly after I came to Dera Ghazi Khan, and as it illustrates the weakness, and I may say the one-sidedness, of the old Close Border System I will relate it. I was at lunch one day with the Minchins when the bearer came in and told Major Minchin[1] that a hill

[1] Major Minchin was Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan before Sandeman.

man had come to the door who said he had some very important news he wished to communicate to the Sahib. Major Minchin asked me to find out what he wanted. The man, who said that he was a Khoseh Beluch and a British subject, had something tied up in the end of his *chuddar*,[1] and slung over his shoulder, which, on my coming to the door, he pulled round and said to me, 'This is a man's head,' and proceeded to tell his story. He said the man whose head it was, was a Bozdar, a resident of Yaghistan, just across the Border.[2] That this Bozdar had, during his absence from home, come down to his village in the plains, and forcibly abducted his wife and carried her off into the hills. That when he found out what had happened, he had presented a written petition to the Deputy Commissioner, representing who the offender was and praying that he might be punished, his wife restored, and justice done to him. That the reply he received was that the *Sirkar* (Government) could not give him any redress, as the offender was a hill man, and that he should make his own *bundobust* (settlement). Accordingly, that on his returning home he took his gun and his sword and a bag of flour, and went off to the hills, and concealed himself for a couple of days in the ravines and jungle adjoining the enemy's hamlet, watching until he got his opportunity, when he went in and slew him and cut off his head, and—'Here it is,' he said, holding up the bundle in his *chuddar*. I confess that for the moment I felt rather nonplussed, and, as a magistrate, somewhat hazy in my mind as to how the law bore on the case, presuming the man's story to be correct. My first anxiety was to get the man away from the Minchins' house, for fear the ladies might come out and get a shock. I therefore

[1] Beluches wear a long scarf called *chuddar*.

[2] The hill country was, before it was opened up, called *Yaghistan* (the country of rebels).

made some excuse and hurried the man away to the Deputy Commissioner's *kutcherri* (court-house). There I found out that such a petition had been given in, and after a short search the record keeper produced it, and it proved to be exactly as the man had said. The order of the magistrate on it was that as nothing could be done it should be '*dakhil-duftered*' (consigned to the record room).

Concluding from this that the man had committed no offence punishable under our law I placed him on security, had the head buried, and reported the case for the orders of the Deputy Commissioner, who took the same view and released the man from his sureties. Such was the result of the Close Border System; but not very long after this occurrence, thanks to Sandeman's arrangements, no Bozdar dare commit such an offence against a British subject without being called to account and made to give full restitution.

But I must now return to my subject. There was room for doubt that this formidable Hurrund raid was not simply and solely one of Gholam Hosein's ordinary plundering forays, but was a bold stroke of the discontented factions to discredit Sandeman's policy, in the belief that it would cause him to be moved from Dera Ghazi Khan. The crushing defeat of Gholam Hosein's force and the death of the robber-leader himself completely turned the tables on them and spoilt their game, as will be seen hereafter. After the defeat of the robber confederacy, Gholam Hosein's immediate relations and followers, led by Khattu, Batil, and Hyder Khan, Mussoori Bugtis, left the Khetrans and obtained an asylum with the Bijarani Marris. From there small bands of raiders continued to come down, but the spirit of emulation among our own Beluch tribes was so stirred up by the success of the Gurchanis and Tibbi-Lunds, and I received from the hill chiefs such timely and reliable information of the movements of the robbers, as enabled me to make

arrangements that in nearly every instance they were either captured or killed.

Nothing succeeds like success, and the Government, which had hitherto viewed Sandeman's policy with suspicion and had left him pretty well to work out his own salvation, now gratefully accepted its results and congratulated him warmly on the valuable services he had rendered. The share I had taken in the proceedings also gained for me favourable mention.

After the Hurrund raid Sandeman had written to Sir Henry Green and asked him to obtain from the Khan of Khelat compensation for the loss of life and property caused by the Marris. Sir Henry Green in his reply said that the Khan had no control over the Marris; and wrote:

> The Marris, being Beluch, are certainly nominally subjects of the Khan of Khelat, and are held by him under about the same control as the Afridis of the hills bounding the Peshawar valley are by the ruler of Kabul; and any complaint of their conduct to the Khan would be of as much use as the Commissioner of Peshawar bringing to the notice of the Amir the conduct of the said Afridis.

Seeing, therefore, that he would be obliged to rely on his own resources to protect and obtain redress for our subjects, Sandeman determined to take the bull by the horns and establish direct relations with the Marris. An opportunity for this soon presented itself. The greater number of the prisoners taken at the Hurrund raid turned out to be Marris, and included two men of influence and note in the tribe. Sandeman received a written petition from Ghazzen Khan, the Marri Tumandar, begging for the release of the prisoners, and he was informed in reply that his petition could not be considered unless he came in himself. Shortly afterwards Ghazzen Khan himself with a complete and representative *Jirga* (Council of Elders) of the tribe came in. This was

the commencement of the intimate and friendly relations which have now existed for so many years between the Marri tribe and our Government.

There was much force in the reasons given by the Marris to account for their previous conduct. Sirdar Ghazzen Khan did not hesitate to declare that he had been ready and willing to serve the Government if he had received encouragement and support.

Having settled all old scores between them and our subjects, the Marris on their part undertaking to return all stolen cattle in their possession, Sandeman entered into agreements with them of a similar nature to those he had concluded with the Bugtis in the previous year, and which had worked so well. With the sanction of the Government of India, he bestowed an allowance on Sirdar Ghazzen Khan, and entertained twenty Marri levy Sowars, who were to be employed in maintaining communications between Kahan, the headquarters of the Marri tribe, and the civil authorities at Rajanpur. As soon as the conditions had been carried out the Marri prisoners were released.

The Khetran tribe was next brought into the arrangements. As they were the chief offenders, in that they had afforded an asylum to Gholam Hosein and his band of ruffians, a fine of two thousand rupees was realised from them, and they were obliged to restore all stolen cattle in their possession.

The negotiations attending these measures necessitated many tribal expeditions into the hills, which now became an essential part of the Southern frontier administration. The life had many charms for me. Whenever I had leisure I was able to find plenty of sport near at hand. I shot markhor and ooryal, and occasionally a small black bear—called by the natives 'mumm'—in the higher ranges; ravine deer in the Shum, Phylawar, and Bohr plains;

besides a great variety of small game, including duck, quail, partridge, snipe, oobara, and different kinds of sand-grouse. I have always been an ardent fisherman, and had capital sport `mahseer fishing in the numerous streams of the Beluch highlands. Sandeman was not much of a shot, but he was devoted to fishing, and many a pleasant day we have had together after the mahseer on the upper waters of the Kaha and other streams in which they abounded.

Subsequent to the Hurrund raid we continued to bring all the pressure we could to bear on Batil Khan and Khuttu Khan, who had succeeded Gholam Hosein as the leaders of the Mussoori Bugti robber band, which ended in their being brought in and surrendered to me as prisoners at Rajanpur. This may be said to have brought to a successful termination the first phase of our dealings with the hill tribes under the 'Forward' or 'Sandeman Policy.' I felt very proud of the results as far as they concerned myself, as, besides several warm acknowledgments from my Deputy Commissioners and the Punjab Government, I received, for the first time, the thanks of the Government of India. In his reply to the Punjab Government, the Secretary of the Government of India in the Foreign Department wrote:

> I am directed to state that in the opinion of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council the proceedings now reported, which have resulted in the capture of these chiefs, are very creditable to Mr. Bruce, and I am to request that you will convey to that officer the thanks of the Government of India for the energy and tact that he has displayed.

A most appropriate opportunity soon occurred for giving a suitable finishing touch to the arrangements. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Donald Macleod, came on tour to the Bhawalpur State. His Honour arranged to hold a durbar at Ahmedpur, to which he invited our new friends the Bugti, Marri, and Khetran Tumandars, as well

as all our own Beluch Sirdars. I was deputed to take them to the durbar, which I found a much more difficult and delicate task than I had anticipated. I appointed the rendezvous at Rojhan, where in due time all the Sirdars assembled with their followers to the number of some four or five hundred mounted men. All went smoothly until we reached the bank of the Indus, which we were to cross over in country boats into the Bhawalpur State. Many of the Marris and Khetrans had never before even seen a large river like the Indus, and had never in their lives been in a boat. Moreover, some designing people had frightened the hill men by telling them that if they crossed the water they would never be permitted to return, but would be sent to *Kala Pani* (the name the natives call the penal setlement at the Andamans). Consequently many of them absolutely declined to enter the boats. Seeing that matters were really getting serious I called Sirdar Emam Baksh Khan and some other of our own Sirdars aside quietly, and impressed on them that I held them responsible to reassure the hill men. I knew if it was possible to be done Sirdar Emam Baksh Khan would do it, as he was without exception the best native organiser I ever came across. He at once assembled all the big men, and after about half an hour's palaver he came back to me accompanied by the three hill Tumandars and some of their most influential followers, and said that it was all right and they were ready to come. I lost no time in getting the Sirdars into the boat with myself, and leaving men responsible to bring over the others with the horses and baggage, we sailed across. My mind was relieved when we landed on the Bhawalpur side, as I knew they could not get back again however much they might have wished it. But another dilemma was in store for me. On arriving at Ahmedpur after a long march I heard that as the Queen-Mother had raised objections to

Sir Donald holding the durbar at Ahmedpur, he had agreed to hold it at Bhawalpur instead, and that he had given up his intention of coming to Ahmedpur at all. I intimated this news as briefly as possible to the Sirdars, and said that I would go straight on to Bhawalpur and that they should follow me immediately. I then and there again mounted my dear old Katiawar horse, Paddy (a better nag no man ever put his leg across), and pushed on at a good round pace into Bhawalpur, a distance of thirty miles I think, where I arrived at eight o'clock in the evening and found Sir Donald and his staff at dinner with the Minchins at the Residency. The Minchins invited me in to dinner, and Sir Donald told me that he had already held his durbar on that morning at Bhawalpur, but that if I would bring my chiefs on to Lodran on the bank of the Sutlej in the Multan district, where his camp would be pitched next day, he would hold a special durbar for them. There was, of course, nothing left but to put the best face I could on it and thank his Honour. Accordingly early next morning Sir Donald marched for Lodran, and I waited with my horse saddled in anxious expectancy for the arrival of my wild men. They arrived about nine o'clock, looking very tired and dusty and slightly despondent. I did not, however, give them any time to think, but told them to come along with me, as the Lord Sahib had arranged to hold a durbar for them at his camp. We rode on to the bank of the Sutlej, where they all dismounted, tied up their mares, washed and changed their clothes, had their breakfasts, and turned out very spic and span. Each of the Sirdars had brought in his saddlebags his best change of raiment, so that when we rode into Sir Donald's camp at Lodran we formed quite an imposing cavalcade. Sir Donald gave them a most gracious and kind reception, held long conversations with them about frontier affairs, and at his durbar, which he held in the

afternoon, presented the three hill Tumandars—Ghulam Mortaza Khan, Bugti; Ghazzen Khan, Marri; and Babul Khan, Khetran—with handsome *khilluts* to the value of about five hundred rupees each. He also gave suitable presents to our own Sirdars and their followers. All doubts and disappointments were thus dispelled, and, having taken leave of Sir Donald, they set out with me on our return march as pleased and as happy as kings. Until they had, a short time previously, made their submission to Sandeman, the complete jirgas of these tribes had never formally paid their respects to any representative of the British Government, nor had they ever witnessed such an imposing function as this durbar. The kind and generous reception accorded them by Sir Donald Macleod had a most excellent and lasting effect on the Border. It set, as it were, the seal of high authority to all Sandeman had accomplished, and the tender of their allegiance which the chiefs then made to the Lieutenant-Governor they have never swerved from, but have loyally and faithfully adhered to their engagements up to the present time. The accompanying illustration, which was taken in the verandah of my bungalow at Rajanpur, represents some members of the Marri and Bugti jirgas as they first came in.

After the close of the negotiations I have described, with the advice of my friends, I submitted an application for promotion to the rank of Assistant Commissioner. I received very favourable testimonials from the Commissioners under whom I have served, Colonel Pollock[1] and Colonel Graham, and was strongly supported by Sandeman, who, in submitting my application to the Lieutenant-Governor, wrote of me as follows:

I have had opportunities of judging of his qualifications. During that time several important Border cases have occurred on

[1] Now Sir Richard Pollock, K.C.S.I.

COUNCIL OF ELDERS (JIRGA), MARRI AND BUGTI TRIBES

the Rajanpur Border, in the conduct of which he has taken an active part, and which it has been admitted by higher authority were brought to a very successful issue. I allude among others to the arrangements come to with the Bugti chief, Gholam Mortaza Khan, to obtain information of the movements of the late noted outlaw Gholam Hosein, which information enabled the troops, with the aid of the country people, to repel the attack on Hurrund, resulting in the death of the robber and two hundred of his band. Also the subsequent arrangements come to with the Khetran, Bugti, and Marri tribes, which resulted in forcing the remnants of the Robber Band to break up and disperse, and surrender to Government nearly six thousand rupees in value of property stolen from British territory. I would further notice what, in my opinion, especially renders him fitted for frontier work—viz. his activity, energy, and power of enduring great fatigue, besides his being an excellent horseman, all of which qualities are most essential to a good frontier officer.

On receiving my application, Sir Donald Macleod was most kind, and wrote himself to the Viceroy, Lord Lawrence, on my behalf, and on December 3, 1868, I was, with the sanction of her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, gazetted as an Assistant Commissioner. I was naturally gratified and proud at receiving this special promotion, as it placed me on the same graded list as the military and covenanted civilians of the Punjab, as far as all ordinary appointments were concerned.

CHAPTER II

INITIATION AND WORKING OF THE POLICY, 1868 TO 1876

NOTHING very eventful occurred for some time after the incidents related in the last chapter. Sandeman gradually drew all the tribes on the immediate frontier west of Dera Ghazi Khan, Bozdars, Kasranis, and Haddianis, within his sphere of influence; while my duties were more immediately connected with those tribes on the Rajanpur-Hurrund Border of whom I was in charge, Marris, Bugtis, Khetrans, Durkanis, and Lisharis, and much of my time was taken up in cementing and consolidating our relations with them.

Frontier affairs had arrived at this stage when Colonel Phayre[1] succeeded Sir Henry Green as Commandant at Jacobabad and Political Superintendent Upper Sind frontier, a change which was destined to exercise an important bearing on the shaping of future Border events. The Marris and Bugtis had loyally acted up to their engagements with us, but they continued to plunder in the Upper Sind frontier district and in the territories of the Khan of Khelat. Colonel Phayre determined to put a stop to this. He made himself thoroughly acquainted with the measures which had been adopted for the better management of the hill tribes on the Dera Ghazi Khan side and their results, and, as it appeared to him that they might prove suitable for the Sind-Khelat frontier as well, he communicated with Sandeman, and, finding his views to be

[1] The late Sir Robert Phayre, K.C.B.

in complete accord with his own, they endeavoured to strike out a joint line of action for the security of both frontiers. Unfortunately their ideas and plans did not meet with the approval of the Commissioner in Sind, Sir William Merewether, and soon brought them into direct and serious conflict with that officer. Colonel Phayre, with the view of bringing Punjab and Sind frontier methods more into harmony, recommended that I should be appointed Assistant Political Superintendent at Jacobabad, and in submitting his application to the Government of Bombay through the Commissioner in Sind, he wrote as follows:

Mr. Bruce is not only personally well acquainted with all the chiefs of the Border under notice, but he enjoys their confidence and respect and I feel sure that in securing his services in connection with the Political Superintendent on this frontier I am adopting the most likely means of reconciling conflicting ideas, and removing those active impulses which at present tend to undo what the Government has already expressed its entire approval of, so far as it has advanced—viz. the civilisation of the tribes by constant communication with them, checking their internal feuds, and encouraging them to adopt habits of industry.

Sir William Merewether was, however, opposed to changing the old order of things, and did not support the proposal, and consequently the Bombay Government did not sanction it. Although I was proud of having gained the good opinion of such a man as Colonel Phayre, and should have considered it my duty to accept the appointment if offered me, still I was not sorry that the proposal fell through, as Jacobabad is a notoriously unhealthy station, of which I was to have unpleasant proof afterwards, and my own health was anything but good at the time, as I had suffered considerably from the hard work and exposure to heat on the frontier. Sandeman was also very unwell, his symptoms being very similar to my own, while his illness was considerably aggravated by the great anxiety

the disagreement with Sir William Merewether caused him We had several long and trying rides from Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur to Jacobabad in the height of the hot season, and it was a marvel to me how Sandeman ever got through the work in the state of health he was in. He could keep nothing on his stomach, and never a day did we get through our march without his being very sick on the road. Nothing, I believe, but his indomitable pluck, excitement, and absorbing interest in the work carried him through.

Meantime the breach between Sir William Merewether on the one hand and Colonel Phayre and Sandeman on the other grew wider and wider.

It is not my intention in this narrative to give a detailed account of this conflict, especially as it did not directly concern me or my work except in so far as it affected the management of the Marris and Bugtis. The dispute was the most interesting and far-reaching in its results of any that had ever occurred on the frontier. A full and accurate account of it is given in Thornton's 'Life of Sir Robert Sandeman,' to which I would refer the reader. Thornton in one place thus writes of it:

Moreover, the dispute with Sind, though it had its personal and provincial side, was not a mere squabble between officials of adjoining provinces, but raised important questions of Imperial frontier policy. It was, in fact, a protest against the existing systems of frontier management, against the uncompromising militarism of Sind and the 'non-intervention-cum-expeditions' system common to both Sind and the Punjab; and was a first step towards a new policy, a policy believed by its promoters to be more humane, more sympathetic, more civilising, and, at the same time, imperatively called for on grounds of public expediency.

And again he writes:

The dispute, as we have seen, originated in certain arrangements made by Lieutenant Sandeman with the Marri tribe; but it soon took a wider range, and embraced the whole policy of the

British Government towards Khelat during the civil war between the Khan and his Sirdars, a policy the justice and expediency of which were boldly challenged by a young frontier officer of less than ten years' standing.

It will be seen hereafter how, in the face of immense opposition, this young officer prevailed, though not without a long and patient struggle, and suffering many vicissitudes of fortune. His views were, however, finally accepted by Government in 1875–76.

In 1870 Colonel[1] Macgregor was employed in writing a gazetteer of the North-West frontier, and I was deputed by Sandeman to assist him in the work. I had myself a short time previously written a gazetteer of the Dera Ghazi Khan district and Border. I placed this at Colonel Macgregor's disposal, and was able to supply him with a good deal of information about the passes and physical features of the country, with which I had become thoroughly acquainted in my frequent tours with Sandeman through the Beluch highlands. I afterwards received from Colonel Macgregor a letter from the Quartermaster-General in India conveying to me the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord Napier of Magdala, for the assistance I had given him.

In May, 1871, I was obliged to take six months' leave on medical certificate to England. The effects of eight hot seasons on the frontier had told on my general health, and I could not succeed in shaking off the fever and other ailments that had taken a firm grip of me. On May 13 I embarked at Bombay in one of the Peninsular and Oriental ships for Brindisi. From the time we sailed I began to feel a different man. The fever left me, and I made up my mind to put in a good time of it. I joined with a party of my fellow-travellers also going home on leave, and from Brindisi

[1] The late Sir Charles Macgregor, K.C.B.

we visited Naples, Rome, and Florence, staying a week at each place. From Florence we went over the Mont Cenis by the highland railway to Bâle. We halted for about an hour near a small lake on the summit, with snow lying all around, and had a good snowballing match, which after eight of the roasting hot seasons of the Derajat plains I throughly enjoyed. When at Bâle my conscience pricked me for loitering so long on my road home, so I bid adieu to my companions and pushed on to Mayence. There a pleasant surprise awaited me. On looking over the hotel book I saw the names of a party of very old friends of mine from Ireland. Presently they came in, and looked at me as if I had fallen from the clouds. They gave me a most hearty welcome, and finally asked me to join their party. They had been making a tour on the Continent, and were now wending their way home again. I accepted the invitation joyfully, and it made a most pleasant wind-up to my journey. It was an intensely interesting time for travelling, just after the close of the Franco-German war. We saw several of the victorious German regiments returning. The trains and the stations were decorated with laurels, and the soldiers carried laurel branches and sprays and sang patriotic songs. At Mayence and Coblentz there were large camps of French prisoners, I think as many as sixteen or twenty thousand. We used to pay them visits, and take them bundles of country cigars, which they were delighted to get. The ladies of the party talked French with them, and I was induced to try my French, but it became so hopelessly involved in Hindustani that I was obliged to give it up as a bad job. After remaining about a week on the Rhine we went to Antwerp, and had a comfortable passage from there to the London Docks, where I said good-bye to my friends.

It was indeed a great joy to me to find on my return after an absence of nine years my dear father and mother

and all I had left in the good old home well and happy. My restless spirit—engendered, I suppose, by my gipsy-like wandering in the jungles of Rajanpur and the frontier hills—would not, however, permit of my remaining long in one place, and after I had been about a month at home I made up a party for a tour on the Continent. We first went to Paris, which was still in the forlorn condition to which it had been reduced by the malign hand of the Commune. The Vendôme Column was lying a ruined heap, as it had been left. A cannon ball was embedded under the altar of the church of the Madeleine, and the shopkeepers had not yet repaired their plate-glass windows, where they had been pierced with bullets or smashed with stones. From Paris we went to Geneva, and thence by diligence by the road that follows for some distance the windings of the lovely river Arve to Chamonix. After staying there a week and visiting all the places of interest in the neighbourhood, we had a charming ride on mules by the Tête-noir and Col-de-Balme to Martigny. We took the train at Martigny, and, after paying short visits to Lausanne, Neuchâtel, and Berne, returned home *viâ* Paris. I believe we all thoroughly enjoyed our tour. I know I can answer for myself, and one of its results was that I became engaged to be married to Miss Webb, a young lady of our party, which numbered eight in all. The time had flown with marvellous rapidity, and not quite two months now remained to me of my six months' leave in which to marry, pack up, and be off again to India; so I felt, indeed, my work cut out for me. Unfortunately, I got two nasty attacks of Indian ague and fever. On the first occasion I was at service on Sunday at St. Paul's in London, when suddenly I got a chill and a most violent attack of ague. My teeth chattered, and I shook all over. From the dismayed looks on the faces of those sitting near me they evidently must have

apprehended that I had been stricken with some infectious disease, so I got up and left the church. Shortly after this, curiously again on Sunday, when I was having lunch with some friends in the country I got the second attack, which laid me up for a fortnight. My recovery found the precious moments of my leave nearly expired, so it was settled that we should get married, start for India on our wedding-day, and spend our honeymoon on the Continent. Accordingly, on October 7, 1871, we were married in Ringcurran Church at Kinsale. We went *viâ* Brussels to the Tyrol, visited Innsbrück and Bötzen, and crossed by the Brenner Pass to Venice. After remaining ten days in Venice, we sailed from there for Bombay, where we arrived on November 12. I received at Bombay the orders of Government directing me to resume my former charge of the Rajanpur subdivision. We accepted an invitation from Sandeman to come and stay with him on our way through Dera Ghazi Khan. We travelled up country to Lahore and Multan by rail and from there by tonga to Dera Ghazi Khan, where Sandeman gave us a right warm welcome, and after a few days' grateful rest we pushed on to Rajanpur. The officers of the garrison gave us a public dinner at their mess. All my old friends among the frontier chiefs and Sirdars, including the Marri and Bugti Tumandars and their head men, came to welcome me, and appeared really glad to have me back among them again. The town was illuminated, and there was a display of fireworks in honour of our marriage.

We passed a very pleasant cold season in tents, moving about all parts of the subdivision, and in the Beluch hills. Sandeman was as energetic and indefatigable as ever, though his health was not good. In August 1872 he was granted three months' privilege leave, and I was appointed to officiate as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan during his absence. In November Lord Northbrook, then Viceroy

Photo, Frith

BARALACHA PASS, LAHAUL

of India, in the course of a tour through the Punjab held a great durbar at Multan, and I was deputed to take the Dera Ghazi Khan Tumandars and Sirdars to attend it. I was very glad of having such a favourable opportunity of being present at a Viceroy's durbar, as I had never seen one before, and I remember I felt not a little proud of my quota of frontier chiefs, and of taking precedence as a frontier Deputy Commissioner over the other Deputy Commissioners of the province who were present. Fortunately my wife was also able to be present at the durbar. Colonel Graham, who had formerly been my Commissioner in the Derajat, was Commissioner of Multan, and invited us to stay with him and his wife, and we spent a very pleasant time under their hospitable roof. It would not be easy to find a more delightful and kind hostess than Mrs. Graham.

In December, Sandeman returned from leave and resumed charge of the district, and I reverted to my charge of Rajanpur. All through that cold season I was not in a good state of health. I could not shake off the effects of the fever, and the doctors recommended that I should have a change. As there was nothing very particular going on on the frontier, I applied for and was granted by the Punjab Government charge of the Kulu subdivision of the Kangra district, to which I was appointed in April 1873.

I shall not attempt to give a description of the lovely Kulu valleys or the grandeur of the glorious mountains, glaciers, and snow fields of Lahaul and Spiti, as they have been frequently described by others with pens far more facile than mine. The accompanying illustrations will give some faint conception of the scenery. Before, however, returning to my legitimate theme, the frontier tribes, my readers will, I am sure, bear with me if I

make a few remarks on sport and other matters connected with Kulu. Looking back over my career in India, my time in Kulu seems like a restful and happy dream, standing out in relief from the more sombre background of the many years I passed full of hard and onerous work, and the responsibilities inseparable from frontier tribal management.

The work of the Kulu subdivision was light indeed in comparison, while the sport was exceptionally fine. In large game there are ibex, tahr (called in Kulu, kurt), sarau, burrell, gural, and musk deer, brown bears and black bears, snow leopards and common leopards, and wild pigs. The small game included six kinds of pheasants, and about the same number of different varieties of partridges, duck, and teal, and last, but best of all, woodcocks. The man who could not content himself with such a bill of fare as this must indeed be difficult to please. The woodcock shooting is a peculiar feature in the Kulu sport, as I believe it is the only place in India, certainly in Northern India, where it can be obtained, though a stray bird may be found here and there. The first heavy fall of snow, which generally comes about Christmas, brings the woodcock down from the mountains into the black alder groves and swampy cover along the banks of the Beas river, and in a good hard winter the shooting up to the end of February is delightful. Between the bridge over the Beas, just under our house at Nagar, and the Raisen tea plantation I have frequently shot eight to ten brace of cock on a forenoon. In the afternoon as the frost melts they seem to disappear, as they go back to the mountains which run down on either side of the river.

A few notes about the bear shooting in Kulu may also be of interest. At the close of the season, after the crops have all been cut, the black bears congregate in the oak

forests, where they feed on the acorns, before moving off to the higher mountains to hibernate for the winter. Bear drives then afford good sport, and the villagers are glad to assemble for a drive, as the bears are most destructive to their crops. I have seen as many as eighteen bears in one small oak forest, and in two days' driving I got seven to my own rifle. I will give here an account of a pleasant bear shooting incident we had. Captain Lockwood, of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, was staying with us, and we were marching from Kulu to Lahaul. On the march from Minali to Ralha we arranged to have our breakfast half way, and sent on some of our servants with a *shuldari* (small tent) to have it ready for us. My wife was going along in her *dandy* (hill palankeen) and Lockwood and I were walking beside her when we saw some villagers on the side of a ravine below the road talking and gesticulating in an excited way. We asked them what was the cause, and they said that a large brown bear had been feeding all the night in their field of sariara (millet), and that he was now in the ravine. We posted some of the men at the top and others at the bottom of the ravine, and as our rifles, which were coming on with our baggage, had not arrived, we went on to our breakfast place, had our breakfast, got our rifles ready, and returned to the ravine. My wife remained at the head of the ravine, and Lockwood and I took up positions, one on either side of it about half way down. The villagers then went to the top and beat the ravine down, throwing stones and making a tremendous row. Presently we saw the bear shuffling down through the trees as fast as he could go. We had both several shots at him, but I never saw a beast take such a lot of killing. He got right out of the ravine into the millet field below, in the centre of which he fell dead. He was certainly a most accommodating beast, as my wife was able to see the sport while sitting in her *dandy* above. He

was a fine, large brown bear, and when skinned we picked four bullets out of his body.

We had a curious experience in this trip through Lahaul. It was at the end of August, and the crops were just ripe but had not yet been cut. We crossed the Rotang Pass, thirteen thousand feet, and marched up the Lahaul valley to Kelang, where there is a Moravian Missionary station. The camping ground at Kelang, which is situated in a grove of large willow trees, consists of two small terraces cut out of the side of the mountain, one below the other, with retaining walls to prevent landslips. We pitched our two hill tents, one on each of these terraces, using the lower one as an office tent and to have our meals in, and the upper one as a sleeping tent. In the afternoon, after we had our camp pitched and made all snug, it began to rain, and it rained incessantly all that night and all the next day, and in the evening it turned to snow, and snowed heavily. It was really a most awful night. The noise of landslips and of the flood waters rushing down through the numerous ravines on the precipitous sides of the mountains, mingled with the crashing of the branches of the willow trees from the weight of snow on them, made the most hideous and alarming combination of sounds I have ever heard. About midnight we heard a tremendous noise of falling stones just outside the tent, and taking the lantern and going out I saw that half of the retaining wall had fallen down with a crash on to our tent-ropes, and the other half, above which were some large willow trees, looked as if it might tumble down any moment with the willow trees right on to our tent. We were therefore obliged to shift our quarters to the tent on the lower terrace. We called up the servants to move the things, and my wife carried down our two little children, one of them a baby of a few months, and after getting them into their beds she fainted from the cold and

Photo, Frith

ROTANG PASS, KULU

anxiety. I had to remain up with the servants for the rest of the night to beat the snow off the tents, as it was falling so thick and heavy I was afraid it would smash the tent down or drag the tent-pegs out of the ground. I was glad that morning when I saw the day break, and about eight o'clock it ceased snowing. The Moravian missionaries, dear Mr. and Mrs. Heyde, came and carried us off, and gave us a refuge in their church, and under their kind and hospitable care we soon forgot our troubles. It was curious to observe the transformation brought about in one night. The face of the country was covered by a coat of snow some nine inches deep, under which the crops were completely buried. My first thought was that there would be a famine in the land, but when the sun came out the snow melted so quickly that the crops suffered little or no injury. Snow at that season, when the trees were all in leaf and the crops standing, was most unusual. All the same we thought it better to get back to Kulu without delay. The Rotang is often a treacherous pass, and travelling with young children we were afraid to run the risk of being caught in a snowstorm on it, or perhaps of having the pass closed and being shut into Lahaul for the winter, which had really happened to one of my predecessors. The Monsoon in Lahaul and Spiti is usually very light as compared with Kulu, and Kashmir Thibet is almost a rainless region. During the Monsoon in Kulu I used to cross the outer Himalayan ranges into Kashmir Thibet either *viâ* Spiti over the Hamta and Parangla Passes, or *viâ* Lahaul over the Rotang and Baralacha. Kashmir Thibet is in every way a truly unique country. Throughout the greater part of it there are no trees and very little vegetation of any kind. The tablelands run up to an elevation of fourteen thousand feet. During the daytime there is a scorching sun, while at night it freezes hard. Consequently the variation of temperature

between the day and night is very great. The heat of the sun in the day prevents the snow from lying, and I have, on my way to Leh, gone over the Tagalang Pass, over eighteen thousand feet, without finding any snow on it. The rarefication of the atmosphere is so great that it disagrees with many people, causing headaches and sickness of the stomach, but I never suffered in the least from it, and enjoyed intensely marching or wandering after game through the wonderful solitudes of the mountains and table-lands of Thibet. The wild animals may be said also to be unique, ovis-ammon, and Thibetan antelope, wild horses (*kiang*), marmots, and blue hares. I have gone up shooting to the Salt Lakes of Tsomoriri and Tsokar, of which it might almost be said that they are on 'the roof of the world.' In the rocks by which they are surrounded wild geese and wild duck build their nests, hatch out their young, and bring their broods down into the lakes; and I have shot flappers in the marshy reeds along the edges. It was certainly curious and interesting to come across up there my old friend the Bramini duck (*chukwi-chukwa*), as well as the different kinds of wild-fowl I shot in India.

I should much like, for the benefit of my brother sports-men, to be able to describe the localities where the different kinds of game mostly resort; or, for those who travel for the sake of lovely scenery, the pet haunts where we pitched our tents, such as Kot, and Jibi, on the Jalauri mountain, Jerri, Manikarn, and Malauna, in the Parbatti valley, Nagur, Jagatsuk, Basisht, Manali, and Ralha, on the Upper Bias, where we usually selected a grassy sward on the edge of one of the lovely deodar groves, in which Kulu abounds, wherein to pitch our tents. Or again in the grand wilds of Lahaul and Spiti; at Gondla, Sissu, Kelang, and Darcha, in Lahaul, or Kioto, Ki, Dankar, or Pin, in Spiti; sur-



Photo, Frith

DUNKAR SPITI

rounded by glaciers and snow fields the dazzling whiteness of which has never been stained even by a drop of rain; and mountain peaks running up to an elevation of twenty-three thousand feet. But I cannot do more than just allude to these places, as I feel that I have already digressed too far, and must now return to the more stern realities of frontier life.

CHAPTER III

SANDEMAN'S MISSIONS TO KHELAT, 1876 TO 1877

My delightful holiday—for I look back on my time in Kulu as a prolonged holiday—was brought to an abrupt termination by the receipt of a letter from my Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Paske, inclosing a telegram he had received from the Punjab Government, dated March 25, 1876, as follows: 'Tell Bruce his services are urgently required by Sandeman, whose expedition starts on fourth. He should join at Jacobabad at once.' We immediately packed up our things and marched to Dharmsala, where I took a house for my wife and children, and proceeded to Jacobabad.

It may be remembered that in a former chapter I referred briefly to the serious conflict of opinion which had arisen between Colonel Phayre and Sandeman on the one side, and Sir William Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, on the other. Sir William Merewether contended that the Khan of Khelat was a sovereign ruler, and that no interference should be permitted between him and his chiefs, who should not be listened to unless they made unconditional surrender. On the other hand, Colonel Phayre and Sandeman held that the Khan was only the head of the Brahoe Confederacy; that he had brought the rebellion on himself by confiscating their rights; that without the support of our Government he dared not have taken up the line he did and that consequently it was our plain duty to put

an end to the deplorable condition of things on the frontier; and by friendly intervention place matters on a just and working basis. For a length of time Sir William Merewether succeeded in maintaining his own policy, and in 1872 Colonel Phayre was transferred from Jacobabad. The Brahoe and Beluch chiefs resented this, as they regarded Colonel Phayre as their friend, and matters continued to go from bad to worse, anarchy spreading over the country. Sandeman carefully observed all passing events, and pressed his views quietly and persistently. As the results of his own policy with the tribes—including the Khan of Khelat's nominal subjects, the Marris and Bugtis, who had hitherto been reckoned incorrigible—continued to be eminently successful, his views could hardly be overlooked; and it would appear that they might have prevailed sooner than they did but for that deplorable event, the assassination of Lord Mayo. The first distinct departure had been made by Lord Mayo, as in a despatch dated January 11, 1872, from his Lordship's Government to the Government of Bombay doubts were expressed as to the 'soundness of a policy which refuses to receive overtures from the insurgent chiefs except on their unconditional surrender,' and after refusing military support to the Khan for the suppression of the revolt, promised him pecuniary assistance on condition that he would accept the mediation of the Commissioner in Sind in regard to the grievances of the Sirdars, and that he 'would consent eventually to such a change in his administration as would give the principal chiefs a due share in the government of the country and an interest in the maintenance of order.' This was really what Sandeman had all along contended for.

Sir William did summon the insurgent Sirdars to Jacobabad, and, after hearing their grievances, issued his award, which, although it did not seem to fully accord with

the suggestions made by Lord Mayo, was accepted by his successor, Lord Northbrook. The award, however, satisfied no one. In fact it made matters worse, because at the same time that it failed to improve the position of the Sirdars it made the Khan angry; and although he did attend at Sukker to pay his respects to Lord Northbrook, he remained sullen and impracticable. Consequently anarchy and bloodshed reigned supreme; the Bolan and other passes became closed to traffic, and matters reached such a crisis that the Government of India recalled the Political Agent at Khelat, Major Harrison, and suspended the Khan's annual subsidy of fifty thousand rupees. Then Sir William Merewether recommended that a military expedition in force should be sent to depose the Khan, as well as to coerce the Marri tribe.

The Government of India declined to consent to either of these proposals, and in lieu of them finally adopted a suggestion made by Sandeman that a mission should be despatched to endeavour to bring about a friendly settlement of all inter-tribal disputes and other matters. They appointed Sandeman in charge of the mission, and in their despatch dated October 16, 1875, they issued the following instructions among others for his guidance:

His Excellency therefore desires that Captain Sandeman shall proceed to the Marri hills as early in the cold season as possible in order to (1) procure what information he can respecting local feuds and quarrels among the Marri and Bugti tribes, or between them and the Afghans, or between them and the Brahoes; (2) to endeavour as far as he can to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels; (3) to report for the information of Government through the Commissioner in Sind his views on such as he cannot settle; and (4) to report on the general relations between the Marris and Bugtis and the Khan's Government.

. . . . . .

Captain Sandeman will also inquire and report whether any-

thing, and if so what, can be done for the protection of trade *vid* the Bolan.

. . . . . .

At the same time, considering the importance of the Kandahar trade, his Excellency in Council thinks it advisable that an alternative route should be opened up, whereby the trade may be to some extent independent of the Bolan, and may not be liable to interruption by the feuds in Khelat. For this purpose the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab is authorised to take such measures as his Honour may think practicable to open up the old trade route from Kandahar *vid* Thal-Chotcali, and if necessary to communicate with his Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, with a view to enlist the co-operation of the Kabul authorities.

. . . . . .

Sandeman lost no time in carrying out his instructions. On November 18 he started on his Mission, and a more adventurous one never crossed the British Border. His escort was almost a purely tribal one, and consisted of the Beluch Tumandars of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, with some twelve hundred of their mounted followers. No military force accompanied the mission except a very small personal escort of the Punjab Frontier Force, under the command of Captain H. Wylie, of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. His march was from the outset a most triumphant one. The hill chiefs[1] without a single exception received him with open arms, and a few days after he entered the hills he was joined by the Marri, Bugti, and Khetran Tumandars, with a considerable number of their followers. He first marched to Kahan, the headquarters of the Marri tribe, and from thence to Sibi. All the leading Brahoe Sirdars met him at Sibi, and as each of them had a personal following his train had by that time increased to some eighteen hundred to two thousand men. From Sibi he set out to march through the Bolan Pass to Quetta. While marching

[1] Now Colonel Wylie, C.S.I., officiating Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, Beluchistan.

through the pass express messengers arrived bringing letters from the Commissioner in Sind directing him not to proceed beyond the Marri hills, but to return to Dera Ghazi Khan forthwith. As the instructions he had received from the Government of India covered all his proceedings, he referred the Commissioner's letters to the Foreign Office, and proceeded on his way.

On his arrival at Quetta on December 24 he received a letter from the Khan of Khelat expressing his readiness to meet him at any place he might name. Sandeman lost no time in taking advantage of the invitation, and proceeded to Khelat immediately, where the Khan welcomed him with every honour. The Khan is in some matters remarkably shrewd. He was fully acquainted with the differences of opinion in regard to Khelat affairs which existed between Sir William Merewether and Sandeman, and was also no doubt aware that no final decision had as yet been arrived at by the Government of India in regard to them. He was therefore afraid to commit himself too far. He, however, promised many things, and gave Sandeman a letter to the Viceroy explaining his conduct and making certain proposals. He further expressed his willingness to accept Sandeman's mediation, and to abide by whatever decision the Supreme Government might arrive at. Further than this he would not go, and Sandeman, seeing that under the circumstances little good could be gained by delay, set out on his return journey.

Meantime the Government of India, doubtless concluding from what had taken place that it was hopeless to think of bringing about a reconciliation of the views of the Commissioner in Sind with their own, issued orders transferring the conduct of Khelat and other frontier affairs from him to the Commissioner of the Derajat, Colonel Munro. Had the Khan known of these orders while

Photo, Elliott & Fry

MAJOR SANDEMAN, 1876

Sandeman was still at Khelat he would no doubt have proved much more amenable, but Sandeman did not himself hear of them until his mission had passed through the Bolan on his return. Colonel Munro had received his orders and was marching to take over charge from Sir William Merewether at Jacobabad, and Sandeman went and joined him there.

Meantime the Sirdars, being disappointed that the mission had not concluded any settlement between the Khan and themselves, prosecuted the rebellion more fiercely than ever, and as there was reason to apprehend that all the tribes both in the hills and plains would be up in arms, it became incumbent on the Government to delay no longer in making their final decision, both as to the immediate course to be pursued and their future policy. Lord Northbrook's Government came to the conclusion that the results of the mission had been sufficiently encouraging to induce them to persist in the policy of mediation and intervention, and they decided to send Major Sandeman on a second mission, the line of action he was to take being set forth in their Resolution dated March 14, 1876. Major Sandeman lost no time in making his preparations, and it was at this juncture that I received the orders at Kulu through Colonel Paske directing me to proceed to Jacobabad.

On April 4, 1876, Major Sandeman[1] set out on his second mission, and a few days afterwards I arrived at Jacobabad, where I joined Colonel Munro. I was put in charge of all executive work connected with the mission at Jacobabad and on the Upper Sind frontier, and my duties included taking over from the Sind authorities the Khelat and other frontier political records. Never throughout the course of my service have I occupied a more unwelcome post.

[1] Sandeman obtained his majority on February 8, 1876.

The Sind officers were naturally sore at the transfer, and could not but regard Colonel Munro and myself as interlopers. Consequently I could not in official matters get rid of the depressing feeling of being under a wet blanket. But I am bound to say that, with one or two exceptions, they never allowed any unpleasantness to intrude into our private relations, and I met with the greatest kindness and courtesy from the officers of Jacobabad, among whom I made many good friends. They made me an honorary member of their messes, and I can recall many happy times spent in the Sind Horse mess, where I constantly dined.

But I am anticipating. This second mission of Major Sandeman's was launched on a far more satisfactory and workable footing than the former one. His credentials and instructions were clear, and his authority for acting under them unmistakable. He was provided with a strong military escort,[1] the moral effect of which in dealing with warlike frontier people can hardly be over-estimated. He was entrusted by Lord Northbrook with a letter to the Khan of Khelat, in which his Highness was clearly informed of the line the Government expected him to take; and strongly advising him to follow Major Sandeman's counsel, who, his Lordship said, was in possession of his full confidence. In fact, the Government omitted nothing that was essential either for the protection of his person or the support of his dignity.

Everything, therefore, seemed combined to secure the success of the mission. But unfortunately at this critical juncture the exigencies of party government at home, which so often act injuriously on Indian interests, caused Lord Northbrook to resign the Viceroyalty, and on April 12, just a week after the mission had started, he was succeeded

[1] The escort consisted of three companies 4th Sikhs, two companies Jacobs Rifles, one hundred sabres, 4th Punjab Cavalry, and two mountain guns.

by Lord Lytton. Thus another king arose who knew not Joseph, and as the despatch of the mission did not fit in with the frontier programme Lord Lytton had determined on, he at first hesitated to accord to it the same warm support with which it had been launched by Lord Northbrook.[1] This caused Major Sandeman considerable embarrassment. But nothing succeeds like success, and never has this saying been better exemplified than in the case of Major Sandeman. On this, as on many other occasions, instead of the support of the authorities gaining him his successes, his successes gained for him the support of those in authority. Thus difficulty after difficulty arose, only to be overcome, till at length, when he obtained the unqualified consent both of the Khan and the Sirdars to abide by the arbitration of the British Government, Lord Lytton telegraphed his congratulations. This was the turning point, and subsequently his Lordship accorded him much more cordial support and sympathy, which lightened his task considerably, and all his negotiations progressed smoothly until they culminated in the crowning success of his grand settlement at Mastang. This was without doubt the most remarkable settlement of the kind ever concluded on the frontier. The Khan himself, who attended on Major Sandeman's invitation, and every Sirdar of note in Beluchistan were present, each attended by a considerable number of followers, and when it is considered of what inflammable materials this vast assembly was composed—each chief being as a rule the deadly enemy of his neighbour, and the Khan the common enemy of all—it will be recognised that only a master hand could have not only controlled such elements, but assimilated them into such a far-reaching agreement without a single mishap.

[1] It is mentioned in *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, by Lady Betty Balfour, published since the above was written, that Lord Lytton had actually requested Lord Northbrook to recall Major Sandeman.

The document embodying the terms of the agreement may be said to be the Magna Charta of the Brahoe chiefs and people. But the battle was as yet only half won. The treaty of peace was in itself all that could be desired, but Major Sandeman saw clearly that it would not be worth the paper on which it was written unless the British Government continued their intervention, and were in a position to ensure the observance of its terms by all parties concerned. This view he represented most strongly, and it was finally accepted by the Government of India, and in their despatch to the Secretary of State for India dated March 23, 1876, they wrote as follows:

We had also before our eyes the history of all previous mediations in Khelat. It showed plainly that each of them had resulted in confusion worse than that which mediation had attempted to remedy. And we had beneath our hand the strongly expressed opinion of an officer exceptionally well qualified to form a sound opinion on the subject that a similar result would infallibly attend his own successful mediation if we decided on withholding the continued intervention which he deemed necessary to maintain and perpetuate the good effect of it. Finally, our consideration was duly given to the consequences foreseen and fully accepted by the Government of India when framing the Resolution of March 14, 1876. That Resolution enabled Major Sandeman to carry out his last mission with unusual pomp and publicity, supported by an imposing military force. This circumstance had attracted to it the special attention of neighbouring States, at the same time securing to it the special confidence and respect of all parties and persons in Khelat. To the reliance thus inspired on our power and determination to protect order, maintain peace, and punish unprovoked aggression must be mainly attributed the almost unprecedented eagerness of all concerned to follow the advice and accept the award of the British mediator.

We had therefore to consider very seriously what would be the effect on the Khanate itself, more especially on those of its inhabitants and rulers who had unreservedly placed their rights and interests in our hands, and what the effect upon our influence

KHELAT FORT

From a painting by Major H. M. Temple

elsewhere, of immediately terminating an intervention which, on all sides, we were earnestly requested to prolong; or abruptly withdrawing those means of maintaining the settlement effected by our agent which the persons who had accepted it and were directly interested in its maintenance unanimously regarded as necessary for that purpose. The British mediator himself had, in very emphatic terms, recorded his deliberate opinion that a more direct and active interference than heretofore would long be needed to secure the fruits of his mediations. With this opinion before us, we were constrained to acknowledge that we could not decline the position thus decreed to us by a long course of antecedent circumstances without thereby incurring the grave responsibility of deliberately plunging into renewed bloodshed and interminable anarchy a neighbouring and friendly State which had urgently appealed to us for timely rescue from those evils.

In accordance with this decision, the Government of India prepared the draft of a treaty of peace between the British Government and the Khan and Sirdars of Khelat. Colonel Colley,[1] Lord Lytton's military secretary, was deputed to Khelat to lay the draft before Major Sandeman, and it was intimated that in the event of the Khan and the Sirdars agreeing to it a meeting between Lord Lytton and the Khan at Jacobabad might be arranged in view of carrying the treaty into execution. Colonel Colley arrived at Khelat on October 14, and everything was concluded as satisfactorily as could be wished. The Khan and Sirdars agreed to the provisions of the treaty, arrangements were made for their meeting Lord Lytton at Jacobabad, and his Highness accepted an invitation from the Viceroy to attend the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi.

Agreeable to these arrangements, on December 7 Lord Lytton arrived at Jacobabad, where the Khan and the Sirdars were already in waiting to receive his Excellency.

[1] Afterwards Sir George Pomeroy-Colley, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.M.G., killed at Majuba Hill.

On the following day the treaty was solemnly executed. It was provided in this as in former treaties that the British Government might station troops at any place within his Highness's territories considered necessary; and in anticipation of formal sanction to this provision Major Sandeman had, in consultation with Colonel Colley, left part of his escort at Quetta, consisting of three hundred men of the 4th Sikhs Punjab Frontier Force under the command of Captain Scott. Thus was the occupation of Quetta peacefully accomplished with a force of three hundred men, with the consent of the Khan of Khelat and all the leading Sirdars of Beluchistan.

After the Viceroy had left Jacobabad Major Sandeman proceeded with the Khan and the principal Sirdars to attend the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. The illustration represents the Khan and Sirdars who attended the Imperial Assemblage, accompanied by Major Sandeman and his staff. On the date of the Assemblage Major Sandeman was made a C.S.I.

On February 21, 1877, by a Resolution of the Government of India, the Beluchistan agency was constituted, with its headquarters at Quetta. Major Sandeman was appointed Agent to the Governor-General, with a staff of three Political Agents and a Medical Officer. I was appointed his First Assistant, and Political Agent at Quetta; Captain S. Reynolds, of the Sind Horse, Second Assistant, to be stationed at Jacobabad; and Captain H. Wylie, 1st Punjab Cavalry, Third Assistant, to be in attendance on his Highness the Khan of Khelat. Mr. O. T. Duke was appointed medical officer.

During the time of the Viceroy's visit to Jacobabad and of the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi I was confined to my bed very ill. The hot season at Jacobabad had been, even

KHAN OF KHELAT AND SIRDARS, AND MAJOR SANDEMAN AND STAFF

for Jacobabad, an exceptionally unhealthy one. The flood waters of the Indus had burst the great retaining dam at Kusmor, and the whole country round Jacobabad became completely submerged, so that except in a boat it was not possible to proceed a mile in any direction beyond the station, which was only saved from destruction by the high protection embankment that surrounded it. After suffering a good deal from malarial fever, I was attacked by a painful malady, which completely prostrated me, and the doctors recommended change of air. As I well knew the nature of the work before me in Beluchistan, I feared I could not, with my health in such a state, do justice to it. I therefore wrote to Colonel Munro and telegraphed to Major Sandeman, who was at the Imperial Assemblage, informing them what the doctors said, and asking that I might be relieved and permitted to return to the Punjab. I received in reply a telegram from Major Sandeman advising me strongly not to leave, adding, 'Viceroy asked me to recommend political officer for charge of Quetta and Bolan Pass. Recommended you.' Colonel Munro also urged me not to decide hurriedly. I therefore took no further steps. After Major Sandeman's return from Calcutta, where he had gone from Delhi, I continued ill; and as the doctor who attended me at Jacobabad recommended me to take a change, I made up my mind to try to make a tour to Gundava, in Katchi, where there was some work to be done. By great good fortune, just as I was starting from our house at Jacobabad Duke arrived. He had been sent in by Major Sandeman to see me, and had ridden in forty miles from Katchi. I proceeded on my march, which was a short one, and Duke said he would follow me after he had breakfast. That night I was very ill, and Duke pronounced me quite unfit for marching. He took me back to Jacobabad in the morning,

got my wife to pack up our things, and we started that evening in bullock carts for Sukker. There I underwent at the hands of Duke and Dr. Leahy a severe operation, which laid me up for some weeks, but effected a complete cure. I have always believed that Duke's opportune arrival saved my life.

CHAPTER IV

OCCUPATION OF QUETTA. 1877.

In order to keep to the thread of my narrative, I have in the previous chapter briefly described the general course of events on the frontier during the time I was in charge of Kulu, until I was appointed Political Agent at Quetta. I have, however, confined myself to a mere summary of the more important events, and would refer those who desire more full information to Dr. Thornton's 'Life of Sir Robert Sandeman,' which gives a detailed and interesting account of all that occurred.

After the Delhi Assemblage, Major Sandeman was summoned to Calcutta by the Viceroy, where he was detained some time on duty, and I was appointed in officiating charge of the mission, which I held from December 10, 1876, to February 20, 1877.

I was, I believe, the first man on that frontier who went in for the study of Beluchi, and in 1875 I wrote a short manual of the language, which was published by the Punjab Government. Subsequently Beluchi was included among the languages for passing an examination in which the Government of India give rewards. I therefore wrote to Major Sandeman while he was at Calcutta, and said that I was prepared to go up for the examination, but that apparently there was no one competent to examine me. Major Sandeman, who was staying at Government House, showed my letter to Lord Lytton, who wrote across it: 'Mr. Bruce may be considered as having passed.' On the

strength of this I drew the reward of one hundred rupees a month for some years, until promoted to First Class Political Agent.

At the end of February Major Sandeman returned from Calcutta, and set about making the arrangements for the organisation of the Quetta Agency. He placed me in charge of the Bolan Pass, and of all executive work in connection with the Marris and Bugtis and other tribes with whom we might have relations or be brought into contact. I may mention that on the establishment of the Agency the management of the Marris and Bugtis had been transferred from the Punjab Government to the Beluchistan Agency. The strength of the Quetta garrison was fixed at a regiment of infantry, a mountain battery, and a squadron of cavalry, in addition to the three hundred men of the 4th Sikh Infantry already stationed there under Captain Scott.

In the month of March we left Jacobabad and marched to Quetta, and nothing very eventful occurred *en route*. After passing through the Dasht-i-be-daulat, Major Sandeman sent me on in advance to select a site for the civil camp. I well remember dismounting on the top of a small hillock on the Seriab Road and having a good look round. I selected a plot close to an orchard about half a mile from the Quetta fort—in fact, the piece of ground which is now the Residency garden—and there we pitched the civil camp.

The Government of India had sanctioned the building of a Residency for the Agent Governor-General, also houses for the First Assistant and the medical officer, and temporary shelter for the troops. The services of two young officers of the Royal Engineers, Lieutenant Hewson and Lieutenant Kunhardt, were placed at the disposal of the Agent Governor-General to aid in the carrying out of these works. I was busily engaged in entertaining and organising the new tribal levies, and in erecting fortified



QUETTA TOWN AND MURDAR MOUNTAIN

AVENUE LEADING FROM QUETTA FORT TO RESIDENCY

posts for them in the Bolan Pass. The tribes more immediately connected with the Bolan, and with whom arrangements for its protection had to be made, were the Raisanis, Kurds, Satakzais, Mengals, Kuchaks, Pughs, Jalambanis, Chotais and Lehris (Brahoes), Dumars (Kakars), and the Mazarani Marris (Beluches). I also, with Major Sandeman's permission, commenced to build my own house, as I was most anxious to have some accommodation ready for my wife and family before the severe winter should set in. I always enjoyed building houses and other public works, as I had had a good deal of experience in that way in the Punjab. Further, I planned and laid out the central principal streets of the present town of Quetta, and the main roads connecting the Residency with the fort and town. One of these was named the Sandeman Road, and another the Bruce Road. The accompanying illustrations show the town and the road between the fort and the Residency as it now is. When I laid it out there was not a single tree on it.

I had besides multifarious duties to perform in connection with our political relations with the tribes, but the work was most congenial to me, as I had made tribal management my special study.

Hewson and Kunhardt were employed in constructing the new Residency and in putting up shelter for the troops. Everything progressed very smoothly for a time, but we were not destined to remain long undisturbed. Relations between the British Government and the Amir of Kabul became strained, and he and his agents commenced intriguing with the Khan, and rousing up discontent among the Kakar and other Pathan tribes living in the neighbourhood of Quetta, inciting them to commit offences against Government. The worst offenders were the Amir's subjects, the Atchakzais (Kakars), as audacious and expert thieves as any I have ever come across on the frontier.

They committed many daring offences, carrying off arms and accoutrements, and sniping into the camps at night. Other Pathan tribes, inhabitants of the Quetta valley and surrounding hills, acting in collusion with them, aided and abetted them in their offences, and gave us a very lively time of it. On one occasion a band of thieves attempted to carry off a number of transport camels belonging to the 4th Sikhs which were out grazing near the hills. The grazing guard fired at the thieves, who, finding that they could not secure their prey, hamstrung four of the unfortunate beasts. I found on investigation that the thieves had put up in a village belonging to the Bazais (Kakars), subjects of the Khan of Khelat. I reported this to Major Sandeman, who sent for the Khan's *Naib* (agent). As the *Naib* agreed that the Bazai head man of the village should be held responsible, Major Sandeman sent for his escort, and we started for the village, taking the Khan's *Naib* with us. We arrested the head men, brought them back prisoners to Quetta and confined them in the jail there.

When the Quetta Agency was established it was ordered by the Government of India that the Agent Governor-General should always have at his disposal a strong military escort, the strength fixed being two hundred infantry, a troop of cavalry, and two mountain guns. This proved of the utmost value. It gave him the power necessary for the prompt settlement of cases such as the one mentioned, which might otherwise have drawn the Government into punitive military measures entailing heavy expenditure. It consequently added to his prestige among the tribes, and contributed materially to the success of his administration.

The Khan of Khelat himself unfortunately at this time gave way to the evil influences that were being brought to bear on him, and it was known that he was carrying on a secret correspondence with the Amir. He doubtless, after

the manner of Orientals, thought that in our difficulty with the Amir he might find his opportunity to prosecute his old feuds against some of the Sirdars, but, finding that this would not be tolerated without full inquiry, he became obdurate, refused to take the annual subsidy, and adopted a generally impracticable and sulky attitude. Instead of coming to Khelat, as was customary in the hot weather, he remained down at Gundava, in the Katchi plain.

Major Sandeman, believing that in a personal interview he might succeed in bringing the Khan to a more reasonable frame of mind, took with him his personal escort and marched to Gundava. While he was at Gundava a very unfortunate affair took place at Quetta. Lieutenant Hewson was murdered and Lieutenant Kunhardt wounded by a party of Bazais (Kakars). They were on the works of the new Residency getting some heaps of stones measured up to pay contractors, when three Bazais, wearing their long cloaks, like ulsters, came up behind them unnoticed among the coolies and others. Each of them was armed with a drawn sword in one hand and a knife in the other, which they had concealed under their cloaks. On getting behind the officers they slipped off their cloaks, and one of them stabbed Hewson in the back, who fell and died immediately. Another attempted to stab Kunhardt in the back, but for some reason missed his aim and struck him on the top of the shoulder-blade, where the knife glanced off, inflicting only a slight wound. He stabbed again and struck him on the other shoulder, with a similar result. He then raised his sword to strike, but Kunhardt, turning round, saw him in the act, and struck him a blow in the face with his fist, and knocked him back and made his escape. A third man inflicted some sword cuts on Hewson as he lay on the ground, and a fourth joined in the attack by throwing stones. After committing the crime they tried to make

their escape, but a Sikh sepoy who was returning from the bazaar with a small axe in his hand valiantly stood before them and attempted to stop them. The poor fellow was himself cut down and killed, but he delayed the assassins and probably prevented their getting off. The place where the crime was committed was close to the 4th Sikhs lines, and Captain Scott had just dismissed his parade and was walking through the lines with his Afridi orderly when he heard a native call out that the Sahibs were being killed. He rushed immediately towards the spot, and as he was running he gave his parade sword to his orderly and took from him his rifle and fixed the bayonet on it. The assassins, seeing Captain Scott coming up, went for him, but luckily they came one after the other. He ran the first man that came up through the body with the bayonet, and the second in the same manner, and they both fell mortally wounded, never to rise again; but before he had time to be quite ready and on his guard again, the third, who was a large, powerful man, was upon him, and made a fierce cut at his head with his sword. Captain Scott had just time to hold up his rifle in both hands and partially ward off the blow, but it cut through his helmet and puggree and inflicted a slight wound on his forehead. He then dropped the rifle, seized the assassin round the body, and they both fell on the ground together. Even on the ground the assassin fought like a fiend, and with his knife he stabbed in the chest the subadar of the 4th Sikhs, who was trying to wrest away his sword. Luckily the knife struck the bone, and the wound was not serious. He was then overpowered, and was almost cut to pieces by the sepoys who had collected. The fourth man, who had thrown stones, was taken prisoner.

Hewson and Kunhardt had been living in the civil camp with me, and we usually went for a walk together in the

afternoon. On the afternoon of the occurrence they called at my tent and said they were going to the Residency works, and asked me if I would accompany them. As I was busy at the time I told them not to wait for me, and said I would follow. After I had finished my work I started to join them, and as I got near the Sikh lines I saw the sepoys with their arms in their hands, looking excited and running towards the Residency works, and, suspecting there must be a row of some kind, I ran on to join them. After crossing the little stream that ran by the lines I met Captain Scott, with his uniform cut and torn and covered with blood, and poor Hewson's body being brought in. Just then there was another alarm. Some Pathan coolies on the works, sympathisers of the assassins, commenced throwing stones at the sepoys. Captain Scott's Afridi orderly shot one of them dead; then Captain [1] Money, with his troop of cavalry, turned up, took a number of them prisoners, and dispersed the crowd.

The Bazai who had been taken prisoner for throwing stones confessed that he had been an accomplice. He said they had first come to my tent with the intention of killing me, as I was the civil officer; but on being warned off by my *chuprassis* [2] they had gone near the Sikh lines, where they sat on a low wall watching Captain Scott drilling his men. That the two sahibs (Hewson and Kunhardt) then came by, and they got up and stalked them and committed the crime. The statement was corroborated by the subadar of the 4th Sikhs, who said he had seen four men sitting on the wall and identified the prisoner as one of them, and also by my *chuprassis*, who said they had warned off some suspicious looking Pathans who were loitering about my tents. He was seen throwing stones and was known to be of the same tribe and village as the assassins. He was tried, and on this

[1] Now General E. A. Money, C.B.

[2] *Chuprassis* are native official messengers.

evidence coupled with his own confession he was convicted and sentenced to transportation for life.

I must now go back a little and explain what led up to this offence. The reader may remember the account I gave of the arrest and imprisonment of the Bazai head men for sheltering and aiding the miscreants who hamstrung the camels belonging to the 4th Sikhs. Also that both the Khan and the Amir were in an unsatisfactory frame of mind, and had encouraged, if not directly instigated, this and other heinous offences which had been committed against the Government. The Quetta fort was at that time occupied by the Khan's *Naib* with a small force of the Khan's infantry and artillery with a couple of guns. This proved a regular thorn in our side, as all the bad characters used to come in there and concoct their schemes, and we could do nothing to prevent it. When we arrived at Quetta I had, with the consent of the *Naib*, rigged up a temporary jail in the fort, and in this jail I had the three Bazai head men confined. Major Sandeman had ordered that they should not be released until the value of the camels, two hundred and seventy-five rupees, had been paid. The Khan's *Naib* could easily have got the case settled if he had wished to do so, as the men in custody were the Khan's subjects; but as the Khan was in a sulky impracticable mood his *Naib* would not stir in the matter, but purposely left the case an open sore, consequently the four men belonging to the same tribe and village as the prisoners came in and committed the offence.

After the crowd had been dispersed by the cavalry I received reports that a number of Pathans had taken refuge in the fort, and I determined to telegraph to the Government of India and say that I proposed to take possession of it unless they forbade me. As I was sitting in the telegraph office tent writing my telegram the native



QUETTA FORT, 1876



Photo, Bremner, Quetta

QUETTA FORT, 1900

police officer in charge of the jail galloped up to the tent and reported that the Pathans in the fort were collecting to rescue the prisoners from the jail. On hearing this, having given details of what had occurred, I concluded my telegram to the Government of India by informing them that I had on my own responsibility requested Major Charles, commanding at Quetta, to take possession of the fort. Major Charles, who was with me in the tent and concurred with me as to the necessity for the step, went off to carry it into execution. Meantime I called up some of the Brahoe Sirdars who were present with some fifty or sixty of their mounted followers, and directed them to gallop down and hold the gate of the fort until Major Charles arrived. I warned them not to fight with the Khan's people or shed any blood if they could possibly avoid it, but to do everything quietly. This they did, and in less than half an hour Major Charles with a couple of companies of infantry marched in and occupied the fort, which has since then been in the possession of the British Government. At the time of the occupation of Quetta Colonel Colley had written to Lord Lytton about the fort: 'I think it might be worth while negotiating with the Khan for its purchase or occupation.' The accompanying illustrations show the fort as it was in 1876, when I occupied it, and as it is now. I immediately sent an express messenger to Gundava to Major Sandeman informing him of all that had occurred, and he hurried back to Quetta with all speed. He fully approved of the measures I had taken, for which I received the 'high commendation' of the Government of India, as well as the acknowledgments of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. Captain Scott received from Her Majesty the Victoria Cross for his conspicuous gallantry on this occasion.

Early in October 1877 I obtained a few days' leave

and started to meet my wife and family at Amritsar, on their way down from Dharmsala. I struck away from the Bolan Pass at Bibinani, and marched to Sangan, and from thence to Badra, Quat-Mundai, Mahmand, Kahan (the head-quarters of the Marri tribe), and thence through the Shum plain to Hurrund, in the Dera Ghazi Khan district. I took with me a few of the Marri and Bugti head men as escort, but no troops, and I had the distinction of being the first European who ever visited Sangan, Badra, and Mahmand.

The Marri Tumandar,[1] Sirdar Mehrulla Khan, met me at Badra, and accompanied me through the Marri country. I was well received everywhere, and had not a single *contretemps* on my march. I believe my visit to Badra and Quat-Mundai has been celebrated in Marri song. The Bard foretold that my coming foreshadowed the taking of *batai* (land revenue) from the tribe. I found my wife and family at Amritsar, and we all returned together to Quetta. My wife was the first lady who had been to Quetta since the Kabul war in 1839–40, and for nearly three years she was the only lady there. The building of my house had not been sufficiently advanced for us to occupy any part of it, so that we were obliged to live in tents the greater part of that winter, which was an exceptionally severe one. The cold was something awful. In the mornings we had the greatest difficulty in lifting the tent purdahs, as they were hard as a rock from the snow and severe frosts. House building at Quetta in those days was no easy matter, and I had to get the woodwork made up at Mithunkote on the Indus, and brought up to Quetta on camels. By the end of February I managed to have a couple of rooms sufficiently ready for us to occupy, but unluckily the night we got in it poured rain, the roof leaked like a sieve, so that we had to

[1] The leading chiefs of Beluch and some Pathan tribes are called Tumandars.



Photo Bremner, Quetta

QUETTA RESIDENCY

put up umbrellas over the beds, as we could not get a dry spot. In the spring I had the house finished, the first to be built at Quetta, and a very delightful and comfortable house it was. I may mention here that subsequently, when I was appointed Political Agent of Thal-Choteali, it was turned into the Residency by Sir Robert Sandeman, since when it has been subject to many alterations, and is, I believe, now a very fine building. The works of the new Residency, which had been commenced by Hewson and Kunhardt, were condemned by Colonel Browne,[1] and it was never built. Colonel Browne, R.E., had been appointed to the charge of the Public Works Department at Quetta. He was also entrusted by Lord Lytton on a secret mission with the object of opening the Thal-Choteali trade route. It will be seen in the course of this narrative that it took some years of laborious tribal work to bring about the successful accomplishment of this important project.

Shortly after Hewson's murder some other *Ghazi*[2] cases occurred at Quetta, but fortunately not one of the Ghazis ever escaped, though they generally managed to do some damage before they were captured or killed. I received a letter from the Malik of the village of Kuchlak, Sultan Mahomed (Kakar), informing me that three men had left his village with the avowed intention of doing *Ghaza*. He gave their names and description, and warned me to be on the look out for them. I wrote at once and informed the officer commanding at Quetta, and recommended that the officers should carry their pistols and the soldiers their side arms. This was done for several days. Still there was no sign of the Ghazis, but I knew they had not returned to their village. At daybreak on the tenth day after I got the

[1] The late Sir James Browne, K.C.B., Chief Commissioner and Agent Governor-General, Beluchistan.

[2] A Mahomedan who fights or kills for the sake of his religion is called a Ghazi.

report, three men came and washed themselves in the stream that runs near the Quetta fort and said their prayers. They were dressed in the long cloaks usually worn by Pathans, and no one took any particular notice of them. They had, however, as in Hewson's case, drawn talwars and knives concealed underneath, and when a number of the sepoys had come out of the fort in the morning unarmed they dropped off their cloaks and ran amok among them. They killed either two or three sepoys, and wounded some others. When the alarm spread a number of the sepoys rushed out of the fort, some armed with rifles and some with swords, and either shot or cut down the three Ghazis, who fought to the death. We heard the shots at my bungalow, and I mounted my horse and galloped down to the fort, and when I arrived the three Ghazis were lying dead on the ground.[1] I sent for Malik Sultan Mahomed, and he identified them as the three men he had warned me about. A curious thing about the case was that the relations of the Ghazis, though one of them was a cousin of his own, never retaliated on Sultan Mahomed, who was, I know, living many years afterwards. In another case a Ghazi attacked a sergeant in the artillery with his knife. The sergeant managed to ward off the blow, but the Ghazi wrestled with him and threw him on the ground, and would no doubt have killed him, only that a public works munshi, who happened to be passing with an axe in his hand, struck the Ghazi on the head with the axe and split open his skull, and he died that night. The sergeant was badly cut about the hands. He had on a revolver, but it was under his *posteen* (coat of skin) and he could not get at it. The munshi was so frightened at what he had done that I could hardly induce him to remain at Quetta until I

[1] A very good painting of this scene was done, I think, by Captain Giles, and was afterwards exhibited in London.

got him a reward. As soon as I paid him the reward which was sanctioned by Government, he disappeared, and was never again seen at Quetta. A few days afterwards a Ghazi murdered a camp follower in the infantry lines. He was taken red-handed, and that same afternoon, with the sanction of the Government of India, which I obtained by telegram, I had him hanged over the spot where he had committed the murder.

CHAPTER V

AFGHAN WAR 1878 TO 1881

ALTHOUGH the Khan of Khelat had to a certain extent been led away by evil counsel, no doubt mainly due to the pressure brought to bear from Kabul, and had become sulky, still he was careful not to commit himself with Government. He was just, after the manner of Orientals, trying it on. Shortly after the events related in the last chapter Major Sandeman paid his Highness another visit at Khelat, and, having made clear to him the gravity of the situation between the Government and the Amir, he soon convinced him of the danger of playing fast and loose at such a crisis; and that his safety and interests lay in showing undivided allegiance to the British Government. The result was that his Highness assumed a much more satisfactory attitude.

Throughout the whole of this trying period the Beluch and Brahoe Sirdars behaved most loyally, and rendered excellent service to Government. The levy services had been organised, posts established in the Bolan Pass, and the protection of the entire trading route from Quetta through the Bolan to Jacobabad so fully secured that *kafilas* (trading convoys), merchants, Government officials, and even single travellers used to pass along it night and day in perfect safety. But while the Marris and Bugtis adhered most faithfully to engagements with us, co-operating in all arrangements for the protection of the Punjab, Sind, and Katchi Borders, they continued to prosecute their inroads against their neighbours the Barozais of Sibi and Sangan,

the Kakars, Musakhels, and Khetrans, with more aggressiveness than ever, and laid waste the districts of Sibi, Sangan, Harnai, Thal-Choteali, and Bori, their forays extending even into the centre of Zhob. We received many deputations and messages from the Sirdars and Maliks of Sibi, Sangan, and Harnai, entreating that we should come into their districts and grant them protection, in return for which they said they would willingly become British subjects and pay revenue. The Khetrans were constantly petitioning in the same way to Major Sandeman, and to the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan.

The satisfactory results of the occupation of Quetta were now beginning to bear fruit in all directions, and after Major Sandeman returned from his visit to the Khan at Khelat we had a most peaceful time of it. The Khan's *Naibs*, who generally took their cue from their master, were on their best behaviour, and everything went smoothly. Even the Ghazis ceased to trouble us. They did not, I think, relish the idea of being always shot, cut up, or hanged. At any rate, whatever may have been the cause, after the burst of fanaticism which commenced with Hewson's murder there were no more cases of Ghaziism in the Quetta cantonment. Probably their finding that they had no real grievances against us, and that we were not so black as their Mullahs had painted us, had more to do with their ceasing to annoy us than anything else.

In January 1878 Major Sandeman was again summoned to Calcutta on duty, and after his work there was finished he took a short leave to England, and did not return to Quetta until the end of July. I was appointed to officiate as Agent Governor-General for this period, from January 1, 1878, to July 26—nearly seven months. This I thought a great feather in my cap, especially as my chief on his return expressed himself well satisfied with the progress made, and

I had reason to believe the Government were equally well pleased.

Shortly after Major Sandeman's return, on his recommendation, in which he was supported by the Punjab Government, the Government of India sanctioned the establishment of a military post at Vitakri. As matters stood at that time, this was a most excellent move, as Vitakri was a kind of no-man's land lying between the Marris, Bugtis, Khetrans, and Gurchanis, and consequently from its situation to a great extent dominating all four tribes. The Gurchanis were deadly enemies both of the Bugtis and Marris, while the Marris plundered and took blackmail from the Khetrans. The chiefs and leading men of all the tribes had petitioned that this post might be established, as they knew that it would answer the purpose of a *purdah* (screen) to them in keeping the peace which they could hardly otherwise be able of themselves to maintain. They had by this time realised the advantage of their alliance with us, and they knew that it would not be possible for them to fulfil their engagements properly if they were continually fighting among themselves and plundering one another. Mr. Dames, B.C.S., Assistant Commissioner in the Punjab, was appointed in political charge with the force. The *bona fides* of the request of the tribesmen were fully proved by the friendly manner in which the establishment of the post was received. It was never assailed or molested in any way, and answered the purpose for which it was intended.

'Bloodless victories,' like those of Major Sandeman, gained through his policy of 'peace and goodwill,' do not gain the acclamations of the multitude nor the recognition of the powers that be as readily as those won at the point of the sword, even though the results of the former may be far more permanent and valuable. Thus it is, I believe, that

few ever realised the inestimable value it proved to the British Government that Beluchistan affairs had, through Major Sandeman's indefatigable exertions, been placed on such a thoroughly sound and peaceful footing before the troublous times of 1878-1880. The clouds which foreshadowed the Afghan war and had for a good while loomed in the horizon were now gathering densely overhead. The Amir had made no secret of his hostile intentions, but had, throughout his dominions, including Kandahar and Peshin, proclaimed a *jehad* (holy war) against us. This had a disturbing effect on the minds of many of the tribesmen residing along the Afghan-Quetta Border land. I learned from the Brahoes that some emissaries sent by his Highness had come secretly to the village of Huramzai, about fourteen miles from Quetta, and were stirring up mischief there. Huramzai is in Khelat territory, but is situated immediately on the Peshin boundary, and belongs to an influential community of Syuds who traded with Kabul, and had at that time a contract with Kabul to supply horses for the Amir's cavalry. I informed Major Sandeman of this news, and we settled to go out quietly and look the place up. Accordingly next morning after breakfast we started for Huramzai, taking with us the Khan's *Naib*, some of the Brahoe Sirdars, and a small party of tribal levies. Colonel Browne also accompanied us. The village is situated on a raised promontory formed by the junction of the beds of two hill torrents, and surrounded by an absolute network of ravines. Our guide led us down one of these ravines into the bed of the torrent, crossing which we entered the village, which appeared to be a large place, and was full of horses. On proceeding further we came to an open space where there was a *chauk* (guest room) and a small mosque, and a number of men were standing about. When they saw us approach, one of the men, who we after-

wards ascertained was a Malik, got on the roof of the mosque and drew his sword, and called out to the people to kill the *kaffirs* (infidels). This excited the people, and a crowd collected, and the position looked a very nasty one, especially as most of our escort, not anticipating any trouble, had tailed away behind, and we found ourselves with only about half a dozen men. Seeing what a fix we were in we thought discretion the better part of valour, and decided to beat a retreat. As it would have looked bad to turn back again by the way we had come, we pushed straight on, and as good luck would have it struck a narrow pathway leading down into the bed of the main torrent, and so got clear of the village. We rode back to Quetta, and Major Sandeman went at once to the officer commanding, Colonel Morgan, told him what had occurred, and requested him to furnish him with a strong escort, as it was necessary to make an example of the village. Colonel Morgan concurred, and gave orders for an escort immediately to be got ready, consisting of a regiment of infantry, a troop of cavalry, and two mountain guns. After completing these arrangements and having a hurried dinner, we started again for Huramzai, timing our march so as to reach the village before daybreak. We arrived in good time, and Major Keen,[1] who commanded the escort, posted the guns on an elevated ridge which commanded the village, and disposed the infantry and cavalry so as completely to surround it. When day had broken, and the first call to prayers was heard in the village, Major Sandeman sent in a messenger to summon the head men. After a short delay they appeared, and they certainly did look astonished to find their village surrounded, with the guns in position right over it. Major Sandeman demanded that they should immediately surrender the Malik who had tried to incite

[1] Now General Sir F. S. Keen, K.C.B.

the people to attack us, and also make over all the horses that were in the village. After some demur, and making many excuses, seeing the hopelessness of making any resistance, they surrendered the Malik as a prisoner, who was handcuffed, and delivered up some three hundred horses. These we took back with us to Quetta, and lodged the Malik in the jail there. We arrived in Quetta about eleven o'clock after forty-eight hours' hard work, mostly spent in the saddle, during which we covered nearly sixty miles. This case had the best effect in Peshin and along the Border. The horses were returned to the owners on their giving security for their future good behaviour. After remaining some time in jail we also released the Malik on security, and subsequently the Huramzai Syuds turned out to be among our best friends, and often rendered good service to the British Government.

Important events now began to march rapidly. A detailed history of these would be quite beyond the scope of this memoir, though a brief *résumé* of them is necessary to make my narrative clear. It became known in June that the Amir had consented to receive a Russian mission at Kabul. He still maintained a sullen and hostile attitude towards our Government, and would vouchsafe no reply to friendly communications addressed to him. On the other hand the Russian mission, under General Stolietoff, arrived at Kabul in July, and was accorded a markedly warm reception by the Amir. On this his Excellency the Viceroy intimated to his Highness by letter dated August 14 his intention of sending a British Mission to Kabul, to which he said he expected his Highness would grant a friendly and honourable reception. In accordance with this intimation, on September 21 the mission, under General Sir Neville Chamberlain, marched from Peshawar, but the Amir's Commandant at Ali Musjid, Faiz Mahomed, insolently refused to allow it

to proceed through the Khyber Pass. The mission had therefore to be withdrawn and broken up. Orders were thereupon issued by the Government of India for arrangements to be made for the mobilisation of three columns, one to be prepared to proceed from Peshawar through the Khyber, one to Kuram, and the third, *viâ* Quetta, to Kandahar. The Government of India further directed that Major Cavagnari [1] should take such measures as might be practicable for detaching the Khyber tribes from the Amir.

Similar orders were issued by Government to Major Sandeman in regard to the tribes on the Quetta-Afghan Border. Instructions were at the same time received for the collection of large quantities of supplies at Quetta, and along the Bolan Pass route. It was arranged simultaneously that Major General Biddulph [2] should push on with a portion of the Kandahar Field Force, numbering six thousand four hundred men and sixteen guns, to strengthen the Quetta garrison.

Meantime it had been decided by the Home Government that one chance more should be afforded the Amir of extricating himself from the dangerous position in which he had placed himself, and by the direction of her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, on October 30, 1878, an ultimatum was sent to his Highness from the Viceroy intimating that, unless he tendered an apology for the conduct of his officers in the Khyber and consented to receive a permanent British mission at Kabul, and sent an immediate reply accepting these conditions, he would be considered the enemy of the British Government. As his Highness vouchsafed no reply to this communication on November 21, the day fixed, all three columns advanced. On November 22 Sir Sam Browne, after a brisk fight,

[1] Afterwards Sir Louis Cavagnari, murdered at Kabul, September 3, 1879.

[2] Now General Sir Michael Biddulph, G.C.B., Groom in Waiting to the Queen and Gentleman Usher of Black Rod.

captured Ali Musjid and cleared the Khyber; and on December 2 Major-General Roberts[1] fought and won his grand victory, and took the Peiwar Pass. The great distances that had to be traversed necessarily rendered the operations on the Quetta side much more protracted. Major Sandeman entrusted to me the duty of laying in supplies for the army from Dadur, in Katchi, through the Bolan Pass to the Peshin boundary. The chief articles to be arranged for were forage, flour, and firewood. At that time there was no commissariat officer at Quetta, and I had no estimates to guide me. After taking all means available to estimate roughly what the requirements would be, I laid in some thousands of maunds of forage and firewood and large quantities of flour at every stage, for which I received cash advances from Government amounting to forty thousand rupees. I was besides responsible for all arrangements connected with the tribal levies and the safe guarding of the route, so that my hands were pretty full.

Early in November General Biddulph's column arrived at Quetta. The cold was something intense, and neither soldiers, camp followers, nor transport animals were sufficiently clad. Two *kafilas* (trading convoys) luckily arrived at this time from Kandahar with a large number of *posteens*, of which, with Major Sandeman's sanction, I purchased some fifteen hundred. From these I supplied as many as were required by the 70th Regiment, which was the worst off for warm clothing, besides providing for many of the officers and a sufficient number for the native soldiers who had to do sentry duty at night. After halting for a few days at Quetta, General Biddulph marched for Peshin. Major Sandeman accompanied the force, and I also went with him. Although commissariat officers did arrive with

[1] Now Field-Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., commanding the forces in South Africa.

the General, they had not had time to start work properly, and I continued in charge of the supply arrangements along the route.

The Sirdars and Maliks of Peshin come out in a body and met the General at the boundary, expressed the most friendly sentiments, and placed the resources of the country at his disposal. Thus was Peshin occupied without firing a shot, and comparatively little trouble was experienced in procuring all the supplies required for the forces. But an unpleasant surprise awaited me. Shortly after we reached Peshin Sir Donald[1] Stewart, with the main body of the Kandahar Field Force, arrived at Dadur, and I received reports from my supply agents in the Bolan to say that General Biddulph's column had eaten up all the forage in the pass. I rode back post haste into Quetta and telegraphed to the Quartermaster-General, Colonel Chapman,[2] informing him of this, and suggesting that he should make arrangements at Dadur for the forage they would require in the pass. General Stewart was naturally annoyed when he received the report, and on arriving at Siriab he sent Colonel Chapman on ahead into Quetta to ascertain the cause. I explained that I had received no estimates of the quantity of forage that would be required for the army, which I had to arrive at as best I could, that I had stored very large quantities in the pass, but that it had all been appropriated by General Biddulph's column. He seemed quite satisfied as far as I was concerned, and returned to give the information to the General. Next morning I rode out to meet the General marching into Quetta. I found his wrath was still only half appeased, and he asked me in no gentle tones if I had expected that the animals of his force could eat the stones in the Bolan. I saw that at such a

[1] Late Field-Marshal Sir Donald Stewart, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E.

[2] Now General E. F. Chapman, C.B., R.A., Commanding Scottish District.

time the least said might be soonest mended, so I held my peace. Afterwards, when he became acquainted with the extent of the arrangements I had made, and that Quetta and the stages on to Peshin were fully stocked, he was quite satisfied. But I believe he subsequently had the officers commanding and the commissariat officers up, and censured them for not submitting proper indents. I know Sir Donald, when he liked, could make it uncommonly hot for people. At all events some of the commissariat and transport officers, after their interview with him, appeared sadder, though no doubt wiser, men. General Biddulph halted at Peshin to await General Stewart's arrival, and employed the time in obtaining a correct knowledge of the country, its communications and resources. Major Sandeman with a tribal escort made a successful reconnaissance of the Khojak Pass, and found that it was not occupied or defended. By the end of December the whole of the Kandahar Field Force was concentrated in Peshin. On January 1, 1879, a general advance was made. They had a slight skirmish with some of the Amir's cavalry at Takht-i-pul, in which Major Luck,[1] of the 15th Hussars, was wounded. With the exception of this small affair the force met with no opposition, and on January 8 Kandahar was occupied.

Under the orders of the Government of India directing that the tribes should be detached from the Amir we were allowed a free hand in negotiating with them. Captain Wylie was appointed political officer in Peshin, while Sibi was added to my political charge. Small military posts were established at Goranari, Sunree, Shahpur, and Lehri, in Katchi; and at Mall, and Sibi. We also engaged a certain number of levies from among the tribes residing along the Sibi-Katchi Border, Bugtis, Kyheris, Domkis, Barozais,

[1] Now Major-General Sir G. Luck, K.C.B., Inspector-General of Cavalry, Great Britain and Ireland.

Khajaks, and Marris, to work in co-operation with the military for the protection of the Border. There were great rejoicings among the inhabitants of Sibi and Katchi at these arrangements, which delivered them permanently out of the clutches of their fierce enemies the Marris and Bugtis. I would wish just to mention here, but will allude to it more fully later on, that after the war was over and everything had settled down quietly, it was found practicable to substitute local tribal levies instead of military in all these posts. Additional service allowances were also granted to the Brahoes for the protection of the Bolan, and right well and loyally they earned them, as night and day there was a continuous stream of convoys, soldiers, officials, traders, camp-followers, transport animals—in fact, all sorts and conditions of men and animals—pouring through the pass in as great safety as if they were traversing one of our long established districts of India.

During this month Sir Richard Temple, K.C.S.I., Governor of Bombay, paid an official visit to Quetta. I was deputed to accompany his Excellency through the Bolan Pass on his return journey. He expressed himself as greatly pleased with the political methods on which we worked the tribes, especially in regard to the protective arrangements in the pass, and on arriving at Dadur he sent the following telegram to the Viceroy, of which he presented me with a copy as being in executive charge of the pass:

On leaving Dadur I beg to submit to your Lordship my testimony to success and ability of Transport Department. A force numbering—combatant and non-combatant—thirty thousand souls transported in two months, with about thirty-five thousand camels at inclement season from Indus to Kandahar; thirty-five marches, of which twenty marches in barren and mountainous country with two ranges upwards six thousand feet high, of which again ten marches through enemy's country. Colonel Tucker, Superintendent of Transport Department, and his officers deserve utmost credit for

their exertions in effectually meeting requirements of the service. Also the manner in which millions worth of public property protected through the Bolan Pass, sixty miles long, without any theft, robbery, or accident, reflects great credit on Khan of Khelat, and his chiefs, and on political officers.

I also, under Major Sandeman's directions, opened up relations with the Dumars, Panizais, and Sarangzais (Kakars), the Tarins of Harnai valley and Thal-Choteali, and the Barozais and Pannis of Sangan. The constantly reiterated cry of the Tarins, Barozais, and Pannis was that we should come in and occupy their country, and secure them protection for their lives and property from their implacable enemies the Marris and Bugtis, saying that they in their turn would willingly become the faithful and loyal subjects of the British Government, would pay land revenue and taxes, and undertake all other obligations necessary to that end. Thus the results of our tribal negotiations appeared most promising in all directions, and though the time was not yet ripe for us to intervene in the thorough and practical way in which they desired it, still we were able to accomplish much by friendly arbitration with the consent of the parties, and so pave the way for future progress towards the civilisation of the tribes and the opening up of the country. In all our dealing with the Kakars the foremost object we held in view was the opening of the Thal-Choteali and Harnai routes. The former had for long been a pet scheme of Major Sandeman's, and in his efforts for its accomplishment he was fortunate in having gained the approval of the Viceroy. We saw that it was essential to our being able to carry it through successfully that we should first come to an understanding with the entire Kakar tribe. Many of the minor Maliks gave unmistakable proofs of their desire for more intimate relations with us, but the leading Sirdar of Zhob, Shah Jehan, who had great influence

over them all, was hostile and held aloof. He was considered to be a very saintly man, possessed of supernatural powers, and was entirely in with the priestly faction. He was besides believed to be a good deal under the influence of Kabul. This constituted a very formidable obstacle, which, as will be seen hereafter, was not got over without much difficulty.

As everything had settled down quietly and peacefully under General Stewart at Kandahar, and there appeared to be no prospect of further resistance or trouble in that quarter, the Government of India determined to withdraw a portion of the Kandahar Field Force. The garrison of Kandahar was accordingly fixed at six thousand men, and it was ordered that General Biddulph should return to India with the remainder of the force. It was further arranged, on Major Sandeman's recommendation, that the General should march by the new route *viâ* Thal-Choteali to the Punjab. Major Sandeman accompanied the force himself, and in order to afford him every facility for dealing with the Kakars he was furnished with a strong escort,[1] and made a détour through the Baghao valley. Here he was opposed by a strong Kakar *lashkar* (force) led by Sirdar Shahjehan of Zhob. After a brisk fight the Kakars were completely defeated.

After this the force met with no further opposition. General Biddulph marched through the Bori and Chemalang valleys, and Major Sandeman through Thal-Choteali to Barkhan, where he joined the main body, and all returned *viâ* Fort Munro to the Punjab after a very successful march, in which an immense amount of useful information about the country and tribes was collected.

[1] The escort, which was commanded by Major F. S. Keen (now General Sir F. S. Keen, K.C.B.), consisted of four hundred men 1st Punjab Infantry, one squadron 8th Bengal Cavalry, one squadron Sind Horse, and four mountain guns.

Meantime events of importance had been taking place in Northern Afghanistan. The Amir, Sher Ali Khan, on hearing of the defeat of his troops in the Khyber and on the Peiwar Kotal, had fled to Turkistan. Before his departure he released his son Yakub Khan, who had been in prison, and who thus became Amir. On February 21 Sher Ali Khan died at Mazar-i-Sharif. After his death the Government of India, through Major Cavagnari, entered into communications with Yakub Khan with a view of bringing about a peaceful settlement, which after lengthened negotiations culminated in the ill-starred treaty of Gandamak, which was signed by Yakub Khan on May 26, 1879. This was the termination of the first phase of the war. Among other conditions in this treaty was one—Article 6—under which it was provided that the districts of Sibi, Peshin, and Kurram were ceded to the British Government.

In the month of June that terrible scourge, cholera, broke out in Quetta. The epidemic spread among the native troops. A sepoy sentry was seized with the disease while doing duty on our house, and fell down in the verandah. My wife saw him fall and being carried away, which gave her a great shock, and the next day, June 23, she was herself attacked. In a few hours she was in the collapse stage. The doctors gave up all hope of her, and everyone believed that she was dying. But somehow she struggled through the crisis, and we hoped she was about to make a good recovery. Her troubles were not, however, so soon to be ended, as after some days she got inflammation of the brain, and ulceration of the cornea of both eyes supervened. She was again given over by the doctors, but again rallied. Other very serious complications set in, which confined her to her bed for three months, and the doctors said that her wonderful constitution saved her. During

this trying period nothing could exceed Major Sandeman's kindness. Immediately on my wife being attacked he took our four children to live in his house, and within twenty-four hours of his doing so three of his own servants—khidmatgar, beestie, and syce—died of cholera. The terrible strain and anxiety, added to the unavoidably heavy work there was in Quetta during the war, told on me, and in September I got completely knocked over. I became very ill and delirious, and was pronounced to have enteric fever. My wife was just able to stagger out of bed to try to help to nurse and tend me, although she was herself only able to crawl about with the aid of two sticks. As I continued dangerously ill, we were both ordered home to England as soon as the weather should become cool enough for us to undertake the journey. In October a convoy of some hundreds of sick soldiers from Kandahar and Quetta was being sent to India under the charge of Dr. Finden, who kindly agreed to take us if it was found that I could stand the journey. We started from Quetta in doolies, Dr. Fullerton, the Residency Surgeon, accompanying us as far as the Dasht plain; and as the change seemed to benefit me, Dr. Finden agreed to take us on. Two soldiers of the 60th Rifles, hospital assistants, were told off to take care of me. One of them was himself taken very ill next day, but the other, a man of the name of Callender, remained with me until we arrived at Jacobabad, and never have I experienced more faithful kindness at any man's hands. We were nearly a month in doolies between Quetta and Jacobabad, and never by night or day did Callender appear to be absent. It seemed as if he never slept, as he was always ready to answer a call, and eager to perform any service for my wife and children as well as for myself. He was simply invaluable, and what we would have done without him on that trying march I do not know. What a different journey it is now, when you can

get into your comfortable railway carriage at Quetta and arrive the same day at Jacobabad.

It was while we were in the Bolan that I first heard the sad news of the tragical massacre of Sir L. Cavagnari and his three companions and escort at Kabul, on September 3, 1879, and of Sir Frederick Roberts's adventurous march from Kurram over the Shutergardan Pass and occupation of Kabul on October 8, the most striking achievment in all his brilliant career.

Or arriving at Karachi I had rather a bad relapse, which delayed us there about ten days; but at length we did get on board ship, and from the day we embarked I began really to mend, though very gradually.

But I must return to the current of events at Quetta, before I was taken ill. In May 1879 I received the special acknowledgments of the Government of India in both the Military and Foreign Departments for my work in connection with the supplying of the army. In July the list of honours for frontier and war services was published in the Gazette. In it Major Sandeman[1] was made a K.C.S.I. I did feel very much disheartened at receiving no reward, notwithstanding that I had been Sir Robert Sandeman's right-hand man during the most critical and trying as well as most important years of his career, from 1866 to 1873, which led to the occupation of Quetta, and again from the time of its permanent occupation. The Government of India had, moreover, in sanctioning my furlough, recorded of my services as follows: 'I am at the same time to request you to convey the acknowledgments of the Governor-General in Council to Mr. Bruce for the excellent services rendered by him in Beluchistan, which are fully appreciated.' I had besides been mentioned twice in despatches, both by Sir

[1] In the same Gazette Generals Stewart, Roberts, and Biddulph were made K.C.B.s.

Donald Stewart and by Sir Michael Biddulph, and had received the most cordial acknowledgments from the latter officer. In one letter he wrote me: 'Let me say that had it not been for your exertions and Sandeman's forethought we should never have moved out of Quetta. . . . I hope you will get your C.S.I. as you deserve.' Sir Robert Sandeman told me that he had also recommended me for a C.S.I. As soon as I became convalescent I wrote to Sir Michael telling him how disappointed I had felt at my name not having been included among those who had received honours for frontier services, and asking his support in representing my claims to the powers that be; and I received from him the following reply:

Your letter of February 19 recalls to my memory that I owe you a special recognition for the admirable service rendered by you in October and November 1878, to myself, to my officers, and to the troops of the Field Force under my command. In those days, when there was such a striving and purpose to pass on troops, and to feed men and animals in Quetta and in Peshin, you were ever helpful and full of resources and forethought, and it was due to these high qualifications, and your energetic action, that the troops were provided with food and passed on rapidly to the front at critical moments.

I had not the good fortune to meet you again on my return march, but I mentioned you in my despatches to Sir Donald Stewart, and I trust that my recognition of your services was duly conveyed to you.

I consider that you are fairly entitled to such rewards as are appropriate for your services, which were all important at Quetta, which was entirely under your direction and control.

And again he wrote:

I can say that I fully recognise your energy, ability, and devotion. I think that to your exertions, under the orders of Major Sandeman, we owe it that we were able to make the movements we did without disaster.

There was no Commissariat, and you acted therefore in a military capacity.

In addition to duties of supply, there was that of all the multifarious work connected with communications and dealing with chiefs and tribes during a time of great pressure, and often for long seasons acting on your own responsibility.

Sir Charles Aitchison, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, had taken a kind interest in my frontier career; and when Foreign Secretary to the Government of India had assisted me in obtaining my Assistant Commissionership; so I sent him the letter quoted last above from Sir Michael, and asked for his support. Sir Charles sent the letter on to Mr. Lyall,[1] the Foreign Secretary, who told him in reply that my name had been put down for a decoration, adding 'he worked very hard, though General Biddulph's testimony that Mr. Bruce saved him, under Sandeman's orders, from disaster puts the case very strongly indeed.' I am content to leave the question in the light of General Biddulph's letters quoted above.

Mr. Lyall did not mention what honour I had been recommended for, and I knew nothing more about it until I received, when at home in Ireland, on March 28, 1881, a command to attend at Windsor Castle to receive at the hands of her Majesty the Insignia of the Order of the Indian Empire. At the investiture I met a good many of my frontier friends and acquaintances, who had also been summoned to receive decorations, among them Captain Henry Wylie, one of my brother politicals at Quetta, who was made a C.S.I., and Mr. Pitman, Superintendent of Telegraphs, Quetta, who was made a C.I.E.

[1] Now Sir Alfred Lyall, K.C.B., G.C.I.E., Council of Government of India.

CHAPTER VI

TRIBAL DISTURBANCES. QUESTION OF RETENTION OF PESHIN AND SIBI, 1881–1882

I MUST here give a brief account of the more important events which occurred in Beluchistan during the time I was on leave. The massacre of the unfortunate Cavagnari and his companions, and the general condition of affairs which supervened in Afghanistan on that deplorable event, had a most disturbing effect on the minds of some of the Pathan tribes in the neighbourhood of Quetta and Harnai; particularly on certain sections of the Kakars, who were under the influence of Sirdar Shahjehan of Zhob. Shahjehan was the acknowledged leader of all the disaffected factions, and the minor Maliks who gave most trouble were Faiz Mahomed (Faizu), chief of the Panizais, and Bhai Khan, chief of the Sarangzais. Up to the time I left for home I had been in charge of all the tribal levies, but the Government of India then sanctioned a separate officer to look after them, and Captain Showers, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, was appointed to the post. He had been to Harnai, and was on his way to Quetta to take charge of the levies when he determined to go by a new route which leaves the Harnai valley opposite Dargai and crosses the Uzhda-psha Pass and a spur of the Zarghun mountains into the Hanna valley, and so on to Quetta. This route had never before been traversed by a European, and as it raised the *purdah* (screen) of both the Panizais and the Dumars,

Faizu, the Panizai chief, secretly helped by the Dumars, determined to oppose his going. Hakim Khan, one of the minor Panizai maliks, who was in our service and who was with Showers, told him that the road was held and warned him not to go that way; but Showers, who was always adventurous to rashness, would not listen to him. Hakim Khan then begged Showers to give him a letter saying that he had warned him of his danger, which Showers did, and then started on his journey. When he got about half-way to the top of the Uzhda-psha Pass he was fired on by a party of Pathans, who were concealed behind a large vertical rock overhanging the pathway. Showers himself fell dead into the ravine. He had a few Beluch guides with him, some of whom were killed and others fled. His camp things, which were being carried on mules, were also looted or broken up. I have many a time since passed the spot and seen the broken plates and dishes lying about, and probably some may be found there to the present day. He was a fine fellow, and I do not believe he knew what fear was. Hakim Khan was afterwards tried as an accomplice to the murder, but was acquitted on his producing the letter he had received from Showers. When Sir Robert Sandeman, who was at Harnai, heard of the outrage he started with his escort for the Chappar mountain, where the Panizais were said to have collected. He at the same time sent a message to Captain Wylie, who was at Katch-Amadun, to come down with any force he could collect from the north. On arriving at the Chappar Rift Sir Robert Sandeman made a reconnaissance on to the mountain, where he found a force of Panizais assembled, and had a skirmish with them at a long distance. Sir Robert Sandeman had himself a narrow escape, as he got a bullet through his helmet. His Sikh orderly, Gurdit Singh, who was standing by his side, was also shot through the shoulder. As it was late in the evening the party withdrew

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from the mountain, but during the night the Panizais, finding they were being hemmed in from both sides, dispersed.

Captain Wylie, with a force of five hundred infantry, had during the night arrived at Manjhi, on the north side of the mountain. As a punishment for their conduct, Sir Robert Sandeman destroyed the towers and fortified villages between Dargai and Katch-Amadun. I received a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman giving me an account of the affair, in which he wrote:

We have punished poor Showers's murderers pretty fairly. Some seven or eight Panizais were killed. The lands belonging to the chief murderers have been confiscated, and on the 21st (July 1880) Henry Wylie starts with two hundred infantry and fifty sabres to collect a sixth of the produce from Katch-Amadun and Kowas. We will get from these three villages Rupees 6,000 to 8,000 yearly. Faizu's lands I have confiscated, and outlawed him. He was not one of the actual murderers. I have placed Rupees 1,000 fine on him. If he pays that sum he may come back. I have proclaimed the actual murderers, offering rewards for their apprehension. Kandahar affairs have given me much trouble.

In September 1879 the railway line from Sukker to Dadur and on to Sibi had been completed, and the Government of India sanctioned its continuance by the Harnai route, through the Narri Gorge and the Chappar Rift, to Quetta. The line was surveyed and laid out, and the work of construction commenced, arrangements being made with the Marris and other tribes through whose limits it passed for its protection. Levy posts had been established at suitable positions along the line, and everything was working smoothly and satisfactorily. It was when matters had reached this stage that I went home on leave, and Mr. O. T. Duke was placed in political charge of the Marri country and Harnai.

The disturbances which had occurred on the northern or Kakar sections of the line at the time of the assassination of Showers did not spread south, and all went on well from Sharigh to Sibi, until the orders were issued for the withdrawal of the troops from Thal-Choteali and Harnai, and the abandonment of the railway line consequent on the deplorable defeat of our troops by Ayub Khan at Maiwand on July 27, 1880. This disaster brought Sirdar Shahjehan of Zhob to the front again, who with Bhai Khan, chief of the Sarangzais, and a *lashkar* of some two thousand Kakars, made an attack on the fortified post of Kach, which was garrisoned by some men of the Bombay native infantry under the command of Major Pierce. The post was situated in the mouth of the narrow gorge where the Kach torrent passes through the mountain range. By great good luck Major Pierce got news of the intended raid the day before it occurred, and posted some of his men on the spurs on either side which commanded the fort. The attack was led by Bhai Khan, Sarangzai, and was a most plucky one. Outside the fort wall, but joined on to it, was an enclosure surrounded by a low fence in which were a number of commissariat and transport animals and their drivers. The Kakars charged right into this enclosure, and killed some twenty of the camp followers and a number of transport bullocks. They tried at the same time to scale the walls of the fort and break in the gate, but all their efforts failed, and they were at length driven off, leaving seventy-three of their number dead on the ground. Most of the execution was done by the sepoys posted on the spurs. Bhai Khan, the leader, was himself severely wounded. Sirdar Shahjehan, though present, did not take part in the fight. It was said that his followers prevented his doing so. This was one of the few occasions in which I have known these tribesmen attack a fortified place within walls. As it was the last

hostile effort on the part of the Panizais and Sarangzais, I may as well relate here how the matter ended so far as they were concerned. After a while Faizu and Bhai Khan both came in and surrendered to Sir Robert Sandeman, and they were imprisoned in Quetta. When they had paid up the fines that were imposed on them and their tribes, they made complete submission, and were released. Faizu died shortly afterwards, and was succeeded in the chieftainship by his son, Ibrahim Khan. Both Bhai Khan and Ibrahim Khan rendered good service to Government until 1887, when they both died of cholera. I have often remarked that the men who had given us most trouble on the frontier were those who afterwards performed the most valuable services.

But a more serious and very regrettable affair occurred at this time on the southern part of the Harnai line, in which some Marri *budmashes* (bad characters) attacked a convoy which was retiring from Harnai to Sibi, and killed two soldiers and several railway and other employés, and carried off treasure amounting to one lakh seventy-three thousand five hundred rupees. This was all the more unfortunate, as for over thirteen years no complications had occurred with the tribe. They had been true to their engagements with us, and with better management, and but for a confusion of orders which occurred on the abandonment of the railway line, it might have been avoided altogether. The outrage was not premeditated, it was confined to two or three hundred *budmashes* who lived in the vicinity, and neither the Tumandar, Mehrulla Khan, who was at Kahan at the time, nor the main body of the tribe had any hand in it. This I know was the opinion of Mr. Fryer[1] and other frontier officers who were in a position to know what occurred, and were well acquainted with the Marris.

[1] Now Sir Frederick Fryer, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of Burma.

In the memorandum before referred to which I wrote in 1884 I gave a description of this affair, and as it gives, I think, a correct account of what actually occurred, and it may be useful that the facts should be known, I shall quote from it here.

When the Maiwand disaster took place, and the orders of Government for the withdrawal of the troops from Thal-Choteali and Harnai and the abandonment of the railway extension works and line were received, Major-General Phayre, in consultation with Sir Robert Sandeman, issued instructions for carrying them out, which were to the effect that Colonel Roome should retire with the Thal-Choteali Field Force to Spintangi. On arrival at Spintangi he was to arrange, in communication with the political officer, Mr. Duke, to move northward by way of Harnai, Sharigh, and Kach, to Peshin, picking up the different detachments of troops *en route* and such Government property as could be conveniently moved, and making over all Government stores that could not be carried to the Maliks of the villages. The officer commanding the 23rd Bombay native light infantry was to act simultaneously and in concert with Colonel Roome, and on Colonel Roome's arrival at Spintangi he was to march down to Sibi, making similar arrangements for Government property lying between Spintangi and Narri Gorge as Colonel Roome was to do from Spintangi northward to Peshin. These orders do not appear to have been carried out, though there may have been some good reason for deviating from them of which I am not aware. At all events, instead of Colonel Roome, who had at his command a strong force convoying the Government property north of Spintangi to Peshin, all such property, including treasure amounting to one lakh seventy-three thousand five hundred rupees, were moved from Sharigh downwards under a weak escort of eighty-two men of the 23rd Bombay Light Infantry

and twenty-five sabres of the Sind Horse. The convoy consisted of one hundred and seventy carts with treasure and stores, fifty sick sepoys, nineteen subordinate clerks belonging to the Transport, Commissariat, and Telegraph Departments, and some two thousand coolies. Colonel Roome with his force did meet the convoy at Spintangi, and it was the very next morning when he continued his march to Peshin, and the convoy marched for Sibi, that the latter were attacked at Kachali. At first the Marris hovered about the rear and robbed some stragglers, and were driven off by Lieutenant Tobin, who commanded the escort. But afterwards more collected, and, attracted by the treasure and seeing the weakness of the escort, as soon as they got into a difficult part of the gorge they made a more determined attack. They charged sword in hand into the middle of the convoy, killed eight of the European subordinates, and a number of coolies. On this the bullock drivers became panic-stricken, and abandoned the carts containing the treasure and stores. When the Marris got these into their hands they desisted from further attack and remained to divide the spoils. Had it been a tribal and pre-arranged affair Mr. Duke could not fail to have received news and warning of it, and he would no doubt have arranged that Colonel Roome should halt at Spintangi, or otherwise provide for the safe conduct of the convoy through the Marri hills to Narri Gorge. The Tumandar, Mehrulla Khan, was exonerated from all blame in the matter, as he was at Kahan, and it was shown that he could not have known anything about the raid until after it occurred.

This was the view of the circumstances attending the outrage taken by Sir Robert Sandeman; who, in reporting the affair to the Government of India, wrote thus:

The letter that I submit from the Marri Sirdar expresses, I believe, his true sentiments towards the British Government, and

no one probably more deeply regrets what has occurred than he does. He, however, feels himself unable, without the aid and protection of our Government, to compel the robbers belonging to the Quat-Mandai section of his clan to make restitution.

Having thus committed themselves with Government, they continued hostile, and perpetrated some raids in Sibi and Katchi.

In consequence of these serious offences the Government of India determined to send a military expedition to enforce restitution and punish those concerned; and advantage was taken of the return to India of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, after Sir Frederick Roberts's celebrated march and defeat of Ayub Khan's army at Kandahar. The punitive expedition was placed under the command of Brigadier General C. M. Macgregor. Sir Robert Sandeman had proposed that the following terms should be imposed on the Marris, viz.—first, restitution of treasure and bullocks plundered from convoy at Kuchali; second, twenty thousand rupees fine to compensate private losses; third, blood money, according to tribal custom, for those slain; fourth, troops to march through Marri country *viâ* Kahan to Hurrund; fifth, approved hostages to be given for future good behaviour.

The Government of India approved of these terms, and it was arranged that in the event of the Marris complying with them the military operations should be confined to a march through their country *viâ* Kahan to Hurrund. In the meantime Sir Robert Sandeman communicated the terms to the Marri Tumandar, Mehrulla Khan, and requested him to come to Sibi to arrange for carrying them out. But the tide had now set in so strong that the Tumandar could not of himself stem it or enforce the fulfilment of such rigorous terms. On the other hand, he feared that if he came in himself, before the Government had

actually resorted to extreme measures, he would lose all influence with his tribe. He therefore continued to temporise until General Macgregor marched his force into the Marri country, and occupied Quat-Mandai, where he left a detachment and advanced to Thal-Choteali. These movements of the troops gave Mehrulla Khan the *purdah* (screen) he wanted with the tribe, and on the force arriving at Kolu, on November 2, 1880, he came in and tendered his submission to the General. Mehrulla Khan then sent for some of the most influential of the head men, and on their arrival they formally accepted the terms laid down by Government. General Macgregor fixed two lakhs of rupees as the amount they would have to pay, and agreed to take fifty thousand rupees as an instalment on the arrival of the force at Kahan, and that the Quat-Mandai valley should remain in possession of the British Government until the balance should be paid up, as further security for which they also presented approved hostages. Accordingly, on the arrival of the force at Kahan, Mehrulla Khan paid down fifty thousand rupees in cash. General Macgregor then marched on with his force to India. He sent the Marri hostages to Sir Robert Sandeman, upon whom the real brunt of the business devolved, as he received orders from the Government of India to enforce the complete fulfilment of the terms.

Sir Robert Sandeman summoned Sirdar Mehrulla Khan to Sibi, where he came at once with several of the head men, but the actual leaders of the Kuchali raid declined to accompany him; and the chief urged that he would require armed assistance to coerce these men, who were the real cause of the difficulties in which his tribe had become involved, into compliance. Sir Robert Sandeman considered the request a reasonable one, and applied to the Government of India for a strong military escort, which was sanctioned, the Government concurring that it was desirable

to support the authority of the Marri chief. Sir Robert then started with his escort for the Marri hills, and on his arriving at Thalli all the leaders of the Kuchali raid came in and surrendered themselves and agreed to the terms. Within a short time seventy-five thousand rupees more were realised; and it was arranged with the sanction of Government that the valley of Quat-Mandai should remain pledged for the payment of the balance.

On the conclusion of these negotiations the Marris were again restored to the favour of Government. The Tumandar and principal head men, with a number of their followers, were again enlisted in our service; and posts of Marri levies were re-established on the Borders and along the main lines of communication. All service pay and allowances had been confiscated from the time of the Kuchali raid.

Thus was accomplished another of Sir Robert Sandeman's 'bloodless victories.' I believe it is the first instance on record, in our connection with the North-Western Frontier tribes, in which a military force was sanctioned for the purpose of maintaining and enforcing the authority of a semi-independent chieftain; and the results, which were eminently satisfactory, prove that it was a wise procedure.

Every circumstance connected with the Kuchali raid, as well as with the subsequent exaction of restitution, bear out my contention that too much had been made in some quarters of the argument that Beluchis are, on account of their allegiance to their Tumandars and their being less democratic, easier to manage than Pathans, and that on this account the Sandeman system cannot be successfully applied to all Pathan tribes. Oliver, in his 'Across the Border, or Pathan and Beluch,' wrote:

The political organisation of both is tribal: but the Pathan is essentially a Radical, every man as good as his neighbour and better, and will obey no one but the jirga, or democratic council,

and not always that; while the Beluch is as loyal to his chief as a Highland clansman to a McIvor. Consequently Government can deal as safely with a Beluch Tumandar as with any other limited monarch, and this fact alone has materially simplified all the frontier arrangements on the borders of Beluchistan.

The facts connected with the Kuchali affair show how overdrawn is this picture. The Tumandar, Mehrulla Khan, was on all hands exonerated of having had any complicity in the raid; as Sir Robert Sandeman wrote, 'no one more deeply regrets what has occurred than he does.' His influence with his tribe was as great as that of any Beluch Tumandar on the frontier. Nevertheless, these facts did not prevent his clansmen committing the outrage. Afterwards, when restitution had to be made, Sir Robert again reported that the Tumandar 'found himself unable without the aid and protection of our Government to compel the robbers to make restitution,' and a military force was sanctioned to uphold his authority. Take again the case of the Bugti Tumandar, Gholam Mortaza, and the robber leader Gholam Hosein described in Chapter I. Gholam Mortaza was justly regarded as the beau ideal of a Beluch Tumandar, and yet he could not prevent Gholam Hosein from raiding, and after Gholam Hosein was killed it was our support that enabled him to coerce the recalcitrant factions. No, it is, I believe, all a question of intelligent management and support judiciously granted; and Pathan Sirdars and jirgas, as well as Beluch Tumandars and jirgas, have great influence, which can be utilised with enormous benefit to the Government and to the good administration of the frontier, if worked on a proper system. We can no more afford to overlook the Beluch jirgas than we can the Pathan jirgas. They are each and all essential parts in the tribal machine, which requires specially trained officers for its successful working.

Simultaneously with the despatch of General Macgregor's expedition against the Marris, Thal-Choteali and the Harnai line were again occupied by troops. Early in the spring of 1881 Kandahar was finally evacuated and made over to the new Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan, and this concluded the second phase of the Afghan war. There still remained the important question as to the permanent retention of Peshin and Sibi.

About the end of February I received a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman telling me that he had been granted a year's furlough, and that he was coming home immediately. It was, I believe, personally most unfortunate for me my having been prostrated by typhoid fever at the particular time I was; and now Sir Robert taking leave before I could return was an additional stroke of ill luck. He had from the very start held out to me the prospect of succeeding him in charge of the Agency. He had intended going home sooner if his services could be spared, and some months before I was taken ill he wrote to me, dated November 13, 1878:

> I never spoke to —— about his officiating for me, and will apply to Government as strongly as I can for you to do so, as I did when I went home last. . . . I do intend to go home in May if I can get leave, but not until this case with Afghanistan is settled. Don't worry youself, I promise to do all I can with Government for you. You have been an excellent assistant, and would keep matters well in hand, I know.

And again in December 1878 he wrote saying he would go home to England as soon 'as the war is over, and, as I told you, I will urge your claims to officiate for me as strongly as I can.' I had besides to my credit the fact of my having twice officiated as Agent to the Governor-General during the eventful times of 1877–78, in the latter instance for seven months; and as matters had not as yet settled

down after the war, and as I had the tribal work then well in hand and was well versed in Khelat affairs, I believe, had I been on the spot, especially with such a redoubtable champion to my back as Sir Robert, I should have had a chance. But it was not to be. I was at home in Ireland still far from well, and I knew that I could not return to India until after the hot season of 1881. Sir Robert at length got his leave, and Sir Oliver St. John was appointed to officiate for him. He started for England in the beginning of March 1881. Dr. Thornton, in his 'Life of Sir Robert Sandeman,' gives an instance of his doughty championship which occurred on his arrival at Bombay on his way home, and as I am the 'uncovenanted officer' referred to in the narrative I may repeat it here:

> An uncovenanted officer who had done good service wished to remain in Beluchistan. Sir Robert had started home on leave, and at Bombay, just before embarking, received a telegram that the officer had been transferred to a neighbouring province. He proceeded to Calcutta by the first train, obtained an interview with the Viceroy, and had the order cancelled. It may well be doubted whether any other man, on the point of starting home after a long exile, would have given up a part of his hard-earned leave and gone to the personal expense of a journey of nearly three thousand miles, from Bombay to Calcutta and back, merely for the sake of benefiting a subordinate.

The explanation given was that the order for my transfer had been issued under a misapprehension, as it was supposed that as I had suffered so much in my health at Quetta I would myself wish for a change. Mr. Primrose, the Viceroy's private secretary, wrote a very kind letter to say that 'my interests will not be neglected,' and that if I gave him notice of the date of my return to duty he would have things settled by the time of my arrival in India. And so it was eventually settled, but not without causing me great anxiety, as well as inconvenience and expense.

On Sir Robert Sandeman's arrival at home we were by a curious coincidence thrown almost as much together as we had been in India. His sister, wife of Colonel Cotton of the 92nd Highlanders, had been living in London with her children, her husband being away on service with his regiment in the Transvaal. Colonel Cotton owned a cottage on the seaside at Ardmore, near Youghal, in the county Waterford, and it occurred to Sir Robert that it might be a nice change for them if they were all to go over to Ireland and live in the cottage. We were at the time living at Kinsale, and I got a letter from Sir Robert asking me if I would have a look at the cottage, and let him know what it would cost to put it in repair and make it comfortable for them to live in. I went at once to Ardmore, taking with me a builder from Cork. We found that, although it had not been inhabited for a long time, it did not require much except papering and painting. On hearing again from Sir Robert I put it in thorough repair, and he and Mrs. Cotton and her family came over and resided there, and we saw a great deal of them. He and I used to meet at the County Cork Club and talk over Indian frontier politics. There is a lovely little harbour at Ardmore and capital sea fishing, and as Sir Robert was, like myself, a most enthusiastic fisherman, he took a great love for the place, and became in turn greatly beloved by the simple fisher folk who live there.

It was at Ardmore he first met Miss Gaisford, the future Lady Sandeman, and he afterwards purchased a nice house and place at Ardmore, where Lady Sandeman still makes her summer residence.

In October 1881 I returned to India. My wife could not accompany me. We had at first intended to leave our boys at a Home near Geneva which had been recommended to us; but on visiting the place we found it would not suit, and

had to change our plans at the last moment. On the day I left Geneva for India she started back with our boys for Ireland. On arrival at Bombay I had, as arranged, to go and see Mr. Primrose, Lord Ripon's private secretary, who was with his Lordship in camp at Delhi. I stayed with some relations at Delhi, and was present at a big durbar Lord Ripon held there. Mr. Primrose made it all right about my appointment, and I was gazetted to return to Beluchistan in my former post of Political Agent and First Assistant Agent Governor-General. Shortly before I arrived Sir Oliver St. John had gone away, and was succeeded by Colonel Waterfield.[1]

The question which was exercising all our minds at that time was whether the districts of Peshin and Sibi were to be retained permanently or evacuated. The Home Government had come to the conclusion that the occupation should not be permanent, and pressed for retirement as soon as practicable; while the Government of India urged for further retention, as they could not under the circumstances which existed at the time see their way to a speedy and honourable evacuation. The exact position may be gathered from the following summary which I abstracted from a newspaper at the time. A Blue Book of 127 pages was issued at home on December 2, containing 'Further correspondence relating to the affairs of Afghanistan, including the transfer of the administration of Kandahar to Amir Abdurrahman Khan.' The papers range from January 12, 1881, to July 29, 1881. Among the documents is a despatch of Lord Hartington to the Government of India, dated April 29, 1881, on the question of the retention of Peshin and Sibi. After referring to communications on this subject which he had received from the Indian Government, Lord Hartington says:

[1] Colonel (now General) Waterfield, C.S.I., was Commissioner of the Peshawar division of the Punjab.

I learn that while accepting in principle the severance of our political connection with Pishin and Sibi when circumstances permit, your Excellency and the majority of your colleagues are decidedly of opinion that our occupation of those districts cannot immediately be terminated without risk of great injury to the interest of the people, and that its continuance for the present, while of no disadvantage to the British Government, need not involve the serious political embarrassments contemplated in my despatch of December 3. Representations in the same sense have been made to me by Sir R. Sandeman, your Excellency's Agent in Beluchistan, who is now in this country.

While, therefore, her Majesty's Government are not prepared to change their opinion as to the inexpediency of the permanent retention of the assigned districts, they recognise the difficulties in the way of immediate or early withdrawal from them, and they are fully sensible that in this respect their policy must be influenced by considerations which did not apply in the case of Kandahar. At no time were the people of that province led to expect the maintenance in any shape of direct British rule; while such pledges as were given in regard to the future native government of the country were subject to conditions which were almost immediately violated. In Pishin and Sibi the case is different. The people have no doubt, as your Excellency in Council observes, been encouraged to believe that British rule would continue, their relations with our officers have been conducted upon the assumption, and their behaviour has been generally good. While, therefore, it is the hope of her Majesty's Government that retirement from these districts, as from the rest of Afghan territory, may take place at no distant date, the decision on the question must evidently in some degree depend upon the course of events at Kandahar. As under thes ecircumstances the existing administrative arrangements will have to be maintained for the present, it is not desirable that the minds of the people should be disturbed by anticipation of immediate change; and I accordingly, on the 14th inst., authorised your Excellency by telegraph to abstain from any announcement of final retirement unless you deemed such an announcement to be expedient.

In thus communicating to you the assent of her Majesty's Government to the postponement of the relinquishment of Pishin and Sibi, I rely on your Excellency to take care that no step will

be taken which might place any permanent obstacle in the way of ultimate fulfilment of the policy indicated in my despatch of December 3 last.

The Government of India, in a long despatch written on June 3 in reply to Lord Hartington, give their reasons for retaining a considerable force at Quetta and along the line from Chaman to Sibi, and sum them up as follows:

We consider that some prolongation of our present tenure of Pishin and Sibi is necessary, not only for the acquittance of our obligations to those districts, but also in order that during a period of uncertainty we may be able to retain our present influence over the tribes of the frontier, and generally to fulfil the treaty engagement whereby, in return for the subordinate co-operation which we have a right to demand from the Khan of Khelat, and which he has very freely given to us, we are bound to protect his territories from external attack. With regard, therefore, to the extent of the country to be temporarily retained under British control, our proposals are to keep the districts of Pishin and Sibi, with any strip of intervening territory that may be clearly necessary for maintaining the communication between the two districts.

It will be seen from the extract from Lord Hartington's despatch that Sir Robert Sandeman was not idle while on leave, but availed himself of the opportunity for pressing his views on the home authorities in his characteristic not-to-be-denied fashion, and there is little room for doubt that it was his powerful and pertinacious advocacy which led to the ultimate satisfactory result.

On the other hand, his *locum tenens*, Colonel Waterfield, favoured, I believe, relinquishment of these districts, if not of Quetta itself; and advocated as a preliminary step the withdrawal of our troops from Thal-Choteali and the Harnai line. The following extracts cut from the telegram of the Quetta correspondent of the 'Times' of February 24, will show the general drift of the views that were being advocated in some quarters at that time:

The meeting between the Agent of the Governor-General and the Khan of Khelat had gone off most satisfactorily. The Sirdars have been again united, have made all formal show of due allegiance to their chief, and have been courteously received by him. Their differences have either been privately settled by arbitration of their own choosing, or have been advanced towards adjustment. Both parties express themselves grateful, and they have no reason to be otherwise. The feelings of all have met with consideration, and the curtain has not been raised. Year by year precedents are being established for the settlement of future misunderstandings, and month by month an order is growing up which should render the ultimate withdrawal of the British troops from Quetta, if this is found advisable, more easy, and their return, should Afghanistan require their support, less difficult. Not that our withdrawal is desired by anyone; and this admits of a simple explanation. Peace has brought prosperity; the cultivation of the land and the resources of the country have greatly increased; the lawless are enlisted for protective purposes, and have found other sources of livelihood; and we shall probably leave behind us, if we do retire, communities strong enough and sufficiently organised for their mutual protection. The longer this move is postponed the safer it will be, and the more profitable to all classes will have been our occupation. The expense to ourselves can be greatly reduced, and the garrison may eventually become but a large escort to the political officers in the assigned districts. We are faithful to the interests of the people and to our trust, if such it may be deemed. The semi-independent tribes are being taught the advantages of opening their country to the daily increasing traffic between Afghanistan and British India. They have hitherto had no knowledge of organisation, save for a limited self-defence. We are establishing a system which may stand without the present restraints and upon self-interest, and which is acquiring enlarged proportions. Why should not the railway advance, in the interest of the local population of the Khan of Khelat, of the trade of Afghanistan and India, of the Amir himself, and of our own policy? Beluchistan and Afghanistan can work a railway as easily as any other native State. They would raise no objections. The prospective advantages, however, of such a step are too numerous for the telegram of a correspondent.

I am afraid we have hardly even yet reached the millennium that will see a railway worked by the Khan and the Amir! It was also reported that Sir Robert Sandeman might not return to Quetta. These rumours and reports gave rise to an uneasy feeling among the tribesmen, which troubled me very much.

Mr. Fryer, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, Mr. Duke, and Rai Bahadour Hittu Ram were as strongly opposed as I was myself to the withdrawal of the troops from Thal-Choteali and Harnai. I wrote a memorandum on the subject, which I gave to Colonel Waterfield, in which I represented as strongly as I could why I believed such a step would be dangerous to the peace of the country and would upset the good results of twenty years of hard work. In a letter I received from Mr. Fryer he said:

What I said in my memo. to Waterfield was that I would be responsible for the trade route from the Han Pass to the Dera Ghazi Khan district on certain conditions, provided that he would answer for the Marris, Kakars, *et hoc genus omne*, which I was quite convinced that he could not do, should it be decided to withdraw the troops from Thal, &c. I think the posts ought to be strengthened if anything. The Marris are certainly in excellent order now. I have always thought that their break out after Maiwand was due to exceptional causes, and might have been prevented.

I also received a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman in which he wrote:

I hope you will go and see Waterfield, and try to induce him not to relieve the Marris of the presence of our troops at Thal-Choteali and elsewhere. If he knew what work it was getting them fairly in hand, I am sure he would think twice before recommending such a course.

He also said that he would return to Quetta at the end of his leave. I lost no time in informing Colonel Waterfield

what Sir Robert had written, and used every argument I knew to induce him not to make any changes in the disposition of the troops. After a time he allowed the question to remain at rest, and took no action in regard to it. In March or April 1882 Colonel Waterfield himself left Beluchistan, and was succeeded by Major John Biddulph.

In November 1882 Sir Robert and Lady Sandeman arrived in India. My wife also came out in the same steamer, and I went down to Bombay to meet her. There was no doubt as to the genuineness of the welcome with which Sir Robert was received in Beluchistan. From the highest to the lowest, from the Khan down to the smallest Malik, all were delighted to see him back. He was greatly pleased at finding things just as he had left them. He expressed in very warm terms his gratitude to me for having urged so strongly on the authorities the importance of maintaining the occupation of Thal-Choteali and the Harnai line. He afterwards told me he believed my memorandum to Colonel Waterfield had much to do with the final decision of Government not to move the troops. This was to me a source of the very greatest satisfaction, and repaid me for all the trouble and anxiety it had cost me.

CHAPTER VII

SETTLEMENT OF MARRIS, BUGTIS, AND KAKARS, 1882 TO 1885

I PROPOSE in this chapter to review as briefly as I can the political stage to which things had reached at this juncture in regard to the state of the country, and the condition of the tribes themselves; their intertribal relations, as well as their relations severally with the Government and as affecting the general frontier situation. I held at that time a splendid and most interesting country under my management. It included the entire mountainous region extending from the Bozdar limits opposite Dera Ghazi Khan to and including the Bolan Pass and Sibi, and thence along the Katchi Border to the Jacobabad district of Upper Sind. I had charge of our political relations with the following tribes: Khetrans, Marris, Bugtis, Barozais of Sibi and Sangan, and Kakars of Katch, Kowas, and Amandun. I was, besides, responsible for all arrangements with the Brahoes and Beluches for the protection of the Bolan Pass, and of the railway line through Katchi to Jacobabad. It was, in fact, the largest executive tribal charge ever held by a frontier officer. The work was in all respects delightful and congenial to me, as I loved riding about among the tribes and settling disputes on the spot, or exploring new territories, ever disclosing fresh subjects of absorbing interest. The distances to be travelled were so vast, and the work so heavy, that Sir Robert Sandeman promised to try to get the Government to sanction a good European assistant for

me. Peace was being maintained between the Marris and Bugtis, a position found from experience to be quite essential to successful tribal management in Beluchistan. Levy posts, garrisoned by men enlisted from these clans, were established on all the internal main lines of communication, as well as along the Sibi-Katchi-Upper Sind frontier. Through these measures the entire Marri-Bugti country was being opened up, and the people were again taking largely to agriculture; from which, in addition to the service pay and allowances they were receiving from us, they were able to obtain an honest means of livelihood alternative to that of plunder and robbery, on which they had for so long depended, but which we were now gradually forcing them to abandon. It is necessary for me to go at some length into particulars about the Marris and Bugtis, as they formed to a great extent the crux of the general tribal situation. We felt that if everything could be brought on a thoroughly satisfactory basis with regard to them, the rest would be comparatively plain sailing. Much had already been accomplished, but much still remained to be done. Our former frontier districts of Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpur, and Upper Sind were now held sacred by them; while Katchi, Sibi, Sangan, and Harnai had also been made safe from their ravages. They continued, however, to plunder a good deal in Thal-Choteali, Duki, and the Khetran country. They also prosecuted most vigorously their wars with the Musakhels and Kibzais; and made many daring forays into Bori, and even into Zhob. We continually received petitions from the Khetrans, the Tarins, and Lunis of Thal-Choteali and Duki entreating us to come and protect them from aggression, and to consider them our subjects and to take revenue from them. These are really agricultural tribes, owning extensive fertile arable lands, and it was melancholy to see the greater part of their fine

estates lying waste and desolate on account of the depredations of the Marris and Bugtis; while those tracts that were cultivated were dotted over with small round towers, where the husbandmen fled for refuge on an alarm being given and saved their own lives, but probably saw from the walls their plough bullocks being carried off by the robbers. I have stood on the crest of the mountain range separating the Marri country from the plains of Thal, and counted as many as a hundred towers scattered through the cultivated fields, not more than a few hundred yards separating them. Curzon's description of the 'hunting grounds' of the Turkoman moss-troopers of the Border (given at page 276 of his 'Persia') applies equally well to all the open valleys and plains which were subjected to Marri-Bugti raids before our intervention. There, too, he says, the frequent proofs of the dreaded presence of the Turkoman bandits were 'the small circular towers dotted all over the plain like chessmen on a chessboard.' The only difference between the two pictures is that in the case of the Turkoman there was for his victim an interesting variety, either death or slavery; while at the hands of the Beluch it was always death. The main object, therefore, we kept in view and worked up to was to extend our protective system, which had proved so successful in Katchi, Sibi, Harnai, and elsewhere, right round through Thal-Choteali and the Khetran country, so as to bring the Marris and Bugtis under complete control, and afford efficient protection to all these agricultural tribes and communities, on which ground alone we would justly be entitled to take revenue from them, and regard them as our subjects. If these results could be secured, the opening up and rendering safe of the trade routes which circulate the country would follow as a matter of course. To attempt to open the routes before squaring the tribes would be putting the cart before the horse, or, to use a more modern phrase,



KOJAK TUNNEL

'ploughing the sands.' The manipulation of the Marris and Bugtis was, for the reasons I have described, the main consideration; but it was not the sole one. Another very formidable obstacle which stood in the way of the accomplishment of our plans was the hostile attitude of Sirdar Shahjehan of Zhob; and we knew that until this was overcome the desired results could not be fully secured. The Hamzazais and Kibzais, instigated by Shahjehan, committed offences in the Thal-Choteali district aimed against the Government; which, combined with the war which was being carried out between the Musakhels and Kibzais on the one side and the Marris and Bugtis on the other, kept the country in a state of ferment, and the Thal-Choteali and other trade routes unsafe.

Matters had again been restored to a peaceful basis on the Harnai line and in the Katch-Kowas district. The Panizais and Sarangzais were now quietly settled down tilling their lands, and were on their best behaviour; and I had, with Sir Robert Sandeman's sanction, opened up friendly relations with the Kakar section residing in Baghao, Pui, Smallan, and Sinjawi, in my negotiations with whom the Panizai and Sarangzai head men gave me much assistance. The railway works on the Harnai line—which had been suspended in 1880, and the resumption of which had been delayed in consequence of a change of Ministry at home—were now being vigorously pushed forward under the superintendence of Sir James Browne. The extension of the line to Peshin was sanctioned by Government, and the construction of the important Kojak tunnel through the Khwaja-Amran range to Chaman was taken in hand. A subsidiary line was also being constructed through the Bolan Pass to Quetta under charge of Colonel Lindsay, R.E. For the protection of these railway lines and other interests there were, in addition to the posts garrisoned by

tribal levies already described, several posts garrisoned by regular troops all along the Upper Sind-Katchi-Sibi frontier as well as on the Harnai line—namely at Sooe, Gundoe, Goranari, Sunre (in Sind), Shahpur, Poleji, Lehri, Mall, Talli, Sibi, Gandakindaf, Khelat-i-Kila, Spintangi, Sanari, Harnai, Sharigh, Manjhi, and Katch. One of the objects we ever kept in view as most important was to gradually substitute local tribal levies for the regular troops in all these small posts. There were many reasons why this was desirable. In the first place, nothing could be more injurious to the discipline of regular troops than scattering them in small detachments and for considerable periods of time. On the other hand, the duties connected with these posts, being in their nature more police than military, can, under proper management, be performed equally well by levies; while the carrying of them out efficiently is most useful for their training, discipline, and organisation.

I hope I may have in the preceding pages succeeded in giving to my readers without wearying them a general idea of the condition of the country and the tribes at that time, as well as the tasks we had set before ourselves to carry out. In the course of my narrative it will be seen how far the programme was accomplished.

I have always held that one of the chief objects of a frontier political officer should be to have his tribes so well in hand that in the event of the regular troops being required elsewhere he should be prepared through his tribal chiefs and levies to maintain the peace of the country, and allow the regular troops to proceed wherever their services were urgently required. This was done at Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur during the Mutiny, when the troops were all taken away, and would be equally practicable on other portions of the Punjab frontier, as well as throughout the greater part of Beluchistan, under a proper system of tribal management

I must at the same time point out that on the other hand there could not be a greater error than to move the troops until everything is ripe for it, the levies well organised and efficient, posts constructed and occupied, tribal services fairly distributed and working smoothly, and malcontents and evil-disposed factions under control. A retrograde or ill-timed step taken in such matters may be difficult if not impossible to retrace. Sir Robert Sandeman's system was to keep the troops wherever required until the tribal arrangements could be thoroughly depended on, but not a day longer; and to show how well the plan worked I need only mention that within a very short space of time we had the satisfaction of being able to substitute tribal levies for the regular troops in every one of the posts above mentioned with the exception of Sibi and Sooe. The tribal leaders—whether Beluch Tumandars and Makadams or Afghan Sirdars and Maliks—and the tribal levies are the backbone of a frontier officer's political arrangements. It would repay the Government well to bestow more interest on the working of the system, and to encourage and support the local officers in remedying any defects there may be in it. I will make some suggestions further on as to how the present system might be improved.

In 1883 I went to Fort Munro, where I met Mr. Fryer, and we settled a large number of cases between all the different tribes, for which we received the thanks of the Government of India.

In the course of my negotiations with the Kakar tribes I explored much of the country between Kowas and Smallan. I had, I believe, the distinction of being the first Britisher who visited Zearat. The chief of the Sarangzais, Sirdar Bhai Khan, who owned the greater part of the country there, guided me all over the place and pointed out to me the stream of water that runs through it. This water is

brought from a perennial hill torrent which takes its rise from some springs at the head of one of the adjacent valleys, and is very cleverly brought by wooden troughs along the face of the cliff on to a fine tableland on a crest of the ridge of the Zearat mountain, at an elevation of about eight thousand feet. The ridge itself, as well as all the other mountains and valleys for miles around, are covered with juniper trees, and the country is very picturesque, with many most lovely walks through its wooded glades, rugged gorges, and grand and unique *tangis* (defiles).

I sent a report on Zearat to Sir Robert Sandeman, and described to him how suitable the place would be for a sanatorium. We afterwards visited the place together, and he was greatly delighted with it and sanctioned my building two circuit houses there, one for the Agent Governor-General and one for the Political Agent, Thal-Choteali. Thus was the Zearat Sanatorium started, which has, I believe, been the means of saving many a life.

Some little time before Showers was assassinated he had gone through Manai down to Pui, but he had never been to Zearat. The Pui people are a fanatical lot, and were at that time hostile, and did, I believe, contemplate killing Showers, but the presence of Allahdad Khan, a very influential Brahoe Sirdar, who had heard of the plot against his life, saved him.

Early in 1883 war broke out quite suddenly between the Marris and the Bugtis. In some petty boundary dispute swords were drawn and a few men were killed on either side. On hearing of this the young Bugti Sirdar, Shahbaz Khan, collected a force, and in a very intemperate way went and attacked the Marris near Kahan and killed two Ghazanis, relations of the Tumandar, and another a leading man of the Loharani section. This put all the Marris up in arms, and the Bugtis took refuge, some in Rajanpur, and some in the

Photo, Bremner, Quetta

ZEARAT SANITORIUM

low hills under cover of our outposts on the Upper Sind frontier. I reported all that occurred to Sir Robert Sandeman, and recommended that the Bugtis should be turned out of the Punjab and Sind, and that they should not be permitted to take refuge behind our posts. This would, I knew, facilitate the settlement of the case. Sir Robert Sandeman concurred with me, and wrote at once to the Punjab and Sind authorities. The Political Superintendent of Upper Sind at once gave orders that they should be turned out; but the Punjab Government demurred, and the question was submitted to the Government of India. The Government of India approved of Sir Robert Sandeman's proposal, and the Bugtis were warned that they could not be permitted an asylum in the Punjab. I then went into the Bugti hills and summoned the Tumandars and jirgas of both tribes, and as soon as all had assembled and the case was ripe for settlement I telegraphed to Sir Robert Sandeman, who came down with his escort. We then marched through the Bugti and Marri hills, and with a good deal of difficulty succeeded in making a satisfactory settlement. This was one of the many instances in which Sir Robert Sandeman's escort proved of very great value. It would be wearisome to the general reader to relate all the ins and outs of a settlement of this kind. It was one of those cases which, under the system prevailing on the Punjab frontier, would probably have drifted into the hands of the military department and have ended in a punitive expedition; whereas Sir Robert Sandeman, with his strong military escort, was master of the situation and able to insure his orders being carried out. The peace then concluded between the Marris and Bugtis has, I believe, lasted ever since. I had the satisfaction of receiving the acknowledgments of her Majesty's Secretary of State, as well as of the Government of India, for my share in the negotiations.

Just after the conclusion of this case I received from Sir Robert Sandeman the welcome news that the Government of India had sanctioned an assistant for me, and that Captain Gaisford,[1] of the 5th Punjab Infantry, had been appointed Assistant Political Agent, Thal-Choteali. I cannot express what a relief this was to me, as I was getting completely overwhelmed with work. After a few days Captain Gaisford himself arrived, and I found in him a most energetic and useful assistant. He certainly found abundant scope for his energies in Thal-Choteali. Sirdar Shahjehan of Zhob still continued to give trouble. A cavalry native trooper was killed near Dabbar-Kote, and on several occasions Government camp followers were robbed and murdered. A murder had also been perpetrated on the railway line near Chappar Rift. These offences were all traced to the Zhobis. We found that the position in which the troops were stationed in the Thal plain, though well situated for protection from Marri-Bugti raids, was too far removed from Kakar limits to act as a check on them and prevent the commission of such offences. Consequently with the sanction of the Government of India, a site for the military cantonment was first chosen at Dabbar-Kote, which was again shortly afterwards transferred to Duki. I was a member of the committee in both instances. When the site had been fixed at Duki, Government sanctioned the erection of barracks for the troops, and the work was put in hand. A strong military post for the protection of the railway line was also established at Zandra, garrisoned by the 2nd Bombay P.W.O. Grenadiers and a troop of the 1st Bombay Lancers.

At the time when the troops were stationed at Dabbar-Kote I had my tents pitched just outside the military lines,

[1] The late Colonel G. Gaisford, Political Agent, Thal-Choteali, after a long and most distinguished career, was murdered at Sinjawi, near Loralai, by a Ghazi, on March 16, 1898.



Photo, Craddock & Co., Simla

MAJOR G. GAISFORD

and Gaisford was in camp with me. After midnight we were woke up by a great noise in my camp, and on going out we found some fifty Utman-Khel Kakars of Loralai, all armed to the teeth and talking in a very excited way. On questioning them they said that a Marri *lashkar* had just killed two of their clansmen and had robbed them of four thousand sheep and goats, and that the raiders were at that very time passing with their booty through the Thal plain within a few miles of our camp. They entreated that I would either send help or accompany them, and restore their property to them. I went at once and woke up the officer commanding the station, Colonel Adam, told him what had occurred, and asked him to let me have an escort of a troop of cavalry, which he kindly did, and, taking the Utman-Khels with us, Gaisford and I set off in pursuit of the raiders. I had also with me in camp some of the Marri influential head men, who volunteered to gallop on ahead, saying that if what the Utman-Khels said was true they would detain the raiders until I came up. When we arrived near Gumbaz, just after daybreak, such a sight met my eyes as I had never before seen: some four thousand sheep and goats in one flock. When we got near them it really seemed as if the whole plain was alive with sheep and goats. The raiding *lashkar*, which had been detained by the Marri head men I had sent on, consisted of about one hundred and fifty footmen and a dozen sowars. The leaders of the band I knew well, and when we arrived on the scene they all came up and salaamed, and were quite civil. I asked them why they had robbed the Utman-Khels, with whom they were at peace. They explained that they had at first no intention of raiding the Utman-Khels, and had passed through the Utman-Khel country into Zhob, whence they had carried off six hundred sheep from the Khidderzais; but on their return the Utman-Khels quarrelled with them

and tried to prevent their passing through with their booty, on which there was a fight, in which two Utman-Khels were killed and two Marris were wounded. On this they raided the Utman-Khels, and carried off all the flocks they could lay their hands on. I had a number of leading men of different tribes with me, and I put these on a jirga on the case, which, after much talk, was amicably settled by the Marris returning all the Utman-Khel flocks, but keeping the six hundred sheep they had taken from Zhob. Gaisford and I waited until we saw the settlement carried out, and the Utman-Khels returned with their flocks in the greatest delight at having recovered them. It is a curious fact that this raid was committed on the very ground where the Loralai cantonment now stands. The country belongs to the Utman-Khels, and when I was employed subsequently on the committee to fix the site for the cantonment they gave me a warm welcome and hailed me as their deliverer. The Marris have not raided since then in Loralai, and I hope the raid described may have been their last one there. I received the thanks of the Government of India for my proceedings and settlement of the affair. I remember some time afterwards Mr. Durand,[1] the Foreign Secretary, when making a tour through my Agency, remarked to me: 'Sandeman and you have a way of sitting down quietly and occupying a tract of tribal territory, and reporting that you had done so at the earnest wish of the tribes. How do you manage this?' I then told him the story of the Marri raid on the Utman-Khels; and the invitation and welcome the Utman-Khels gave me when their lands at Loralai were selected for the site of the new cantonment. It was really nothing more than a repetition of what had occurred at Sibi, Harnai, Thal-Choteali, Duki, and many other places.

[1] Now Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., late Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Persia; now Ambassador at Madrid.

I have found, as a rule, that the majority of tribesmen who possess lands and property wish for peace and to be able to enjoy their own; and it is the minority, those who have no stake in the country and live by intrigues, plunder, and bloodshed, who desire a continuance of anarchy. Unfortunately we too often mistake the voice of the latter for that of the former, thereby encouraging what we should suppress, and discouraging and compromising those who are really inclined to act loyally and be our good friends.

After the works of the new cantonment had been started at Duki, a band of Kakars, Sarans, Hamzazais, Kibzais, and Musakhels, instigated by Sirdar Shahjehan, came down at night and murdered seven coolies who were employed on the works. An alarm was immediately raised, but as the camp in which the coolies had been sleeping was some distance from the military camp, the murderers succeeded in making their escape into the hills. This outrage filled up the measure of Shahjehan's cup, and on Sir Robert Sandeman's recommendation the Government of India sanctioned a military expedition to punish the Zhobis and others implicated in the murder of the coolies and other offences. It was at first proposed that the expedition should start early in September, but the preliminary arrangements necessary for the equipment of the Russo-Afghan Frontier Delimitation Commission, which had to be made at Quetta, intervened and caused a delay.

In the beginning of September Colonel Ridgeway[1] and his staff arrived at Quetta, and Sir Robert Sandeman entrusted me with the duty of arranging for the camel transport required for the commission. This I carried out through Darya Khan, Nasir, who supplied for me thirteen hundred splendid camels. Darya Khan's son, Abdulla Khan, was placed in charge of the camel transport, and remained

[1] Now Colonel Sir Joseph West Ridgeway, K.C.B., Governor of Ceylon.

on duty with Colonel Ridgeway the whole time, until he marched back to India through Kabul. Colonel Ridgeway testified warmly to the valuable services rendered by Abdulla Khan, on the strength of which the Government of India conferred upon him the title of *Khan Sahib*. The Government of India expressed their acknowledgments to me for the transport arrangements I had made. I am glad to have this opportunity of recording the good services rendered to Government by Darya Khan and his family, on this as well as on many other occasions, up to and including the expedition for the opening of the Gomal Pass; a short time after which, in an epidemic of cholera which raged in Sibi, the whole family were, I believe, swept away. The more arduous duty of the arrangements for the passage of the Delimitation Commission through the Beluch desert from Nushki to the Helmund were carried out most successfully by Mr. H. S. Barnes,[1] Political Agent of Quetta, for a full account of which I would refer the reader to Dr. Thornton's 'Life of Sir Robert Sandeman.'

After the Delimitation Commission had marched from Quetta the arrangements for the Zhob expedition were taken vigorously in hand. As a first step Sir Robert Sandeman, with the approval of the Government of India, sent an ultimatum to the Zhob Kakars requiring them to come in and make submission and reparation for offences committed, and warning them that if they failed to do so by October 10, Government would take their own measures for enforcing submission. General Sir Oriel Tanner, K.C.B., was appointed to command the expedition. The force consisted of four thousand two hundred infantry, five hundred and sixty-one cavalry, ten mountain guns, and two companies of sappers. For a full account of the force and the details

[1] Mr. H. S. Barnes, C.S.I, formerly Officiating Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and now Governor-General's Agent in Beluchistan.

of the military movements, I would refer the reader to the 'History of the Zhob Valley Expedition,' by Captain S. M. Congreve Schneider, 2nd Bombay Infantry. Sir Robert Sandeman was accompanied by the leading Sirdars of the Beluch and Brahoe tribes, and a force of five hundred tribal levies, of which Lieutenant R. J. C. Domvile (since deceased), of the 1st Sind Horse, who was appointed on special duty for that purpose, was put in command.

On September 19 the force left Quetta, and marching through the country of the Panizais, Sarangzais, and Dumars, and Thal-Choteali, reached Anambar on October 9. All the chiefs of Bori, including the Hamzazais, had by this time come in and made complete submission. But Sirdar Shahjehan had failed to appear, and there remained to be dealt with the Saran Kakars of Zhob, the Musakhels, and the Kibzais; who had been the principal offenders and had disregarded the proclamation. It had been proposed to proceed first against the Musakhels and Kibzais; but afterwards the General in consultation with Sir Robert Sandeman decided that it would have a better effect on the tribes to march direct to Shajehan's fort.

As the term fixed in the proclamation had now expired, on October 11, General Tanner advanced with the force to Dulai in the Bori valley, where a permanent camp was established for the purpose of keeping open communications and arranging for supplies. Large quantities of supplies were obtainable in the Bori valley, which were brought in willingly through the Maliks and were paid for on the spot by the commissariat. On the 18th the force marched to Shahjehan's fort, called Vela, adjoining the hamlet of Akhtarzai. Here we found everything changed. Shahjehan had fled, and the villages were deserted. The inhabitants had concealed their supplies, and had gone off to the hills. We had at first a good deal of difficulty in procuring sufficient

grain and forage for the troops. The grain had all been buried or hidden away in caves in the hills and in pits, but our Brahoes and Beluches, and indeed some of the Sikh and Pathan sepoys, proved very clever at finding out the hiding places, and soon we had as much grain as we wanted. The fort and towers belonging to Shahjehan and others at Vela and Akhtarzai were by the orders of the General blown up. I have still in my possession a small Koran I found in Shahjehan's house. It was also decided that it would be a good thing to seize all the flocks and herds that could be found, and this duty was assigned to the Beluch and Brahoe Sirdars, with the tribal levies. The plan was kept quite secret, and at night, when the moon rose, having made all their preparations, they started, the Beluches taking one side of the valley and the Brahoes the other. We begged the Sirdars to avoid bloodshed as far as possible, and simply to seize and bring in flocks and herds. Next morning, about ten o'clock, the Beluch contingent returned, bringing with them three hundred camels. The Brahoes did not turn up until the afternoon, having captured some two thousand five hundred sheep and goats. Until the settlement was made the troops, as well as tribal followers and levies, revelled in mutton, and our holding such a prize in our hands, probably to the value of twenty or twenty-five thousand rupees, assisted materially in hastening the submission of the tribes.

On October 22 Sirdars Shahbaz Khan and Shahmar Khan, cousins of Shahjehan, came in under a safe-conduct and tendered their submission to Sir Robert Sandeman. Some of the other leading Maliks also came dropping in. Meantime the troops were not idle. Reconnaissance parties went out in all directions to search for hostile assemblages. On October 23 information was brought in that a force of Kakars, variously estimated at five hundred to a thousand fighting

men, had collected in the hills at Dowlatzai, about eleven miles to the south of our camp, under the leadership of Maliks Hamza and Ghaus Mahomed. The news was corroborated by a cavalry detachment of the 1st Bombay Lancers being fired on while reconnoitring the enemy's position.

Before daybreak the next morning General Tanner marched with the following force to attack the Zhobis: Half battalion North Staffordshire Regiment; half battalions of the 45th Sikhs, 4th Punjab infantry, and 2nd P.W.O. Bombay Grenadiers; a squadron each from the 10th Bengal Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and 1st Bombay Lancers; and a company of Bengal Sappers and Miners. Captain Congreve Schneider, in his Zhob Valley Expedition, gives the following account of the fight:

Moving along in the dark with only the light from the stars to guide them, the troops got up to the river by the time daylight appeared, and crossed by a ford that had been marked off the previous day—a very necessary precaution on account of the quicksands in the river bed. Cavalry scouts were well ahead of the column, and some time before the base of the hills behind which the enemy lay was reached the firing of the Zhobis on them could be heard. Sir Robert Sandeman, Mr. Bruce, C.I.E., and Staff rode up and met General Tanner at about half-past eight, and at nine o'clock the column halted at half a mile distance from the hills, preparatory to action. The position taken up by the Zhobis was along a narrow winding pass, which led into a series of hills that got higher and higher as they came up to a precipitous cliff that formed their background, and up which ran paths, affording means of retreat up to a tableland perhaps 1,000 feet above the plain. The first hills that rose from the valley were about one hundred feet in height, and the four or five ridges that intervened between them and their background increased in height by successive hundreds of feet till they came to an abrupt finale with a precipice of some four hundred feet towering above them. It looked rather as if the mountain had split in two, and that the half towards the valley had, in falling, rolled over and over, forming the waving series of hills. Destitute

of a particle of vegetation, it looked indeed an ugly desolate place, and unacquainted with the country one wondered why and how any large number of men could have assembled behind those barren hills. Our position was as follows: the 4th Punjab Infantry on the right, supported by the 2nd P.W.O. Grenadiers; the North Staffordshire on the left, supported by the 45th Sikhs; the guns in the centre, and the cavalry on the flanks. The Zhobis refusing to surrender, and keeping up an irregular fire, orders for the advance were given, and the Punjabis began rapidly running up the hills in order to drive in the left flank of the enemy's position. The mountain battery then came into action getting on to a ridge of the second line of hills, whence a number of Zhobis could be seen falling back. The North Staffordshire then went up the hills on the left of the guns, and got the enemy between two fires. The latter had the advantage of knowing every path on these hills that led up to the precipice in rear, and parties of them repeatedly charged out on our skirmishers, not doing, however, much damage. The troops did their work well and rapidly, and 'cease fire' was sounded within an hour and a half of the advance from the preliminary position. Colonel Graham's battery—one of those that marched with General Roberts from Kabul to Kandahar—did some wonderfully accurate practice, though it could not come fully into play. It was difficult to estimate the number of Zhobis killed, but from the various accounts the number must have been somewhere between fifty and a hundred, besides many wounded. . . .

Fortunately, both of the leaders, Maliks Hamza and Ghaus Mahomed, were killed in the fight. After this a number of the leading Maliks came in and made their submission, and Sirdar Shahbaz Khan—who had been publicly recognised by Sir Robert Sandeman as chief of Zhob and was now working heartily with us to bring matters to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion—pointed out those who had not come in and were still making efforts to oppose us, and recommended that they should be seized and brought in. Accordingly two flying columns were told off as

Photo, Vandervweyde, 182 Regent Street

MY FRIEND AND BROTHER SPORTSMAN,
MAJOR FRED CARR

escorts, one to accompany me and the other Captain Gaisford. My destination was Hindu Bagh, the Maliks of which had not yet come in, and my escort, which was commanded by Colonel Armstrong, of the 45th Sikhs, consisted of a wing of the 45th, a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major F. S. Carr, two mountain guns under Captain Keene, and a company of sappers under Lieutenant C. Maxwell. Major Carr (since deceased) had been one of my oldest and dearest friends, and sporting companion, and it was a pleasant coincidence which threw us together in the Zhob expedition. We arranged to blow up the fort of Malik Bisharat, who had absconded. On arriving at the fort, which was a fine substantial building of stone and mud with four corner towers, we found it completely deserted. We left Maxwell and his company of sappers in the fort, and it was settled that he should undermine the towers and walls and have everything in readiness to blow it up when we should return from Hindu-Bagh in the afternoon. We then continued our march, and on reaching the boundary of Hindu-Bagh all the recalcitrant Maliks were waiting there to meet us. They threw down their turbans at my feet in token of submission, and I had them placed under a military guard. We rested awhile and had our lunch at Hindu-Bagh, and after feeding our animals we set out on our return march, bringing the Maliks with us. When we arrived at Malik Bisharat's fort we found that Maxwell had everything ready. The towers were mined and the walls were mined and charged, and nothing was left to be done but to apply the match. We stood at a short distance off to watch the effect. I had some thirty Kakar Maliks with me. Never have I seen such a look of blank amazement and consternation as was depicted on their faces. They did not know that anyone had been in the fort or that any preparations had been made, until the bugle sounded and Maxwell and his

men came out, having set fire to the fuses. Then came the explosions as if they had been timed, one, two, three, four, and when the dense cloud of smoke and dust cleared away there was not a vestige of Bisharat Khan's fort left. That one explosion dissipated the legend of Shahjehan's supernatural powers and sanctity, and of his being able to stop our bullets and prevent our powder going off. One Malik remarked to me: 'Where is the use, Sahib, when you can blow up our forts without any powder at all?' He thought, I believe, that the fort had fallen before the blast of the bugle, like the walls of Jericho.

Captain Gaisford was also entirely successful in his venture, and brought back with him all the Maliks he had gone in quest of. When he was returning Malik Bisharat also came to him and surrendered. The submission of the Zhobis being now complete, there remained the Musakhels and Kibzais to be dealt with. The General first marched the force to Mina-Bazar, and thence to Murgha-Kibzai, the headquarters of the Kibzais, and to Sara, the headquarters of the Musakhels. No opposition was experienced anywhere. The three leading Maliks of the Kibzais and the leading Musakhels, Baik Khan and others, surrendered. A final settlement was then concluded with all the tribes, the principal terms of which were that they acknowledged the supremacy of the British Government and their right to station troops in Zhob and Bori. The chiefs themselves begged that this might be done as a support to them in carrying out their engagements, and to prevent anarchy. They agreed to pay down in cash a sum of twenty-two thousand rupees as fine and compensation for offences committed. They bound themselves to prevent their clansmen raiding in British protected territory, and that if any should so offend they would make them over for punishment. They further bound themselves not to allow

Sirdar Shahjehan to return to Zhob without the consent of the British Government. As security for the fulfilment of these terms they made over a number of representative hostages selected by me, and approved of by Sir Robert Sandeman. Sir Robert, in describing the proceedings after the fight at Dowlatzai, wrote as follows:

The next few days were spent in sending detached parties to seize those who did not come in of their own free will. This was done at the request of Sirdar Shahbaz Khan, who from the time that he made his submission worked thoroughly with us. In some instances the captures were made only with difficulty. It reflects the greatest credit on the political officers chiefly concerned, Mr. Bruce and Captain Gaisford, that by October 31 every chief of note in Zhob, with the exception of Shahjehan, Saifulla, and one or two who had fled or who resided at a distance, was in my camp. Their task was an arduous one, and was most efficiently carried out. My thanks are also due to the military officers who commanded the detached parties of troops on these occasions. . . .

My special thanks are due to Mr. R. J. Bruce, C.I.E., Political Agent, Thal-Choteali. During the whole of the expedition he made arrangements for supplying the Commissariat Department with the material necessary for feeding the native troops, camp followers, and baggage animals. He rendered me the greatest possible assistance in all measures of a political character connected with summoning the head men of the tribes, bringing in refractory Maliks, and arranging the terms of the settlement arrived at. His duties were of an arduous nature, but he worked always without any thoughts of sparing himself. I have had on several occasions the pleasure of bringing to the favourable notice of the Government of India the valuable services rendered by Mr. Bruce since he has been on this frontier. It was mainly due to his exertions that the camels necessary for the transport of the expeditionary force were collected, as well as those for the Afghan Boundary Mission. I trust, therefore, I may be excused if I venture to express a hope that the Government of India may be pleased to bestow on Mr. Bruce some suitable mark in token of their approval of the admirable work performed by him in

Beluchistan. Further, I desire to bring to notice the excellent work performed by Captain Gaisford, Assistant Political Agent, Thal-Choteali. In addition to other good work, it was owing entirely to his energetic action that the important capture of Malik Bisharat, Chief of the Khwadadzais, was effected.

Sir Robert Sandeman further recommended that Sirdar Shahbaz Khan should be recognised as the chief of Zhob, and that the Bori Valley should be occupied.

At the time that I destroyed Malik Bisharat's fort I found in the mosque there a large Koran belonging to him, beautifully written and illuminated. The Kakars told me that it had been purchased in Kandahar for three hundred rupees. I kept the Koran for some years. Meantime our former enemy had turned our friend, and one of the most useful men in Zhob; in consideration of which, in my last tour through Zhob, I restored his Koran to him, and his delight was great at getting it back. Nearly fifteen years have now gone by since this settlement with the Zhobis was made, and I think I may appropriately ask my readers to bear in mind, as having an important bearing on the merits of the Forward Policy, that they have throughout continued loyally to abide by their engagements; and that during the recent troubles which convulsed the frontier tracts further north, tranquillity reigned throughout the length and breadth of Beluchistan, while there alone no serious difficulty was experienced in the important work of demarcating the Durand boundary line throughout the vast extent in which Afghan territory runs coterminous with Beluchistan; and which was so ably carried out by Captain MacMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E.

All the same, I cannot accept the theory that the late imbroglio was due to a wave of religious fanaticism. I believe if we could only trace them to their sources we would find that each of the risings had a distinct and local

cause of its own, and that in their original inception there was no connection whatsoever between the hostile movements of the Swattis on the Malakand, the Mohmands and Afridis on the Peshawar Border, and what is known as the Maizer affair in the Tochi. Their occurring so near one another was simply an unfortunate coincidence; though, after the risings took place and the results became widely known, there may have been more in the way of religious combination between the different tribes, worked up by the mullahs, who are always ready to take advantage of any elements of disorder for the spread of their pernicious doctrines. The Maizer affair certainly arose from local causes quite independent of any other.[1]

I noticed in a former chapter that taken all round the difference between Beluch and Pathan tribes as regards their constitution and requirements for successful management are practically very small. Our experiences in Zhob strengthened this view considerably. Sirdar Shahjehan, up to the time of the Zhob expedition, had as much

[1] Since the above was written, *Eighteen Years in the Khyber*, by Sir Robert Warburton, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., has been published, and I am glad to see from it that his opinion agrees with my own on this point. He writes: 'It was not difficult or impossible from Jelallabad and Asmar to be in touch with Sayad Akbar in Tirah, the "Hadda Mulah" at Jarobi, and the "Mad Fakir" in Swat; so that if a combined move in all three quarters was required, it might, under favourable circumstances, have been executed nearly simultaneously within a period of seven days. But the facts show that it was at least fourteen days after the "Mad Mullah's" first advance against Malakand and Chakdara that the Mohmand gathering, urged on by the "Mullah of Hada," descended into the plains of the Peshawar Valley and made its attack on Shabkaddar on August 9. And it was on the 22nd, nearly fourteen days later, that the Afridi lashkar appeared at Lala China, and commenced the attack on the posts of Shadi Bagiar, Jehangira, and Fort Maud on the following day. . . . It may be accepted, therefore, that there is no proof of any attempt having been made to raise the border from Maizar northwards to the Swat Valley in one combined movement against us.' I would further notice as bearing on the Forward Policy that although the methods he followed differed from the lines of the Sandeman System, the conclusions he draws and his proposals for the future administration of the Border agree generally with those I have advocated in these Memoirs.

influence as any of the Beluch Tumandars, and the prestige of his family was as great. This may be gathered from Sir Robert Sandeman's account of the Sirdar's family, in which he writes:

Shahbaz Khan is now a man of about fifty years of age. He appears to possess fair intelligence, and his authority in the Zhob valley has been only second to that of Shahjehan himself. After he once joined us he worked honestly with us, and showed a strong desire to win our friendship. In the absence of Shahjehan the other Maliks turned to Shahbaz Khan as the natural successor to the chieftainship . . . . The position to which Shahbaz Khan aspires is a peculiar one. He holds a Sanid from Ahmed Shah Durani creating one of his ancestors *Badshah of Zhob*, and has in his possession a jewelled ornament presented to the same ancestor by the Durani King when he gave him the Sanad. The title was enjoyed by the chief of Zhob till the last few years, but it appears to have now fallen into disuse. The Badshah was regarded as the chief among the whole of the Kakars, and I believe I am correct in saying that even the Sanatias, such as the Panizais and Sarangzais, were bound by tribal custom to join his standard at his bidding. Of course, his authority has to some extent disappeared as regards the Kakars within British territory, but nevertheless, even with regard to them, at the present day the Sirdar of Zhob is influential enough to make it of much importance to us to secure his friendship.

The objects of the Zhob Expedition having been fully secured, the force was broken up and General Tanner marched back to Quetta. The success of the expedition had been very great; I fear, from the soldiers' point of view, too great, as had it been less successful or the arrangements faulty, entailing more fighting and bloodshed, they would no doubt have received medals and promotion. The question still continues to crop up in Parliament: Will not Government give the frontier medal for the Zhob expedition? And when it is understood that, as the result of downright hard work on the part of the troops and all concerned, a country

nearly as large as Switzerland became added to the Protectorate of the Queen Empress, there would appear to be good grounds for the question. It may be that Sir Robert Sandeman's policy was in this instance, as it had so often been before, in advance of the times, and Government had not yet come to fully realise what a valuable factor the acquisition of Zhob and Bori would prove in the civilisation and strengthening of the frontier, and hence were tardy in their recognition of services there. Had Zhob been the fashion, the result might have been different.

I have been often asked the question: 'Why did we not meet with more opposition in Zhob, a country that could turn out some twenty thousand fighting men?' I shall try to answer the question here. The Zhobis were utterly ignorant about us and our rapid ways of doing things, and judged us by their own standards. No British force, indeed no British officer, had ever been in Zhob. They only knew of us by reputation as *faringhis* or *kaffirs* (infidels), whom it was the duty of all good Mahomedans to slay with the sword. Shahjehan had no doubt convinced many of his superstitious followers, probably even brought himself to believe, that he did possess the supernatural powers with which he was credited, and that if we did come our powder would not burn nor our bullets penetrate; moreover, neither he nor his people believed that we were coming to Zhob until we had actually marched into Bori. The prompt defeat of the Kakar force at Dowlatzai, with the death of the two leaders, and the subsequent splendid marching of the flying columns, particulars of which may be gathered from the military despatches, paralysed their efforts and made any formidable organised opposition difficult, if not impossible. No sooner did a few Maliks attempt to organise a following than they were pounced on and suppressed in detail. Another thing that took the heart out of the

opposition was the complete submission of the Bori and other Kakar sections residing outside of Zhob. At the time of the occupation of Quetta all the Kakars, taking their cue from Kabul, looked on us as enemies, which led up to the series of offences, both before and after the Maiwand disaster, for which they were severely punished at Chappar, Kach-Amadun, and Baghao. After this they came to know us better, and gradually to realise that we were not as black as we had been painted. On the contrary, they found to their surprise that under British rule, as administered by Sir Robert Sandeman, their religion and customs would be respected, their *izzat* (honour) upheld, and that they would not be subjected to *begar* (forced labour and supply) or other unjust demands or exactions; while they would enjoy protection from their enemies, and be able to cultivate their lands and carry on their ordinary occupations in peace. Furthermore they found that they would reap substantial pecuniary advantages by enlistment in the local tribal levy corps and other Government services. Consequently they completely dropped their hostile attitude, and ranged themselves on the side of Government as our good friends and allies. It was these same considerations which led the Bori Maliks to come in a body and make complete submission; and to request that they also might be taken under the protection of the British Government. It was therefore the rapid and successful movements of the troops, rendered the more effective by the reliable news we had of every hostile movement, added to the humiliation of seeing all their former allies and fellow-tribesmen fall away from them, that prevented more serious opposition on the part of the Zhobis, Musakhels, and Kibzais. Had the Kakars of Bori, Smallan, Baghao, and Appozai joined against us, it would have been a different business altogether. In the important matter of obtaining trustworthy news the work done by my

native assistant, Hak Nawaz Khan, was invaluable. Sir Robert Sandeman testified to his services in the following flattering terms:

> Among the subordinate establishment, the services rendered by the Native Assistant Agent to the Governor-General, Hak Nawaz Khan, were conspicuous. He worked loyally and well during the whole expedition, and was of the greatest possible assistance to me. The work of controlling the *jirgas*, or assemblies of chiefs, was in his hands, and he displayed admirable tact in managing them.

It is noteworthy that he was the only one who received a substantial reward in connection with the expedition, the title of *Khan Bahadour* being bestowed on him by the Government of India. Officers were permitted to enter the 'affair at Dowlatzai' among their war services, but the coveted frontier medal was not granted.

A history of the Zhob Expedition which omitted to notice the work done by the tribal levies would be incomplete, and while referring to their services on this special occasion it may not be out of place if I make a few general remarks on the subject of tribal levies and allowances to leading head men.

For many years I combatted to the best of my ability the arguments of those who were opposed to the Sandeman methods, and who stigmatised his system of tribal levies and service allowances to chiefs and leading men as one of 'black-mail.' As I assume that this opinion has ere now been 'effectually silenced,' I shall not lengthen this narrative by dwelling on it. Should my readers desire further information on the subject, I would refer them to a memorandum written by Mr. H. S. Barnes, C.S.I., quoted in pages 301 to 305 of the 'Life of Sir Robert Sandeman' by Dr. Thornton, as well as to the description of the duties of the tribal chiefs and levies given in pages 188–189 and 316–317 of the same work.

Two successive Quartermaster-Generals in India—General E. F. Chapman, C.B., and Sir James Browne, K.C.B.—who were both admirers of the Sandeman policy, took a great interest in the tribal levies, and a perusal of their writings on the subject, which may be obtained from the Quartermaster-General's Department, will well repay those connected with frontier tribal management. A very comprehensive memorandum on the subject of 'the different systems adopted on the North-Western Frontier for the employment of local levies' was written by General Chapman, which he sent to me for my opinion. There is a note attached to it written by Sir Robert Sandeman in 1888, in which, after describing the services of the Beluchistan Sirdars in connection with the working of the jirga system and the protection of the lines of communication, he writes thus about the duties of the tribal levies:

It will be convenient to note here that a full *quid pro quo* is obtained for the service bestowed on the tribesmen in active police duty alone rendered at all times and seasons and as compensation for transit and escort fees. It has been explained in the last paragraph that the jirga system, on which the peace of the country depends, hinges on this service, and I have here to add that in addition to the advantages secured by this system the tribesmen perform other active valuable duties in return for the service they receive. They guard roads, lines of communication, and traffic, protect posts, trace, discover, and surrender criminals, recover stolen property, bring in witnesses and accused persons, carry our jirga decrees, bring in information, make independent inquiries, carry letters all over the country where there is no post, produce fodder, grain, and other commissariat supplies, escort property, prisoners, officers, and survey parties, for the safety of which and whom they are made personally responsible.

In the year 1883 the duties and responsibilities of the Beluchistan tribal levies were considerably increased. What had been known as the Corps of Beluch Guides was amalga-

mated with them. Additional men were enrolled, chiefly from among the Marris, Bugtis, and Kakars. The military garrisons of Shahpur, Poleji, Lehri, Mall Thalli, Hanna, Gulistan, Kushdil-Khan, Kach, Zearat, Harnai, Nari, Kuchali, Kelati-Kila, Gandakindaf, Chaman and Bolan posts, as well as of others on the Upper Sind frontier, were withdrawn, and garrisons of tribal levies were substituted. A number of additional levy posts were established where considered necessary, so that when the scheme had been carried out there were forty-five posts entirely garrisoned by levies numbering some eighteen hundred men. I have already noticed what an immense advantage this was to the regular troops.

The weak point in the scheme was the paucity of European officers. With such a large body of men, divided among posts scattered over such a vast extent of country and responsible for very important duties, the constant supervision of European officers is necessary to their being efficiently carried out. Supervision is necessary for securing the attendance of a reasonable and sufficient proportion of men at the posts, the maintaining of correct relations between the chiefs and the head men, and their nominees in the levies; the securing of the correct distribution of the tribal pay and allowances, which should not be left in the hands of native subordinates, the inspection of the arms, accoutrements, and mounting of the men, as well as their dress or uniform and many other matters. It is the want of this supervision and this only which constitutes the danger of the taint of blackmail attaching to it, and not to any defect inherent in the system itself. It cannot be expected that large numbers of these wild clansmen will remain present at their posts, or carry out duties of the nature alluded to efficiently, without proper supervision.

The tribal levy services are besides becoming more and

more valuable as stepping-stones to more regular services such as the Khyber rifles, the Zhob levy corps, the Kurram militia, as well as to the local frontier regiments, and would, if properly worked, prove invaluable as a supplement for the recruiting of the native army. Considering, therefore, their present value and future possibilities, it is bad economy to starve the system, and it would, I believe, repay Government over and over again in the long run to provide their Political Agents with European assistants to help them to supervise the levies, which, with the multifarious calls on their own time, it is not possible for them to carry out efficiently themselves. As instances I may mention that there is important work among the Marri, Bugti, and Khetran tribal levies alone sufficient to well repay the employment of a special assistant. Another might be advantageously employed with the Waziri levies on the Dera Ismail Khan—Gomal Border, and another on the Bannu-Tochi side.[1]

What comes next in importance, and is almost as essential, is that the military authorities should afford more active sympathy and support in the working of the tribal levies. They have it in their power to do an immense deal in this way, and to assist in remedying their shortcomings, instead of merely showing them up.

The first duty of a frontier civil officer is, as I have before said, to get his tribal arrangements into such perfect working order as to be able to dispense with the presence of the regular troops, who should be free to take the field. If, in consequence of the advance of Russia, or for any other reason, we were obliged to send an army into Afghanistan, the first wish of every soldier serving in Beluchistan or on the Punjab frontier would be to go to the front; and in any sphere where the Government felt that the civil officers

[1] Since writing the above additional assistants have been sanctioned, but more are still required.

might be safely entrusted to administer the country and keep open communications through tribal arrangements, they would not hesitate to put the responsibility on them and march the troops away. This was done at Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur in the time of the Mutiny, and in the Bolan and other parts during the Afghan war, and a similar condition of things could, I am persuaded, be brought about in time along our entire frontier line through a wise development of the Sandeman System, by Government strengthening the hands of their civil officers and enabling them to utilise in a proper manner the valuable material lying to their hand. As it is, therefore, of primary advantage from a military point of view that our frontier tribal arrangements should be brought on to such a basis, it is not too much to expect that the military authorities may give their support in bringing it about.

It is on these lines, I repeat, that more interest in the practical working of the system, and more support and encouragement to the civil officers in its development on the part of Government, would be well repaid.

The tribal levies were made more practical use of in the Zhob Expedition than in any punitive expedition that had ever taken place on the frontier. I have described how cleverly they captured and brought in three hundred camels and two thousand five hundred sheep and goats, which contributed so materially in bringing about the submission of the Zhobis. The officers commanding the cavalry detachments—Colonel Heyland, Colonel Barnes, and Major Carr—when on reconnaissance duty employed them largely as scouts and guides and in obtaining intelligence of the movements of the enemy, and testified most highly to their qualifications for such duties. In fact, all the officers of the force praised them for their usefulness and hard work. Practical encouragement of the kind does incalculable good with these

manly fellows, and if given more freely and systematically would prove of the greatest value to the tribal services.

The hostages I had selected, and who were made over into my custody, were all either themselves leading men of influence or their sons, and were fully representative of those sections of the Kakar tribes who had for so long given us trouble. I felt, in fact, that through them I was enabled to exercise a practical control over the whole of Zhob, which proved most valuable. The more we became acquainted with the country, the more we were convinced that it was absolutely essential to our success in opening the trade routes and securing protection for life and property that we should retain our control over the Zhobis. The only practical way possible for ensuring this was to retain our hold on the hostages until the Government had come to a final decision as to the nature of our future relations with Zhob and Bori; but the question arose how this could be done, as the terms had been all fulfilled under which they would be entitled to their release. I therefore found myself in a dilemma and had to cast about in my mind for the best way of arranging it, when I hit on the following device. In the scheme for the reorganisation of the tribal levies a sum of three hundred rupees a month had been sanctioned for the establishment of a strong levy post in the Han Pass to protect the Khetran country from raids by the Kakars. The Han Pass lies between the Khetran and Kakar countries. In former times there had been a strong fort in the mouth of the pass, but the Musakhels had driven the Khetrans out of it and destroyed the fort, which is now in ruins. I had at first proposed to entertain Khetran levies and get them to occupy and rebuild the fort, but they were too afraid of the Musakhels to attempt it. I therefore proposed to Sir Robert Sandeman that I should employ the Kakar hostages, entertain their relations as levies, making them responsible for the protec-

tion of the Han Pass and the trade route through it. I would thus be killing two birds with one stone, as, while securing the Khetran country from Kakar attacks and the safety of the Han Pass route, I should also retain my hold on the Zhobis. Sir Robert Sandeman approved of my proposal and sanctioned it, and in reply to my letter he wrote, dated May 23, 1885:

> I think it is all right to do so. I would make the hostages regular nokers[1] of the Sirkar for the time being, and alter the constitution of the post as circumstances admit, directly the order about the occupation of Smalan and Bori is issued. I think it is quite right to do as you propose.

The benefits of this arrangement very soon made themselves evident. It gave the Kakars a taste for our service, it kept them in hand during a very critical period, and afterwards, when the important work of the construction of the Dera Ghazi Khan-Peshin road was taken in hand, it aided us materially in maintaining the peace of the country, and thus enabled the work to be expeditiously and successfully carried out. It was no doubt an irregularity, as under the scheme it was the enlistment of Khetrans that was sanctioned, but, as was invariably the case with Sir Robert Sandeman's irregularities, it proved a most valuable one in the interests of Government. Had we delayed to go through the forms of red tape to obtain sanction, the Kakars would have slipped through our fingers, the construction of the road would have been delayed, the main advantage of the expedition lost, and the work would probably have to be done over again. Afterwards when Mr. Durand, the Foreign Secretary, visited my district, he censured me in the matter; but when I fully explained how it came about, and what a useful purpose the plan had served, he seemed appeased.

On September 23, 1885, Sir Robert Sandeman went

[1] Men holding service.

on three months' privilege leave to England, and I was appointed to officiate as Agent to the Governor-General during his absence. While he was at home I received from him the following letter, which is worth quoting:

The Grove, Dunboyne, County Meath, Ireland: November 26, 1885.

DEAR OLD PAT,—A week after this reaches you I ought to be in Karachi, where, of course, I will take over charge by telegram; but I shall not delay there, but come on to Sibi for New Year's Day and the Fair, which I wrote you I would be glad if you held on January 2, 1886. I was glad to get your last letter, telling about your interview with Sir Donald.[1] I gathered from it that he really agreed about the frontier, but had no troops to spare to give me to carry out my views. But we will talk over the whole matter soon. It is bosh to talk of my annexation proclivities. We ought to take the whole country up to the Gumal Pass. Now, old comrade, good-bye. With kindest regards to Mrs. Bruce from us both. In great haste, I am always,

Yours very sincerely,

R. G. SANDEMAN.

I selected the above from among many of the same tenour I possess. Obviously it was not at the time intended to go beyond me, but there can be no harm in publishing it now; on the contrary, it may prove useful as showing how wise and far-sighted were his frontier schemes, and how persistently and grandly he worked out their successful achievement.

In December Sirdar Shahjehan came in and surrendered himself to me. He said that he had come in of his own free will, and had no longer any hostile feeling towards us. I detained him under surveillance until Sir Robert Sandeman returned from leave. Sir Robert then summoned all the Zhob Sirdars and Chief Maliks to Sibi, and there came to an agreement with them, under which they held themselves responsible for Shahjehan's future loyalty and good conduct.

[1] Sir Donald Stewart.

The quarrel between Shahbaz Khan and Shahjehan was composed by the jirga, and it was settled that Shahjehan would be permitted to return to Zhob, and that his son, Shingul Khan, should act as his agent in all work connected with Government and the political officers. Sir Robert Sandeman in reporting on the settlement pronounced it as 'a highly satisfactory conclusion to the Zhob Expedition,' and added:

I fully concur in what Mr. Bruce has said respecting the action of Captain Gaisford and Khan Bahadour Hak Newaz Khan. Captain Gaisford has worked indefatigably and earnestly to carry out the views of the Governor-General's Agent in every respect, and I beg to bring his services to the favourable notice of the Government of India. Mr. Bruce himself showed much tact and judgment in the way in which in my absence he brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

The Government of India wrote in reply to this despatch:

I am to add that the Governor-General in Council concurs with Sir Robert Sandeman in commending the services rendered in this matter by Mr. R. Bruce, Captain Gaisford, and Khan Bahadour Hak Newaz Khan.

I may add here that the agreement was adhered to, as Sirdar Shahjehan gave no further trouble to the British Government.

CHAPTER VIII

VISITS OF LORD ROSEBERY AND DUKE OF CONNAUGHT, 1885 TO 1887

DURING the Spring of 1885 came the deadlock with Russia over their attitude on the Delimitation Commission, which culminated in the attack made by the Russian troops on the Afghan troops at Penjdeh. Orders were received for the collection of supplies for an Army Corps in Quetta and Peshin, for the carriage of which from the railway terminus at Rindli arrangements had to be made. Sir Robert Sandeman volunteered to supply the carriage, provided that all the negotiations with the owners and their payment was left in his own hands. When this was agreed to, he at once assembled all the Beluch and Brahoe chiefs at Mach in the Bolan Pass, and concluded satisfactory engagements with them for the supply of the required carriage. He then deputed me to carry out the arrangements. The Beluches and Brahoes pressed every animal they possessed, bullocks, donkeys, even their own riding horses, into the work, and the busy scene at the Rindli railway station would be difficult to describe. When the work was in full swing some thirteen thousand maunds a day were being despatched to Quetta and Peshin. Mr. Barnes thus describes the working:

> This result was mainly owing to the excellence and extreme simplicity of the arrangements made for the prompt payment of the camelmen. Payment was made at the rate of so much per maund per stage. Each camelman receiving a way-bill from the commissariat officer at Rindli showing the number of maunds his camels

were carrying. On arrival at his destination this way-bill was receipted by the commissariat officer who accepted charge of the goods, and the camelman at once took the receipted bill to the political officer stationed at each post, who paid the hire without further question, and the camels were thus enabled to leave within a few hours of their arrival to fetch more supplies from Rindli. Under the regular departmental system the hire would probably not have been paid for weeks, and not half the camelmen would have remained on duty.

It is right to mention here that the great success of the arrangement was in a large measure due to the personal exertions of Colonel Badcock,[1] Chief Commissariat Officer, who took the greatest interest in the working, and saw that everything that was possible was done by his own department to ensure its success.

For a time it seemed that the question of war or peace was just trembling in the balance, until the Russians came to realise that we meant business, when they modified their aggressive attitude. Lord Roberts thus graphically describes the situation:

> A change of Government, however, took place just in time to prevent the war. Lord Salisbury's determined attitude convinced Russia that no further encroachments on the Afghan frontier would be permitted, she ceased the 'game of brag' she had been allowed to play, and the Boundary Commission were enabled to proceed with the work of delimitation.

The supply arrangements were accordingly wound up, and I had the satisfaction of receiving intimation of the appreciation of my work by the Governor-General in Council.

In January 1886 I applied for and obtained sanction for three months' privilege leave to enable me to take my wife and children to England. I had, in fact, taken my passage home when I got a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman saying

[1] Now General Badcock, C.B., Quartermaster-General in India.

that he had been very unwell and was about to apply for furlough. At first he wrote that he would apply for eight months, but he afterwards said he would take nineteen months' leave. He most strongly urged on me the inexpediency of my taking privilege leave at such a juncture, as I might thereby lose my chance of getting the officiating appointment, and wrote:

> Do you think you are right to go on privilege leave and be absent at the very time the officiating appointment falls vacant? You have done very well during my absence, and why should you not go on officiating for me? I will let you know what reply I get, and were I in your place I would take Mrs. Bruce and the small boys to Karachi and Bombay, see them off, and return here until the question is settled. With six sons you cannot afford to throw away a chance of promotion. Were I in your place I would not do so. I have thought over this matter for many days before writing you, and as your old friend I advise you to do nothing in a hurry.

As an additional reason why I should not go, he telegraphed to me: 'The Commander-in-Chief will visit frontier if he can manage it, and it is for you to judge whether you should be absent when his Excellency is in your Agency.' Although I had urgent business at home, I felt I could not act contrary to such advice, so I wrote and asked him to telegraph and get my leave cancelled. This he did and wrote in reply 'the Foreign Secretary has agreed to your cancelling your leave.' I accordingly wrote to my agents in Bombay to arrange with the Peninsular and Oriental Company to put off my passage.

In March Lord Roberts, who had succeeded Sir Donald Stewart as Commander-in-Chief in India, visited Beluchistan, and, having arranged some very important matters for 'the offensive and defensive requirements of Quetta and the Bolan Pass,' his Excellency marched through my Agency accompanied by Sir Robert Sandeman, and I had the honour

of accompanying them. The route was taken through Harnai, Thal-Choteali, and Barkhan (Khetran country) to Fort Munro. His Excellency inspected the works of the Dera Ghazi Khan-Peshin road, which was being constructed, and took the keenest interest in all the measures which had been taken with the tribes, at which he expressed himself greatly pleased and gratified.

After returning from the march, I took my wife and children to Bombay, and having seen them safely on board the steamer 'Kaiser-i-Hind' I returned to my work at Thal-Choteali. My expectations proved, however, to be all in vain, and my hopes were shortly afterwards dashed to the ground by a letter I received from Sir Robert Sandeman from which I gathered that Government had decided to appoint Sir Oliver St. John[1] to the officiating appointment. This was to me the most bitter disappointment I had experienced during the whole course of my career; all the more so as we all felt that the troublous times in Beluchistan had been weathered and that we might now look forward to a time in calm waters, while the many testimonials I had received from those high in authority for work performed during times of real trial and difficulty led me to believe that my services had been throughout approved. I had, moreover, just been promoted to the rank of First Class Political Agent.

On being relieved by Sir Oliver St. John in April, Sir Robert Sandeman proceeded on furlough, and when starting I asked him to let me know why Government had declined to allow me to officiate for him; to which he sent me the following reply, which he said I might make any use of I liked, dated Karachi, April 21, 1886:

I have considered your question very carefully, and I must confess I feel considerable difficulty in replying to it. But probably the reason for the Viceroy not appointing you on the present

[1] Sir Oliver St. John died in Peshin on June 3, 1891.

occasion to officiate for me was because when you entered the Public Service you were then in its Uncovenanted Ranks. Perhaps it is not known at Headquarters or to Lord Dufferin that the late Lord Lawrence, when Viceroy of India, for good frontier service some years ago, with the sanction of her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, transferred you from the 'Uncovenanted Civil List' to the 'Covenanted Ranks of the Punjab Commission.' When I was first deputed by Lord Lytton, then Viceroy of India, to Beluchistan, I asked his Excellency to transfer you from the Punjab Commission List to the Political Department of the Government of India, and you were regularly graded as a second class political agent, and, as you know, I asked Mr. Durand to solicit the present Viceroy to sanction your acting on the present occasion for me. I explained my views fully to the present Commander-in-Chief, Sir F. Roberts, during his late tour, and told him why I considered it desirable in the interests of Government that you should carry on the work for me. I believe he understood the importance I attach to the administration of Beluchistan and the assigned districts not being changed at the present time, and concurred in it. I further think that it is not improbable had I been able to have placed the question before his Excellency the Viceroy and the Foreign Secretary, as I was in a position to place it before the Commander-in-Chief, the reply might have been different. This is, however, entirely my own view of the matter.

I can only add that you have my most sincere sympathy in your disappointment, in which I share. You have done the Government excellent service during the eventful years we have passed together on the North-West Frontier of India, and if on the present occasion I have been disappointed in obtaining for you the reward I contemplated, you must notwithstanding work on happily and contentedly with the knowledge that you have done your country good service, and as far as you could served it during troublesome times. Perhaps the Viceroy hereafter may be able to reward you in some other way. I can assure you if I see an opportunity of bringing the matter before his Excellency I will do so. With my most sincere best wishes for your future,

Believe me, yours very sincerely,

R. J. SANDEMAN.

Sir Robert was mistaken in thinking that my promotion by her Majesty's Secretaries of State, first to the Punjab Commission and afterwards to the Political Service of the Government of India, severed my connection with the Uncovenanted Ranks or the disadvantage attaching themselves to that anomalous service. I, however, resolved to abide by his advice, and to continue to use every effort to overcome these disadvantages.

About the time the events above related took place the sanction of Government to the occupation of Bori was received. It was ordered that the military garrison of Duki should be transferred to Bori, and I was appointed on the committee to select the site for the new cantonment. The site we selected was Loralai, and I have already in the last chapter noted what a welcome I received there at the hands of my old friends the Utman-Khels. As a matter of fact, all the Bori people welcomed us, and not a voice was raised against the occupation, which was carried out in the most peaceful and friendly way possible, without the firing of a shot or a single mishap.

In December 1886 Lord Rosebery visited Sibi accompanied by Mr. Munro Ferguson. Sir Oliver St. John asked me to accompany his lordship *viâ* the Harnai line to Sibi. The Municipal Committee of Sibi suggested that they should illuminate the town, and have a show of fireworks in celebration of the visit. The rumours that had been spread regarding the retirement from Peshin and Sibi upset the minds of the people, and they were anxious that his Lordship should bear away with him a favourable impression as to the importance of the place; and as I was myself equally anxious I encouraged them to do all in their power to show off their town to the best advantage. Perhaps it favoured our wishes that we did not arrive in Sibi until it was dark, and under the artistic way

in which natives illuminate a town with rows of small oil lamps, following the tracery of arches, cornices, doors, and windows, the town certainly did look its very best. Every wall and line of building of any kind, even to the ruins of the old fort, was taken advantage of, and, picked out in lines of brilliant light, looked most effective. Viewed from the roof of the Residency bungalow, Sibi had the appearance of a good-sized city. I presented to his Lordship the Beluch, Brahoe, and Pathan Sirdars, and the leading merchants of Sibi, who expressed their pleasure at his visit and the advantages they were now enjoying under British protection, which they said it was their earnest desire should be continued to them.

I entertained his Lordship at the Residency, and after dinner I drove him to the railway station and back through the town to see the illuminations. I was driving a pair of ponies belonging to Sir Oliver St. John, and as we were returning through the town the ponies took fright at some rockets that were let off, and ran away. We were fortunately on the straight road for the Residency, but I was in terror about getting through the gate, which was a very narrow one. As good luck would have it the illuminations enabled me to see the gate distinctly, and I succeeded in guiding them safely through, and I was able to pull them up before we reached the house. The thought just passed through my mind: if I wreck a Cabinet Minister at Sibi, how will it affect the Forward Policy question? Lord Rosebery left Sibi that night by rail. Everything he had seen on the frontier seemed to have pleased and impressed him, as indeed he expressed in his letters. I received one amusing little note from him which he wrote me on reaching Lucknow, which, as it is a characteristic one, I will quote here:

Lucknow: January 2, 1887.

My dear Mr. Bruce,—I must write a line once more to express my thanks to you for your thoughtful and cordial kindness to us.



SIBI FORT

From a painting by Major H. M. Temple

You have made Sibi a delightful memory, more especially as I cannot help thinking that you and the municipality, if not identical, are at any rate extremely thick with each other.

Believe me, yours very truly,
ROSEBERY.

I was honoured shortly after this by the presence of a still more distinguished guest. His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, then Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, who had arrived at Quetta on a tour of inspection, decided to march through my Agency to Sharigh and Loralai, and inspect the troops at these stations. I was camped out in the wilds between Khalifat and Sharigh, when I received a telegram from General Sir Oriel Tanner from Kach saying that the Duke and his staff expected to arrive the next day at Sharigh. I telegraphed back at once and invited the party to dine with me, to which I received a reply: 'Duke of Connaught accepts invitation to dinner with pleasure.' Then came the serious side of the situation. Although I never went in for roughing it for the sake of roughing it, as I had been encamped for a length of time in the wilds, I found my larder reduced to an alarming extent, and at that season of the year Sharigh was about the most impossible place to get supplies of any kind, and with eight or ten hungry men to provide for and the time so short I felt in despair. In desperation I took my gun and went off, and by good luck managed to get a mixed bag of about eight brace of sisi (hill partridge) and quail, and with these and the inevitable Indian murghi (fowl) and tinned provisions I managed to get together a dinner sufficient of its kind. Luckily I had a few bottles of champagne, which helped to make it go off all right, though I was in an agony the whole time and fear I did not make a very lively host. I am sure my reader will agree that under the circumstances there was some excuse for me, as I had not been in the habit of

entertaining royalty, though afterwards when I had the honour of becoming better acquainted with his Royal Highness on the line of march, and found that he was just the English gentleman and good soldier who did not on occasion mind roughing it with the best of us, I saw that I need not have taken it to heart as much as I did. All the same, I took the first opportunity of telling Sir Oriel Tanner how annoyed I was at not having received timely information of the intended march through my Agency, to enable me to give his Royal Highness a more worthy reception.

We had a delightful tour to Loralai. We were marching along one morning through the valley between Smallan and Loralai when a fine male ooryal with a grand pair of horns came down from the hills on our left and crossed right through the open valley, making for the hills on our right, along the margin of which we were riding. He was determined not to be daunted or turned back, and when he got near he just made for the hills at full speed. I was riding on ahead with the Duke's A.D.C., Major Hannay, and a party of police and tribal levies. I hastily snatched two police carbines, gave one to Major Hannay and kept the other myself, and we cantered on, when on going a little further the ooryal crossed right in front of our horses and bounded up the side of the mountain. We both jumped off our horses. When the ooryal had gone about a hundred yards he sprang on to a projecting rock, and, in the idiotic way they often do, just stood and looked down at our cavalcade. Major Hannay took a snap shot at him and bowled him over, and he rolled down the side of the mountain quite dead, almost under the legs of the horse ridden by the Duke, who had just galloped up and was greatly pleased with the little incident. I think the feat was a remarkable one, considering it was a snap shot and a police carbine.

From Loralai his Royal Highness marched to Harnai



LOUISE MARGARET BRIDGE, CHAPPAR RIFT

to meet the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, who arrived by train from Sibi. The reception by the Duke of his chief was a very interesting sight. The whole party then proceeded by appointment to Manjhi, where they met her Royal Highness the Duchess of Connaught, who was accompanied by Sir Oliver St. John and Sir James Browne. The next day the Duchess performed the interesting ceremony of opening the great Chappar Rift bridge, called after herself the Louise Margaret. The illustration (facing p. 162) represents a view of the bridge looking up the Rift. The Duchess adventurously volunteered to proceed from Manjhi through the Rift and over the bridge to the scene of the ceremony on a trolly, on which her Royal Highness was safely piloted by the energetic constructor, Major B. Scott, R.E.

CHAPTER IX

TRANSFER TO DERAJAT—WAZIRI AFFAIRS, 1887 TO 1889

My disappointment at not getting the officiating Agency when Sir Robert Sandeman went on furlough in March 1887 was added to by my not being able to see any prospect of further promotion in Beluchistan. I found, moreover, that my contemporaries, and even my juniors, in the Punjab Commission were succeeding to appointments with better prospects and emoluments than my own. I therefore put my case before the Government of India, and begged that my claims might receive consideration. I also put the matter before Sir Robert Sandeman, and asked that one of three things might be conceded me—either that, if I remained in Beluchistan, I should receive emoluments at least equal to what I should have got had I remained in the Punjab Commission; or that I should receive promotion in the Political Department in India; or, if these were denied me, that I might be permitted to return to the Punjab Commission in the place I should have occupied if I had never left. At the same time, I said I was loth to break off my frontier career if it could be avoided. Sir Robert Sandeman replied that he entirely concurred in the grounds of my claim, and promised to do everything in his power for me. Meantime business connected with urgent affairs demanded my presence in England, and I applied for and obtained a year's furlough, and sailed from Bombay on May 6, 1887. Sir Robert Sandeman kindly said that he would try to have something satisfactory decided for me about my appointment before my return to India.

I will pass over the time I spent on leave, which would not interest the general reader. I found my wife and children all well at Bournemouth. Our eldest boy was reading for Sandhurst, and our third boy had got into Wellington College.

Sir Robert Sandeman was as good as his word. He supported my claims to the Government of India, in which he expressed his concurrence; represented the exceptional length and nature of my service on the frontier, the recognition my tribal work had gained, and recommended that my services might be retained in Beluchistan, some special arrangement being made whereby I should not be a loser. The question had not yet been settled when I returned to India, and on arriving at Bombay on April 4, 1888, I telegraphed to the Government of India for instructions, and was directed to join Sir Robert Sandeman at Lus Beyla. I sailed immediately for Karachi, and having arranged for some riding camels I started to Lus Beyla and found Sir Robert Sandeman at Sonmeani, laid up in bed from the effects of a bad fall from his horse, which, it was subsequently found, had put his shoulder out of joint. He was still in communication with the Government of India as to my future employment, and hoped to be able to retain my services and obtain for me some suitable position in Beluchistan. Meantime he deputed me to carry on the work that had brought him to Lus Beyla, and when he was well enough to travel he returned to Quetta.

Soon afterwards it was decided by the Government of India that I might return to the Punjab in my former place in the Punjab Commission, and it was intimated to me by the Punjab Government that I was appointed to officiate as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan. I received the following telegram from Sir Robert Sandeman, dated Quetta, April 25, 1888: 'I congratulate you heartily on your appointment to officiate as Deputy Commissioner, Dera

Ismail Khan.' I also had a kind letter from him in which he wrote:

I am sure you will get on well at Dera Ismail. I thank you many times and most sincerely for all the good work you have done in Beluchistan for the Government and for me. I am sure that it will bear fruit to yourself hereafter more than it has done perhaps in the present. I think all are aware of the very excellent service you have done in Beluchistan.

So ended my service under the Government of India in the Political Department, extending over a period of twelve years, full of absorbing events, as I think these pages show. Twenty-five years had passed since I had been to Dera Ismail Khan, and coming back under such different circumstances seemed strange to me. I found the mission and school that had been established by my brother was being carried on by the Rev. F. Papprill, of the C.M.S., and was in a very flourishing condition.

The first thing naturally which engaged my attention on taking over charge of the district was the state of the powerful and important Waziri tribe. The position which the Waziris occupied in respect to the Dera Ismail Khan-Banu Border appeared to me to be very similar to that occupied by the Marris and Bugtis towards the Dera Ghazi Khan-Jacobabad frontier in 1866, as described in Chapter I. Ever since the annexation the state of our relations with the Waziris had continued to occupy a foremost place in the serious attention of Government. Over twenty years before, her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, in commenting on a scheme for the amelioration of the condition of the Mahsud Waziris which had been proposed by Major Graham, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, wrote as follows:

March 8, 1866.

The experience of the last few years has abundantly shown that in a political, a military, and a financial sense the preserva-

tion of the peace of the Trans-Indus frontier in such a manner as to secure to our subjects permanent immunity from predatory incursions is an object of paramount importance to which the best efforts of your Government should be constantly directed. When I consider the expense incurred in expeditions for the repression and punishment of tribes concerned in such depredations—a course which we have frequently been compelled to adopt during the last ten or fifteen years—and their unsatisfactory results, I cannot but think that an experiment, even if, as you believe, of doubtful advantage, can be otherwise than a good application of the public money. The pacification of Border tribes by persevering in the exercise of humanising influences is more likely to be permanent than their subjection by military force; and I always shall, therefore, receive with satisfaction such proposals as that now before me, recommended by your officers on the spot, which afford a reasonable prospect of rendering the people on the frontier line between our territories and Afghanistan peaceful and friendly neighbours.

These words, emanating from such high authority, encouraged me in my hopes, and, taking them as a starting point, I perused carefully everything that had been recorded about the Waziris, and held long and frequent interviews with the Sirdars and Maliks of the tribe. After some months' study of the question I came to the conclusion that it would be found practicable to deal with them on the lines suggested by her Majesty's Secretary of State. These were, in fact, neither more nor less than the principles which formed the keynote of Sir Robert Sandeman's policy, and I fully believed that the Waziris would be amenable to the same influences which had proved so successful in the case of the Beluch, Brahoe, and Pathan tribes of Beluchistan, between whom and the Waziris I could practically see little difference. I felt convinced that it would at all events be worth the trial. Accordingly, in November 1888 I drew up a memorandum giving my views in full, and containing certain proposals for the better management of the Waziris,

as well as of the Bhittani and Sherani tribes, which was published by the Punjab Government.

I noticed in a former chapter that I believed that the democratic character of the Waziris and the Afridis as compared with other tribes, Beluch and Pathan, is exceptional and of recent growth, and is in a large measure due to our dealing direct with men who had no hereditary standing, and on lines quite opposed to their own tribal customs and procedure. I think this view is borne out by the writings of Major Graham, Colonel Munro, Colonel Paget, and other frontier officers who knew the Waziris in former times. Paget, in his 'History of Frontier Expeditions,' in describing a Waziri raid committed in 1860, writes:

> The Waziris, personally brave and invariably of vigorous muscular frames, wanted the power of combination to resist effectually the charge of our cavalry. Cut down and ridden over, they fled in confusion, the men in the front forcing back the men behind, till all became a helpless rabble, struggling, striving, straining to regain the safety of the mountains. The result was that about 300 Mahsuds were killed, including six leading Maliks, and many more wounded. Among the former was Jangi Khan, the leading chief of the whole tribe.

Major Graham, in submitting his scheme in 1866, writes thus: 'The business of those clans without Maliks is conducted by Umar Khan, Yarik Khan, and Sarfaraz Khan.' Yarik Khan was brother-in-law of Shah Newaz Khan, chief of Tank, Sarfaraz Khan was chief of the Machikhel section, and there is no doubt that these were the then most influential men; but Umar Khan was, as his father, Janghi Khan, had been before him, the head chief of the whole Mahsud tribe. We, however, threw over Umar Khan and dealt direct with the small men of the tribe, with the result that in 1879 he came down with a force of some two or three thousand Waziris and burned the town of Tank. In reporting on this raid Colonel Munro wrote:

When reporting to Government in October last on the measures taken for detaching the Border tribes from communication with Kabul, I had occasion to note the absence then at Kabul of Umar Khan, a leading Alizai Mahsud Malik, whose father, Janghi Khan, had led the Mahsuds in their attempted attack on Tank in 1860, when he was killed with upwards of two hundred of the tribe in the rout of three thousand Mahsuds towards their hills which ensued upon the brave and well-managed attack made upon them by detachments of cavalry suddenly called from the outposts by Ressaldar Saadat Khan and Akwak Singh of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. I noticed in forwarding your reports of October that Umar Khan's hatred of us and our Government was a well-known fact. He has long been considered a dark-minded bigot of fanatical tendencies, and the loss of his father fighting against us has ever rankled with him. His influence, however, among the Mahsuds has not hitherto been believed by any means to equal that of his father, but recent events would indicate that this impression or estimate of Umar Khan was incorrect.

I brought this point to notice myself in my Memorandum referred to, which I may repeat here :

The main difficulty with the Mahsuds will be to undo the evils we have ourselves done. By ignoring the head men and working through go-betweens we have raised up a multitude of nobodies in the tribe until their jirgas have become a perfect rabble. These men have pushed themselves to the front either by sharp practice or in the general scramble, where under a better system they would never have had an opportunity of putting themselves forward or making themselves troublesome, and our first task would be to relegate these men again to their proper position. The really legitimate and influential Khans and head men look on these upstarts with great jealousy, and would be only too glad to assist in getting them back into their proper places again, but until this is accomplished they would probably give some trouble.

I think our subsequent working of the tribe proved this view to be correct. Had Sir Robert Sandeman ignored the Marri and Bugti Tumandars as Umar Khan was ignored,

we should never have brought those tribes straight; but he took the opposite course and supported the right man in the right place, and it is that support which has made them what they are.

I therefore went to work on precisely the same lines as I had done in Rajanpur over twenty years before. My main difficulty proved to be, as indeed it may be remembered had also been the case in Dera Ghazi Khan, the undoing the evil we had given rise to ourselves by dealing direct with marauding characters and minor men of the tribe, and in getting together a working jirga. I found some, indeed I may say most, of the leading men willing to assist, but the predatory sections, Abdulrehman-Khels, Ghararais, and others, had got the upper hand. The attitude of these sections was similar to what had been the attitude of the Mussoories among the Bugtis, the Bijaranis among the Marris, and the Panizais and Hamzazais among the Kakars, when we first tackled them. Without our strong support Gholam Mortaza Khan could never have coerced the Mussoories, nor could Ghazzen Khan and Mehrulla Khan have brought the Bijaranis straight; and in the case of the Mahsud Waziris, it is still more difficult for the loyally disposed Maliks to restrain the bad characters of the tribe. What makes it so is that the numbers to be dealt with are so much larger. The Mahsuds number some eight thousand fighting men, while the total fighting strength of Marris and Bugtis combined does not exceed six thousand. Notwithstanding this, I hold that if our support is given in the proper way the Mahsud Maliks will be enabled to restrain and keep the bad characters in order.

The popular idea, but a very erroneous one, is that all Mahsuds are incorrigible robbers and live on their ill-gotten gains. There never was a greater mistake than this. The majority of the tribe are well skilled and industrious

cultivators of the soil and clever and keen traders, and it is only a small minority who live by plunder. It is curious that the same popular error was prevalent with regard to the tribe of Kurds in Persia, which Curzon in his book on Persia corrects, and his account of the misconception, as well as the general description he gives of the Kurds, so exactly applies in all particulars to the Mahsuds that I will quote it here. He writes:

> They (the Kurds) are commonly spoken of as though they were all nomads, all robbers, and for the most part monsters of iniquity. The impeachment against the evil-doers among them is quite sufficiently strong without including the innocent in the attainder. By far the greater part of the Persian Kurds are sedentary and pastoral, a great many of them farm and till the ground on the hill slopes, an even larger number keep herds of sheep, goats, and cattle, from which they make excellent cheese and butter, and the extent of the nomadic habits is in most cases that in the summer months they move into camp on the higher acclivities above the settled villages which they inhabit in the winter. . . . As regards their character, every variety may be found in their midst, from the typical robber chieftain to the harmless peasant, and from the dashing warrior to the miserable thrall. Those who know them best deny that they are naturally either cruel or fanatical, and credit them with a rude hospitality and high courage. When excited, however, they are as ugly customers as can be encountered. . . . Ruled by a strong and just hand, there is no reason why they should not become an orderly community, very useful for purposes of warfare, instead of a bogey to frighten the missionaries and scarify the readers of 'The Daily News.'

If we substitute for the name of Kurds that of Mahsud Waziris, this account would apply with equal correctness to the latter.

It would only bore my readers if I were to give a history of the different measures I proposed for the improvement of our relations with the tribes, especially the Mahsud Waziris,

more particularly as it would, to the general public, seem almost a repetition of what I have already described of our first intimate dealings with the Marris and Bugtis. Should those connected with frontier tribal administration desire further particulars they will find them in the Memorandum referred to, and connected official correspondence. I shall therefore confine myself to giving as briefly as possible an account of the general line I adopted, and the results achieved in a few cases, I may call test cases, I took up in which the Mahsuds had been implicated.

In February 1888 an attempt had been made under the direction of my predecessor, Mr. Ogilvie, to open the Gomal Pass, which, chiefly in consequence of the misconduct of certain notorious bad characters among the Mahsuds, ended in failure. All relations with the tribe had been consequently severed, certain emoluments they received and rent-free lands they enjoyed were confiscated, and they were informed that until they made amends for their past misconduct, and, by a continuance of good behaviour for such term as might satisfy the Government, proved themselves worthy, these would not be restored to them or friendly relations be established. My aim was therefore to bring about this desired result. In November 1887 two convicts, who had been convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for burglary, escaped from police custody and fled across the Border and obtained an asylum with the Mahsuds. The Mahsuds had been severely censured for bringing these men in with them at the time of the Gomal Expedition, which they had done in the hope that at such a juncture they might succeed in obtaining a pardon for them. The men were at the same time arrested and sent back across the Border. Subsequent to the failure of the expedition the Mahsuds had committed a few heinous offences, notably a daring one in which some Mahsud

burglars had broken into the military post of Manjhi, and carried off two breech-loading cavalry carbines and some other Government arms and accoutrements. I determined to take these cases up, and by means of them test the professions of the Mahsuds and their worthiness to be received into favour under the terms laid down by Government. The first step I took was to summon Umar Khan, the leading Malik, who came in at once on receiving my summons. I had many conversations with him and the other head men, and I told them that if they surrendered to me unconditionally the two convict outlaws, made over the rifles and other Government property stolen from the Manjhi post, and made suitable restitution in other outstanding cases, I would make a special recommendation to Government in their favour. The surrender of refugees and the giving up of breech-loading rifles were, I knew, both as severe tests as could be conceived. After lengthy consultations among themselves and some hesitation, especially in regard to the surrender of the refugees, they said they would do all that I had advised them to do.

In the case of the Manjhi robbery, unfortunately, the two men, Haji and Azammi, who had got the Government arms in their possession were relations of Umar Khan and had a bitter family feud with him; and when Umar Khan went to their house to receive from them the arms which they had promised to surrender, they treacherously shot him dead. If we take Umar Khan's antecedents into consideration, it is indeed a remarkable fact that he should have met his death while actually engaged in recovering Government stolen property. Neither the tribe nor his relations attributed any fault to us in the matter, and his son, Badshah Khan, continued to work well for me, and in the month of September succeeded in recovering the rifles and other property, and brought them in and made them over to

me. In the prosecution of the other cases I continued to keep the Maliks up to the mark, and at length in November they brought in and surrendered to me unconditionally one of the two outlaws, and shortly afterwards in January the second one. These two important matters, in the results of which I took such a deep interest, being disposed of, I came to an engagement with them about all other outstanding cases, subject to the approval and confirmation by Government. The Commissioner, Mr. Ogilvie, in recommending my settlement for sanction, wrote of it:

The proceedings now terminated involve the submission of the Mahsud tribe to the terms imposed by Government in the spring of last year after the failure of the Gomal Expedition; and sufficient amends for their past misconduct. This is the view held by the Deputy Commissioner, and taking the whole case into consideration I agree in this view. . . .

With special reference to the surrender of the two convict refugees, he recorded as follows:

. . . The convict Kaka was given up in November 1888, and the convict Walli in January 1889. These men were surrendered unconditionally, and they are now working out their sentences in the jail at Dera Ismail Khan. I believe that in consideration of the petition of the Mahsuds the Deputy Commissioner has not sentenced them to any additional punishment for escaping from custody, but the sentences to which they were condemned at the time of their escape will be completely worked out. I cannot lay too much stress on the importance of this act on the part of the Mahsud tribe. It is an act of unequivocal submission, and will be a most valuable political precedent for the future. The surrender of refugees is opposed to all the traditions and feelings of a Pathan tribe, and there could be no surer test of the degree to which the insolent pretensions of the Mahsuds have been humbled by the policy of Government than the fact that they have been forced to do this act in the hope of regaining favour. The surrender of these offenders was not among the conditions imposed when the hostages were returned, and the Deputy

Commissioner deserved great credit for having firmly impressed on the Mahsuds the propriety of proving their contrition for past offences and breaches of faith by this signal act of submission.

With reference to the question of getting together a representative council of the head men and working the tribe through them, he wrote:

Regarding the Deputy Commissioner's statement in Paragraph 33 of his report, that he knows the real representative men of the tribe, I observe that it has been the aim of former Deputy Commissioners to get together a really representative jirga of moderate size which would have authority in the tribe; but owing to the anarchical condition of the Mahsuds these efforts have hitherto met with but indifferent success. I note, however, that it may be possible to do now, under the present altered circumstances, what was impossible formerly; and the prospects of introducing some order into the tribe are more hopeful now than was ever the case before.

The Punjab Government, after some demur on the grounds that my settlement had been too lenient a one, confirmed it; and sanctioned the restoration of the emoluments, rent-free lands, and service allowances that had been withheld, but in a different form to that in which they had formerly been granted. On receiving official intimation of the sanction, I held a great meeting of the Mahsuds at Shiekhbudin, in which nearly all the leading men, with some hundreds of their followers, were present. I was able at this meeting to lay the foundation of a representative working jirga, and to make a distribution of the Government service allowances among the sub-sections in such a way as was agreeable to the whole assembly. The Commissioner gave the following account of my negotiations and their results:

. . . The Deputy Commissioner has succeeded in distributing the grant between the sub-sections of the tribe in a manner which

has received the formal approval of a large and thoroughly representative tribal assembly. As a direct consequence of this distribution, a body of representative men has been brought forward, whose position as such has received recognition by consent of the whole tribal assembly. Thus, for the first time in the history of our dealings with the Mahsud tribe, it appears that substantial progress has been made towards the formation of a manageable representative jirga on a sound basis.

. . . . .

The Deputy Commissioner deserves credit for the able manner in which he has carried out this business. In this, as in all other dealings between Government and the Mahsuds which have taken place in late years, Azim Khan,[1] Kundi, has done excellent service. The three officials who were associated with him also did good work; but to Azim Khan, after the Deputy Commissioner, undoubtedly belongs the chief credit of bringing the negotiations to a completely successful issue.

Never was praise more richly deserved than that bestowed on Azim Khan.

In sending up my schemes for the approval of Government I most strongly urged that a properly qualified European officer should be appointed to superintend the working of them.

The Punjab Government, in their final proceedings, commended my exertions, and concurred as to the good service done by Azim Khan. While recognising the advantages of having a special European officer to supervise the tribal arrangements, they did not recommend it on the grounds of its cost.

On November 26, 1889, I was promoted to be a Deputy Commissioner of the first class.

My transfer from Thal-Choteali to Dera Ismail Khan by no means terminated my official connection with

[1] The title of Khan Bahadour and a valuable jagir were afterwards bestowed on Azim Khan by the Government of India in recognition of his valuable frontier services.

the Beluchistan Agency. As the boundaries of Dera Ismail Khan are coterminous for a considerable distance with those of Thal-Choteali and Zhob (see map) I had to settle a great deal of tribal work in communication with the Beluchistan officers, and Sir Robert Sandeman and I were still destined to work out together many important and interesting frontier measures.

In 1886 the Kakars of Mina-Bazar had committed some outrages in the Thal-Choteali district. With the sanction of the Government of India, Sir Robert Sandeman proceeded himself to Mina-Bazar to exact reparation for these offences. He was provided with a strong military escort, and was accompanied by the principal Beluch, Brahoe, and Pathan Sirdars, with a numerous contingent of their followers and a body of tribal levies. The expedition proved entirely successful. Umar Khan—one of the leading Maliks of Mina-Bazar, and who had been the moving spirit in the hostile faction—was taken prisoner, and suitable punishment was inflicted on the offenders. From Mina-Bazar he marched to Appozai, now Fort Sandeman, where he was received with the most marked friendliness by Khanan Khan, the head chief of the Mundo-Khel Kakars. The Mundo-Khel jirga presented a petition soliciting that Zhob might, like Bori, be taken directly under British protection, in return for which they said they would willingly become loyal and faithful subjects.

I got a letter dated December 17, 1888, from Major MacIvor, who had succeeded me as Political Agent of Thal-Choteali, telling me all about the expedition, and as the interesting account he gives of it may be taken as typical of the general nature of the tribal work of a frontier civilian under the Sandeman *régime*, I will quote some extracts from it here. He writes:

Our expedition has been, I think, a great success, and I had better tell you all about it from the beginning. You know, of

course, that after you made over charge several cases of Ghaza occurred in Bori and Duki, and the badmashes invariably took refuge in Mina-Bazar with Umar Khan. Sultan Mahomed had been surrendered by the Kibzai chief, and was sent as a prisoner to Quetta. Umar Khan remained to be dealt with. He remained rebellious, would not obey Sirdars Shahjehan and Shingul, and declined to come in when summoned by Archer. Sir Robert took advantage of the Commander-in-Chief's (Lord Roberts) visit to urge the necessity of his visiting Mina Bazar, which the Government sanctioned. We marched from Kingri to Khan-Mahomed-Kot on November 27, and the same day Archer and I reconnoitred the shortest route to the Drug, which we found quite impracticable for camels without considerable labour. On the 29th we marched straight to Musakhel Bazar, and then on to Murgha-Kibzai, which we reached on December 2. A march previous, one of the Kibzai villages proved *Yagi*,[1] and refused to bring in supplies to our halting place, so I visited it with a party of cavalry and captured the ringleaders, and made the village grind a certain quantity of flour and bring it on to Murgha. At Murgha we got a letter from the Mina-Bazar Maliks and Umar Khan, begging us to wait at Murgha and they would do anything we liked. At the same time we heard that they were blocking up the pass, Durra-i-Dahna, with boulders. There was some talk of a halt or of going round by Barakwal and Tadda, but I strongly urged speed, and luckily we decided to go on at once. With our levies and Beluches we cleared away the barrier of boulders for the force and pushed on, meeting the head men of Pir Mahomed's village (who always sheltered the badmashes) some distance within the pass. They were in fear and trembling, Pir Mahomed being himself at Mina, and swore they were our subjects. The next day, the 4th, we reached Mina, but found Umar Khan had left for his own village twenty miles off. He left friends to say he was coming in, but wished Shingul to go and bring him and give him 'safe conduct.' We sent on Shingul and others, and Archer and I started next morning with a lot of levies and fifty cavalry troopers. On the road we met Shingul and Co., who had not ventured to go to Umar Khan's village, with Umar Khan's cousin. They said Umar Khan had fled, no one knew where,

[1] *Yagi* means rebellious.

with his goods and family, but that his cousin was as strong a man as he and would do as well. I knew better, and made the beggar dismount and hurried him on in front, with an occasional cuff to make him go on faster, and said he should go on like that till he chose to remember in what direction Umar Khan and his family had gone. After a bit he thought better of it, and told us he had gone off towards the Kunder River, so we diverged off in that direction, and after a ride of twenty-three miles overtook the convoy of camels, bullocks, &c., with his wives, goods, and chattels, and his son. Some said Umar Khan had gone on ahead, and others said he was behind, but all agreed when his family was captured he would soon turn up; and sure enough, when we were resting and feeding our horses, a solitary horseman appeared, who turned out to be Umar Khan, and he gave himself up, so we returned in triumph with him and his son to Mina. Next day a durbar was held, and the Abdullazais and Pakhizais were fined 3,500 rs., and Umar Khan, his son, and Pir Mahomed were ordered to be kept in confinement until the Sibi fair, when their cases would be taken up. Late that night the Mundo-Khel head men came in, and next day we marched on twenty miles to Umar Khan's village, and next day to Appozai, one of the Mundo-Khel villages. The same day Archer and I made a détour of forty-five miles into Ghosa to visit a refractory Kibzai Malik. Having secured him, we returned *viâ* the Babar village to Appozai very late, and found Sir Robert intent on making a rapid reconnoitre next day down the Zhob River to the Gomal. We accordingly started off next morning, and marched some thirty miles and more down the river almost to a place marked Tal Khan Kot on your old map. Coming on the tracks of a raiding party, presumed to be Sulimankhels, it was thought advisable to return and avoid any chance of a row, so we came back ten miles and encamped, returning next day to Appozai. We were within twenty-five miles of Kajuri-Kach and the Gweleri Kotal, and I was much disappointed we did not get up closer to you! The country is practically quite open, and as far as we went there was a lot of rice cultivation. Sir Robert has been, you will be glad to hear, extremely fit, only suffering occasionally from his arm, and is up to any march. After a day's halt at Appozai, we marched straight back here in five marches, *viâ* Barutkhel and the Tor-Khezi Pass. At Gwal-Haiderzai Shahjehan, Shahbaz Khan, and all the Jogizai family joined us,

and marched to Barutkhel, where we had a durbar and settled all pending cases, and they gave in a petition praying us to occupy Zhob with troops, and saying they were willing to pay revenue. The old Mundo-Khel chief, a very fine old fellow, was really most delighted to see us, and made similar petitions. I asked him if he was prepared to accept the consequences of our bringing troops up and pay the revenue, and he replied beaming 'certainly, with pleasure, take revenue from us, take cattle tax, take everything, but only come!' . . . We have now made all the Zhob tribes, from the Mundo-Khel and Abdullazais to the Mirzais, acknowledge Shahjehan and Shingul, and they are all to work together and keep Zhob in order until we are pleased to take over the country, and I certainly think we are great fools not to do this without delay. What do you think? If we were up in Zhob behind them, I don't think your friends the Sheranis would give any more trouble. I shall like very much to hear from you about them and the Mahsuds. What is the strength of the latter, &c?

I had also a letter from Sir Robert Sandeman giving an account of his tour, and asking if I thought it would be practicable for him, in communication with me, to come from Zhob with a tribal escort down the Gomal Pass to Tank, suggesting that I should meet him in the pass with the Mahsud Maliks. The march of events, however, as will be seen from the following pages, prevented any action being taken with regard to this suggestion.

In order to ensure the proper protection of the railway lines to Quetta and Peshin, and for the establishment and maintenance of safe communications between India and Afghanistan, the necessity for opening the Gomal and Tochi Passes had for long engaged the attention of Government. After Sir Robert Sandeman's very successful tour just described, which in a great measure cleared the way for them, these important questions were brought prominently to notice again. Sir Robert Sandeman recommended that the petition of the Zhob Kakars tendering their allegiance, and asking that they should be taken under the ægis of the

British Government, might be accepted, and that Zhob should be put on the same footing as the Bori valley, and be incorporated in the Beluchistan Agency. He proposed that he should proceed himself with a suitable escort to carry this measure out, and suggested that simultaneous action should be taken by the Punjab Government for the opening of the Gomal Pass, and that I should be deputed on special duty to accompany and work under him, in the first place, in coming to a settlement with the Mundo-Khels and Sheranis, and secondly to negotiate with the Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khel Waziris of Wana for opening and guarding the Gomal Pass, and for the permanent pacification of the country through which it runs.

I also wrote a Memorandum on the subject, and as I gave in it the reasons why I believed it would be practicable to come to a satisfactory arrangement with the Waziris for the Gomal and Tochi Passes, on the same lines as had been adapted with such success for the opening of the Bolan and other passes in Beluchistan, I will quote an extract from it here. After alluding to the desirability of pacifying the country and rendering the passes safe, in the interests of frontier defence as well as of trade, I wrote :

. . . On the north, having obtained a footing in the Khyber by treaty with the Amir of Kabul, we have so strengthened and secured our position there by the erection of forts and the enlistment of armed local levies that we now hold undisputed possession of the pass as far as Lundi-Kotal.

On the south a policy has been pursued still wider in its scope and more far-reaching in its results. Under the Sandeman administration not only has free and unrestricted communication been secured over the passes, but throughout the length and breadth of the vast territory which stretches from the northern boundary of Zhob southward to the sea our influence now reigns supreme and paramount, and henceforward the destinies of its people are inseparably linked, for better or worse, with those of the British Government.

In spite of this process of political absorption which has been going on elsewhere, the strip of territory which forms the subject of the present Memorandum still remains for us a *terra incognita*, its resources undeveloped, its people practically unknown to us, and even the country itself for the most part unexplored. The reasons for this, I think, are not far to seek. The Waziris cannot be said to have resisted our efforts to enter on more neighbourly terms with them ; for hitherto, if the truth be told, we have made no such efforts, or, if attempted, they have been made in such an inadequate and spasmodic way as was almost certain to defeat their object. We seemed to have looked on them as a nationality of irreclaimable brigands with whom the less we had to do the better.

On the few occasions on which we have come in contact, or rather in collision, with them we have taught them that we could meet reprisal by counter-reprisal; but up to the present we seem to have never thought it worth our while to show them that it is in our power to befriend and benefit them, as well as injure them.

If, however, the scheme of Imperial defence is to be carried through in its entirety, the present isolation of Waziri territory from the sphere of British influence must clearly sooner or later cease, for in this scheme the opening up of the Gomal and Tochi Passes has become a detail of the first importance.

The former of these routes leads to Kandahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and the latter to Ghazni. Both passes are dominated by the Derwesh-Khel and Mahsud sections of the Waziri tribe. Consequently their political administration and control cannot be separated, and it will be convenient to treat them both together.

I would here note that the term 'opening up' these passes is somewhat misleading. If it were only required, as in the case of the Khyber, to enforce and maintain our right of way, there is no doubt that by enlisting and arming strong bodies of local tribesmen and establishing a chain of posts we might push up troops by these routes, or a certain number of kafilas might be convoyed up every month under the protection of an armed escort. I presume, however, that the Government has other and larger ends in view; that their object is not merely to secure the military tenure of the Gomal and Tochi Passes, but to open out the entire country, reclaim it from anarchy, and render it safe for all comers, develop

its resources, so that its supplies, transport, &c., may be available for the purposes of Government, and, in short, bring it into line with its southern neighbours, in whose territories commerce and agriculture are now carried on without interruption, and the roads, as is the case in the Bolan, Harnai, and Thal-Choteali routes, as well as along the new military road from Peshin to Dera Ghazi Khan, can be traversed in safety by night or day without the protection of armed escorts.

The Khyber System and the Beluchistan System have sometimes been contrasted and compared as if they were two different methods of attaining the same object. A moment's consideration will show that they are essentially different not only in the means they employ, but in the ends they aim at. In the Khyber we had a special object limited by special conditions, and the term 'opening up' the pass was not inapplicable; for in this instance our attention and expenditure was mainly directed on the opening up and maintenance of the pass itself, the extension of political influence over the surrounding tribes not being regarded as essential to our immediate purpose. In the Gomal and Tochi Passes we are limited by no such conditions. We are at liberty to secure not only the mere right of way, but the ulterior advantages the situation affords us, and this understood the opening up of the two passes at once falls into its natural place as only one of the resultant but essential details of a wider and more comprehensive scheme. It has been held in some quarters that the exceptionally democratical and incorrigible character of the Waziri tribe presents an insurmountable barrier against the further extension of the Beluchistan system towards the north. In the Memorandum I wrote in November 1888 on the Waziri, Bhitanni, and Sherani tribes, I gave my reasons for not concurring in this opinion. The views which I then held I felt much diffidence in bringing forward, for they were contrary to popular opinion on the subject, and at that time I had only recently become acquainted with these tribes. Since then, however, another year has passed, during which time I have been brought into intimate and continuous relations with them and have been afforded repeated opportunities of studying their character and measuring to some extent the difficulties we have to contend with. The experience thus gained confirms me in the views I then expressed. I find the Waziris neither better nor worse than many of their neighbours, and my dealings with them

up to the present lead me to the conviction that provided we go the right way to work and succeed in convincing them that their interests are identical with our own, they will readily appreciate the advantages which our connection with them will bring in their train, and cast in their lot with us without reserve. I would be far from asserting that such a consummation will be easy of accomplishment. The management of men is always a difficult and delicate task, especially of such wild spirits as those of the semi-savage, but fine, manly, and warlike races who inhabit our borderland.

Twenty-five years ago anarchy reigned supreme along our frontier from Dera Ghazi Khan to the sea, and those passes were as insecure and as firmly closed against us as the Gomal and Tochi are now. Why then should it be supposed that difficulties which we have successfully mastered elsewhere should prove insurmountable in the case of the Waziris, at all events until similar means have been tried and failed? The same thing, I recollect, was said of the Kakars, Marris, and nearly every other tribe with which we have been brought successively in contact, but a long experience in these matters has taught me that no difficulties exist which cannot be overcome by a firm, fair, conciliatory, and unbiassed policy, carried out with tact, courage, and perseverance.

The whole question was now taken up by the Government of India, and the measures adopted must form the subject of another chapter.

CHAPTER X

OPENING OF GOMAL PASS, 1889 TO 1890

THE Government of India had come to recognise the great importance of the Zhob and Bori valleys, and that it would be essential to the maintaining of the safety of the railway lines, as well as to the perfecting of the communications with Quetta, that Zhob should be, like Bori, under our protection and control, all sections of the Kakars thus coming under one uniform administration, and that the Gomal Pass should be opened; the two operations forming one scheme, neither of which would be successful without the other, and which should be treated simultaneously.

At this time the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, contemplated making a tour on the frontier, and it was arranged that the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir James Lyall, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, and the Chief Commissioner Beluchistan, Sir Robert Sandeman, should meet his Excellency at Dera Ismail Khan and there come to an understanding on the whole question. On arriving at Dera Ismail Khan, on November 10, the Viceroy determined to visit Tank and have a look at the Gomal Pass for himself. The arrangements for the tour devolved on me, and I had the privilege of entertaining the party while at Tank. It was, I believe, the first occasion on which it fell to the lot of a Deputy Commissioner to have the privilege of entertaining at the same time a Viceroy, a Commander-in-Chief, a Lieutenant-Governor, and a Chief Commissioner, and, though rather anxious, as was I think natural, I felt honoured by

such a distinction. I had one set of tents pitched round the sessions house at Tank, and another set at Mortaza, a village situated near the entrance to the Gomal Pass. After breakfasting at Dera Ismail Khan the whole party drove out to Tank in tongas. All the leading Mahsud Maliks, and the Derwesh-Khel Maliks of Wana, came out to meet and pay their respects to his Excellency, who spoke to them kindly and asked them some questions about the Gomal and other matters. In the afternoon the Private Secretary, Colonel (now Sir John) Ardagh, sent for me and said the Viceroy wished me to take him for a drive and show him round the place. This put me in rather a dilemma. There are only two roads at Tank fit for driving, the road to Dera Ismail Khan, the one along which we had just come, and the other round the town of Tank. It would indeed, I apprehended, be a bad omen for our Forward Policy if I were to drive his Excellency along the Dera Ismail Khan road, thus turning our back to the frontier. On the other hand, the town of Tank had up to that time the evil reputation of being rather a dangerous place, and I did not wish to make a fuss about escorts. I did not myself believe there would be the slightest danger, as most of the Waziri Maliks were with me and the tribe was on its best behaviour, and had it been anyone but the Viceroy I should not have minded, but being the Viceroy I hesitated to take such a responsibility on myself. I therefore consulted Sir James Lyall, and on my assuring him that I believed there would be no risk, he concurred that it would be best for me to drive his Excellency round the town. We accordingly set out, and as we were driving under the wall of the town Lord Lansdowne said he should like of all things to go in and see it. I said that we could not drive through the town; 'then,' said his Lordship, 'let us get out and walk.' I then told him of my consultation with Sir James Lyall about the

drive. When I said I thought it would be quite safe to do so, he decided to walk through the town. His Lordship first visited the mission school, which was in charge of the Rev. John Williams, a highly respected native pastor. We then went to the Waziri serai, and through the garden of the young Nawab of Tank. There were about fifty Mahsud Waziris working in the garden, and when they saw us they threw down their spades and ran up, said they were very hungry, and asked for a *sohbut* (feast). Lord Lansdowne spoke to them for a while, and then asked me to tell them that he would send them a present. The Tonga met us in the garden, and as we drove back I showed his Excellency the gate where Sir Henry Durand, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, had been killed in passing through on his elephant. On arriving at the camp Lord Lansdowne asked his Military Secretary, Lord William Beresford (better known to his hosts of friends in India as Bill Beresford) to send the Mahsud workmen a present of 100 rupees. On the next morning we marched to Mortaza, and after breakfast rode to the entrance to the Gomal Pass. Again there was a consultation as to whether it would be safe for the Viceroy to enter the pass, which he was himself anxious to do. I gave my opinion that there was no risk whatever, as the most influential of the Waziri Maliks were present with me, and I knew well that they were all most eager that their Excellencies should see everything. And so it was decided that his Lordship might go; and nothing in the course of my long frontier service had afforded me more intense satisfaction than seeing Lord Lansdowne ride up the Gomal Pass. I felt that the pass might then be considered as good as already opened, and the pacification and civilisation of Waziristan ensured! After inspecting the pass we rode back to Mortaza, and returned to Tank in the afternoon after a long but entirely satisfactory day's outing.

On the next day at the Viceroy's command a committee was convened, consisting of Sir James Lyall, Lord Roberts, and Sir Robert Sandeman, to decide on and frame a plan of operations for the occupation of Zhob and the opening of the Gomal Pass. As soon as the committee had agreed as to the measures necessary to be taken, they waited on the Viceroy, who approved generally of their proposals.

It would be beyond the scope of this memoir to describe the different important measures proposed by Sir Robert Sandeman in connection with the occupation of Zhob, and for the carrying out of which it was decided that he should visit Zhob again in December accompanied by a suitable military escort.

It was explained to me that I was to be put on special duty to accompany Sir Robert Sandeman and work under him, first in coming to a settlement with the Mundo-Khels and Sheranis, and secondly on the more important business of getting in the Mahsud Waziris and Derwesh-Khel Waziris of Wano, of making an arrangement through them for the permanent opening of the Gomal Pass, the safe-guarding of it and the Gomal route to Zhob by means of service allowances granted to the leading Maliks, and the establishment of tribal posts garrisoned by Waziri levies in the pass and elsewhere, on somewhat the same lines as had been pursued in Beluchistan. I was asked to prepare a Memorandum showing the amount of allowances I considered should be granted to the head men, as well as the numbers and cost of the tribal levies, Waziris and Sheranis, for guarding the Gomal Pass and other lines of communication with Zhob. I was further invited to state in my Memorandum any additional measures I might believe to be necessary to enable me to carry to a successful issue the special duty on which I was to be deputed by Government.

My recommendations may be thus briefly summarised. I proposed to entertain from the Mahsuds twelve non-commissioned officers and one hundred and two mounted men at a cost of 28,440 rs. per annum; from the Derwesh-Khels of Wana four non-commissioned officers and fifty-four mounted men at a cost of 14,280 rs. per annum; and from the Sheranis two non-commissioned officers and twenty-three mounted men at a cost of 18,540 rs., making a total of 61,260 rs. per annum. I asked that I should continue to hold charge of the Dera Ismail Khan district, and that an additional officer should be sent to carry on the ordinary current work under my orders. This would, I knew, strengthen my hands in my negotiations with the tribes and prevent intrigues. I further asked that a European Assistant should be permanently sanctioned for Tank, especially for tribal work, and as a personal favour I begged that Mr. J. S. Donald, Extra Assistant Commissioner of Rajanpur, should be appointed to the post, and that his services might be placed at my disposal immediately, as there was no time to be lost. I had been acquainted with Mr. Donald and his work in my old post at Rajanpur for many years, and knew well that it would be difficult to find a more skilful tribal manager. I proposed to take the following native gentlemen with me: the young Nawab of Tank and Sirdars Azim-Khan, Kundi; Rab Newaz Khan, Musazai; Dost Mahomed Khan, Babar; Allahdad Khan, Ramzan Khan, and Khoedad Khan, Usteranas; and Zeman-Shah, Syud.

My programme was approved of, and all my proposals sanctioned with the exception of the estimate for the annual tribal service allowances, which was reduced by Sir James Lyall from 61,260 rs. to 50,000 rs.

On the following day the party returned to Dera Ismail Khan. As everyone seemed pleased I concluded that the Tank arrangements had gone off all right, and

I got a kind letter from the Viceroy's Secretary, in which he said:

I am glad to say that the tour terminated in a brilliant success, and I think their Excellencies were really very much pleased with their trip round the frontier, to the success of which you ably contributed, and for which we are very grateful.

As far as the entertaining part went, if credit was due it was to my wife and not to me, as she did everything, and Lord Lansdowne very graciously made a formal call on her expressly to thank her.

After halting for a day at Dera Ismail Khan the Viceroy started for Quetta, and before the party broke up it was arranged that Sir Robert Sandeman should shortly proceed to Lahore to meet Sir James Lyall again, to arrange the final preliminaries of the scheme, and that I should accompany him. It had at first been proposed by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to send a force to the Dera Ismail Khan side of the Gomal Pass as a support to us in our negotiations, but this was deprecated by Sir Robert Sandeman as tending to make the Waziris think we had no confidence in them, and thus create doubts in their minds as to our intentions. In this I agreed, and the idea was abandoned. As previously arranged, I met Sir Robert Sandeman *en route* to Lahore on December 1, and there some matters connected with the scheme which had not been fully settled at the Dera Ismail Khan conferences were disposed of in consultation with Sir James Lyall. Subsequently the orders of the Government approving of the proposed arrangements were received, with the important reservation that unless a satisfactory understanding were concluded with the tribes beforehand no attempt should be made to open or force the Gomal Pass without further reference. It will be seen further on how this proviso made my task all the more delicate and responsible. Sir Robert



FORT SANDEMAN, APPOZAI

Sandeman and I took every precaution to keep the order secret, as in all frontier enterprises intrigues, unless guarded against, are liable to upset the best laid plans; and we feared that if the order became known some evil-disposed factions might have taken advantage of it to raise an opposition.

I returned to Dera Ismail Khan from Lahore on December 6, and on the 10th I received a telegram from Sir Robert Sandeman asking me to meet him at Loralai on the 16th. I therefore felt that I had all my work cut out for me, and little time for preparation. Fortunately Mr. Donald arrived on the 10th, and I arranged with him for the assemblage of the Mahsud jirga at Tank. I wrote invitations to all the leading Maliks, and left them with Mr. Donald, and told him I would, directly on my arrival in Zhob, open communications with him and inform him when and where he should send the Maliks to meet us. I then arranged to send my office establishment with the native gentlemen through the mountains by the direct route *vid* the Vehoa Pass and Drug, with directions to meet me at Appozai (now Fort Sandeman). The Usterana Tumandars held themselves responsible to safeguard the party through the hills and arrange for their supplies. I also despatched a separate mission under the charge of Sirdar Rab Nawaz Khan, Musazai, to go through the Sherani country and endeavour to collect and bring with him the Sherani Maliks.

On December 13 I started from Dera Ismail Khan and joined Sir Robert Sandeman at Sibi on the 16th, and on the same day we proceeded by rail to Harnai. From Harnai we reached Appozai in ten marches, where we arrived on December 26. The party I had sent direct in charge of the Sirdars also arrived safely the next day without encountering any difficulties. No more convincing proof could be afforded of the friendly feeling of the Kakars towards us, and the

genuineness of their invitation and request that they should be brought under the ægis of the British Government, than the fact that nothing eventful occurred on the march. We met with a welcome everywhere, but especially from the Mundo-Khels.

I may note so far at this juncture with regard to Sir Robert Sandeman's scheme for the occupation of Zhob that Bori and Zhob were, with the sanction of the Government of India, formed into a separate Political Agency, and Captain MacIvor[1] was put in charge. The appointment was in every way an appropriate one. Captain MacIvor was an able officer and a man of great energy and courage; he had a long experience of frontier civil work, and was a universal favourite.

I have already mentioned that the orders of the Government of India directing that no attempt should be made to move the troops through the Gomal Pass without having beforehand concluded a thorough understanding with the tribes had made my task a very delicate one. In effect it came to this, that Sir Robert Sandeman, having occupied Appozai, said to me: 'Here we must remain, even if it should entail the loss of a year, until you have completed your arrangements with the Waziris for a peaceful progress onwards.' He was undoubtedly right, as in the face of the orders of the Government of India the idea could not be entertained of advancing in the direction of the pass with any risk of having to turn back again. All the same Sir Robert agreed that it was putting the *bona fides* and capabilities of the Waziri Maliks to a very crucial test to require them all to come to Appozai through the country of their enemies, and some seventy-five miles from their own borders. Luckily, I had mentioned to some of the Maliks

[1] The late Major MacIvor, C.I.E., who died of cholera at Gwalior just as he was about to come home on leave, as we hoped, to enjoy a well-earned rest.

Photo, Lafayette

MAJOR MacIVOR, C.I.E.

that they might have to come to Appozai, though I had hoped we might have arranged with them as we continued our march onwards towards the pass, concluding our negotiations with them at Kajuri-Kach. Seeing now that this could not be, I took the bull by the horns and telegraphed to Mr. Donald to send the complete jirga to Appozai. I sent at the same time messengers direct and summoned the leading men of the Derwesh-Khel Waziris of Wana. The first measure I took in hand after arriving at Appozai was to establish by means of Waziri and Sherani tribal levies direct communications with Mr. Donald at Tank. For this purpose I stationed mounted men at Koria-Wasta, Kashmir-Kar, Nili-Kach in the Gomal Pass, and Mortaza. They carried the post for ourselves and the escort. They were constantly employed carrying letters and messages, which they did with great rapidity and punctuality, and made themselves useful in a hundred other ways. In fact, the arrangement worked well from first to last and without a single hitch.

By the time that Mr. Donald received my telegram the leading Maliks of all sections of Mahsuds were with him, with the exception of Badshah Khan and a few of the Abdulrehman-Khels. Badshah Khan's idea was that by not showing eagerness in coming in he might enhance his prestige as leading Khan of the Mahsuds; while, on the other hand, the Abdulrehman-Khels thought their status, as chief among the plunderers in the Gomal, entitled them to separate and exceptional treatment. Mr. Donald, however, wisely determined not to wait for them, but to endeavour to induce those who were with him to start immediately, believing that he would then have less difficulty in getting the others to follow. All his plans turned out successfully. Notwithstanding that intrigues of the usual kind were rife, and the wildest rumours were circulated to prevent the

Mahsuds from going to Appozai, by patient tact and good judgment he overcame all difficulties, and on January 7 I had the satisfaction to receive his reply saying that he had despatched the Mahsud jirga to Appozai in charge of Karim Khan, son of Sirdar Azim Khan. The Abdulrehman-Khel Maliks, finding that the others had actually started, came in to him without further delay followed by Badshah Khan, and after some palaver and pressure he was able to start them off also. They came by the Gomal Pass and Moghul-Kote, and arrived in due time at Appozai without meeting any misadventure or opposition *en route*. The jirgas comprised nearly every leading man of note in the tribe, and numbered, with their followers, four hundred and sixteen men. They also brought with them at my request two hundred Mahsud labourers to work on the new road Sir Robert Sandeman had commenced to construct between Appozai and the Gomal.

It will thus be seen that I had not been mistaken in my estimate of Mr. Donald. To the uninitiated in the management of frontier tribes, it may seem to have been a small matter for him to collect all the Mahsud Maliks at Tank and send them to Appozai; but it was in reality a task full of difficulties, as was warmly recognised by Sir Robert Sandeman, who in referring to this point wrote in the following terms:

I halted at Appozai from December 26 to January 22 in order to allow Captain MacIvor to complete his settlements with the Mando-Khel and Zhobi tribesmen, while Mr. Bruce was engaged in more distant negotiations with the Sheranis, who live in the Punjab frontier south of the Gomal Pass, and the Mahsud and Zalli-Khel Waziris, who inhabit the country round the Gomal Pass itself. Naturally, my attention was largely occupied with Mr. Bruce's negotiations, and all his arrangements were made in communication with myself. His report shows how, after much patient labour, the Mahsud and Zalli-Khel jirgas were eventually

induced to come in their entirety the whole way to Appozai. These two jirgas were thoroughly representative of their tribes, and I gladly permitted Mr. Bruce to authorise their arranging among themselves within the limits of their respective allotments the terms of their future service. Mr. Bruce describes the risk and discomforts which attended the long and arduous journey undertaken by the Waziris to join me at Appozai, and I agree with him that no greater test of their good faith could have been put to them. When once they arrived at Appozai and I had had time to notice their demeanour there I gave them my entire confidence, and their subsequent excellent behaviour, both on the march and in the pass, proved that my trust in them was fully justified.

It is well to bear in mind that this was the deliberate opinion Sir Robert Sandeman formed of the Mahsud Maliks after full opportunity of judging of their working, and it may be admitted that no man was better qualified to judge or less seldom mistaken in his estimate of the characters of our Border chieftains.

The jirga of the Derwesh-Khels of Wana, in answer to my summons, also arrived in camp, and my task of distributing the service grants and entertaining the levies commenced. It would weary my readers if I were to ask them to follow me through the ups and downs of my negotiations; suffice it to say that I was able to make my distribution of the services to the satisfaction of all parties concerned, and to take written agreements from the jirgas for the safety and protection of the Gomal Pass, and communications with Zhob; and that their levies, nominated by themselves, would remain present and serve loyally and faithfully in any posts the Government might be pleased to fix.

It may be remembered that my original estimate for the cost of tribal services necessary for the opening of the Gomal and other passes into Zhob, and for a permanent settlement with the Waziri and Sherani tribes concerned, was

61,260 rs. per annum; but this had been cut down by Government to 50,000 rs., and I was instructed to keep my engagements within that limit. In the arrangements that had been concluded the Bargha Sheranis had been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Beluchistan Agency, and out of the 50,000 rs. a sum of 7,680 rs. per annum was made over to Sir Robert Sandeman for service allowances for that tribe, leaving 42,320 rs. From this I proposed service grants to the Mahsud Waziris costing 30,456 rs., and to the Derwesh-Khel Waziris of Wana 5,040 rs.; total, 35,496 rs. per annum. The balance of 6,824 rs. was retained for the settlement of the Largha Sheranis. I shall have a word to say further on on the subject of the cost of these tribal levy corps and allowances to chiefs.

We had not been quite so fortunate in our negotiations with the Sherani tribe, as Murtaza Khan and some other Maliks in the Largha division, who had always been in hot water with Government, failed to come in. As their absence did not, however, interfere with the two principal measures, the occupation of Zhob and the opening of the Gomal, Sir Robert Sandeman determined to leave them to be dealt with hereafter. How this was accomplished will be seen later on in this memoir.

After completing my negotiations with the Waziris, I represented to Sir Robert Sandeman that we might now march through the Gomal without encountering any opposition. I brought all the Maliks before him, and after testing their agreements and satisfying himself as to their ability to carry them out, and their good faith, he gave orders for our continuing our march onwards through the Gomal Pass to Dera Ismail Khan. Sir Robert telegraphed these results to Sir James Lyall, who replied:

Lieutenant-Governor is very glad to get the news regarding acceptance of conditions of service by Mahsud and Zalli-Khel

Waziris given in your telegram of yesterday, and cordially congratulates you and Mr. Bruce on the success of the negotiations.

Captain MacIvor was now installed in his new and important post of Political Agent, Zhob, with the faithful Khan Bahadour Hak Nawaz Khan as his native assistant, and a force of two hundred infantry, one hundred and fifty cavalry, and two guns, and a party of tribal levies was told off from the Zhob Field Force as his escort. On January 22 we bade him good-bye, and wished him good luck in his new and responsible sphere; and, marching from Appozai, made Kajuri-Kach in four marches, arriving there on the morning of the 25th. As we neared Kajuri-Kach it was with a feeling of great pleasure and satisfaction that we saw Mr. Donald riding out to meet us, and Sir Robert congratulated him warmly on his successful arrangements. He had just come from Tank, and had ridden through the Gomal Pass escorted by a party of Waziri and other tribal levies. The news of our arrival was telegraphed to Government by Sir Robert, who said:

I have already wired to you that I was able to place confidence in arrangements come to with Waziris. This was due to Mr. Bruce's indefatigable exertions, which I assure you I cannot praise too highly. This confidence was fully justified by their subsequent loyal and faithful conduct. They formed part of the levy escort which nightly took charge of my advanced camp, and our Sirdars report that during the marches, which have been accomplished without any misadventure, they aided them in every possible way, guiding them by the best routes, and evincing their desire to do good services. On arrival in the morning I found my camp ready pitched, as if we had been marching in our own territory. I telegraphed this, as it speaks better for good faith of Waziris than any words I could employ to show my expectations have been realised. . . .

We halted for a couple of days at Kajuri-Kach to enable the Superintending Engineer, Colonel Bigg Wither, with the

aid of the Pioneer Regiment and some Mahsud labourers, to improve the road over the Gweleri Kotal at the head of the pass. The few days we spent at Kajuri-Kach were perhaps, with the exception of the time at Quetta when poor Hewson was murdered, the most anxious days of my whole frontier service. I knew that the Gweleri Kotal was the key of the Gomal position, and that if any unforeseen difficulty were to arise that would be the most likely place for it to do so. On the morning of our arrival at Kajuri-Kach a very unfortunate incident occurred, which upset me a good deal. My native superintendent, Amir Chand, a Hindu, who was in charge of my office, committed suicide. The work and anxiety had proved too much for him, and for a few days it had been noticed that he did not seem like himself, and was excited. I saw him when I arrived at Kajuri-Kach, and it struck me that his manner was very peculiar. After breakfast I sent for him, but he was nowhere to be found. I suspected at once that something was wrong, and sent out parties to search for him. About half a mile from camp he was found lying under a cliff quite dead. They did not disturb the body, but sent in word for me, and I went out and saw him lying there with the revolver still in his hand, with which he had shot himself through the brain. Over-anxiety was the immediate cause of the act, but I learned afterwards that there was madness in his family, and that another member of it had committed suicide.

The second night at Kajuri-Kach was a very trying one. About midnight I was awoke by a great noise in the camp. My tent was quite light inside, and on hurrying out I found that the tent just behind mine was on fire. The fire had caused a stampede among the horses, and a number of loose horses were brought back into camp by the Waziris. It was a strange and a weird scene, to see by the light of the burning tent a number of wild-looking Waziris,

armed to the teeth, holding these horses in the middle of the camp. There were a lot of loaded cartridges in the burning tent, and these exploding added to the anxiety of the moment. Presently things settled down quietly, and I ascertained there had been a sick man in the tent who kept a small oil lamp lighted, with which the fly of the tent had come in contact and caught fire. When the fire had been extinguished I went back to bed, and was just going to sleep again when I heard a shot fired, and almost immediately afterwards the assembly was sounded. I called a Waziri orderly of mine and asked him what had happened. He said he did not know, but supposed the Waziris were up! I just thought to myself all our efforts have come to naught, with no alternative but to force the Gomal! It turned out that a Havildar of the Pioneers had foolishly, contrary to orders, gone outside the camp limits, and had been shot dead by some ruffians who were prowling about. In the morning the tracks of some men were found going in the direction of the Suleiman-Khel hills, and it was said that the offenders were Suleiman-Khels.

Sir Robert Sandeman had given orders that we were to march in the morning to Nili-Kach, in the Gomal Pass. Early in the morning the military escort with all the baggage animals was sent on in advance. The furnishing of Captain MacIvor's escort had considerably reduced the strength of our military force, and we had an immense number of baggage animals, I believe over a thousand, which included the commissariat and transport camels and mules which had carried the supplies for the whole force; and as the road was still very steep and bad in parts, the crossing of the Gweleri Kotal was an arduous task. After breakfasting at Kajuri-Kach Sir Robert Sandeman and I started, escorted by the Waziri Maliks, and our own Sirdars and levies. We reached the summit of the Gweleri about noon,

and sat there for three hours watching the baggage animals passing over, and did not leave until the very last animal had passed from the foot of the Kotal right down into the Gomal Pass. I could not but feel a sense of triumph on realising that the Gomal Pass had been opened without firing a shot; I hoped never to be closed again. The three hours I had spent on the summit with Sir Robert were the three most anxious hours I had ever passed, and the sense of relief was correspondingly great. The scene itself was a strange and unique one; we two Englishmen, with our tribal following, which included some hundreds of Mahsud and Derwesh-Khel Waziris, all armed to the teeth. That was the strong point of Sir Robert Sandeman's policy throughout; he knew his men, and when and where to trust them. He went in for no half measures, but showed them unmistakably when he did trust them, and this, above all things, they appreciated, and gave in return valuable and loyal service.

He thus describes the situation at this juncture:

It had been settled that troops of escort were to march first through the pass, starting at half-past six, and that I was to follow with Maliks and levies after breakfast. The troops marched as arranged, and I followed at half-past eleven, and remained on Kotal till all the baggage had passed over, consisting of 400 mules and 643 camels. I then marched for Nili-Kach, arriving late in afternoon. All baggage arrived there safely, and not even a petty theft occurred. As, during previous nights, Maliks had been in responsible charge of political camp, I assembled them at Nili-Kach, and proposed that during night they should be responsible for whole camp. This they agreed to, and the night at Nili-Kach passed without incident of any kind. We marched in the morning and arrived late in the afternoon. As far as has been reported not a theft has occurred. This disposes of assertion often made that Waziri Maliks cannot combine to enable them to command obedience of their clansmen. Undoubtedly, owing to the tribe being numerically very strong and

extremely poor, care and patience in our dealing with it is necessary before we can secure from the Mahsuds all our desired ends. At the same time, I am perfectly convinced that if these essentials are forthcoming we shall be amply rewarded by the Gomal Pass being made perfectly safe for traffic, and one of the largest of our frontier tribes becoming devoted to British interests. . . .

In another place he says:

A little time and patience with the wild but really fine people we have to deal with will give Government entire control of the pass.

On the 29th we marched from Nili-Kach to Tank, and on the 30th Sir Robert held a durbar and presented *khillats* to the leading Sirdars and Maliks who had done good service during the expedition. The native gentlemen I had taken with me had all given loyal assistance, but especially Sirdar Azim Khan, whose services in the working of the jirgas and composing all disputed points connected with the distribution of the service grants and other matters were simply invaluable. Sir Robert Sandeman said he had never seen a man work better than Azim Khan did, and that 'he had in fact done first-rate work,' and brought his services to the special notice of Government.

It will be necessary for me to go back here a little and give a brief account of our negotiations with the Sherani tribe. I mentioned that at the time I was starting from Dera Ismail Khan I had sent Sirdar Rab Nawaz Khan to try to assemble the Sherani head men and bring them to Appozai. The Khidderzai section and some of the Chuarkhels opposed Rab Nawaz Khan and would not allow him a passage through their hills. When I heard this I asked Mr. Donald to withdraw him, and send him on to Appozai with the Mahsuds, which he did.

After further inquiries, and on becoming better ac-

quainted with the physical features of the country, we found that the Sherani tribe and country are divided into two well-defined branches called Bargha and Largha, or the Highlands and the Lowlands, the inhabitants being called respectively Barghawals and Larghawals. The Highlands are on the side of Zhob and the Lowlands on the side of the Derajat, the dividing line being generally the watershed and higher peaks of the Takht-i-Suliman range of mountains. Consequently the physical configuration of the country makes the separation so complete that the two tribal divisions act almost entirely independently of each other. Moreover, the Bargha valleys and Zhob valleys open into one another, and the Barghawals possess large landed estates throughout Zhob. Sir Robert Sandeman and I therefore came to the conclusion that Bargha should be under the same administration as Zhob, namely Beluchistan, and Largha under the Punjab, and that on this understanding we would treat the two separately. I sent messengers to summon the jirgas of both divisions. After some delay and making sundry excuses all the Bargha Maliks arrived, including the leading Khan, Sarwar Khan. A deputation of Largha Maliks also came in and represented that they had failed to induce Murtaza Khan, the leading Khidderzai Malik, to come in, and they begged that further time might be granted to them. With Sir Robert Sandeman's concurrence I agreed to this, and they sent off messengers again. We then made a final settlement with the Bargha head men, entertained their levies, fixed the posts they were to garrison, and distributed the service grants. They were placed under the management of Captain MacIvor, pending the sanction of Government to Bargha being incorporated in the Zhob Agency, which was afterwards accorded. As I mentioned before, Sir Robert Sandeman did not consider the contumacy of the Khidderzais sufficient cause to delay our onward

march, as he said their absence did not affect the opening of the Gomal Pass or his arrangements in regard to Zhob and the settlement of the country, 'although it did the arrangements I desired to make with them for the Dera Ismail Khan frontier.' On leaving Appozai we therefore left directions that they should follow us to Tank. This they did, and all the head men arrived in Tank with the exception of the Khidderzais, whom they again failed to bring in. They entreated that they should not be punished for the sins of the Khidderzais, and that they might be taken into the service of Government. They held themselves responsible to put pressure on the Khidderzais, and to do their utmost to bring them in to make their submission within a term of six months. Should they fail and Government take a force to punish the Khidderzais, they undertook to accompany it and render every assistance in their power. Sir Robert Sandeman agreed with me that it would be well to give them a trial, and I accordingly concluded a settlement with them. This settlement included the entertainment of tribal levies, establishment of posts, and engagements with Maliks for the safe-guarding of the Chuar-Khel, Zao, and other passes between the Dera Ismail Khan district and Zhob; and other conditions. The annual cost of the services came to 6,824 rs. per annum, the balance of the 50,000 rs. sanctioned by Government, which had been retained for that purpose. In my final report to Sir Robert I recommended that if the measures taken did not bring about the submission of the Khidderzais within the term fixed, that a small military force should be sent against them from the Punjab and a similar one from Zhob. In this he concurred, noting at the same time that as it was a matter in which the Punjab was more directly concerned than Beluchistan, it would rest with the Punjab authorities to take the initiative. The Khidderzais had always been, like the Abdulrehman-

Khels among the Waziris, the black sheep of the tribe. Hence they were the scapegoats, and the sins of all sections were fathered on them. This probably made them afraid to come in.

Thus ended without a single serious *contretemps* another series of eventful measures connected with the tribes, carried out under the direction of my old chief, Sir Robert Sandeman. I was deeply gratified by his warm appreciation of my share in the work. Among other complimentary references to my services, he wrote:

> He has served under my own orders almost uninterruptedly since 1866. During the Afghan war he did noble service, and his work since then and during the late operations for zeal and ability in its performance could not be surpassed.

Such testimony, coming from such a quarter, was indeed something to have gained. Subsequently I received the cordial acknowledgments of her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, as well as of the Governments of the Punjab and India. The Government of India wrote:

> I am now to request that the thanks of the Government of India may be conveyed to Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, for the able and successful way in which he carried out his share in the difficult task entrusted to him and to Sir Robert Sandeman. It was in a great measure owing to the advice which this officer's judgment and thorough knowledge of the Waziri tribe enabled him to give that it was decided to combine the attempt to open the Gomal Pass with the proposed advance into Zhob; and the Government of India desire to acknowledge cordially the extent to which they are indebted to his exertions for the success of these important frontier operations.

In conveying their cordial thanks to Sir Robert Sandeman for his conduct of the Expedition the Government of India referred to it as 'one of the most brilliant and successful

frontier operations of recent years.' Sir Robert Sandeman also gratefully testified how much he was indebted to the good work done by Mr. Donald and by Sirdar Azim Khan, and brought their services to the special notice of Government, which, it will be seen further on, were generously recognised and rewarded.

On January 31, 1890, we returned to Dera Ismail Khan, and the next day Sir Robert Sandeman started for Quetta.

CHAPTER XI

KHIDDERZAI EXPEDITION. SHERANI AFFAIRS, 1890 TO 1891.

THE opening of the Gomal Pass necessarily brought in its train a long succession of difficult but most interesting frontier work. It became now a matter of the first importance to leave nothing undone to complete and perfect the arrangements for keeping the pass open and safe. To no people does the old saying of striking the iron while it is hot apply more forcibly than it does to our impulsive Border tribesmen, and many a good thing has been lost on the frontier by letting opportunities slip through our fingers. It is pottering over things and half measures that proves dangerous with them; but when matters are vigorously carried out in a reasonable way, though there may at first be opposition, they usually submit with a good grace.

The Government sanctioned posts to be garrisoned by the newly entertained Waziri levies. The sites we selected for the posts were Mortaza, Spinkai-Kach, Nili-Kach, Kajuri-Kach, and Kashmir-Kar. We prepared our plans and strained every muscle to get the works completed, for the construction of which we employed Waziri labour as much as possible. In this work Mr. Donald's services proved simply invaluable, and nothing could have been better than his management of the Waziris, particularly of the Mahsuds. He was always everywhere, superintending everything personally, and morning, noon, and until he went to bed at night, thronged by Waziris. Before he was dressed in the morning they used to come into his bedroom, and stalk

him even while in his bath. Still, he never lost his temper, hardly even his patience. He spoke their language as well as they did themselves, and managed them with consummate tact, and it was largely due to these rare qualifications that tribal affairs worked so smoothly at this juncture. Such men are worth their weight in gold to the Government on the frontier. The work was pushed on so vigorously that by the latter end of March the outer walls of all the posts had been completed and the gates put up, which afforded a great sense of relief and security.

Stimulating incidents were not wanting to keep us up to the mark. The Taji-Khel section of the Derwesh-Khels of Wana, who, not without some good grounds, were discontented with the distribution of service allowances made at Appozai, in which they thought their claims had not received due consideration, threatened to attack the Kajuri-Kach post and prevent its being built. I urged Mr. Donald to push on with all his might the finishing of the outer walls and to get the gate up. This he did, and the very day after the gate had been fixed the Taji-Khels came down with a force some hundreds strong and attacked the post. The garrison consisted of eighty of the lately enlisted Waziri levies, Mahsuds, and Derwesh-Khels of Wana, and a few Border police. Syud Akbar Shah and his brother, Sanobar Shah, Mahsuds of Kanigoram, both non-commissioned officers in the levies, were in charge. They had a few rifles, of which they made good use, as they successfully repulsed the attack and killed seven of the Taji-Khels, including two men of note. This was one of that class of cases which, in our future dealings with these tribes, should not be lost sight of. A mixed garrison of Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels, in fulfilment of their engagements for the opening of the Gomal, loyally defended one of our posts, repulsed a determined attack, and shot down their own

tribesmen, thereby inheriting a legacy of relentless blood feuds. It afforded a good test that Sir Robert Sandeman was not mistaken in his estimate that, if properly dealt with, they would prove deserving of 'trust and confidence.' I may appropriately relate here the conclusion of the affair, as I shall not have to refer to it again. Government, on my recommendation, gave handsome rewards to the defenders of the post. After a short time the Taji-Khels, who were completely crestfallen at the defeat and loss they had suffered, came in and made submission. I realised from them in cash a fine of 700 rs., and took adequate security from them for their future good conduct. I put the case of their alleged grievances before a Council of Elders of the tribe, who settled it to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

Some discontented Sheranis also threatened to attack the Kashmir-Kar post, which from its position dominates the Sherani country. But the post was finished before their plans were matured, and the failure of the attack on Kajuri-Kach so disconcerted them that it never came off. A number of the levies in the Kashmir-Kar post were themselves Sheranis. By the time the hot weather had fairly set in all our posts were finished, and we had, besides, constructed a fair road through the Gomal Pass. For these and connected tribal arrangements I had the satisfaction of receiving the thanks of the Punjab Government. I was then able to look around a bit, and experience a sense of real relief and rest. Mr. Donald and I had many delightful rambles in our new dominions, Mahseer fishing in the Gomal river, or shooting ooryal and markhor, and an occasional bear, on Kashmir-Kar. The higher peaks of the mountain attain to an elevation of over seven thousand feet, and we had hoped it might turn out a really good site for a sanatorium; but the water, of which there is a plentiful

supply, clear as crystal, gushing from springs covered with lovely maidenhair fern, is bad and unwholesome in quality, which will, I am afraid, always prove an insurmountable obstacle.

On July 1, 1890, Mr. Ogilvie went on leave, and I was appointed to officiate as Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division. This was the first time I really recovered from the bitter disappointment I had experienced in not having been appointed to officiate as Agent Governor-General of Beluchistan when Sir Robert Sandeman went on furlough in March 1887. After labouring for many years in a subordinate position, it is indeed one of the most delightful of sensations to feel one's self, as it were, suddenly emancipated and placed in the position of a responsible director of important affairs, and with the happy prospect of working out one's own plans. This was to me, I think, even a greater pleasure than it would be to most people, as, working as I did for such a number of years under Sir Robert Sandeman in the exceptionally close and intimate relations of friendship which existed between us, relations rarely found in men in our respective positions, in a measure spoilt me for continuing in a similar position under authority of a less sympathetic character.

In the month of April 1890 a troublesome quarrel occurred between some factions of the Bargha and Largha Sheranis, in which a Bargha head man, Laku Khan, who was in service with the Zhob authorities, and his brother were killed. Captain MacIvor, Political Agent of Zhob, accused the Khidderzais of being concerned in the affair, and Sir Robert Sandeman, in reporting the case to Government, recommended that in the event of the Khidderzais not making full submission within the term that had been allowed them, a punitive expedition should be sent against them in October. He suggested that a force of twelve

hundred infantry, two hundred cavalry, a mountain battery, and six hundred Beluch and Pathan levies should be sent from the Zhob side; that a force of similar strength should be sent from the Punjab side; that he should himself accompany the force from Zhob; and that the two forces should join hands at such a place in the Sherani country as might be decided on afterwards. He further proposed that the military arrangements for the expedition should be in the hands of Major-General Sir George White,[1] V.C., commanding in Beluchistan. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir James Lyall, recommended that as the Khidderzais resided in Largha, and for other reasons, the main force should go from the Punjab, and that I should be the chief political authority; but added that if the Government of India preferred that the main force should go from Beluchistan and Sir Robert Sandeman have chief political control, he would raise no objection. After a somewhat lengthy correspondence it was finally settled by the Government of India that the main force in command of Sir George White should proceed from Beluchistan with Sir Robert Sandeman as chief political officer, and that I should march up through the Gomal Pass with a tribal escort and meet him at Appozai. Further, that a force consisting of one and a half battalions of infantry, six mountain guns, and six troops of cavalry should advance simultaneously from the Punjab side under the command of Colonel Ross, C.B., and occupy Drazand in the Largha country. Mr. King, who had succeeded me as Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, was appointed to accompany Colonel Ross as political officer. Mr. Donald was also, on my recommendation, deputed to accompany

[1] Lately commanding the troops in Natal in the war against the Boers; now Governor of Gibraltar.

the force. The entire military force was placed under Sir George White's command.

After all preliminaries had been settled I left Dera Ismail Khan on October 21 accompanied by Mr. Donald, certain native gentlemen and head men of frontier tribes, and a tribal escort of one hundred men. We marched through the Gomal Pass, and on the 26th we met Sir Robert Sandeman at Safai, and next day made a double march and all reached Appozai together. From there Sir Robert sent an ultimatum to Murtaza Khan and the other Khidderzai Maliks, calling on them to make immediate submission; and, as they sent an evasive reply asking for a month's grace to consider the terms, Sir Robert informed the General that it would be necessary to compel the Khidderzais to submit by force of arms, and to take whatever measures he might consider necessary for this end. Accordingly under the General's orders two columns advanced, one under his own direct command *viâ* Walla and Marmazh to the Khidderzai headquarters at Namar, and the other, under the command of Colonel Nicholson, *viâ* the Chuar-Khel Pass to Moghul-Kot. The General at the same time telegraphed orders to Colonel Ross to advance and occupy Drazand and Domandai. He took with him Captain MacIvor and Mr. Donald as his political officers, and I accompanied Sir Robert Sandeman with Colonel Nicholson's column. The Khidderzais were by these measures regularly caught in a trap. They could make no effective resistance, and after a little while all the Maliks, with the exception of Murtaza Khan, who they said had fled from the country, came in and surrendered. Some bad characters at Nishpa and Kuchbina offered some slight resistance to Colonel Ross's column, and there was a small skirmish in which one sepoy was killed. But these also quickly made submission, which virtually put an end to

the military punitive operations. The terms fixed by Sir Robert Sandeman and myself in consultation were: (1) that Murtaza Khan and certain criminal refugees should be surrendered, or, in the event of their having left the country as reported, that they should not be permitted to return; (2) that the tribe should pay a fine of 6,000 rs., including 1,000 rs. inflicted on certain individuals for offences committed by them in Zhob and Dera Ismail Khan; and (3) that the Khidderzai Maliks and other refractory members of the tribe who had either surrendered or been taken prisoners should be detained as hostages until the terms had been completely fulfilled. This security was ample, as we had fifty-one prisoners, most of them men of some influence. The General consented to leave a small force in the country while the fines were being collected, and in a few days all were realised. Sir Robert Sandeman telegraphed to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that the objects of the expedition had been completely attained, and 'the political results eminently satisfactory.'

On November 18 the Force was broken up, and Sir Robert Sandeman and I marched to Drazand, and on the 20th we arrived at Dera Ismail Khan. In reporting to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab the particulars of the final settlement he expressed his grateful acknowledgments to myself and my officers and the native gentlemen and officials with me. Sir George White also mentioned the useful work done by Mr. Donald, and these services as well as those rendered by Mr. King and my native assistant, Sirdar Mahsud, were brought to the notice of the Government of India by Sir James Lyall. On the 21st Sir Robert left Dera Ismail Khan for Quetta, and thus ended the last event of active service which it was to be my privilege to carry out in personal communication with him, after a connection which had extended over a period of some

twenty-four years, and it may in justice be added to the roll of his 'bloodless victories.'

There was one unfortunate event occurred in connection with the Khidderzai Expedition. A party of the 3rd Beluch Regiment with some Sherani tribal levies were reconnoitring up the Zao Pass. They took shelter from a furious rain storm under a projecting cliff, when a land slip came down and buried twenty of them alive. The rest of the party summoned help from a neighbouring hamlet, but they only succeeded in extricating two, one dead and the other in a dying state. I have often since passed by the spot and seen the very innocent looking mound of *débris* which caused the untimely death and burial at the same time of twenty men.

On December 7, while I was out in camp on the Border, Murtaza Khan, the leading Khidderzai Malik, came in and surrendered himself to me. I telegraphed the news to Sir George White, and received from him the following reply: 'Thanks for telegram. Sherani subjugation now most complete. Accept my congratulations on result of strong policy.'

After the close of the Khidderzai Expedition, the question of boundaries between the Punjab and Beluchistan jurisdictions had to be settled, and the Government of India decided that Bargha should remain with Beluchistan and Largha with the Punjab, as had been settled at the time of the Zhob–Gomal Expedition, and that on the north the Gomal river from Kundar-Domandi to Kajuri-Kach should be the boundary between Beluchistan and Waziristan, as well as of the respective jurisdictions.

As in the case of the opening of the Gomal, the first practical step we took for the pacifying of and rendering safe the communications through the Largha Sherani country was the establishment and construction of levy posts at selected positions. The sites we decided on were

Drazand, Domandi, Gander-Kach, Moghul-Kot, and Ata-Khan-Kahol.

Of all the regions in the opening up and pacifying of which I have had a hand, few have surpassed in interest that of Largha Sherani. The scenery of its valleys, with the grand Takht-i-Suleiman and Kaiser-Garh Mountain, as it were, keeping watch and guard over them, and its superb gorges of Zao, Gat, Khidderzai-Dhana, and Chuar-Khel Dhana, are quite beyond the power of my poor pen to portray. I can only advise those who can get the chance to go and see them for themselves. They will find a rare treat in the way of scenery, which is quite unique; and if they are lovers of sport there are grand heads of markhor and ooryal to be found in the higher ranges of Yezekar, Khaiser-Garh, and Marmuzh, as well as black bears; and nice mahseer fishing to be had in the streams about Domandi and Drazand.

The opening of the Sherani country brought again to the front the very important question of the taking of land revenue from the hill tribes. It was held by a good many of our frontier officers that the subjugation of a frontier tribe was sufficient ground to entitle us to demand land revenue from them, or that it was a legitimate form of punishment to impose for crimes or outrages committed by a tribe. I, on the other hand, contended that the taking of land revenue or other Imperial taxes imposed on us continued obligations and responsibilities, and that we had no right to demand such until we were in a position to protect the clansmen from their enemies, and maintain such a measure of internal peace and order as would ensure their being able to cultivate their lands, and enjoy their own in safety, with security for life and property. In writing on this subject with reference to the entire belt of quasi-independent tribes, I thus represented my views at the time:

Our title to take revenue depends on our being able to extend to the tribes all the rights, privileges, and benefits of subjects. The broad principle I have always gone on is that we may fairly claim revenue when we secure protection from outside enemies, suppress crime, and control internecine feuds, so that each man can cultivate his fields and carry on his ordinary occupation in peace and safety. Until we do this we have no title to take revenue. It is a principle the justice of which is admitted by the people themselves, as it is indeed the foundation of all civilised government.

It is this status that the tribal chiefs have always meant, and do mean, when in their petitions they ask that they should be considered British subjects. They themselves thoroughly understand and appreciate the difference. This view at length prevailed, and Sir James Lyall, when writing to Sir Robert Sandeman about Largha Sherani, wrote as follows:

In Sir James Lyall's opinion, it will be better not to raise the question at present, and to let it stand over till the hill country of these tribes is more thoroughly under control, and till, by securing internal as well as external peace and order, we have conferred benefits on the people for which they may be properly made to pay.

And so it was ultimately settled; Bargha was incorporated with Beluchistan, peace and security for life and property established there, and land revenue and other taxes were realised, while Largha was left to what some consider the enjoyment of her feuds, with no security for life or property among themselves, and no taxes were taken. No doubt in time, when it becomes fully realised that peace and security among the tribes is as much an essential to the well-being of the Punjab frontiers as it is to those of Beluchistan, the question will be taken up in a comprehensive manner, not with reference to Largha Sherani only, but to all the quasi-independent tribes inhabiting the outer Suleimani ranges—Bhitanis, Mahsuds, Mianis, Largha

Sheranis, Usteranas, Kusranis, Bozdars, Haddianis, Durkanis, Bugtis, Marris, and others. The question is a very large one, and should be dealt with on a uniform and consistent plan.

At this time, under the orders of the Punjab Government, I formulated a scheme for the opening of the Tochi and other routes intersecting the regions inhabited by the Derwesh-Khel Waziris and Dawar tribes, on somewhat similar lines to those adopted for the opening of the Gomal Pass. It was a large business, but as its details would be a good deal like a repetition of those I have already related about the Gomal, and they would not be interesting to the general reader, I shall reserve the remarks I may have to make on the subject until I am giving an account of the opening of the Tochi Pass, when the scheme, modified to some extent, was sanctioned by Government. The scheme as proposed by me was to provide for the opening of the Tochi, Gumatti-Thal, and other principal trade routes and the pacification and protection of the country traversed by them.

On November 21, 1890, I was confirmed in my appointment as Commissioner and Superintendent of the Derajat Division. This was indeed a relief to my mind as well as a cause for much satisfaction, as I believe I was the first uncovenanted man who had gained the high post of permanent Commissioner, certainly of Frontier Commissioner. In a letter I received from Sir Robert Sandeman, he wrote: 'I congratulate you very heartily on your being appointed *pukka* Commissioner of the Derajat.'

In January 1891, at the time of the Cesarewitch's visit to India, I took the leading Waziri Maliks to Lahore, some eighty men in all, including their followers. Very few of them had ever been in a railway carriage before, and many of them had never been in a boat. I engaged for them a

couple of reserved carriages, and it was most amusing to listen to their arguments when trying to prevent other passengers from entering their compartments. I heard one of them say in very broken Hindustani: 'You must not come in here, we are all Waziris, and all robbers, and if anything were to happen to you we would get a bad name.' I need not, I think, say that the argument proved quite convincing! Sir James Lyall gave the Waziris a most kind reception, and treated them as Government guests during the time they stayed at Lahore. They were immensely pleased with everything they saw. They were present at the public reception of the Cesarewitch at the Lahore railway station, and at the fireworks given in his honour at the Montgomery Hall. They visited the zoological gardens and railway workshops, and everything else of interest there was to be seen at Lahore. I then took them to Amritsar, showed them over the Golden Temple and Davie Sehai's carpet manufactory and sent them in open carriages for a drive through the city of Amritsar and the public gardens. They told me that of all the strange things they had seen, they liked the carpet manufactory and the Lahore railway workshops best.

Our frontier work during the year 1891 was most absorbing and interesting; obtaining a knowledge of the newly opened up regions, and finding out and providing for their requirements. In May I made a tour accompanied by Mr. King and Mr. Donald through the Gomal Pass to Spin and Toi. Mr. Donald made several adventurous excursions. He started early one morning from Kajuri-Kach, and rode by the Shahur route *viâ* Maddijan, Sarwekai, Haidrai-Kach, and the Shahur Pass to Jandola. On another occasion he went through Spin and Wana to the summit of the Marwatti mountain. In this way we acquired a practical knowledge of the country which afterwards proved

useful when the boundary line was being fixed by Sir Mortimer Durand with the Amir.

In the autumn Lord Roberts paid a visit to the Derajat frontier accompanied by Sir James Browne and General Brackenbury. I had the privilege of conducting his Lordship on his tour. We marched through the Gomal Pass to Kajuri-Kach, and from thence through Upper Spin on to the Toi River at Karab-Kote, where it comes through the hills from Wana. We had breakfast at a lovely spring which gushes out of the foot of the Dandar rock, and some delicious little hill trout we caught in the stream made a welcome addition to our picnic repast. While at breakfast I sent one of our mounted levies to Wana to inform the chiefs that his Excellency had arrived, and in a couple of hours a large cavalcade of them, mounted on their fine little Waziri horses, came galloping up. They showed the greatest delight at seeing us, and begged that we might come on to Wana and afford them the pleasure of entertaining us there; but, as we had a long ride before us to get back to Kajuri-Kach, his Excellency expressed his regret at not being able to accept their pressing invitation. On our way back we took a different route, returning along the valley of the Toi, *viâ* Tatti-Dotani, Naureza-Zearat (the tomb of a saint named Hosein), and Dotoi, the junction of the Toi and Gomal Rivers. Just below Dotoi there are the ruins of an old fort called Sawan-Kot, occupying a picturesque and imposing position on the summit of an isolated hill. Sawan is said to have been a Hindu Governor under some king of ancient times, who established himself in this commanding and central position to dominate the surrounding tribes and protect the Gomal trade route. There is some capital mahseer fishing to be had in the reaches of the Gomal River below Dotoi. From Sawan-Kot we marched by the Gomal caravan route to Kajuri-Kach,

crossing and re-crossing the river several times. We passed several large Dotani encampments. The head men all came out to make their salaam. His Lordship spoke to them, and they all seemed very glad to see us, and were most friendly. After a ride of about forty-five miles we arrived late in the afternoon at Kajuri-Kach, where we stayed for the night. Next morning Lord Roberts continued his march to Zhob. Major MacIvor met us at Moghul-Kot, and there I bid farewell to his Excellency, who expressed himself greatly gratified at all he had seen, especially at the friendly disposition so eagerly displayed by all the tribesmen, with which he was much impressed. As was the case in the old Beluchistan days, I felt confident a visit from Lord Roberts would assuredly bring in its train good results for our frontier plans, and in this I was not disappointed. When saying good-bye I said that the object of my ambition was that I might have the pleasure, before his Lordship left India, of conducting him similarly through the Tochi Pass. Although I was not able to accomplish this, his Lordship had not left India very long before the Tochi Pass, at the earnest request of the tribesmen, was also opened.

Although the arrangements I had made, in consultation with Sir Robert Sandeman, with the Waziris at Appozai were very good as far as they went, practical experience and working proved that they had not gone far enough. They had only provided for the safety of the Gomal Pass itself, and the direct route from the head of the Pass along the Zhob valley to Appozai, or Fort Sandeman, as it was by the order of the Government of India now called; while the protection of the country north of the Gomal River from Kajuri-Kach to Spin and Gul-Kach was, as before, left to take care of itself. Now the fact that the boundary of Zhob extended right up to the Gomal River for the whole of this distance, while the great Powindah trading routes traversed

the tract, made it essential that its pacification and safety should be secured. This had always been one of the most favourite and profitable hunting grounds of the Mahsuds, and now that they were prevented from plundering in the pass they concentrated their attention on it, and harried the Powindah traders more than ever, who always, not without some just grounds, appealed to me for redress. Besides this, some notoriously bad characters among the Mahsuds, chiefly Abdulrehman-Khels, crossed through this unprotected tract and committed serious offences in Zhob. The key to the problem seemed to be in Spin, and in order to secure the position Government had assumed in the Gomal Pass and Zhob it seemed unavoidable that Spin should be occupied. I therefore proposed to Government that a strong military post should be established in Spin, and that new tribal levy posts, garrisoned by Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels of Wana and Shakai, should be established at selected positions between Kajuri-Kach and Spin, as well as at Jandola, and other points on the Mahsud-Bhitanni Border. I recommended at the same time that the military posts of Tank-Zam, Girni, Manjhi, and Jatta should be abolished. The total cost of the new levies required amounted to 18,000 rs. per annum. The tribal arrangements I proposed were approved of generally by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir James Lyall. But while recognising the necessity for a military post in Spin in the event of a railroad, or a cart road with railway gradients, being constructed through the Gomal Pass, his Honour recommended that its establishment should be deferred until the necessity for it should arise, meantime confining ourselves to the establishment of the tribal levy posts, for sanction for which he applied to the Government of India, and the keeping of the Waziris 'in decent order,' gradually improving our relations with them.

Unfortunately, these amended recommendations hung fire and much valuable time was lost.

Another useful measure which was carried out in 1890–1 was the amalgamation of the old frontier militia and border police of the Derajat districts, and the uniting and re-organising them into one force under the direct orders of the Deputy Commissioners. The object of the change was to substitute a better organised border police force, competent to deal with robbers from the hill tribes and to escort officers touring in the hills, thus relieving the regular troops of what is ordinary police work, and such like duties, which can be as efficiently carried out by police and levies, and enabling the troops to be moved away quickly wherever their services might be urgently required without disturbing the general administration. This should be, as I before explained, one of the great aims of frontier civil administration.

CHAPTER XII

DEATH OF SIR R. SANDEMAN, 1891 TO 1892.

IT was at this time that I was shocked and grieved to receive the intelligence of the death of my old friend and chief, Sir Robert Sandeman. To me personally it was indeed a sad blow, but to the frontier and service it was nothing short of a public calamity. As the originator and apostle of the true Forward Policy, and one with whom my own career was so intimately bound up, I cannot let the event of his untimely death pass without rendering my small tribute to his memory.

He died as he had lived, in harness at Lus Beyla, the most out of the way part of the vast territory to which, by years of unremitting labour, he had brought the blessings of peace and prosperity out of anarchy and confusion. As showing the light in which he was regarded by the tribes and those officially connected with him, I cannot do better than quote here the touching letter I received from his trusted and faithful native assistant, Rai Bahadur Hittu Ram, C.I.E. He wrote thus:

Camp Beyla, February 2, 1892.

DEAR SIR,—I am very sorry to inform you that we have lost here our old patron and master, and your old friend Sir Robert Sandeman. On January 20 he was attacked with catarrh, which on our approach to Beyla changed to influenza and inflammation of the heart, and at last, in the evening of the 29th at seven P.M., left this world, leaving sorrow and grievance for Lady Sandeman and his friends.

Lady Sandeman is in camp. Yesterday he was buried at this

place. Ah! The hope of the tribe and the joy of his friends is fled, and they will weep the tears of grief. Knowing that you will shed bitter tears of sorrow over his untimely death.

I remain, yours obediently,
HITTU RAM, E. A. C. Sibi.

The 'Pioneer,' in its obituary notice of Sir Robert Sandeman, in referring to the success which crowned his dealings with the frontier tribes and the Khelat State, which was identical with the success of his Forward Policy, wrote in the most laudatory terms. I will not repeat at length the 'Pioneer's' tribute of praise in regard to what it termed 'the almost Homeric conflict between him and Sir William Merewether, the Commissioner in Sind,' and his subsequent great work in Khelat, but will quote some extracts relating to his management of the frontier tribes, with which these Memoirs are more immediately concerned. It records thus:

By the death of Sir Robert Sandeman a well-known and commanding figure disappears from the scene of Border politics. Indeed it would scarcely be too much to say that never since British rule came in contact with the fierce Mahomedan tribes of the North-West has any British officer attained so widespread an influence among our warlike neighbours, or used it with more enduring results. It is now more than twenty years since Captain Sandeman first brought himself into prominence at the Mithankote Conference of 1871 as the irrepressible Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, brimming over with zeal and confidence in his own system for the management of the Marri and Bugti tribes and the Khelat State.

In those days he was by many regarded as a rash enthusiast to be repressed rather than encouraged, and the magnitude of the work his enthusiasm has since accomplished is hardly realised by the general public, or is at best but imperfectly appreciated, except by the few whose official duties have led them to make a study of the state of affairs which in the sixties and early seventies existed on the Sind and Punjab Borders.

. . . . . .

In those days the state of affairs on the Dera Ghazi Khan

frontier was similar to that which still exists, or at any rate until recently existed, on the border of most of the Punjab frontier districts. The country outside our own territory was a *terra incognita*, a British officer's life was not safe a few miles inside the hills, no friendly relations were maintained with the hill tribes, and on the principle of *omne ignotum pro magnifico*, the fighting strength of the tribes was egregiously exaggerated. The Marris and Bugtis were the terror of the country side, and were only kept in comparative order by the fear of our military strength, which on the Sind side was represented by the three regiments of Sind Horse maintained at Jacobabad, with their numerous outposts along the foot of the Bugti Hills. Our relations with the neighbouring Khelat State were managed by the Commissioner in Sind through the Political Superintendent of the Sind frontier at Jacobabad, and a Political Agent was maintained at the Court of the Khan. But ever since the accession of the present Khan in 1857 that country had been torn by dissension and civil war. In 1862 the Khan had been deposed, but had been recalled within the year. In 1865 and 1867 the Sirdars and the Jam of Bela again rose in rebellion, the Bolan Pass was closed to trade for months at a time, long strings of kafilas used to assemble at Shikarpur waiting for safe conducts which never came, and the whole Sind Border had been kept for years in a more or less disturbed and alarmed condition. It is clear, therefore, the two burning questions of the time when Captain Sandeman arrived in Dera Ghazi Khan were the best methods by which to control the Marris and Bugtis and the policy most likely to introduce peace into Khelat. On both these questions the young Deputy Commissioner soon formed decided opinions. He very shortly had an opportunity for dealing with the tribes, for in 1867, Ghulam Hosein, a Bugti outlaw, with about a thousand Marris and Bugtis, made a formidable raid on Hurrand in the Punjab, and burnt several hamlets. They were beaten off with loss, and after the raid Captain Sandeman applied to the Political Superintendent at Jacobabad to obtain redress for the injured parties from the Khan. The Political Superintendent replied that the Khan had no power over the Marri and Bugti tribes, although they were nominally his subjects, and could not be expected to control them; the Punjab officers must therefore trust to their military posts to keep them in order. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan was thus com-

pelled in self-defence to take action himself, and this Captain Sandeman, with characteristic promptitude, proceeded to do. The Marri chief was induced to visit him, the numerous cases of reprisals between his tribe and Punjab subjects were satisfactorily settled, and, having obtained sufficient funds by the farm of a salt tax on the Border, in the hills which his successful negotiations opened up, the money was distributed in service to the Marri head men.

This was the commencement of Sir Robert Sandeman's system of tribal service. It proved completely successful, and thenceforward the peace of the Southern Punjab Border was secured.

After referring to the results of the Mithankote Conference of February 1871, the 'Pioneer' further writes, in describing Sir Robert Sandeman's first Khelat mission and subsequent work:

Here at last was the tide which, taken at the flood, was to lead on to fortune, and Captain Sandeman seized boldly on the opportunity offered. Though his instructions did not expressly direct his interference in Khelat affairs, he, as usual, interpreted the orders given in the widest fashion, and with a large body of Marri and other Beluch tribesmen marched straight to Sibi and Dadar through the Marri Hills. At these places he was received by the representatives of both the Khan and the rebel Sirdars with enthusiasm, for both parties were weary of war, and, disregarding the anger of the Commissioner in Sind and his express orders to return at once, he pushed through the Bolan Pass to Mustang and Khelat, and boldly offered his services as a mediator between the rival parties. Sir William Merewether—who was under the impression that Captain Sandeman's operations were to be confined to the Marri and Bugti Hills, and that he would not attempt to interfere in the Commissioner's own domain of Khelat—telegraphed to Government that Captain Sandeman was grossly insubordinate, that his conduct was indiscreet, unbecoming, and contrary to orders, and that he had consequently recalled him, and trusted he would be instructed to return at once for venturing to interfere in matters with which he had no concern. But the daring young officer's bold stroke had succeeded so well, and there was such an evident readiness on the part of the Khan and the Sirdars to accept his mediation that he was warmly supported by his own

Government of the Punjab and also by the Government of India. His mission was considered to have established the soundness of his opinions, and his further proposals were approved. Finally, as Sir William Merewether's views were found to be irreconcileable with the new policy of Government, that officer was in January, 1876 relieved of all further responsibility for Khelat affairs, which by a stroke of the pen were placed under the Commissioner of the Derajat with Captain Sandeman as his subordinate.

A few months later Captain (now Major) Sandeman was sent a second time to Khelat to complete his work of reconciling the Khan and his chiefs. He met the Khan at Mustang early in June 1876, and after settling all the numerous tribal disputes by means of jirgas or councils of the Sirdars and the Khan's vakils, he obtained the consent of the Khan and the Sirdars to the famous agreement of Mustang. This important paper is the Magna Charta of Beluchistan. It lays down the principles of the old State constitution and the way in which they should be applied, it defines the rights and duties of the Sirdars both in their own tribes and in respect to each other and the Khan, and, as the last resort, in the event of irreconcileable differences, it provides for an appeal to the arbitration of the representative of the British Government. Major Sandeman's proceedings were highly approved by the new Viceroy, Lord Lytton, whose quick mind at once perceived the value of what had been accomplished. His Military Secretary, Colonel Colley, was sent to Quetta to confer with Major Sandeman on the situation, and the result was the signature by the Khan of the treaty of 1876. By this treaty the old provisions of the treaty of 1854 were confirmed and renewed, the Khan's subsidy was raised from 50,000 rs. to one lac of rupees per annum, and to the Government of India was conceded the right to make railways and telegraphs in the Khan's dominions, and to place troops in any part of the Khelat State. One of Lord Lytton's characteristics in his official work was his thoroughness, and he was the last man in the world to allow such results as those obtained by Major Sandeman to be rendered abortive through timidity in accepting new responsibilities. It was urged by Major Sandeman and readily admitted by the Viceroy, that the Mustang settlement would inevitably prove a dead letter unless an officer of the Government was on the spot to hold the Khan and the Sirdars to their engagements and to insist on its pro-

visions being observed. In pursuance, therefore, of the last mentioned article of the treaty, Quetta was fixed upon as the Headquarters of Major Sandeman and his escort, and that officer was formally appointed Governor-General's Agent for Beluchistan with three assistants under his orders.

In the concluding paragraph of his despatch reporting these arrangements to the Secretary of State, Lord Lytton used these memorable words, which strike the keynote of Sir Robert Sandeman's policy toward the frontier tribes and foretold the results which followed his appointment:

'Of one thing we feel certain. If it be conducive to British interests, as we have no doubt it is, to influence the tribes and people who lie beyond our Borders, we must be in contact with them. It is by the everyday acts of earnest, upright English gentlemen that lasting influence must be obtained, not by spasmodic demonstrations, nor any sudden or temporary influence purchased by money or presents. If at length we succeed in binding more closely to us the people of Khelat by making them feel the benefit of peace and the power for good exercised by the British Government, we shall have added an additional bulwark to our empire. An important part of our frontier will no longer be harassed by mistrustful, wild, and dangerous neighbours, and our officers will have chiefs and populations to deal with who welcome their counsels and receive them as their best friends.'

No one can read through the interesting official papers presented to Parliament, in which the history of these episodes is contained, without recognising Major Sandeman's quick intuition into the ways and feelings of the wild tribes with whom he was brought into contact, his wonderful capacity for inspiring their confidence, his pluck and daring in putting his theories into practice, and the tact and shrewdness which enabled him to steer through the many difficulties which beset him without a single disaster. The long struggle of eleven years against what he considered the wrong views held in Sind illustrates also his extraordinary enthusiasm and tenacity of purpose, while his daring ride to Khelat in 1875, in the face of imperative orders to return, gives us a vivid impression of the strength of character and the sublime self-confidence which during the last sixteen years has enabled him, in spite of reluctant Governments, to firmly establish British supremacy over all the trans-Border tribes from the Gumal Pass

to the sea. His tendency to take all responsibility on his own shoulders, to act without orders, or (like Nelson putting his blind eye to the telescope) in spite of orders when he saw success within his grasp, is a quality, or it may be a failing, which no Government like ours could tolerate for long in a lesser man. But it is to be recorded to Sir Robert Sandeman's great honour and credit, that even when he seemed most wayward he never forgot his responsibility for the good name and prestige of the Government he served, he never in his own opinion ran unnecessary risks, and he never once led his Government into disaster.

. . . . . .

The latter portion of Sir Robert Sandeman's career is better known, and may be alluded to more briefly. It need hardly be said that the value of his settlement of Khelat affairs in connection with the outbreak of the Afghan war in 1878 was incalculable. Instead of having to march through a disturbed and hostile country, and possibly to fight their way through the Bolan Pass, the troops ordered to Kandahar found the whole resources of the Khelat State in the way of camel carriage and supplies placed at their disposal. The railway to Sibi was pushed forward through Khelat territory with the Khan's full consent and support, and both the Khan and his Sirdars did all in their power to assist us. Major Sandeman was no doubt disappointed at not being sent on to Kandahar as the Chief Political Officer with the British troops. It is probable that Sir Donald Stewart preferred to have a political officer of less masterful tendencies than the Governor-General's Agent, but in any case Major Sandeman's presence in Beluchistan was under the circumstances indispensable. He did yeoman's service in maintaining the peace of the country, in protecting our line of communications, and in extending British authority over the Pathan tribes on the Hurnai route. It may be mentioned that in the fight with the Kakar Pathans on the Chappar Rift Major Sandeman nearly lost his life, a bullet penetrating his helmet. His good work was cordially acknowledged by Government, and in July 1879 he received the decoration of the K.C.S.I.

The conclusion of the Afghan war saw the Afghan districts of Pishin, Sibi, Thal-Choteali, and Shararud added to the Baluchistan Agency. Pishin and Sibi were assigned to us by the treaty of Gundamuk, and we retained possession of them after the second Afghan campaign, together with Shararud. Sir Robert Sandeman

would have liked to retain possession of Sharawak also, which had been governed from Pishin during the Afghan war, but this small district was given back to the Amir in 1881. Thal-Choteali, though originally a portion of Suristan, was rarely visited by the Amir's officials, and their authority for many years had been practically nil, as the place was devastated by the fierce Marri raids. Sir Robert Sandeman speedily extended his authority over the district when Sibi was assigned to us, and the occupation of the Thal-Choteali plain completed the cordon of British troops all round the Marri tribe. The last remaining corner where these daring freebooters could raid unchecked was thus closed to them, and though the tribe broke out once and plundered the railway line after the British defeat at Maiwand, their power for evil was henceforth at an end, and they have ever since been compelled to be peaceable and orderly.

In 1884–85 the first expedition against Zhob took place in order to punish the raids of the Zhob Kakars into the territories under our administration.

It was completely successful. The chiefs submitted and received small allowances as service from the British Government, and the Bori Valley, which lies between Thal-Choteali and Zhob, was taken under our administration at the earnest request of the people themselves. The acquisition of Bori, which yielded a handsome revenue and speedily paid the expenses of its civil administration, enabled the Government of India to construct the frontier road which now connects Pishin with Dera Ghazi Khan. About the same time Barkhan and the Khetran country were also included in the Baluchistan Agency. In 1887–88 Sir Robert Sandeman made his second expedition to Zhob, penetrating as far as Mina-Bazar and Appozai. He was everywhere cordially received, and in consequence of the reports he submitted he was authorised to make a third expedition in order to complete our political control over the country. This expedition was carried out in 1889–90. The people, both Mandu-Khels and Zhob Kakars, submitted without a show of resistance, and a political agent was established at Appozai, who is now peaceably employed in collecting revenue from a contented and comparatively orderly population, in a country which four years ago was absolutely unknown and unsurveyed, and which was inhabited by tribes whose boast was that they had never paid revenue to any ruler.

This exploit, in accordance with a plan prearranged with his Excellency the present Viceroy at Dera Ismail Khan, was crowned by the successful negotiations for the grant of tribal service to the Waziris and the opening of the Gumal Pass, through which Sir Robert Sandeman marched triumphantly back to Dera Ismail Khan escorted by Waziri tribesmen. This notable achievement was not, however, to be the last of Sir Robert's successes with the Pathan tribes who have so long resisted all our advances from the Punjab side. In the autumn of the following year, 1890, Sir Robert organised the expedition against the Sherani tribe, which his tact and skill brought as usual, and practically without bloodshed, to a successful termination, and thus was completed the subjugation of the Border Pathan tribes south of the Gamul Pass. The Burgha or Highland Sheranis are now peaceably paying revenue to the political agent in Zhob.

. . . . . .

Such, hastily and imperfectly sketched, has been the career of the man whose sudden death has recently shocked and grieved his friends in India. It is one of which his countrymen may well be proud, and truly may it be said of him in Quetta: *Si monumentum quaris circumspice.* In the last sixteen years he has by his energy, sagacity, and determination given peace to Khelat and transformed that distracted country into a friendly and well-governed bulwark to our empire. He has given peace also to the Sind and Punjab Borders from the Gumal to the sea, and firmly established British supremacy over all the once hostile Pathan tribes who intervene between the Dera Ismail and Dehra Ghazi Khan districts and the frontier of Afghanistan. His loss, as the Viceroy has truly said in the recent 'Gazette,' is a public misfortune, and we can only be thankful that he lived long enough to round off and complete the great work on which he was engaged.

Of Sir Robert Sandeman as an official chief and in his private relations it is difficult in a public article, without seeming exaggeration, to say all that intimate acquaintance and affectionate admiration for his character would readily dictate. The story recently told in this paper of his journeying all the way from Bombay to Calcutta when about to embark on leave in order to prevent one of his officers being transferred against his will from Beluchistan is a true one, and is typical of the warm affection

and support he accorded to those who had gained his confidence. No man was ever better served by his subordinates, whether European or native. As may be supposed, he was a shrewd judge of character. He seemed to know by instinct whom he could trust, and once his confidence was given it was given unreservedly. Kind-hearted and generous, he was the cheeriest and most genial of hosts, and his hospitality was unbounded. In camp his assistants and the members of his staff were always his guests, and his famous major-domo, "Mr. Bux," has acquired almost a European reputation through the numerous high officials and travelling gentlemen who have been welcomed and guided through Beluchistan by his hospitable master. In his friendships Sir Robert Sandeman was as enthusiastic and as thorough as in his official work, and the man who was fortunate enough to win his affection was always sure of the staunchest and most uncompromising ally. Even in his bitterest political conflicts he always had a friendly feeling for his opponents. He was kind and courteous to all men, and feared none.

It is the privilege of the little town of Lus Bela in Southern Beluchistan to—

> "Keep safe his dedicated dust,
> His sacred sleep:"

and we may be sure that the present Jam of Lus Bela, who probably owes more to Sir Robert Sandeman than any other chief in Beluchistan, will be faithful to his trust. Apart from the public loss and private sorrow caused by his death, it is grievous to think that a man still so full of the 'wild joys of living' should, after so stirring and successful a career, be cut off in the very last year of his Indian service. But he never spared himself when work was to be done, and he died in the discharge of his duty. His last words on his deathbed were for the people he loved so well, and it is a satisfaction to his friends to feel that, though he is gone, his influence and his example still survive, and that for many a generation to come his name will be remembered with affection and respect by the Pathan and Beluch tribesmen for whom he accomplished so much.

Recent utterances would, I am afraid, tend to show that the 'Pioneer' has not adhered as consistently to the

principles of our dealings with the frontier tribes advocated in this obituary notice as Sir Robert Sandeman would have done had he lived.

The 'Pioneer' is, I think, hardly correct in conveying the impression that Sir Robert Sandeman had exceeded his instructions in his first Khelat mission. The orders of the Government of India were, as will be seen by reference to Chapter III., elastic, and advisedly so; but in directing that he should procure information regarding feuds and quarrels between the Marris and Bugtis, *or between them and the Brahoes, and to endeavour as far as he can to bring about an amicable settlement of these quarrels,*' and to inquire what could be done for '*the protection of the trade* viâ *the Bolan,*' they obviously implied a sanction for interference in Khelat affairs.

The tribute of all other Indian journals, as well as of most of the English ones, was equally complimentary to Sir Robert Sandeman.

Sir George Pomeroy Colley,[1] in writing to Lord Lytton, thus describes Sir Robert Sandeman and the policy pursued in Beluchistan:

> Sandeman I think you will find much what you expect from his letters, argumentative but energetic, an enthusiast in his work, really anxious to carry out the wishes of his superiors, with a genuine sympathy for these rude races and their ways of thought which enables him to listen patiently for hours to their grievances, and thoroughly to enter into them.

And again in writing two years later of the policy which had been adopted, he wrote:

> We believed that an opportunity had presented itself of substituting a friendly, peaceful, and prosperous rule for the utter anarchy and devastation that had prevailed in Beluchistan for nearly twenty

[1] See *Life of Sir George Pomeroy Colley*, by Sir Wm. F. Butler, K.C.B., pp. 166 and 169.

years, and at the same time of securing a position of enormous value strategically for the defence of our southern Border. Militarily speaking, Quetta covers five hundred miles of our Trans-Indus frontier from the sea to Dera Ghazi Khan.

The policy of the measure has been much disputed and is of course a fair subject of discussion. Of its practical results, however, I can personally speak. During the three years preceding Sandeman's mission hardly a month passed without some raid on our Borders and the Bolan Pass was absolutely closed. During the two years following there had not been a single raid of any sort or kind. The Bolan Pass is perfectly safe, and has been traversed by thousands of caravans. . . . And the tableland of Beluchistan, which then could barely support Sandeman's small garrison of one thousand men, is now able to furnish without difficulty several months' supplies for the force of ten thousand men now being collected there. Were matters now in Beluchistan as they were when we came out, so far from being prepared to-morrow to commence our advance from Quetta into Afghanistan, we should still be collecting in the plains of Katchi and preparing for the difficult operation of forcing the Bolan Pass. I may add that not only have the Beluch Sirdars enthusiastically supported Sandeman in all our complications with the Amir and the Khan placed all his supplies at our disposal, but even the more distant ruler of Lus Beyla has just offered his army for service against the Amir if necessary.

Additional testimony from those high in authority, of all shades of political opinion, in Parliament and the Press, may be found in Dr. Thornton's 'Life of Sir Robert Sandeman.' I shall only quote a few of the more striking ones. Lord Lansdowne, then Viceroy of India, wrote to Lady Sandeman:

To me his death is a very great misfortune; no one can fill his place or continue without difficulty the work he has been doing. The service which he has rendered to the Government of India stands by itself. I do not think there is any living official who can point to an achievement so distinct and so complete as his; it will remain and be remembered so long as India has a frontier to hold

Mr. H. Barnes, C.S.I., thus describes Sir Robert Sandeman's method of dealing with the tribes:

It was a useful lesson in frontier tribal management to watch Sir Robert Sandeman in durbar surrounded by an eager noisy crowd of Beluch notables, encouraging, threatening, and persuading in fluent Hindustani, never losing his temper, patient to hear all that was urged in reason, but putting his foot down at once on all extravagant claims, making the best terms he could for the Government while recognising the legitimate claims of the chiefs to fair and generous treatment, and finally clenching the bargain by stirring appeals to the loyalty and public feeling of the Sirdars.

I will quote one more tribute to Sir Robert Sandeman and to the success of his Forward Policy—that of Dr. Thornton himself, who as Secretary to the Punjab Government for many years and afterwards as Secretary to the Government of India was well competent to form an opinion. He writes:

By others Sir Robert was regarded as a dangerous man. Yes, he was 'dangerous' in the sense of having ideas a good deal in advance of his time which he persistently pressed upon his superiors, and sometimes carried into effect on his own responsibility in anticipation of approval. Nevertheless, judging from results, it may be asserted with some confidence that the British Government never had a less dangerous political adviser than Sir Robert Sandeman; for during a service of nearly thirty years upon the frontier in responsible posts he never, so far as we are aware, committed a single serious mistake or brought the Government into difficulty. The fact is that though his policy and proceedings were bold and vigorous, and even startling, they were the result of careful forethought and consideration.

For instance, he believed in and predicted the occupation of Quetta when the idea was considered outside the range of practical politics. Quetta has been occupied with the best results.

He believed he could terminate the civil war between the Khan of Khelat and his Sirdars by friendly intervention, and his belief, at first, was laughed to scorn. But he was right.

He believed in the annexation of the assigned districts, when

many men of 'light and leading' were opposed to it; and after years of persistent effort succeeded in inducing the Government to sanction, first their temporary retention, and ultimately their incorporation with British territory. He believed that, if allowed a free hand, he could bring under his control and influence, without expeditions or blockades, the independent tribes on the Punjab frontier. After years of opposition he was allowed his chance, with the result that the Marris and the Bugtis, the Khetrans, the Sheranis, the Pathans of the Zhob Valley, the Waziris of the Gumal Pass, once our unfriendly neighbours and inaccessible to European influence, are now our friends, and their hills with few exceptions almost as safe as the safest parts of British India.

He believed in and strongly urged the fixation and demarcation of the Afghan boundary, and his views are being carried out.

He believed in other things which have not yet come to pass. He believed, for instance, that all the tribes between British territory and the Afghan Border might be dealt with as successfully as the Pathans of Zhob and the Waziris of the Gomal Pass, and who can say that he was wrong? He believed in the future of a railway from Karachi, connecting Lus Beyla and Panjgur and Quetta with Seistan, the granary of Persia—and he may be right.

As one who was intimately associated with him in all those schemes which he had accomplished, as well as a believer in those contemplated, I may add my humble corroboration to all that Dr. Thornton has written. In short, the leading characteristics of Sir Robert Sandeman were, first and underlying all the others, sympathy with and knowledge of the tribes and their leaders; keen discernment between the good and the bad, the loyal and the disloyal, and great quickness in identifying and securing the former on his side, to the discomfiture of the latter. Added to these were freedom from partisanship, consummate patience and tact, combined with untiring energy and labour in all his dealings with the people. A combination of such qualifications is not easy to find.

After Sir Robert Sandeman's death I was a good deal

perplexed in my mind as to whether I should or should not apply for the appointment of Agent Governor-General of Beluchistan. Some of my friends urged me to put in my claims and apply for the post. The fact that my application for the officiating appointment in 1886, though supported by Sir Robert Sandeman, had not been accepted might in itself have prevented my doing anything in the matter, had it not been that I had in the meantime been promoted to an important Frontier Commissionership, and that I had been associated with Sir Robert Sandeman in the opening of the Gomal Pass and the settlement of the Sherani tribe—both important operations in themselves, and for the former of which I received, in addition to other honorary testimonials, the special acknowledgments of her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. These circumstances should, I felt, greatly strengthen my claims in connection with Beluchistan. Nevertheless, after weighing all the pros and cons, I determined not to make any application. The following were the considerations which led me to this decision. I believed the post of Agent Governor-General, Beluchistan, to be the most difficult and responsible of its kind in India, and one that it would not be possible to do justice to or work successfully without a very large measure of support from Government. I did not, however, feel convinced that the Government of India regarded it in the same light, or considered the difficulties and responsibilities as exceptional and calling for exceptional support. Had they, in consideration of my long connection with Beluchistan and my knowledge of the Khan of Khelat and the tribes, spontaneously offered it to me, I should have felt it my duty to accept it, but for the reasons given I would not go out of my way to ask for it, and I did not. My being in the Uncovenanted service also influenced me to a certain extent in my decision. I afterwards learned that the Lieutenant-

Governor of the Punjab, Sir James Lyall, had, on his own motion, recommended me for the post, and the following leading article which appeared in the 'Pioneer' at the time showed in a measure the chances of the running:

The question of a successor to Sir Robert Sandeman in Beluchistan must be anxiously occupying the Viceroy and his Foreign Secretary at the present moment, since for reasons obvious to everyone the selection is of extreme importance, and the responsibility proportionate. The field is, however, narrow, for the conditions of the case demand above everything a local experience, which is quite apart from anything acquired by political officers in the ordinary round at native courts. The officer who holds the vacancy temporarily, good man though he is, is probably too junior to have any serious chance for the appointment. Next suggests itself the name of Mr. R. I. Bruce, officiating superintendent of the Derajat, who, though a man comparatively little known to the public, has the reputation of a first-class frontier officer, and is probably more closely identified with the Sandeman tradition and method than any other man. Nor will the Government be likely to pass over without consideration the claims of Colonel J. Biddulph, now Commissioner of Ajmere, an officer with a great deal of frontier experience generally at his back, even if it is not special to Beluchistan. Colonel Biddulph, however, officiated in this very appointment as Governor-General's Agent so far back as 1882. Finally, there is Major-General Sir J. Browne, the present Quartermaster-General, who is well known to be identified heart and soul with the politics and fortunes of the Trans-Indus frontier, and whose special qualifications for success in the post now vacant are no secret either to Government or to the public. As Chief Engineer of the Sind-Peshin Railway during the trying times of its construction, General Browne had ample opportunities of proving the power of his personal influence with the tribesmen, a power not lessened by his extraordinary command of their native dialects, and on the whole we should be inclined to believe that it is on Sir James that the mantle will fall. His selection would certainly take an appointment from the Political Department, but on the other hand they will have one restored to them by the impending departure of General Prendergast from Mysore.

The prophecy, or I think I might more correctly call it inspiration, of the 'Pioneer' turned out to be correct, as Sir Robert Sandeman's mantle did fall on Major-General Sir James Browne, Quartermaster General. Sir James was one of my oldest and best friends in India. On hearing of his appointment I telegraphed and congratulated him, and in his reply, after alluding to the reasons why he believed the appointment had not been offered to me, he wrote: 'I never moved a finger to get it; so, my dear old Bruce, it was a great pleasure to get your telegram, for I feel you would have filled the post far better than ever I could have done, and that it was your hak,[1] if ever a man had a hak to a berth . . .' Subsequently I received many letters from Sir James, which I have by me, showing he agreed that I had not overrated the difficulties of the Quetta charge at that time. In one dated April 1, 1893, he wrote: 'Beluchistan is not (as you predicted) a bed of roses for anyone, and I have almost had enough of it, as one's whole life is a life of anxiety and doubt here.' I had told him that I had not applied for the appointment, and my reasons for not doing so.

I cannot close this chapter without adding a further tribute to the memory of one with whom I was associated for many years in interesting tribal work mostly connected with measures of forward policy, and who was a staunch personal friend to my wife and myself.

The widely different nature of the important duties attaching to the posts he held from time to time speak plainly as to the versatility of his talents. After some years' employment as assistant and executive engineer on public works, we find him deputed by Lord Lytton in 1878 to a semi-political mission for the purpose of opening up the Thal-Choteali trade routes. When the Afghan war broke

[1] Hak in Arabic means 'right.'

Photo, Johnston & Hoffmann, Calcutta

SIR JAMES BROWNE, K.C.B.

out in 1879 he accompanied General Biddulph as political officer. Subsequently under Lord Lansdowne's Government he succeeded Sir Charles MacGregor as Quartermaster-General in India. In 1892 he was, as before mentioned, appointed Governor-General's Agent and Chief Commissioner, Beluchistan, which post he held until his sudden and untimely decease in 1896. He was a distinguished man in many ways. He was a capital linguist, had a good knowledge of Hindustani, Persian, and Pushtoo, could speak French and German fluently, and had, I believe, also studied Russian. He was a good musician, and had a very fine voice. Added to this he was a most amusing and entertaining companion, was first-rate company, and when in the humour for it would keep a room in roars of laughter. He occasionally indulged in a mild practical joke. I remember his account of a very amusing one which, although to appreciate it properly one should have heard himself tell it, I must relate. He was deputed by the Government of India to prepare and submit plans and estimates for a railway bridge over the Indus at Sukker. The work was a difficult and important one, and he was provided with a large engineering staff. To enable him to prepare his elaborate surveys, levels, and plans, he had to clear tracks and spaces along the river banks. One morning he was walking by the river with the Deputy Collector, Mr. ——, and they came to the snag of a large peepul tree lying on the bank, and Sir James remarked casually that he intended to have it thrown into the river, as it was interfering with his plans. 'Oh no,' said Mr. ——, 'you must not do that as it would obstruct the navigation!' Sir James, who probably knew as much about the Indus as any man alive, poohpoohed such an idea, and rather chaffed Mr. ——, which offended his official dignity, and in angry tones he forbade Sir James doing as he had intended and warned him not to do

so. Sir James had a large steam launch on the river, and the next moonlight night he brought a gang of coolies, had the snag put on board the launch, and took it across and landed it on the island of Bhakkar. Mr. —— in coming out on his morning walk saw that the snag had disappeared, and immediately jumped to the conclusion that in defiance of his serious warning it had been thrown into the river. He was wroth accordingly, and wrote an official letter to Sir James calling on him for an explanation. Sir James wrote a clever reply, I do not exactly remember what he said, but at any rate Mr. —— did not consider it satisfactory and handed the matter up to the Collector. The Sind authorities could not, however, correspond direct with Sir James, as he was employed under the Government of India, so the Collector sent on the case to the Commissioner of Sind, who sent it to the Government of Bombay, who sent it to the Government of India. The Government of India called on Sir James to explain why he had disregarded the warning of the Sind civil authorities. Meantime Sir James again took his launch and brought back the snag, and put it in the very spot from which he had taken it; so in reply to the Government's letter he said: 'What can Mr. —— mean? The snag is there, it has not been thrown into the Indus.' This came back from the Government of India, through the Government of Bombay, the Commissioner of Sind, the Collector of Shikarpur, to the Deputy Collector of Sukkar, Mr. ——, who finally got a rap over the knuckles for making such a fuss about nothing! Sir James chuckled in describing the huge pile of correspondence, red tape, and circumlocution involved in the affair.

Sir James Browne was once himself subjected to what might almost be regarded as a very serious practical joke. While engaged on the construction of the Sind-Pishin railroad, he had several Bengalee Baboos employed as clerks

and accountants. A severe epidemic of cholera broke out on the line which caused a regular panic among the Baboos; and Sir James was dumbfounded by receiving a communication from them, of which, as well as I can remember, the substance was as follows:

From the Bengalee Baboos, Sind-Pishin Railway, Nari Gorge, To Sir James Browne, K.C.B., Chief Engineer, &c.

Honoured Sir,—The petition of the undersigned Bengalee Baboos humbly showeth, that cholera having broken out on the railway works to remain here is instantaneous death. What can a Baboo give in exchange for his soul? We leave here to-day by the six o'clock train in anticipation of sanction.

Your obedient humble servants,

Signed (*about twenty names*).

Before any possible steps could be taken to stop them they had all gone.

As a soldier Sir James had seen much active service. He was a friend of Sir Neville Chamberlain and accompanied him on some of his frontier expeditions. He was a man of Herculean physique, very powerful, and I believe an accomplished swordsman. Many stories are told of his great deeds of strength. In one of the expeditions he found himself in a tight corner attacked by three Afghans. After disabling two of them, in fighting with the third his sword broke off short at the hilt, but with one blow in the forehead, with his fist holding the broken hilt, he stretched his assailant dead at his feet. It is said that in the night attack by the Mahsud Waziris on the Palosin camp in 1860, in the thick of the *mêlée*, he successfully defended himself with a small tent pole, which he used with wonderful effect. I know many amusing stories told by him and of him, but space does not permit of my relating them here. I often look over his letters, numbers of which

I have kept, and they bring back to me pleasant and happy reminiscences of old frontier scenes and work, in which I may, I am sure, reckon on the sympathy of those of my readers who can realise the difference between the intensely active and absorbing life I spent in India and that of a retired Indian civilian with no permanent employment.

CHAPTER XIII

KABUL INTRIGUES. DURAND BOUNDARY, 1892 TO 1895

THE arrangements we had concluded with the Waziris for the opening up and pacification of the country continued to progress satisfactorily. A good cart road was constructed from Tank through the Gomal to connect with the road through the Zhob Valley to Quetta and Peshin. Detailed surveys and estimates for a railway through the Gomal Pass to Kajuri-Kach and on to Zhob were carried out under the supervision of Major B. Scott, R.E. Tribal escorts entertained from among the Waziris themselves were employed for the protection of the survey and road-making parties. These worked admirably, and from the time the works were commenced until they were finished not a single officer lost his life, nor did any serious *contretemps* occur in the Gomal. In February 1891 Mr. Donald, who was getting on splendidly with the Waziris, thus described the improvement which had taken place in our relations with the Mahsuds:

> The survey officers have been visiting the hills in the neighbourhood of the Gomal escorted by four or five Mahsuds only. They have also constantly been out shooting with only one or two men, and I have roamed about these hills just in the same way I used to on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier. There I took with me two or three Beluches, and here I have only been accompanied by a Bhittani orderly and a couple of Mahsuds. The survey camps have been unmolested, and with the exception of the carbine that was stolen from the camp of the 5th Division there has been no loss of life or property in the camps.

I used also to move through all parts of the country

with small escorts settling cases, shooting, and fishing. Major Scott gave similar testimony as to the friendly attitude of the tribesmen and the good work done by the Waziri levies, which enabled him to carry out his work to completion smoothly and without a hitch. During the whole of this time we did not have a single case of Ghaziism,[1] and from my experience of the Waziris, both then and afterwards, I can safely say that they are not a fanatical tribe. Mr. Donald and myself were thronged by Waziris all day, and they had constant opportunities of assaulting us or any of the numerous survey officers working in the pass, but nothing occurred; and from first to last we had not, as I said, any cases of Ghaziism.

As I have had in this chapter to allude to the subject of Ghazis and Ghaziism, I may before closing it say a few words on an important connected question, regarding which there exists much divergence of opinion—namely, the expediency or otherwise of burning the corpses of Ghazis who have been killed or executed for crime. For my part I have always been strongly opposed to it. Over and over again I have been asked by our most loyal native subjects what our motives are for adopting such a course. They say, having taken a man's life, why pursue him after his death? In short, they regard it as hitting below the belt—a vindictive policy unworthy of the British Government. So far as I could gather, I believe Sir Robert Sandeman was not in favour of it, although he regarded it as one of those delicate questions in which it would be inexpedient not to allow his executive officers a free hand. That he had at least an open mind on the question is proved by the fact that, with his concurrence, in not one of the cases which occurred while I was in executive charge of Quetta did I have the bodies burned, and subsequent statistics did not show any conse-

[1] Murder for religious motives.

quent increase in the crime of Ghaziism in that district. I had the bodies buried quietly within the precincts of the jail, as what is really useful is to prevent the relations and friends of the Ghazi setting up a *zearat* (place of pilgrimage) over his grave. Many men have been reputed as Ghazis who were not Ghazis at all. For instance, it was said that in the battle of Ahmed Khel some thousands of Ghazis opposed General Stewart. But these were not Ghazis, they were just the common country folk who regarded us as their enemy. A Ghazi is a man who, purely for the sake of his religion, kills an unbeliever, Kaffir, Sikh, Hindu, Bhuddist, or Christian, in the belief that in doing so he gains a sure title to Paradise, into which, if killed in the encounter, he obtains immediate admission. Religious frenzy or fanaticism is at the bottom of it, and the more reason we give them to hate us and our religion the more we encourage Ghaziism. The idea of some is that Mahomedans believe that the burning of the body bars the entrance to Paradise, and thereby deters others from committing the crime. But I believe this to be entirely a mistaken view. The Mullahs have quite got over such a notion, and it is a well-known fact that instances occurred at Kandahar where the relations and adherents collected the ashes and bits of bones of a burnt Ghazi and set up a shrine over them. But even supposing it did act as a deterrent, is it worthy of a great Christian civilising Government to resort to such a doubtful means of preventing crime as the taking advantage of a religious belief that the burning of the body bars the entrance of the soul to Heaven or Paradise? What occurred in the Tochi, to my mind, clearly shows that the evils of the procedure outweigh any possible compensating advantages. The Tochi was occupied by Government on the pressing invitation, time after time repeated, of the Derwesh-Khels and Dauris ; and our title there is founded

on this invitation, their freewill and friendship, the safest title we could possibly have. When we accepted the invitation the great majority, representative of all that was best in the land, gave us a hearty welcome; but when they became aware of this usage of burning bodies they bitterly resented it to a man, and showed plainly that they would prefer to be rid of us, at all cost, rather than submit to such a degrading procedure, and they earnestly entreated that it might not be applied to them. I believe the Punjab Government have acceded to their petition, and if so I am confident not only that no evil results need be apprehended, but that, on the contrary, the advantages of dealing with a happy and contented people instead of a sulky or hostile one will make themselves manifest in the decrease of such crime, as well as in other directions. But this again brings in the important question of having one consistent and uniform policy for the whole frontier, as it will be anomalous, as well as injurious in the interests of good government, if while Waziris are exempt from this procedure in Waziristan they should be subject to it in Beluchistan.

In March 1891 the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir James Lyall, had made a tour through the Gomal Pass to Kajuri-Kach, and in June, in writing to the Government of India, he thus describes the progress that was being made :

> His Honour can assure the Government of India that a most important work is being quietly done in connection with the opening of this route, and that the success which has been secured by the local officers under the direction of Mr. Bruce is to the present time far greater than he could have dared to hope.

The work was being pushed forward simultaneously in Zhob, and a military and levy post was established at Gul-Kach for the protection of the railway survey parties.

The practical working of the new arrangements brought to light all their weak parts, and certain deficiencies and

defects, which should have been set right without delay. Obviously the weak part of the whole system was that we could not, as in Beluchistan, afford the chiefs and leading Maliks material support within their own country, which, naturally, the hostile and bad characters took advantage of. With the limited support 'from without' we were able to afford them the Maliks could go to a certain point, but when it came to surrendering unconditionally those accused of heinous offences, or shedding the blood of their own tribesmen, without some power 'from within' their own country to protect them from the consequences and see them as it were through, the difficulties in the way of their doing so were almost insurmountable; and that it was unreasonable to expect it was, I think, clearly proved afterwards, as will be shown in these Memoirs. With the Waziri levies the weakness of the position in this particular became evident almost from the very start. Some of them did shoot down their own tribesmen who were raiding and robbing in the Gomal Pass, but invariably they were killed or wounded themselves in retaliation when they attempted to return to their homes. Consequently the carrying out of their duty in this respect became tantamount to sentencing themselves to banishment from their own country. But what I would draw especial attention to is that the Waziris were in these matters no exception in regard to general tribal usage, as precisely the same thing would have occurred with the Marris, or any of the other predatory tribes in Beluchistan under similar circumstances. If a Marri head man had been killed in the fulfilment of his engagements with Government, or one of the Bugti levies in retaliation for having killed a robber or raider, I could enter the Marri or Bugti country to inflict punishment, or, if the case was a serious one, Sir Robert Sandeman would come with his escort in support of the chief or loyal Maliks.

There was, in fact, no point on which we were more strict, and we insisted, as a vital condition of all their engagements with us, that no retaliation would be permitted for anything done in execution of duty to Government.

As long as this fundamental difference between the Beluchistan and Punjab systems exists it is idle to compare the two, and until we are in a position to afford the Waziri Maliks material assistance within their own country for the coercion of criminals, and our tribal levies adequate protection, we cannot expect the same successful results in Waziristan as are attained in Beluchistan. However, apart from this, had the arrangements made at Appozai been promptly followed up, flaws and defects which the working brought to light remedied, grievances regarding inequalities in the distribution of the service allowances put to rights, and efficient arrangements made for the protection of Zhob from Kajuri-Kach to Gul-Kach, we should have been in a position to counteract the Amir's intrigues, and so probably avoid the complications which subsequently arose in connection with the demarcation of the boundary. It was a thousand pities that at this juncture valuable time had been lost, as after-events fully showed.

With these semi-civilised hill men nothing succeeds like striking the iron while it is hot, as once a thing is accomplished they usually accept it with a good grace. Accordingly, any modifications or improvements I thought necessary, or weak points that required to be remedied, I brought promptly to the notice of the Punjab Government, and asked for sanction for the means necessary for carrying them out. The Punjab Government, while generally convinced of the expediency of what I asked, hesitated to support my proposals on the ground of cost, but finally did, with certain modifications, recommend them for sanction. But a long delay had taken place, and when finally, in

October 1891, they were submitted, it would appear that the time was not opportune, as the Government of India did not then sanction them, probably out of regard for the susceptibilities of the Amir, with whom negotiations for the demarcation of the frontier were then contemplated. The Amir had not, however, the same regard for our susceptibilities as we had for his, as, after the manner of Orientals, probably judging our hesitancy as his opportunity, he deputed his emissaries to stir up trouble between us and the frontier tribes. The military force which had been stationed by the Beluchistan authorities at Gul-Kach was withdrawn, and no sooner had they left than the place was occupied by an agent of the Amir's named Mansur Khan, who immediately commenced to intrigue actively, not only with the Waziris, but with our own subjects the Bhitannis. He had the presumption to come and erect boundary pillars in the Bhitanni country close to our outposts. Mr. Donald had to pull the pillars down in order to reassure the Bhitannis. After a while the Amir recalled Mansur Khan and sent Sirdar Gul Mahomed in his place. This change did not in the least improve the position, as the Sirdar circulated all manner of alarming and disturbing reports, saying that the Amir was sending down large armies to occupy the country, and that the people should, as true Mahomedans, declare themselves his adherents, in which event he represented that the British Government had agreed to his taking possession. He further held out promises that the Amir would take all the leading men into his service, and bestow on them handsome allowances. In short, he did everything in his power to cajole, bribe, or frighten them, using at the same time every means to convince the tribesmen that their success and happiness in this world as well as their hope in the next depended on their ranging themselves under the banner of the 'King of Islam,' as he

styled himself, while the fate of those who voluntarily served infidels and ate their salt was depicted in the blackest colours. It might have been all well had he stopped here, but he went further and instigated the worst characters among the Mahsuds and the Derwesh-Khels of Wana and Shakai to commit offences against the British Government, and many murders and other serious outrages were committed in Zhob and in the Derajat districts. The effrontery of these proceedings will be appreciated when it is remembered that not only had the Waziris been always independent of the Amir, but they actually depended in a large measure for their means of existence on the wholesale plundering of the Amir's subjects. On the other hand, their relations with us, whether for peace or war, were always of the closest kind. They hold extensive valuable estates within British territory. Some two-thirds of the tribe reside for six months of the year in our frontier districts, where they enjoy valuable concessions and grazing privileges; and the whole tribe look to us and their connection with us for some essential means of their existence, such as trading, daily labour, service pay, and tribal allowances. For offences committed in British territory we have always been obliged to deal with them direct, and on four different occasions we have sent punitive military expeditions, at enormous cost, to punish them. They were therefore naturally very much exercised in their minds and perplexed at the turn events had taken, especially as to them our policy seemed to be vacillating and our objects uncertain. In the beginning of February they came flocking to me for advice as to what line they should take. I could not, of course, take it on myself to give them an answer, and referred the question to Government, recommending that assurances should be given to them. Meantime, before anything definite was determined on, both

Derwesh-Khels and Mahsuds had split into two factions, one siding with the Amir and the other with our Government. These afterwards became distinguished as the *Kabul factions* and the *loyal factions*. They were no doubt on the horns of a dilemma, as it was known at this time that negotiations were on foot between the British Government and the Amir for the demarcation of the boundary; and as the Amir and his officials misrepresented to the Waziris the gist of these negotiations, they could not know for certain 'under which king' they would eventually come, or that 'between two stools' they might not come to the ground. At length, on March 25 I received the instructions from Government, which were to the effect that I should inform the Waziris that if the Amir's officials made overtures to them or tried to enter their country they should say that they hold relations with the British Government, and can have nothing to do with any other Power; and that they should not allow the establishment on behalf of the Amir of any posts in their territory. This assurance did not go as far as the Waziris would have liked. What they wished for was that our Government should take the bull by the horns and send up a force, expel Sirdar Gul Mahomed, and assure them that no interference would be permitted in Waziristan. But probably at this time such a course would not have been possible without risk or prejudice to the very important negotiations proceeding for the delimitation of the boundary. The assurance, even as far as it went, was a great relief to my mind, as I was just about to proceed on six months' special leave to England on urgent private affairs, and, as the loyal sections had been working heartily for me in endeavouring to stop crime and bring home punishment to those who had committed serious offences, I was glad to have received the assurance or advice for them before I started. The loyal sections of the

Waziris proved their *bona fides* beyond doubt by begging that Government might occupy Jandola and place a strong military post there, as well as at Kajuri-Kach, to coerce and control the bad characters. It was, in fact, on the grounds that it was the urgent request and wish of the loyal Waziri Maliks themselves that the Government of India consented to station troops at these places, and what showed perhaps more clearly than anything else that the entire influential body of the tribe at heart wished to range themselves on the side of our Government, and that the Amir should have no concern in Waziristan, was that these two important measures, both of which must have been unpalatable to the evil-doers, were carried out quite quietly, without any excitement, and without a shot being fired. Had the Waziris been convinced that the question would be settled on their vote, they would have gone solid for the British Government. Such actions as these should not be forgotten, as we are often only too apt to forget, in our future relations with the Waziris. By the action we took to suit our own ends we incurred responsibilities towards them which we cannot in honour rid ourselves of. Had we taken them at their word and occupied Spin shortly after the Appozai settlement, when they were in the humour for it and before the place became honeycombed with intrigues, matters might have turned out very differently from what they did.

On March 25, 1892, I went on six months' special leave to England. Our eldest son was reading for Sandhurst. On the strength of my frontier services I had applied for a Queen's Indian Cadetship for him, and among other matters I wanted to work up my interest for him at home. Having done all that lay in my power for him, I returned to India and resumed charge of the Derajat Division on October 6. Colonel Hutchinson had held

charge during my absence. Shortly after my return I received from my wife the welcome intelligence that I had been granted the Queen's Indian Cadetship for our son. Nothing could exceed the kindness of Lord Roberts and Sir James Browne in assisting me to obtain it. Lord Roberts could not have taken more trouble if it had been for his own son, which I appreciated all the more gratefully as I had no claim whatever on his Lordship except my work on the frontier. On hearing that the Cadetship had been granted, he wrote to congratulate me as follows:

MY DEAR BRUCE,—I am delighted to hear that your boy has been offered a Queen's Cadetship. I am afraid I shall leave India without having the pleasure of seeing you again, or my many friends in the Derajat. I trust all will prosper with you, and that you will soon get the Waziris into order.

Yours sincerely,

Dated November 21, 1892. ROBERTS.

With six sons to launch in the world the value of the boon was a great one; and the fact that the Cadetship included admission into the Indian Staff Corps enhanced its value considerably.

Meantime affairs on the frontier had moved on apace. Sirdar Gul Mahomed had taken the leading men of the *Kabul faction* of the Derwesh-Khels to Kabul, where the Amir had received them with marked honour, and bestowed on them large personal allowances amounting to 1,546 rs. per mensem. The Sirdar had himself previously taken up his abode in Wana. The state of unrest had become intensified and outrages continued to be perpetrated by bands of notoriously desperate characters, conspicuous among whom as leaders were Zarriband, Derwesh-Khel of Shakai, and Jambil, Mahsud of Spiltoi. So serious did matters at length become that the Government of India were obliged to issue peremptory orders to the Amir directing that he

should withdraw Sirdar Gul Mahomed from Wana on or before October 1, 1892.

The Amir's agents also circulated reports that they intended to occupy a place called Narija in the Derwesh-Khel hills near the Tochi Pass on the Bannu border. This caused considerable excitement among the Derwesh-Khels and Dauris, and I received numerous petitions from the Maliks of the tribe begging that the British Government should warn the Amir, and prohibit him from interfering in their affairs or occupying posts in their country. They represented that they wished to have no connection whatever with Kabul, but that all their relations should be with the British Government. The game the Amir and his agents were playing on the Tochi and in Dawar was in fact practically similar to what they were playing on the Gomal and in Wana. I will not, therefore, enter into details of all that occurred, which, though intensely interesting to us who were dealing with the crisis on the spot, would to the uninitiated only seem a repetition of what I have already written, and be wearisome.

The orders of the Government of India directing the withdrawal of Sirdar Gul Mahomed from Wana apparently brought the Amir to his senses, and he accordingly, before the date fixed, withdrew him from Wana and stationed him at Wazi-Khwah, a place not far from Wana, but in his own territory. The Amir's explanation of this move to the tribes was a very wily one. He told them that it was merely taken as a temporary measure with reference to the negotiations then progressing for the delimitation of the boundary, but that when the line would be actually laid down those tribes who elected to be subjects of the Afghan rule would, with the consent of the British Government, be governed from Kabul, while those who desired to be under the British Government would be

managed by the Government of India. This explanation did not, however, deceive the tribesmen, and this withdrawal of the Sirdar was the first thing that really tended to reassure them, and before long signs of the break up of the *Kabul factions* made themselves evident.

I had from the first continued to maintain strong pressure on the tribe to compel them to surrender certain individuals who were accused of committing serious crimes. The most effectual means I had at my command for coercing the recalcitrant factions was by seizing the trading convoys, and arresting the relations and adherents of the accused persons. The loyal Maliks used secretly to give information which enabled Mr. Donald to carry this out, and hardly a day passed that he was not off with a party of tribal levies or a small escort of cavalry, and generally returned elated, having secured some prisoners or a *baher* (trading convoy). In this way we succeeded in apprehending a number of members of the hostile factions, and in seizing property of theirs to the value of several thousands of rupees. After Sirdar Gul Mahomed's withdrawal the *Kabul factions* ceased to intrigue or to offer opposition to the surrender of the offenders, and in the beginning of February 1893 I received the welcome intelligence that the *loyal Maliks* were bringing in all the persons accused of heinous crimes, both Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels.

About the middle of February the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, who had succeeded Sir James Lyall, made a tour on the Derajat frontier, and visited the Gomal Pass and Kajuri-Kach. The leading men of the *Kabul factions* came to Kajuri-Kach, and begged for and were granted an interview with the Lieutenant-Governor. They represented the predicament in which they had been placed through the action of the Amir and his agents, and

begged that now that the storm was blowing over and their way becoming more clear to them, that they might be allowed to renew their friendly relations with us and be received back again into favour. On my recommendation the Lieutenant-Governor consented to this, and, on his Honour's representation, the Government of India sanctioned the restoration of their service allowances. All arrears were, however, confiscated.

When we arrived at Tank on our return from the Gomal the Lieutenant-Governor held a durbar, and presented *khilluts*[1] to the *loyal Maliks* of the Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels, in recognition of good and faithful services rendered during the time of the crisis with the Amir. This was the very first instance in which Waziri leading chiefs had been honoured by a Lieutenant-Governor, and it had a most excellent effect on all the tribes.

After his Honour's departure I completed the settlement with the Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels for offences committed. The accused persons, fifteen in number, had been brought in and made over to me by the Maliks, and I had them placed in the lock-up. I had at first recommended the following terms:

1. Surrender of the ringleaders, to be imprisoned for terms not exceeding five years.

2. Restoration of all stolen arms and other property, or payment of full value.

3. Fines to the amount of 8,000 rs. to be realised, as compensation for lives taken, wounds inflicted, and other loss caused to person and property. I recommended that I might be authorised by Government to hold out a threat that if these terms were not complied with a military expedition would be sent against Khaisera and Shikai to inflict such punishment as Government might think fit. The

[1] Dresses of honour.

Government of India, however, in consideration of the extenuating circumstances connected with the action of the Amir, and the presence of his agents at Wana, did not at this time wish to go so far, and suggested that the offences should be either condoned or punished with fines. As I could not, therefore, hold out the threat of a punitive expedition, I was obliged to modify the terms, and content myself with inflicting heavy fines and taking security for the future good behaviour of the incriminated persons. I fined the Derwesh-Khels 10,000 rs., and the Mahsuds 9,000 rs. The surety bonds, with agreements on the part of the Maliks in regard to distribution of fines, and holding themselves responsible for the future good conduct of the prisoners, with other conditions, were then drawn up in writing; the Maliks affixing their seals to them, and swearing on the Koran to abide by their conditions. All the arms and other Government property stolen had been previously restored. The execution of these proceedings, which were carried out in the presence of Mr. Donald and myself, was a very striking and interesting spectacle. Some three hundred Waziris were seated on the ground in a large circle in front of my bungalow at Tank. In the centre was a chair with the Koran wrapped up in a cloth placed on it. Syud Akbar, Shah of Kanigoram, and Mullah Salem, Alizai Malik, stood beside the Koran, and each of the head men of the sections considered to be in any way implicated or responsible for the offences, and each of the prisoners who had been brought from the lock-up, went up one by one, and, having taken off his shoes, placed the Koran on his head, and had the oath administered to him by the Syud and Mullah, swearing that he would abide by the terms of the agreement. The 19,000 rs. fines were then paid in, and I released the prisoners, and made them over to the Maliks in durbar. I know some people think no good comes from such pro-

ceedings, but I cannot agree in this view, and I could refer to many similar ceremonies carried out under the directions of Sir Robert Sandeman and myself by the Brahoe, Beluch, and Pathan tribes of Beluchistan, with the most excellent results. The Governments of India and the Punjab expressed much satisfaction at the settlement I had made, and in the letter of the Secretary to the Government of India to the Punjab Government sanctioning it he wrote thus:

> The Governor-General in Council desires to express his cordial concurrence in the Lieutenant-Governor's high commendation of Mr. Bruce, and the other local officers mentioned by him, especially Mr. Donald, who have been concerned in bringing this matter to so satisfactory a termination.

This was very gratifying, and I was particularly pleased on Mr. Donald's account. On the strength of recommendations made by Sir Robert Sandeman and myself, backed up by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, he was, with the sanction of her Majesty's Secretary of State, promoted to be an Assistant-Commissioner. Few things in the course of my career have given me so much satisfaction as this. His grand work among the Waziris fully entitled him to this special distinction, and I felt myself deeply indebted to him, knowing, as I did, that whatever success had attended my work was in a large measure due to his remarkable tribal work and capacity.

But the unsettled state of affairs which had been brought about by the Amir and the plotting of his agents at Wana, Gul-Kach, and elsewhere was not to end yet. In fact, just at this time their intrigues were most active, and serious crimes continued to be committed. On July 31, 1893, Mr. Kelly, an overseer in the Public Works Department employed in Beluchistan, and a levy sowar who accompanied him, were both shot dead near Moghul-Kot in Zhob. Mr. Kelly had foolishly, and contrary to orders, gone about

MacMahon King Bruce Jervis McConaghey Grant Donald

MEETING OF POLITICAL OFFICERS, KAJURI KACH,
DECEMBER 7, 1893

without taking a proper escort, and at the time he was killed had only with him this one levy sowar.

After instituting inquiries I proceeded to Kajuri-Kach accompanied by Mr. King and Mr. Donald, where we were met by Captain MacMahon, the Political Agent of Zhob. From information I had received there were strong grounds for suspecting that the outrage had been committed by a gang of Mahsuds, led by the notorious Jambil, and one Kurram, both members of the Abdulrehman-Khel section. This again necessitated the adoption of coercive measures, and I demanded of the tribal jirga that those accused of the crime should be brought in and surrendered; and in order to support the Maliks I brought the strongest pressure I could to bear in such directions as seemed best calculated to assist them. The measures adopted turned out successful, and after a time the Maliks brought in and made over to me Jambil and Kurram, and three others of the Abdalli section, accused of the murder of a native soldier in the Zam Pass. All the leading Maliks of the Mahsuds and the Derwesh-Khels of Wana and Shikai were present, and I committed the cases for trial before a council of the elders of the tribes. The result was that they were all found guilty by the council, and with the sanction of Government I sentenced them: Jambil and Kurram, for the murder of Mr. Kelly, to undergo each seven years' imprisonment; and the three Abdallis, for the murder of the soldier, each three years' imprisonment and 1,000 rs. fine. Seven years is the longest term that can be given under the Tribal Councils Act. The acknowledgments of the Governments of India and the Punjab were conveyed to Mr. King and myself for the settlement of the cases. The Government of India, in commenting on the proceedings, wrote:

The Governor-General in Council regards the surrender of Jambil and Kurram, and of the three men guilty of the Zam outrage, as marking a distinct step in advance in the work of bringing the Waziris under control in the matter of raids and outrages, and the untiring efforts of Messrs. Bruce and King and the officers serving under them are worthy of praise.

The sequel will show that the Maliks had not equal cause for congratulation. The procedure adopted in these cases and the heavy sentences inflicted created a profound sensation among the criminal and malcontent Waziri factions, the results of which soon made themselves apparent. Within a short time after I had dismissed the jirga and they returned to the hills, three of the Maliks who had been foremost in assisting me and instrumental in obtaining the surrender of those accused of crimes were treacherously murdered by the factions to which the prisoners belonged; one by the Abdulrehman-Khels, and two by the Abdallis of Makin—the former associates of Jambil and Karram, and the latter of the three Abdallis.

So serious did the Punjab Government consider the crisis that the Lieutenant-Governor recommended that the unconditional surrender of the murderers of the Maliks should be demanded of the sections implicated, under the threat of a punitive military expedition for their punishment in the event of their failing to deliver them up. The Government of India, however—in view of the obligations they felt themselves under to carry out, in co-operation with the Amir, the demarcation of the frontier without delay—declined to authorise the threat of an expedition. In this they were no doubt right, as it might have risked the delimitation, which was the measure of supreme importance to be considered. It was, all the same, a thousand pities that the two things should have clashed, and looking back now on the field of Waziri politics, since the opening of the

Gomal Pass in 1890, it will, I think, be evident that it was very unfortunate that the boundary delimitation question should have come on us before the re-adjustment of the services I had subsequently proposed, and which had been recommended by Sir James Lyall in 1893, had been carried out, and time afforded for testing them. It was the loss of these two precious years, and then having to make way for the delimitation, that was, I believe, the main cause of the subsequent imbroglio.

The murder of the three Maliks in such a cause, as in the case of Umar Khan noticed in Chapter IX., and the chain of circumstances which led to them, constitutes another of those series of events which it is incumbent on the Government to bear in mind in deciding on the plan of our future relations with the Waziris and Waziristan. Among these Border tribes, where blood feuds are carried on from generation to generation with a pertinacity difficult for us to understand, the murder of men of influence, perpetrated in retaliation for good services rendered to us, impose on us responsibilities and obligations we are in honour bound neither to forget nor to shirk, but to closely watch the results and be guided in our arrangements accordingly.

Notwithstanding these troubles with the tribes, the negotiations with the Amir for the delimitation of the frontier proceeded successfully, and his Highness consented to receive a mission at Kabul to arrange preliminaries. Sir Mortimer Durand was appointed in charge of the mission, and he selected certain civil officers to accompany him whose special knowledge of the tribes, their languages, and acquaintance with the different tracts of country co-terminous with the boundary might prove useful in the negotiations. Mr. Donald, on account of his particular knowledge of the Waziris and Waziristan, was one of those selected. When saying good-bye to him I gave him a

sketch map of Waziristan, which I drew up from native information, and impressed on him how suitable the summit of the Marwatti range of mountains would be for the boundary of Southern Waziristan. My sketch map turned out useful, and on it the hotly contested question of the future sovereignty of Wana was argued. On Mr. Donald's return from Kabul he gave me back my map, which has an historic value, as on it are some notes made by Sir Mortimer Durand, as well as some pencil lines drawn by the Amir, showing where he proposed the line should run with reference to Wana. I had also the satisfaction of hearing from him that Marwatti was well within the Waziristan side of the boundary fixed. It is a beautifully wooded range rising up on the North-Western side of the Wana plain, its highest peaks attaining an elevation of ten to eleven thousand feet.

There are many places in the lovely tract of country lying between Wana on the Gomal and Sheranni on the Tochi (see map) that would make the most perfect sanatoriums for troops, British or native. In short, on the whole of our North-Western Frontier I believe there is no stretch of country possessing such advantages, certainly nothing in Beluchistan that can compare for a moment with it.

On November 12, 1893, the famous agreement between the Amir of Kabul on the one part, and Sir Mortimer Durand, on the part of the Government of India, on the other, was signed; by which the boundary dividing India from Afghanistan, from Wakkan to the Persian Border, was defined and fixed. No measure has been carried through since our occupation of the Punjab so pregnant of possibilities for the pacification and strengthening of our frontier, and the civilisation and attaching of the Border tribes to our rule. So far as Waziristan is concerned the only flaw in the agreement is that Birmal, which is an integral part of Waziristan and inhabited by Derwesh-Khel Waziris, is by

it made over to the Amir. But perhaps this could not have been avoided, as the Amir strove so hard to get Wana ceded to him that it may have been necessary, in order not to risk the breakdown of the entire settlement, that some compromise should be made. Possibly some day, when his Highness realises what a questionable advantage a detached section of the Waziris is to his rule, he may be willing to part with Birmal on easy terms.

To secure the full advantages of the determination of the boundary the line must be held strictly inviolate. Should tribes residing on the British side of the boundary commit depredations in the Amir's territory, it will be necessary, in order to make our agreement effective, either that we should punish them or permit the Amir and his officials to do so. It would be most unfortunate to adopt the latter course, which might lead to intrigues and offences, such as those already described in these pages, instigated simply with the object of enabling them to keep a finger in the pie. It would besides shake the faith of the tribes in the settlement, as they would attribute our shifting our burden on to the Amir to weakness and encourage them also to play a double game. On the other hand, if we hold the tribes on our side of the line responsible, we may, I think, rest assured that the Amir will restrain those on his side.

These remarks apply to those portions of the line that have been delimitated on the spot by the officers of the two Governments, which include the continuous length coterminous with Beluchistan, Waziristan, and Kurram.

On his return from Kabul Mr. Donald did not come back to the Derajat, but was appointed to the important charge of Kurram. This I felt to be a grievous loss to me in my work with the tribes, but as it was promotion to Mr. Donald I could not stand in the way of it.

As a result of the mission I was, in August 1894,

instructed to inform the Waziris that, in accordance with an arrangement come to with the Amir, a commission was about to be appointed to demarcate the frontier boundary, and that a political officer would be deputed to arrange simultaneously with the tribes a scheme for the entertainment of levies, payment of service allowances, and other arrangements necessary for the establishment of permanent relations with them for the pacification of the country, the preservation of order, and the opening of the lines of communication. The policy determined on by the Government was that it was essential that we should be in a position to maintain such an effective control over Waziristan as would enable us to protect our borders and posts and lines of communication, and to afford to the sections and leading men of the tribes who had thrown in their lot with Government by co-operating in the coercion of turbulent characters, and the punishment of murderers and robbers, that protection which they deserved and without which they cannot maintain their position. As a means towards securing those ends the Government sanctioned additional service allowances, and the importance of obtaining the consent of the tribal leaders to our measures and of taking the tribes with us in all we did was impressed on us.

I am confident that the consent of the tribal leaders in Waziristan can, if skilfully worked, be obtained to all reasonable measures, and service allowances are very essential as a means to the end; but such a measure of effective control as that defined and laid down by the Government of India, which will secure punishment to turbulent characters and criminals and protection to those tribal leaders who have thrown in their lot with Government in their coercion, cannot, I fear, for the reasons I have already given, be secured unless our material support is given them 'from within' as well as outside of their hills.

On September 13, 1894, I received by telegram the gratifying news that the Viceroy had, on the recommendation of the Punjab Government, appointed me British Joint Commissioner for the delimitation of the Afghan-Waziristan boundary, and that Messrs. King, Anderson, and Grant were to accompany me and assist me. It was further ordered that I should have a brigade of troops as escort [1] and protection for the commission, and that all were to assemble at Dera Ismail Khan on October 1. Colonel A. H. Turner was appointed to command the escort, with the rank of Brigadier-General. The Government of India informed the Amir that the commission would be on the ground by October 15, and requested his Highness to send his Joint Commissioner to meet and carry out the demarcation work in co-operation with me. This the Amir consented to do, and wrote in reply asking that he might be informed when the commission started to enable him to issue the necessary orders for his Commissioner to join and begin the work.

These preliminaries being arranged, I was informed that the estimates I had furnished in 1890 for the opening of the Tochi Pass, on the same lines as I had adopted for the Gomal—namely, by the granting of service allowances to the tribal leaders, the enrolment of tribal levies, and the establishment of posts—had been sanctioned, as well as the amount I had solicited for remedying the defects and omissions in the former distribution of the service grants made to the Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels of Wana at the Appozai settlement made by Sir Robert Sandeman and myself in 1890. The total sum sanctioned by Government

[1] The escort consisted of 3rd Sikh Infantry, 20th Punjab Infantry, 1st Battalion 1st Gurkha Rifles, one squadron 1st Punjab Cavalry, No. 3 Peshawar Mountain Battery, and No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners. There was also a reserve brigade, held in readiness if required.

to enable me to carry these measures out was a lac of rupees per annum. The following were the details:

50,000 rs. on account of entertainment of Derwesh-Khel levies and allowances to Maliks for pacification of Tochi and Thal-Gumatti routes; keeping of the peace between the Derwesh-Khels and Dawaris; and protection to the Derwesh-Khels themselves.

15,000 rs. to the Dawaris for protection of the Tochi route.

20,000 rs. Redistribution of Mahsud and Wana service allowances; remedying defects, and supplying omissions in same.

15,000 rs. Uniform for tribal levies, and other incidental charges.

Total 100,000 rs. (one lac).

The establishment of a permanent military post at or near Spin, which I had advocated since early in 1891, was also approved by Government. While I was at Tank the jirga of the Derwesh-Khels of Wana came in there to see me, and represented that the Afghan tribesmen of the Suleiman-Khels, Dotanis, and Kharotis, the Amir's subjects, were assembling to attack them at Wana, and begging that I should take immediate steps to restrain them from hostilities. They at the same time gave a most pressing invitation that we should go to Wana, declaring it to be their most earnest desire to become British subjects, and that we should establish peace and security in their country and afford them protection from their enemies. With the sanction of the Government of India I sent with them on their return Fazl-Hak-Khan, native commandant of levies, with letters to the Afghan leaders warning them against invading Wana or disturbing the peace there. This had the desired effect.

I had at this time received my marching orders, and having arranged all preliminaries I left Tank on October 16, and on the 18th marched through the Gomal Pass to Kajuri-

Kach accompanied by General Turner. The Wana jirga came to Kajuri-Kach on the afternoon of the same day, and I wrote to the Mahsud chiefs and directed them to meet me at Wana on the 25th. So far everything had gone on smoothly and without a hitch.

Since the beginning of September convoys of supplies for the commission and their carriage had been traversing the Gomal Pass to Kajuri-Kach, and not an animal had been stolen or a shot fired, and all seemed to give promise of a peaceful and friendly reception to the Commission on the part of both Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels. On the 22nd we encamped in the Spin plain, and on the 23rd at Karab-Kot, where we halted. On the 24th a party, consisting of Mr. King, Deputy Commissioner, Lieutenant Colonel Mason, Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster General for Intelligence, and Mr. Grant, Assistant Commissioner, escorted by a troop of cavalry and accompanied by some Waziri Maliks, rode into Wana and selected a site for the commission camp and escort there.

On the nights of the 22nd and 24th a few shots had been fired into camp. They were said to be the work of some Derwesh-Khel bad characters, and no political importance was attached to them. On the 26th and 27th Badshah Khan and several other leading Mahsud Maliks came in to see me. They brought me information that certain discontented Mahsud factions—chiefly Abdulrehman-Khels and Abdallis, relations and adherents of the five prisoners, and at whose instigation the three Mahsud Maliks had been murdered—had set up one Mullah Powindah of the Shabi-Khel section as their spiritual adviser and leader, and were intriguing with all their power to spread dissensions and prevent any settlement being made with the British Government. They added that they were themselves using every effort to suppress the hostile movement and that they

entertained hopes of being successful. They then took their leave and returned to their homes. On November 1 a messenger came to me from the Maliks to say that Mullah Powindah with a force of some eight hundred to a thousand men was on that day moving to Khaisera with hostile intentions; and on the same evening they sent me further news to say that he had actually arrived at the Shabi-Khel village of Torwam in Khaisera with a thousand followers, and meditated attacking my camp. On November 2 messengers came in sent by Mullah Powindah himself to inform me that he had no wish to commit hostilities if I would give him assurances that the five prisoners would be released and that we would not enter within Mahsud limits. To this I sent him a reply declining to open any negotiations with him except through the representative tribal jirga, and advising him to disperse his following and return to his home. This reply was approved by Government. Subsequently I was told that other malcontents from Shikai and elsewhere had joined the Mullah's standard, which raised the strength of his force to some two thousand men, and that he contemplated making an early attack on my camp. I communicated all news as I received it to the officer commanding the escort. As it was Friday, the day usually selected by Mahomedans for fanatical demonstrations, we thought it probable that we might be attacked either that night or next morning, and General Turner issued orders that the men should sleep accoutred with their arms beside them and ready to fall in at 4 o'clock A.M.; but the night passed off quietly. On the evening of the 2nd a number of the Maliks came in, bringing news that the Mullah had actually moved with his force to a position near the Inzar Kotal, and that he intended to attack us that night. I communicated this to General Turner, and accompanied him round that portion of the camp where my own and my assistants' tents were, and as

the military guard told off for it was very weak, he gave orders that additional men should be sent to strengthen it.

He afterwards held a meeting of the officers commanding and issued instructions similar to the previous night. None of us took off our clothes that night, as we fully expected to be attacked, and having made the part around our tents as shipshape and defensible as we could in the time, we lay down with arms beside us. The night was a pitch-dark one. About five or half-past five suddenly the most fiendish row broke out; a regular roar of voices, shouting, beating of drums, and firing, coming from the opposite side of the camp in the direction occupied by the 1st Gurkhas and the cavalry (see plan of commission camp). This was followed almost immediately by volley and independent firing, which continued pretty well until the day broke a little after six o'clock, when the enemy were cleared out and driven off. The cavalry detachment, sixty troopers under the command of Major O'Mealy, then started in pursuit, followed by a force of infantry and guns under the command of Colonel Meiklejohn. The attack had been skilfully planned, and was as plucky and daring a one as had ever been made on our frontier. The Waziri attacking force, probably numbering some fifteen hundred men, divided itself into two bodies and advanced on the left flank of the main camp. This doubtless was selected, being the weakest point, as it was not protected by a continuous breastwork on that side. Favoured by the darkness of the night and the uneven nature of the ground, they must have crept up through the ravines close to the Gurkha picquets without being observed. They then made a wild rush on the left flank and rear of the Gurkha camp, firing, screaming their war cries, and beating their drums, with the object of creating a panic and a stampede among the animals. The outlying Gurkha picquets had to retreat before them, a

good number of the sepoys being killed. One body of the enemy succeeded in penetrating right into the Gurkha lines, where they did a good deal of harm. The other body, taking a *détour* to the left, also got into the camp and caused considerable loss among the commissariat camp followers and the cavalry and transport animals. It was in the pitchy darkness almost impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and hand-to-hand fighting went on until the day broke, when the Gurkhas, supported by a company of the 20th Punjab Infantry and a company of the 3rd Sikhs, fixed bayonets, and after some sharp fighting cleared the camp; and the Waziris, being repulsed on every side, retreated with all haste for their hills. There were some other bands of Waziris about, but they did not succeed in effecting an entrance into the camp or in causing any loss. The light of the star shells disclosed a considerable body in front of the Headquarters camp, and the 20th Punjab Infantry got some volleys into them and killed a number of them. The clearing of the enemy out of the camp necessarily took some time, which enabled the main body to get right off with the stolen rifles and other plunder they were able to secure. This was to be regretted, as had the troops been free to act on the offensive earlier, probably few of the Waziris would have effected their escape, and this would probably have smoothed away all difficulties in the way of future negotiations. As it was, the small pursuing body of cavalry led by Major O'Mealy accounted well for themselves and did considerable execution, killing fifty of the enemy, while the infantry and guns under Colonel Meiklejohn killed some twenty-five more. When the fighting was over we counted one hundred and thirty corpses of Waziris in and around the main camp, which with the seventy-five killed by the pursuing forces made two hundred and five killed. Native reports estimated the number of the enemy wounded at two hundred

to two hundred and fifty. The killed were identified as being mostly Shabi-Khels, relations of Mullah Powindah, and Abdulrehman-Khels and Abdallis, relations and adherents of the five prisoners and who had been implicated in the murder of the three Maliks. There were also some Garerais and members of other sections, who had been discontented about the distribution of allowances, and a few Derwesh-Khels of Shakai, relations of the notorious Zarriband.

The loss on our side was considerable. One British officer, Lieutenant Macaulay, R.E., two native officers, eighteen sepoys, and twenty-four camp followers were killed. Five officers—Surgeon-Major Haig, Captain Lang, Lieutenant Herbert, Lieutenant Thompson, and Lieutenant Angelo—were severely wounded. Of these Lieutenant Angelo afterwards died from the effects of his wound. It would appear that in the first rush a band of Waziris penetrated as far as the tents of the Headquarters Staff, and it was these probably who killed Lieutenant Macaulay and wounded some of the other officers. In the midst of the fighting a number of them were coolly plundering the tents, and four or five of them were shot red-handed. Colonel Mason shot one just outside his tent. It was so dark he at first took him for a camp follower, until his servant called, 'Look out, Sahib, he is a badmash,' when Colonel Mason seized him and shot him with his revolver, with a lot of plunder on his person.

In the same way Surgeon-Major Haig mistook a man quite close to him for a friend until the ruffian suddenly struck him with his sword and nearly cut off his arm. There were thirty-eight native soldiers and twenty camp followers wounded. Most of the native soldiers killed and wounded were of the 1st Gurkhas, on whom the brunt of the attack had fallen. The Waziris succeeded in carrying off with them fifteen cavalry horses, thirty-seven Government

rifles and carbines, and 3,000 rs. in treasure, besides a good deal of private property. About one hundred Government mules and camels were killed or wounded. The Waziris cut the head and heel ropes of the cavalry horses, in pursuance, no doubt, of their plan for creating a stampede and panic in the camp. They hamstrung the unfortunate mules, as they could not cut the chains with which they were fastened.

I heard many officers who had seen lots of fighting say they had never experienced a more unpleasant time. To those in the parts of the camp attacked the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe or of getting at the enemy in the darkness, scattered in and out among the animals, tents, and camp followers, was most perplexing, while to those in other parts of the camp the position was equally trying. They could not stir from their respective beats, for the defence of which they were responsible, to go in support of their comrades. Except the indescribable uproar, mingled with unhappy sounds from the wounded men and animals, they knew absolutely nothing of what was really going on; while bullets flying about, without being able to strike a blow at the enemy in return, made their position anything but an enviable one. As may be imagined, the dawn was anxiously looked for, and the first streaks of light showing over the mountains was hailed with delight.

An examination of the sketch of the commission camp, drawn by Mr. King, will help the reader to understand the nature of the attack and repulse and defeat of the Waziris. That part occupied as a civil camp by myself and my assistants was, as may be seen from the sketch, more exposed than the rest, and it was the weakest, as there was no substantial breastwork round it, and only a weak detached guard of native infantry and some police and tribal levies for its defence. I have on different

occasions heard surprise expressed as to why this was not the point selected by the Waziris for their attack. But there were, I believe, very sound reasons for it. They could no doubt have swept through our tents and caused considerable loss, but to do so would have brought them right on to the lines of the 3rd Sikhs, who were under their commanding officer, Colonel Thompson—an officer of long and tried experience in frontier warfare—were fully expecting the attack, and were prepared at all points, with a strong and complete encircling breastwork, through which the Waziris could not have penetrated. They could not, therefore, hope at this point to be able to force an entrance into or inflict any severe blow on the main camp, which was clearly their design; while, on the other hand, the whole force would have been free to turn the tables on them, and they would most likely have found themselves caught in a trap between two fires, with their chief lines of retreat closed to them. It must be considered that the fort to the north of our tents was occupied by one hundred Gurkhas under Captain Powell, a fact the Waziris were no doubt aware of. Had they, therefore, attacked at this point the chances are they would have sustained a crushing and overwhelming defeat. There were some deserters from our regiments with the Waziri force who knew all the ins and outs of the camp.

Mullah Powindah was not himself present. It was said that his followers would not allow him to expose his saintly person, and that he remained behind in the hills.

After the fighting was over, under the orders of General Turner the whole camp was moved a few hundred yards more to the west, with its south side resting on the high bank of the ravine, and a substantial breastwork was erected all round. This change made it so strong and defensible that I do not believe any number of Waziris could break through it.

Far the next few nights everyone remained on the alert, as there were rumours that Mullah Powindah was still in



Khaisera and meditated another attack; but on the 6th a deputation of the Maliks came to me with the news that he

had dismissed his followers and had gone to his home at Marob near Makin. I received at the same time a letter from the Mullah saying that he would continue hostilities until the five prisoners were released.

The question which now presented itself was, whether the punishment inflicted on the Mullah's following was sufficient, considering the loss they inflicted on us, and in answering this an all-important consideration was how the Waziris themselves regarded the affair and its results. The question was put to me by Government—namely, whether the incident might now be considered at an end or whether further punishment would be necessary. After consulting General Turner and fully acquainting myself with the feeling in Waziristan, especially among the Mahsuds, I replied that in my opinion, considering the nature of the attack, the arms, cavalry horses, and other property carried off, the heavy loss caused to men and animals, the punishment inflicted on the hostile factions had not been sufficient. This was the view entertained by the Mahsud Maliks, which they did not hesitate to express to me privately. They knew well that their own influence depended on the complete subjugation of Mullah Powindah and his criminal and fanatical following. I therefore recommended that as additional punishment they should be compelled to banish Mullah Powindah from the country until the whole business had been finally settled; that eighteen of the leaders, whose names I furnished, should be surrendered, that all Government and other property carried off should be restored, and that a fine of 10,000 rs. should be levied for other losses caused. I further recommended that a date might be fixed within which compliance should be demanded, failing which punitive military measures should be adopted to enforce them.

General Turner, while concurring with me that additional

punishment was called for, disagreed with me as to its nature and terms, and recommended that the whole tribe, without any distinction as to sections or individuals, should be proceeded against, and that the surrender of Mullah Powindah should be demanded. The Punjab Government, however, supported my views, only suggesting in modification of them that the surrender of the leaders should be demanded as hostages and not to be imprisoned as common criminals. The Government of India approved of these proposals, and directed that I should continue my work in the spirit of my former instructions, and re-open negotiations with the Waziris on the accepted footing that Mullah Powindah's acts were disapproved of by the sectional tribal leaders, and suggesting that the terms should not be made too difficult for them to accept. They gave orders at the same time for the strengthening of my escort by a British battalion, a regiment of native infantry, and two mountain guns from the reserve brigade, but impressed on me that no aggressive movement should be made without their sanction.

I accordingly acted on these instructions. The Maliks continued to come in, and gave me detailed information of the names of the leaders and factions concerned in the attack on my camp at Wana, as well as the names of the individuals who had got the Government rifles, horses, and other plundered property in their possession. Mullah Powindah continued to send me letters and messages, invariably vilifying the Maliks and demanding the release of the five prisoners. I always sent him the same answer, declining to hold any communication with him except through the recognised tribal representatives.

Before passing on I think it might prove useful, as having a bearing on the all-important question of tribal management, to make a few remarks on the disagreement between General Turner and myself as to the nature of the punish-

ment called for. It must be borne in mind that he was not fully conversant with all the ramifications of the policy which Government had for some years adopted in our relations with the Waziris, and the leading part the Maliks had played in it; especially since the opening of the Gomal Pass in 1890, and the subsequent keeping of it open, mainly through their instrumentality. It entailed from the commencement a death struggle between Government on the one side, and on the other the notoriously bad characters and fanatical and plundering factions of the tribe, in which the Maliks ranged themselves on the side of Government. It was solely in view of coercing and bringing these refractory factions under control that they entreated that Government should station troops permanently at Kajuri-Kach and Jandola, thereby openly committing themselves on our side; and it was primarily on the strength of their making the request, and in recognition of their authority to do so, that Government felt themselves justified in according their consent and did send the troops. Furthermore, it was in prosecution of the same ends that they surrendered to me the five criminals (as well as many others) who were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and in retaliation for which three of their own number were treacherously murdered, and the lives of others endangered; the next desperate attempt of the common enemy to free themselves from the yoke being this very attack on my camp at Wana. In the face of all this we could not with any show of honour, or without ruining our good name on the frontier, have lightly thrown these men over, and punished the innocent with the guilty, our friends with our foes; thereby playing the very game our enemies were intriguing with all their might to force us to play.

But I must hark back. On November 19 a large and influential jirga of all sections of the Mahsuds came in. I explained to them the Government terms, and informed

them that grace would be allowed them up to the evening of the 26th instant for compliance. They entreated that more time should be granted them, but I told them that the orders of Government were explicit and did not admit of more. They left me vowing that no effort would be wanting on their part to bring about compliance, and that if they failed they would present themselves and co-operate with Government in the punishment of the rebellious factions and individuals. They further expressed their belief that the advance of the force, even to Khaisera, would render them all the support necessary to enable them to enforce the fulfilment of the terms.

The Maliks had several meetings with Mullah Powindah, and endeavoured to dissuade him from further hostile action and to co-operate with them in obtaining submission to the Government demands. In this they, however, failed. The Mullah would not listen to their advice and again commenced to assemble his followers. Some factions did agree to return their shares of plundered property, but the Abdul-rehman-Khels, Abdallis, and Shabi-Khels would not consent to the surrender of the leaders. The maliks, finding matters at a deadlock, returned to interview me at Wana. They told me exactly how matters stood, and begged of me that, in order to strengthen their hands and give them moral force to overcome the Mullah's opposition, I should permit them to take back with them an influential deputation of Sirdars and Maliks of other tribes, Suleiman-Khel, Derwesh-Khel, Dotani, and others. As the men asked for had themselves no objection I consented to their going, and they all started together, promising to return by the 28th. They found on their arrival that the Mullah had some two thousand five hundred men assembled. The combined jirga brought all the pressure they could to bear on him, and eventually succeeded in getting him to dismiss his

following and to agree to co-operate with them in getting the terms fulfilled. As a token that he was acting in good faith he sent two agents with the jirga, and, agreeable to their promise to bring me an answer by the 28th, they all came in, informed me of the agreement they had come to, and begged that the term of grace might be extended. As things looked more promising for a peaceful settlement, on my representation the Government of India consented to extend the period of grace up to December 13, and directed me to inform the Mahsuds that if by that date full compliance with the terms had not been made we should enter their country to enforce them, and that in the meantime the military forces would get into position to advance. I was further instructed to report the results on the 13th, and it was intimated to me that if the Government of India then decided that the time had come for military operations, the political control as well as the military command would be placed in the hands of Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., acting directly under the orders of the Government of India.

The following proclamation was drafted and approved of, to be issued by Sir William Lockhart in the event of punitive military measures becoming necessary:

Whereas Mr. Bruce, the British Commissioner for the delimitation of the Border of the Afghan dominions on the side of Waziristan, advanced to Wana, in accordance with the proclamation he issued to you in August last.

Whereas some evil-disposed persons of the Waziri tribe made an unprovoked attack upon the camp of the Commissioner at Wana upon November 3, 1894, and plundered certain property therefrom.

Whereas the Sirkar is aware that the Maliks of the Mahsud Waziris did not sympathise with the objects of the evil-disposed persons aforesaid.

And whereas the Sirkar is desirous of living in friendship with its neighbours, the Waziri tribe, and wishes to show the sincerity of its pacific intentions: therefore Mr. Bruce called to himself a

jirga of the said tribe, and explained to the Maliks who attended the said jirga that, notwithstanding the unprovoked aggression committed by the evil-disposed persons aforesaid, the Sirkar would not hold the tribe responsible, nor inflict punishment upon the tribe generally, provided that on a given date the Maliks restored to the British Government every horse and every rifle and every rupee stolen from the British camp, or 500 rs. instead for each rifle and horse; and also that certain persons named by aim were surrendered to the British Government, and that the Mullah Powindah, the leader of the attack on the British camp, retired from the country until the matter was settled. Now the said date has passed, and the tribe aforesaid has failed to comply with the above terms.

I therefore proclaim to all concerned, that I am authorised by the Sirkar to punish the sections of the tribe who attacked the British camp as above said, and all persons who assist or screen such sections, to enforce from the Waziri tribe the fulfilment of the terms and conditions which I have detailed above, and of any further terms and conditions which renewed opposition by the said tribe or by any sections or individuals thereof, may require the Sirkar to impose.

And I inform you that it is my intention to secure the carrying out of the demarcation of the boundary which the Sirkar has from the beginning intended to carry out, to inflict chastisement for the unprovoked attack on the British camp at Wana, and to enforce the conditions above said. I have no desire to stay in your country longer than is necessary for the attainment of these objects; but if you or any section of you resist me or do not comply with my demands, I may be compelled to remain longer than the Sirkar has any desire that I should stay.

And I call on all who wish to live in peace with the Sirkar and desire to possess their own country, and to see it no more in the power and occupation of the Sirkar, to assist to the utmost of their abilities in facilitating the objects with which, as notified to you, I have been sent into your country, by which means they will save the tribe from further punishment and the tribal country from further occupation.

The Government of India had decided that the loyal and friendly Maliks should be protected, directing that the details as to how this should best be carried out were to be

arranged by Sir William Lockhart and myself in consultation, adding that his Excellency the Viceroy considered it most desirable to prevent the punitive expedition, if undertaken, 'from developing into one against the whole tribe.'

Besides the Wana force, arrangements were made in the military department for the advance of a second brigade on Jandola, also a strong force from Bannu, with the object of being able to enter the Waziri country at three points.

It was at first proposed that I should join Sir William Lockhart, Mr. King remain with the Wana force, Mr. Anderson with the Bannu force, and Mr. Grant at Jandola, as political officers. Afterwards, as it was considered that my leaving Wana before the expiration of the period of grace might prove detrimental to the chances of the negotiations succeeding, it was proposed to Sir William that I should remain there and that Mr. King should join him for the present. To this he agreed, and telegraphed to me that I should join him as soon as General Turner's column reached Kanigoram. Meantime signs were not wanting to show an intention to submit on the part of Mullah Powindah and the hostile factions, and that a genuine and combined effort was being made to comply with the Government terms. The Mullah had, as I said before, dismissed his following. The Abdulrehman-Khels restored to me fifty-nine camels they had plundered in the Gomal Pass. Some of the Government horses, rifles, and other property were brought into Khaisera, but I told the Maliks I could not take a part unless I was satisfied that all would be forthcoming. On this I received messages both from the Maliks and Mullah Powindah saying they expected to be able to bring in all to Wana within the term of grace. But in this they failed, and apparently the rock on which they split was the surrender of the eighteen hostages. The Abdallis and Shabi-Khels, who were the principal offenders,

in spite of their promise to appear, had neither come in themselves nor sent in their hostages. In view of all the surroundings it appeared that the order was too large a one for it to be possible to bring about compliance in a limited time. I might have suggested that I should be permitted to take over what Government arms and property I could get and work the case piecemeal, but I felt it impossible to determine what time it might take to accomplish, and as the delimitation was hanging fire and the troops, who were all now mobilised, were impatient to advance before the setting in of the severe weather, with snow and frost in the highlands, I did not see my way to ask for any further extension. I therefore telegraphed all particulars to Government, recommending that the troops should advance.

On receiving my telegram the Government of India directed Sir William Lockhart to assume military and political control, to act forthwith on the instructions he had received for an advance, and issue the proclamation. Before making the transfer they had requested the Punjab Government that, in the event of an advance being made, they should see that all possible time was given to the friendly Maliks to withdraw with their families, flocks, and other property to British territory. This had been my original proposal, which had been sanctioned by Government; but it was found impracticable to carry it out, as the Maliks were constantly employed by me up to the very last moment in endeavouring to bring about compliance with the Government terms. The alternative course I proposed was that they should accompany the different columns and render service by assisting in the punishment of the refractory sections and individuals by pointing out their persons, houses, and property. Also that they should be held responsible for reliable intelligence, for furnishing guides and night picquets round the different camps, for the postal arrangements

through the Gomal Pass, which they had conducted most satisfactorily throughout the whole business, as well as on other lines of communication. This was the course finally approved of and adopted by Sir William Lockhart, who himself telegraphed to the Punjab Government and asked that he might be permitted to take Mr. Grant with him, as Mr. Grant had, he alleged, established cordial personal relations with the Waziri Maliks of the Shingi section, who owned the country through which the first part of the proposed line of advance of his own column would be made. Mr. Grant, with the Shingi and other Maliks on that side, did accompany the General and rendered useful services. It was, in fact, found that unless the friendly Maliks were allowed to accompany columns and point out the persons, houses, cattle, and other property of offenders, as well as their own, it would have been impossible to protect them or to prevent their suffering equally with the Mullah and the malcontents. Even as it was, the matter was no easy one to arrange, and required tact, discrimination, and patience to carry it out properly.

It was to me the source of the greatest satisfaction that at this juncture I received information that the Government of India and the Punjab Government had approved of the assurances I had given to the Derwesh-Khels of Wana for the loyal assistance they had rendered. Briefly these assurances were: (1) that the Government had no intention of levying land revenue from them so long as they remained peaceful, rendered good and loyal service, and abstained from crime; (2) that they would be exempt from forced labour (*begar*), but that they should be ready to make the resources of the country available on reasonable terms. In my negotiations with the hill tribes I have always found that what they fear more than anything else is forced labour and compulsory levy of supplies at arbitrary rates,

which all come under the head of what is known as *begar*. Nothing reconciles them so much to our rule as the assurance that they will not be subjected to *begar* in any form. (3) I assured them that they would receive payment for all supplies taken from them. I explained, however, that they would have no just claim on account of camel grazing or grass cutting in waste tracts, or on account of timber and firewood taken from waste jungles and mountains, not required for their own personal use. (4) In regard to the decision of their disputes, I assured them that it was not the intention of Government to interfere in their internal affairs more than was absolutely necessary in the interests of general peace, and that cases among themselves would, as far as possible, be decided by jirga, or in accordance with Pathan custom and usage.

It was the approval of these assurances by the Government that I was able to convey to the Derwesh-Khel Maliks before I started on the expedition, and for which they expressed the greatest gratitude. I may add here that subsequently the Government of India sanctioned my bestowing on the head men written *Sanads*, or title deeds, as a mark of honour, exempting them in perpetuity from the payment of land revenue and from forced labour (*begar*) on condition of good and loyal service. These title deeds they set an immense value on. In the face of such proceedings it seems absurd to talk of the Government giving up Wana, as to do so would make our engagements and the granting of title deeds a mere mockery. The Derwesh-Khels were given to understand that the settlement was a permanent one. It was on this understanding that they welcomed us and threw in their lot unreservedly with Government, and to abandon them now to their enemies would be tantamount to a repudiation of our most solemn engagements. It had been decided that the entire Wana

force should go with the expedition, returning there again after its close; but this caused considerable alarm to the Derwesh-Khels, and on my earnest solicitation, bearing in mind our assurances of permanent occupation and protection of our friends and allies, it was finally ordered by the Government of India that one regiment of native infantry, twenty cavalry, and two guns should remain. The building of a cantonment for the troops was at the same time sanctioned by Government, and the Derwesh-Khels were informed, greatly to their delight, that the arrangement for their protection would be a permanent one.

The position at Wana, besides dominating Mahsuds, dominates powerful Afghan tribes, Suleiman-Khels, Dotanis, Kharotis, Nasirs, and others, numbering about fifty thousand men of some of the finest fighting races in the world; and should another frontier war with Afghanistan or Russia arise, it is then that the value of the position for dealing with these tribes will be fully realised and appreciated.

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CHAPTER XIV

OPENING OF THE TOCHI, 1895 TO 1896

On December 18 the advance of the different columns of the Mahsud Expedition commenced, Sir William Lockhart marched with the headquarters column from Jandola to Margaband. The Bannu column, under the command of General Egerton, marched from Edwardsabad, the objective being Razmak. The Wana column, under the command of General Turner, marched to Khaisera. I accompanied the latter. Before leaving Wana the Khaisera Maliks bound themselves to point out the hamlets, towers, and property of Mullah Powindah's adherents, engaging that no opposition would be offered in Khaisera and that supplies would be furnished for the force. For the due fulfilment of these engagements I took, with General Turner's concurrence, a number of representative hostages, and these I had detained under police custody in Wana. As we marched into Khaisera the Maliks came out to meet us, and according to their agreement provided on payment supplies, grain, grass, firewood, &c., for the force. We halted for a day at Khaisera and the troops destroyed the Shabi-Khel fortified village of Tor-Wam, which had been the rendezvous of Mullah Powindah and his followers, as well as another small Shabi-Khel hamlet. The Shabi-Khels had all deserted their villages. During the two nights we spent in Khaisera not a shot was fired. No hostile gathering was reported anywhere, and it was said that the Mullah had fled to Afghanistan. Mr. King had, under General Lockhart's orders, taken

similar engagements from the Shingi Maliks, and no opposition was met with by that column either. They destroyed some towers and fortified hamlets belonging to offenders. A few stray shots were fired at rearguards, but no organised opposition was encountered anywhere, and the celebrated Barari Tangi, where the Mahsuds had made a stubborn stand on the former expedition, was found to be unoccupied. On December 21 Sir William Lockhart marched to Makin. His force destroyed *en route* Mullah Powindah's hamlet of Marobi, which was found deserted. As a large proportion of those who had been proclaimed were Abdallis and Shabi-Khels, who resided in and about Makin, the place was found to be almost entirely evacuated, and the force destroyed numerous towers and hamlets belonging to them. Unfortunately, some houses belonging to the loyal Maliks, relations of one of the three murdered Maliks, were, in spite of stringent orders, destroyed by the troops. General Lockhart, however, compensated the owners. It shows, as I have before mentioned, what a difficult matter it is, where intimate but complicated relations, such as those we had with the Waziris, exist, once the dogs of war are let loose, to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty.

On December 20 we marched from Khaisera over the Sarwangai Pass to Moghul-Khel, and on the 21st to Kanigorum. On the next day, the 22nd, the Bannu column arrived at Makin. They had marched *viâ* the Tochi and Razmak. The Tochi Derwesh-Khels welcomed us to their country as friends, and furnished supplies to the column on payment. Their Maliks accompanied Mr. Anderson, and nothing worthy of the name of opposition was encountered *en route*.

As all three brigades were now in touch, Sir William Lockhart, after holding a council of war with the officers commanding, resolved on a plan of operations by which it

was arranged that on Christmas day six columns, in the lightest of marching order, without any tents, should proceed in different directions to hunt up the proclaimed factions, who had mostly found hiding places in the numerous ravines and formidable gorges which encircle and pierce the grand Pir-Ghal mountain. The following was the programme laid out for the columns.

Wana Brigade

1. Up the Baddar Valley, under General Turner.
2. Through the Pir Ghal Algad, under Colonel Pollock.

Jandola Brigade

3. Up the Patwela Valley, under Colonel Gaselee.
4. Up the Murdar Algad, under General Symons.

Bannu Brigade

5 Up the Darra Valley, under Major Mein.

6. Up the Maidan Valley, under Colonel Egerton. Sir William Lockhart and staff were to accompany this last.

I accompanied the column going up the Baddar Valley. We started on Christmas morning and had a delightful march through a lovely wooded country. It was a fine cold bracing morning, with the snow lying on the ground. Nothing eventful occurred on the march. At Baddar we found four sets of small but very substantial hamlets belonging to the Abdulrehman-Khels, Nekzan-Khels, Giga-Khels, and Kekarai sections, which were all inhabited except those of the Abdulrehman-Khels. The Abdulrehman-Khels had gone off with their families and flocks, only leaving a few men to look after the place. These, on seeing the column approaching, set fire to some of their houses that were filled with grain and forage, but on arriving we found no great harm had been done. The Abdulrehman-

Khel settlement consisted of some thirty houses, with four substantial towers, one of which belonged to the notorious Jambel, who had been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for Mr. Kelly's murder. The houses were well stocked with grain and forage. While these were being removed for the use of the troops, some shots were fired from an adjacent hill by the Abdulrehman-Khels, and two soldiers of the Border regiment were wounded. After the removal of the grain and forage, the towers were blown up by the Sappers and the place was completely destroyed. The loss caused to the Abdulrehman-Khels could not have been less than 5,000 rs. or 6,000 rs., as the towers and houses were large and well built. General Turner agreed not to destroy the settlements of the other sections, as their Maliks had been friendly and had given me valuable information about the movements of Mullah Powindah and his followers at the time of the attack on my camp at Wana. We remained at Baddar for two nights bivouacking in the Giga-Khel hamlet. By a curious coincidence the leading Malik was Mahomed Afzal Khan, whose father, Dawagar, was one of the three Maliks who had been murdered for assisting me in compassing the surrender of the Abdulrehman-Khel offenders charged with the murder of Mr. Kelly. Mahomed Afzal showed me the spot in this very hamlet where his father had been shot dead. He willingly made over his village to us, having removed his women and children to an adjacent hamlet and rendered us every assistance in his power. I felt indebted to General Turner for the great trouble he took in meting out punishment according to the merits in each case, and in supporting those who had done good service; the effect of which will be far more salutary and lasting than it would have been had he punished all indiscriminately. We ate our plum pudding, some thirty or forty of us, seated on the floor of Mahomed Afzal's shed, where we also slept

during the two nights of our bivouac, and made quite a jolly Christmas of it. Baddar is a lovely valley right under Pir-Ghal. All this extensive tract, comprising the grand Pir-Ghal and Shuidar ranges of mountains, and the lovely valleys of Shakai, Baddar, Shawal, and Razmak, is beautifully wooded, and enjoys a splendid climate, with abundant supplies of first-rate water. It would be a regular Paradise for troops, and I hope I may one day see them stationed there instead of in the roasting and malaria saturated plains of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The Derwesh-Khels and Dawaris would rejoice if we were to establish a cantonment in Razmak (see map), which is in their own country, to keep the peace between them and the Mahsuds.

On the 27th we marched back to Kanigoram. The other columns also returned to their respective camps, having in the same way destroyed the towers and confiscated the property of Abdallis, Shabi-Khels, Garrerais, and others who had been implicated in the Wana attack. The friendly Maliks were constantly employed pointing these out, and in this, as well as in other matters, were doing useful service. We were still working through them for obtaining the return of the Government rifles, horses, and other property, and the surrender of the eighteen hostages. By this time twenty-four of the rifles and some cavalry horses had been made over to Mr. King and myself, and there were abundant signs to show that Mullah Powindah's game was fast drawing to its close. The weather had broken and we had some heavy falls of snow, the thermometer at night registering eighteen degrees of frost, which in eighty-pound Kabul tents and with light kit was rather severe; and as the cavalry horses and transport animals were all tethered in the open, they suffered a good deal. We were therefore glad to move down into less rigorous regions, especially as

at that season a fall of three feet of snow at Kanigoram, at an elevation of seven thousand feet, is not unusual.

As all parts of the northern Mahsud country had been visited by the different columns of the force and no enemy could be found to fight with, Sir William Lockhart ordered that the 1st Brigade should move back to Wana, the 2nd Brigade to the Khaisera valley, and the Bannu column to Mirian, to act as a reserve. He further directed that the 2nd Brigade should be employed in opening up the direct route from Jandola to Wana by the Shahur Pass, and that the 1st should be available to furnish an escort for the Delimitation Commission, while demarcating the part of the boundary from Kundar-Domandi northward in the direction of the Tochi. The route decided on for the return march of the 1st and 2nd Brigades was *vid* Jandola and the Shahur Pass.

Accordingly, on January 5 the several columns marched for Jandola, where the whole force was to be concentrated. The Makin column halted the first day at Jhanjal, where a deplorable accident took place. Lieutenant Lockhart, A.D.C., was accidentally shot dead by a native orderly who was cleaning a revolver, and, not knowing that it was loaded, inadvertently let the weapon off. His untimely death cast a gloom over the whole force, as he was liked by everyone and was a very promising young officer.

The Shabi-Khel settlements of Nargao, Tangai, and Janjara were visited by the troops, but as they only marched through they had not time to destroy the towers and fortified hamlets, which were very numerous and substantially built. This was to be regretted, as the Shabi-Khels were Mullah Powindah's own people and had been among the prime instigators and leaders throughout the whole business, and it would have paid well to have halted there for a couple of days to completely destroy the

defences. The settlements were all found to be deserted, and the troops met with no opposition.

On January 7 Sir William Lockhart issued summonses to all the leading Mahsud Maliks directing them to meet him at Khaisera on the 19th instant to notify to them the final terms of Government. He also sent notices to the Derwesh-Khel head men of Shikai, instructing them to attend at the same time and deliver up the five men accused of committing murders and outrages in the Gomal Pass and in Zhob, and informing them that in the event of their failing to do so the force would visit Shikai and inflict condign punishment. Nothing of interest occurred on the march from Jandola through the Shahur Pass and valley.

On the force arriving at Barwand a column was detached to destroy some Machi-Khel settlements at the head of the Ghurghura valley. I regretted this, as it was a breach of the engagements I had, with the concurrence of General Turner, entered into with the Khaisera head men before we marched from Wana, and for the due observance of which I had taken hostages from these very Machi-Khels and others, who were still under police surveillance at Wana. As I was not the political officer with this column, and had not been consulted, all I could do was to make a protest, which I did. Relying on the understanding that they would not be treated as enemies, they never left their hamlets, and the force found them all occupied, but gave the inhabitants time to clear out before destroying the defences. It was another instance out of many that came under my observation showing how very difficult it is, once punitive military operations are in force, where parties are so mixed, to separate the sheep from the goats and secure the interests of those we are bound to protect.

On January 19 Sir William Lockhart held his great durbar at Kundiwam in Khaisera. The leading men of all

sections, with the exception of the Shabi-Khels, Abdulrehman-Khels, and Abdallis, numbering two hundred and seventy-two, were present. The General announced to them the final terms, as approved by the Government of India, which were:

(1) The surrender of the remaining hostages, fourteen in number.

(2) Government property plundered from the Wana camp, and not yet returned, to be given up—viz. ten rifles, ten horses, and 2,000 rs. in cash. Compensation to the amount of 500 rs. to be paid for each rifle and horse not returned.

(3) The amount of fines due from the tribe, amounting to 12,828 rs., to be paid in cash.

(4) The Shahur Valley route, from Jandola to Wana *vid* Khaisera, to be opened up, and posts established thereon. The Maliks to be held responsible for the safety of the route.

(5) The following arms to be surrendered to Government: fifty breech-loading rifles, two hundred matchlocks, and two hundred swords or knives.

He informed them that they would be given to March 1 to comply, and that the troops would remain in the country till all were fulfilled.

The jirga of the Shakai Maliks presented themselves at the durbar and surrendered the five men accused of the Zhob and Gweleri murders. They at the same time presented a petition praying that Shakai might be considered a part of Wana, and be included in the same arrangements; and that Government would be at liberty to place troops and locate posts at any place they pleased within Shakai limits. They represented that in all their arrangements, whether for war or peace, they were at one with the Wana people and separate from the Tochi. Their statement is

borne out by the general configuration of the country and the position of the tribal boundaries. The Baddar and some of the other valleys that run up into the Pir-Ghal mountain belong to the Mahsuds, and intervene between Shakai and the Tochi-Bannu Derwesh-Khels. Moreover, Shakai is situated on one of the slopes of the Jánimela mountain, which belongs jointly to them and to the Wana Ahmadzais, and to attempt to separate them would lead to confusion and complications. On these grounds, with the concurrence of Sir William Lockhart, I supported their petition, but the Punjab Government postponed the final settlement until the arrangements with the Tochi Derwesh-Khels should come under consideration. Sir William and I had visited Shakai together, and had seen on the spot exactly how the position lay.

After the terms had been announced to the Mahsuds General Lockhart requested that I should remain at Kundiwam for the purpose of securing their fulfilment, and ordered that I should have as escort a brigade of troops under the command of General Symons. He further directed that as soon as the terms had been complied with I should join him in the Tochi, to take up what the Punjab Government styled 'the big question' of the Derwesh-Khel and Dawar service allowances. Mr. King was at the same time deputed to carry out the demarcation of the boundary from Domandi to Khwaja-Khidar, and Mr. Anderson from Khwaja-Khidar to Laram.

There also remained for settlement the very important question of the restoration and distribution of the Mahsud tribal services and allowances, which had been to a large extent suspended or confiscated in consequence of the Wana affair. In referring to this measure the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in making his proposal to the Government of India, wrote:

I recommend that Sir William Lockhart and Mr. Bruce should be requested to submit by an early date a full and comprehensive report showing all divisions and ramifications of the tribe with their Maliks, and the mode in which they have behaved throughout this business, &c. The matter is one of immense complication, and without such report Government will not be able to judge of proposals when received.

This suggestion was approved of by the Government of India and was sent to Sir William Lockhart for compliance; but before anything could be done Sir William had left the country, and the negotiations devolved on me, as will be seen hereafter.

Meantime I took in hand the arrangements for the carrying out of the terms. The Maliks had raised objections to two of the conditions. First, they represented that it was impossible for them to surrender fifty breech-loading rifles. The second objection was to the occupation and opening up of the Shahur route. If this was to be insisted on they begged that the whole Mahsud country might, like Wana, be taken under our control and protection; but that, in that event, as they would then be subjects of the British Government, they should be let off the surrender of arms and payment of fines, and exempted from the payment of land revenue and forced labour (*begar*), as the Derwesh-Khels of Wana had been. Sir William Lockhart considered the opening of the Shahur route an essential point, but doubted if it could be maintained by levy posts alone, and recommended that in addition a permanent military post should be established at Barwand, or other suitable position on the route. He pointed out that one of the advantages of it would be that it would impose an effective check on the Abdulrehman-Khels, that most troublesome of Mahsud sections.

There was a good deal of speculation as to what the

Mahsud Maliks meant by their petition that we should extend our protection and control over the whole Mahsud country rather than that we should, as it were, separate off and take up the Shahur route by itself. It must be borne in mind that the Shahur route traverses the most fertile and valuable settlements in the Mahsud country. For my part I believe the petition expressed the *bona-fide* wish of the Maliks, and that there was no hidden or ulterior meaning whatever in it. It had all along been their earnest desire that the settlement made with Sir Robert Sandeman and myself at Appozai for the pacification of the Gomal and protection of the Zhob route should be successful, but, in consequence of the limited nature of the support we were able to extend to them in their own country, the bad characters of the tribe had proved too much for them, causing them endless worry, trouble, and complications, the murder of three of their number, constant personal danger to themselves, culminating in the Wana attack, the consequent breakdown of the settlement, followed by the punitive expedition and punishment, in which they had to take their share. They saw clearly enough that if we continued to confine our policy to mere support 'from without,' which had already failed in securing 'effective control' over bad characters and marauding sections, the same thing would be liable to recur, with perhaps still more fatal consequences to themselves; that the bad characters would attribute our half-in-half policy to timidity, would again 'get wind in their heads,' and the same outrages which had occurred on the Gomal-Zhob line would be repeated on the Shahur route, which is manifestly more exposed, and the fanatical factions might once more seize the opportunity and get the upper hand of them. On the other hand, by our holding of the Shahur route the backbone of the Mahsud country would be broken, and render hopeless anything like combined resistance in the future, so

that in either case the Maliks would have no status. They felt, to use an expressive phrase, that they would be between the devil and the deep sea. Surely it was a similar position which presented itself to Sir William Lockhart's mind when he recommended that a military force should be stationed at Barwand, and had it not been for the establishment of this post, afterwards changed to Sarwekai, I have no doubt that it would have been proved ere now that the Maliks had good grounds for their apprehensions, and that their petition was a sensible one.

It was just one of those opportunities that Sir Robert Sandeman would have eagerly seized on, and probably have made it a sure foundation for the early pacification of the entire Mahsud country, carrying with him the Maliks and the greater proportion of the tribe. The solicitation of the Brahoe Sirdars to Sir Robert Sandeman led to the occupation of Quetta. It was on the pressing invitations of the leading men of Sibi, Harnai, Thal-Choteali, Duki, Khetran, Zhob, and Appozai that he compassed the pacification of all those tracts of country. It was by the active support that he afforded Sirdar Gholam Mortaza, Bugti, that the death of the renowned robber chief, Gholam Hosein, with two hundred and sixty of his followers and the submission of his clan, the Mussoori Bugtis, was brought about. He took a military force to support the authority of the Marri Sirdar, Mehrulla Khan, and exacted from the notorious Bijarani Marris full restitution and reparation for the Kuchali raid. The Mussooris among the Bugtis and the Bijaranis among the Marris were in those days what in recent times the Abdulrehman-Khels were among the Mahsuds. Why, then, should it be considered anything extraordinary or unaccountable that the Mahsud Maliks should ask that, instead of what they regarded as a half-hearted risky arrangement for the opening of the Shahur route, we should bring the

whole of their country under a uniform and workable policy, as had been done in the case of Wana? The Wana chiefs had given a unanimous petition for the occupation of Wana, and the great majority of the Dawaris and Derwesh-Khels had done the same in regard to the Tochi.

I would go further than this and say that, as far as Waziristan is concerned, having gone so far, we are bound to the Sandeman policy and could not in honour withdraw from it. In all important measures, where it was to our own advantage and in the interests of the general scheme of frontier defence and administration, we have not hesitated to recognise the authority of the Maliks, and to accept the voice of their council or jirga as binding on the tribe and to act on it. Thus it was on the grounds that the loyal Mahsud Maliks spontaneously asked for it that the Government so readily occupied Kajuri-Kach, Jandola, and Barwand with troops. The Government sought for and were glad to gain the acquiescence, in fact the invitation, of the Derwesh-Khel Maliks to our occupation of Wana. Similarly it is the petitions of the Dawari and Tochi Waziris which constitute our justification for the occupation of the Tochi. By these measures—which, as I said, we carried through on the solicitation and on the authority of the Maliks, and which are each and all distasteful to the evildoers and malcontents—we have bound Waziristan hand and foot, and are thereby pledged to mould our policy on such lines as will afford the Maliks efficient support and protection, and not leave them to the mercy of these criminal and fanatical factions. Yes, if we look the question straight in the face we are bound to come to the conclusion that we are pledged by our acts to work out our policy, gradually it may be, but surely, to its legitimate end, as was done in Beluchistan. On our side we have those who hold a name and stake, and whatever there may be of loyalty, law, and order in the

country, while opposed to us we have a combination of all the evil elements. It should not, therefore, be a matter of doubt, even had we incurred no obligations, to a great civilising power like ours which side to espouse, and no reasonable expense should be allowed to stand in the way of putting matters on a safe and effective footing. In the face of such facts as those I have referred to above, why should we proclaim that our ways are offensive to the people and that they will have none of us, thus discrediting and belittling our own policy, except that it is a national idiosyncrasy to do so?

But I must return to the account of my own immediate work in the obtaining of the fulfilment of the Government terms by the Mahsuds. The Maliks had by this time, with our support, got the control of the settlement pretty well into their own hands; and before the end of January they had secured compliance with nearly all the conditions. Out of the eighteen hostages demanded, fourteen had been surrendered. Out of thirty-six Government rifles and sixteen horses, thirty-two rifles and fourteen horses had been restored. The fines were also being rapidly realised, the arms demanded being given in, and it was certain that all would be complied with before the date fixed. I telegraphed all these particulars to Sir William Lockhart, and was gratified at receiving from him the following reply: 'Dated January 29, 1895. Very glad to get your telegram last night. I congratulate you on success. Please send all arms here, including swords and knives, for approval.'

On February 5 Sir William despatched from Wana to Bannu the following troops, to provide an escort for Mr. Anderson in carrying out the delimitation of the boundary, as well as in connection with the measures contemplated for the pacification of the Derwesh-Khel country and the opening of the Tochi and other routes: the Border regiment,

the 20th Punjab Infantry, the 5th Gurkhas, and the 2nd company Sappers and Miners.

Mr. Anderson had reported that complete jirgas of the Derwesh-Khels and Dawaris, numbering respectively some fifteen hundred men, and including all the leading influential Maliks, had arrived in Bannu; that they were most friendly, agreeing to provide supplies for the force when it entered their limits and to render their good services in connection with the delimitation of the boundary, in which they were deeply interested, and in other matters; and that there were no signs of any discontent among them. This was very satisfactory intelligence. The only thing they expressed any apprehension about was lest we should occupy the country without first coming to a settlement with them in regard to service allowances, and begged that we should in the first instance make the settlement with them, as had been done in the case of the Gomal Pass. This was reasonable enough, and Mr. Anderson assured them that as soon as ever I had completed my settlement with the Mahsuds and Wana people I was coming to the Tochi expressly to negotiate with them about all these matters, and that Government would be certain to consult them before adopting any permanent measures. This reassured them.

On February 13 Mr. King reported that he had completed his section of the delimitation, as far as Khwaja-Khidar; and on the same day Sir William Lockhart left Wana *en route* for Bannu and the Tochi. On the 24th he entered the Tochi Pass, and on the 26th encamped at the large village of Idak in Dawar. Mullah Powindah owned two houses in Idak, which were destroyed by Sir William Lockhart's orders. From Idak the General's marches up the Tochi valley were Darpa-Khel (in Upper Dawar), eleven miles; Mohammed-Khel, eleven miles; Datta-Khel (in Waziri limits), eleven miles; Sheranni (near the head of

the Tochi valley), six miles. A few shots had been fired at night into the camp, and a Gurkha sepoy was killed, but the General reported that the people were friendly, the opposition 'being confined to a few men.' Sada Khan, son of the well-known Adam Khan, came out to meet the troops and was said to be well disposed.

He halted for some days at Sheranni. On March 5 Mr. Anderson commenced the delimitation of his section of the boundary, from Charkia-Garh to Khwaja-Khidar. He erected his first boundary pillar at Khar-Kumar, which is the correct name of the peak shown in the former map as Charkai-Garh. Thence he proceeded south towards Khwaja-Khidar, which he reached on the 22nd, thus completing the Charkai-Garh-Khwaja-Khidar section in seventeen days. There now only remained the short section between Charkia-Garh and Laram, which there was a delay in starting on account of some reference that had to be made to the Amir.

Having secured the complete fulfilment of the Mahsud terms, I started for the Tochi to make a settlement with the Dawaris and Derwesh-Khels in regard to service allowances, entertainment of tribal levies, establishments, and other measures indispensable to the opening up of the country, as previously arranged. I was delayed at Tank for some time, and our eldest son, who had passed out of Sandhurst and had been nominated for the Indian Staff Corps, came and paid me a visit there on his way to join the 1st Battalion of the Devonshire regiment stationed at Peshawar, to which he had been attached. He stayed with me in camp for a week, and I was glad to be able to give him his first lessons in Indian shooting, and we had some pleasant days together after quail and partridge.

Sir William Lockhart had directed that I should meet him in the Tochi, but before I arrived he had left Waziristan.

I was just in time, however, to have an interview with him at Edwardsabad on March 18 on his way through that station; and on the 24th, under the orders of the Government of India, I reverted to my former position of Chief Political Officer in Waziristan. After my interview with Sir William Lockhart, I marched to Datta-Khel, in the Tochi valley, where Mr. Anderson met me. He gave me a most interesting description of the tracts he had passed through while on delimitation duty. The places that struck him most were the lovely forest-covered ridges and slopes of the Shuidar mountain, the Alwara and Shawal valleys, and Birmal. In writing he thus describes them :

The Alwara valley, towards the western end of which lies the Usman-Katsa, is some five miles broad and from ten to twelve miles long. If water can be found it would be a magnificent site for a cantonment, commanding what appears to be a very easy route to Urgun by the Kazha. Seen from the hills around, it appears to be a perfectly flat plain, much more so even than Wana.

The Shawal valley, as regards climate, forest, and grazing is the choicest valley of the Derwesh-Khels, and it certainly deserves the high praise which I have often heard bestowed upon it by them. It is about sixteen miles long and eight miles broad, measuring between the high ranges which surround it. Low broken hills and ridges descend from the mountains to within a quarter of a mile of the river bed. Numerous valleys pass through and join the main stream from the mountains. The Bosh-Nerai and the Dare-Nashtar valleys have magnificent timber. I have seen no place in the Waziri hills more suitable for a sanitorium than this valley.

Birmal is a fine broad open valley with numerous hamlets and a fair amount of cultivation. There is a somewhat large plain in the centre, but on the eastern side, where it slopes up to the mountains, is an abundance of chilgoza pines, and the scenery is that of a well-wooded park. It is a broad highway connecting and communicating easily with all the passes leading from this part of Waziristan into Afghanistan. It appears to me to be a

valley of high strategical value from a military point of view, and its cession to the Amir is a great loss from that view.

It will be seen that Mr. Anderson's account tallies with the description I have already given of that most highly favoured tract of country lying between Wana and Sheranni. The Mahsud and Derwesh-Khel Maliks urged me on many occasions to open up and maintain the direct route from Wana through Kanigoram to Sheranni, saying, 'Sahib, you will never keep the Waziris properly under control until you do that,' and I believe that they were not far wrong.

Mr. Anderson spoke very highly of the assistance he had throughout received from Sadda Khan, as well as from his son, who had accompanied him on his delimitation tour. I brought this to the notice of Government.

As the important negotiations I had been ordered to enter into with the Dauris and Derwesh-Khels had not yet been even commenced, I was concerned to find on my arrival at Datta-Khel that the troops had been withdrawn from Sheranni, and still more so to learn from Mr. Anderson that they were under orders to march to Edwardsabad on the completion of the demarcation of the Charkia-Garh-Laram section of the boundary. This proposed move was disconcerting and unsettling the minds of the tribesmen. I therefore telegraphed immediately to the Punjab Government recommending that troops should be retained in the Tochi at all events until my negotiations for the promised settlement with the tribes had been completed. The Punjab Government supported my recommendation, and the Government of India issued orders that all the troops should not be withdrawn, and a force under Colonel Meiklejohn was retained. I recommended that the force should be stationed near Sheranni (see map). Subsequent events tend to show that it was a mistake having ever moved the troops down from Datta-Khel, which from its position at the head of the

valley dominated all the tribes. Moreover, it was in this vicinity that the new boundary cut off Birmal and divided the Madda-Khels, some of their lands falling on the Amir's side of the boundary and some on the British. This left openings for the intrigues of the Amir's officials, which they took every advantage of, and led, I believe, a good deal to the troubles which afterwards occurred, and which the presence of a force at or near Sheranni might have prevented.

On March 22 the orders arrived from the Amir directing that the Kabul Sirdars who were in our camp should accompany the British Commissioner and co-operate in the demarcation of the Charkia-Garh-Laram section of the boundary, and Mr. Anderson started immediately to carry out the work.

On the 25th I held a durbar and presented *khilluts* to a number of Derwesh-Khel and Dawar Maliks who had rendered good service to the Government from the time the troops had entered the Tochi valley; especially those who had done active and valuable work in the actual delimitation proceedings, and whose services had been brought prominently to my notice by Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson testified that from first to last neither the Derwesh-Khel Waziris nor the Dawaris had shown any hostile spirit. From my frequent interviews with the Maliks I was in entire concurrence with Mr. Anderson in the opinion he had formed in regard to the feeling and attitude of the tribes; which were, I reported to Government, even more friendly than I had anticipated; and that the mass of the people desired our intervention, and would gladly hail our system, under which peace and security would be established and the country opened up and civilised.

On April 4 Mr. Anderson completed his delimitation to Laram, where he linked it on to the Kurram section, which had previously been carried out by Mr. Donald,

The force continued to march down the Tochi to Idak, where Mr. Anderson joined it. He and Mr. King received the congratulations of the Punjab Government, and subsequently of the Government of India, on the successful completion of their delimitation work.

The usual term of my Indian service expired this month, but Government granted me an extension of a year, with prospect of a second if I should desire it, to enable me to finish up my Waziri settlements.

It was now arranged in communication with the Government of India that I should return to Barwand and complete there the arrangements for the readjustment of the service allowances, reorganisation of levies, &c., of the Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels of Wani and Shakai; and on their completion return again to the Tochi and proceed with the settlement with the Dauris and Tochi Waziris. Meantime I directed Mr. Anderson to test as far as possible the real feelings and wishes of the people, and to make certain preliminary inquiries in connection with the ramifications and sectional divisions of the tribes. I at the same time proposed that the force should move up the valley again, either to Sheranni or Datta-Khel, until the measures were carried out and the future policy of the Government in the Tochi had been determined on. I further suggested that a strong military garrison should be posted at a central position, such as Razmak; with outposts at Sheranni and Wana, and that a good road might be opened through the Shawal valley and the Dhana Pass, connecting Wana and Sheranni in four marches.

Matters had arrived at this stage when I started again for Barwand; where, marching by Jani-Khel, the Bain Pass, Tank, and Jandola, I arrived on April 16. The terms imposed on the Mahsuds at the time of the expedition had

been completely fulfilled, and friendly relations had been re-established with the tribe.

I am glad to have an opportunity of mentioning here the debt of gratitude I was under to General Symons for the hearty and thoroughly considerate way in which he co-operated with me. From early morning until late in the evening the Mahsuds flocked into the camp bringing Government rifles, horses, and other plundered property, as well as the fines and arms imposed on them, and the hostages whose surrender was demanded, under the terms. General Symons[1] never raised any objections, but assisted me by every means in his power, and if we had been in one of our own districts in India everything could not have gone on smoother. Not a theft was committed in our camp, nor was there a shot fired in anger from first to last. He is an ardent sportsman, and we constantly went shooting over the hills, taking a couple of sepoys and a few men of the Waziri levies with us, and not a single mishap occurred.

I was now busy carrying out the general settlement with the tribe, which embraced among other matters: (1) the redistribution of all service and other allowances of the tribe, as the settlement made in 1890 at the time of the opening of the Gomal Pass had been cancelled by Government on account of the Wana affair; (2) the remedying of the defects and inequalities in the former distribution by granting allowances to some Maliks who had been inadvertently omitted, and increasing the grants to others commensurate with their status in the tribe; (3) the reorganisation of the tribal levies, so as to include the establishment of new posts for the opening of the route *viâ* Jandola, Shahur, and Khaisera, to Wana. I framed my plan for

[1] Afterwards Sir William Penn Symons, K.C.B. It was after this was written that the sad intelligence of his death, from a wound received at the hour of victory in his battle of Glencoe, was received.

these schemes, and the estimates of their cost, on the assumption that military garrisons will be maintained at Jandola and Barwand, or Sarwekai. The total sum, including old and new proposed services, amounted to 5,129 rs. per mensem, or 61,548 rs. per annum. Of this 33,060 rs. was pay of the tribal levies garrisoning the posts, and 28,488 rs. service allowances to the Sirdars and Maliks. Having thus worked out the new schemes in all particulars, I prepared tables and statements containing the following particulars: a genealogical tree showing all branches of the tribe; names of the leading Maliks and the sections they represent; table showing the ramifications of the tribe in tabular form; the number of fighting men in each branch, and number of houses of each branch at each place of residence of that branch; details of the tribal garrisons to be maintained in the old posts, as well as in those now proposed to be established; and statements showing the former distribution of pay and allowances compared with that proposed under the new scheme.

I must crave the indulgence of my readers for having on this as well on other occasions entered into such details about these schemes. I should not have ventured to strain their patience so far but for the hope that they may help to stimulate the interest of my brother officers charged with the practical duty of working the schemes with these fine tribesmen whom I for so many years regarded as friends, and who I believe looked on me in the same light. I was myself so intensely interested and absorbed in the planning and working of them out that I am, I fear, inclined to forget that others cannot be expected to find the same interest in them.

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, in alluding beforehand to these settlements as 'the big question' and 'one of immense complications'—did not, I think, exaggerate the situation; and as they, with the important connected

measure of the opening of the Tochi Pass, were to be the winding up of my long Indian frontier career, it was to me a matter of very great gratification that they were accepted and sanctioned by Government as they stood without the change of a figure. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, in recommending them to the Government of India, wrote:

His Honour has no doubt that the statements of the subdivisions of the tribe, and of the comparative influence of these and of their leading men, now submitted present a far more complete view of the general considerations that have to be dealt with in discussing the question of allowances than has hitherto been before Government. At the same time, it is quite impossible for Government to check or criticise the details of these statements, and we must trust as regards them to Mr. Bruce, who is master of this subject.

The fact that I was personally acquainted with the position and circumstances of each and all of the leading men made it comparatively easy for me to do what would have been impossible for any man not possessing an intimate knowledge of the tribesmen to have done.

In submitting my settlement with the Mahsuds, I ventured to represent fully my views on the whole Waziristan question, and the Government of India in sanctioning it wrote:

The Government of India sanction, with effect from May 1, 1895, the scheme of allowances which Mr. Bruce has drawn up with so much care and elaboration, and approve all the conditions cited in the 9th paragraph of your letter subject to which it is proposed that the new allowances should be enjoyed. . . . The Governor-General has read with interest Mr. Bruce's views on these subjects, and is glad that he took this opportunity of putting them forward.

It was at this time, when I had nearly completed my Mahsud settlement, that the Mahsud Maliks pointed out Sarwekai to me as the most suitable site for the permanent

military post in connection with the opening of the Shahur route, and strongly recommended that it should be established there. This was a practical proof that the objection they had formerly raised to Sir William Lockhart's terms was not on account of the opening of the route, but was due to their apprehension that, through insufficient arrangements for their control, the bad characters might again cause trouble, risk the settlement, and bring them to grief. I went to Sarwekai accompanied by Colonel Hogg, C.I.E., commanding at Barwand. We had several of the Mahsud Maliks with us, who pointed out to us the advantages of the site. Colonel Hogg concurred with me that it was in every way far superior to Barwand, which is low and unhealthy, very hot, and suffers from a regular plague of mosquitoes in the hot season. There were besides constant disputes and difficulties about the water at Barwand, whereas at Sarwekai there are springs of good water under the very rifles of the post. On our recommendation Sarwekai was approved of, and the garrison was transferred there from Barwand without encountering the slightest opposition from the tribesmen; and a post has since been erected there and is still occupied. As regards site and position, it is a grand post. It is on the crest of a fine commanding ridge, and is, or certainly can easily be made, quite impregnable to any attack from tribesmen. It looks right down on and dominates the Shahur route, especially Spiltoe and other settlements of those persistent disturbers of the peace, the Abdulhrehman-Khels. It is a curious fact that they are now more useful than any of the other sections, as, living close by, their Maliks are constantly employed arranging about supplies, and the money they receive for the sale of their sheep, fowls, eggs, forage, firewood, &c., to the troops compensates them in some degree for having to give up their life of plunder.

Having wound up my Mahsud arrangements I went to Wana, where I made a similar settlement with the Derwesh-Khels. The pay of the tribal levies and the allowances to Maliks amounted to 1,485 rs. per mensem or 17,820 rs. per annum. This was an increase of 6,840 rs., over the former cost of the services rendered necessary for the establishment of the new posts and other measures connected with the occupation of Wana, and providing for the safety of the lines of communication.

My recommendation that Shakai and Badar should be included in the Wana arrangements had at length been sanctioned by Government, so I was able at the same time to settle their service allowances. These came to 301 rs. per mensem or 3,612 rs. per annum, making the total of the tribal levies pay and allowances of the Derwesh-Khel Waziris on the Gomal side 21,432 rs. per annum. These settlements were all approved of and sanctioned by Government. The site for the permanent military post at Wana had been selected by Sir William Lockhart near where our camp had been pitched, and, much to the satisfaction of the people, this was now being built. It also included quarters for the Political Officer. Mr. A. J. Grant[1] had been appointed 'Political Officer' for Southern Waziristan, to work directly under the Commissioner of the Division. I had done everything that lay in my power to advance the interests of Wana and its people. It was therefore a great pleasure to me that all the arrangements there had been completed and placed on such a permanently satisfactory basis before I left it on this, my last official visit.

From Wana I marched to Sheikhbudin, where I took up the case against the five Shakai prisoners who had been surrendered for trial at the time of the expedition for

[1] Since the above was written Mr. Grant died of cholera at Bannu. Publicly and privately his loss is a grievous one.

murders and outrages committed in Zhob and Gweleri. I adopted the same procedure in this case as in that of Jambil and Kurram for the murder of Mr. Kelly. They were tried by a large and influential Council of Elders of the different tribes, and were found guilty; and I sentenced each of them to undergo seven years' imprisonment, subject to the confirmation of the Government of India. The Punjab Government supported my finding in the case, and in submitting it to the Government of India noted:

> The trial of the five accused men was, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick thinks, conducted in the best way possible in the special circumstances of the case, and he considers the Government of India need have no hesitation in confirming the sentence of seven years' imprisonment which has been passed on each of them. His Honour further ventures to think that the successful management of the case by Mr. Bruce is deserving of the acknowledgments of the Governor-General in Council.

He at the same time brought to favourable notice the good work done by Mr. Grant. The Government of India approved of the proceedings and confirmed my sentences, with the remark:

> I am to express concurrence in Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick's appreciation of the successful management of the affair by Mr. Bruce, to whom the acknowledgment of the Governor-General in Council may be conveyed.

One of the men sentenced was Cherai, brother of the notorious Zarriband. Zarriband had during the previous year been killed by a Mahsud. He and the Mahsud went on a plundering expedition. As they went along Zarriband put his rifle, a breech-loading carbine, on the ground beside him, and lay down to take a drink out of the stream; and while he was drinking the Mahsud quietly slipped up, seized the rifle, shot Zarriband dead with it through the back, appropriated the rifle, and walked off. The Mahsud in telling me the story said the rifle was worth some 300 rs.

or 400 rs. and the man could not resist such a temptation! A Waziri will do or dare anything to get possession of arms, particularly breech-loading arms. We had once a rather exciting personal experience of this. I was staying with my wife and children in the circuit house at Tank. We had a military guard in a small tent in front of the house, and a police guard in another small tent outside the gate of the compound. Mr. Donald had dined with us, and my wife and Mr. Donald and myself were sitting after dinner talking in front of a door into the verandah, which was open. The night was as dark as pitch, and it was raining heavily. We heard the native sentry challenge very sharply, 'Who comes there?' but as there was no answer I asked him who it was. He said he thought a man had passed close by him, but in the darkness he could not tell for certain, and it might have been a dog. The non-commissioned officer was not satisfied, and turned out the guard and searched the shrubbery all round the bungalow, when three men who were concealed in a clump of shrubs close to their tent rushed out. The guard gave chase and fired three or four shots at the robbers as they ran away, but did not succeed in catching or in hitting any of them. Their object had evidently been to steal the sepoys' rifles. But as the guard was now thoroughly on the alert they turned their attention to the police guard outside the gate. One of the robbers hid himself behind a tree and fired his pistol at the police sentry as he came close to him, and shot him in the ear. As the police guard, on hearing the shot, rushed out, the other two thieves slipped in under the fly of their tent and secured two of the police rifles and made off with them. Mr. Donald turned out a party of levies and sent them in pursuit, and to watch the passes. He succeeded in arresting one of the robbers and recovered the rifles, but the other two made good their escape into the hills. There was

a little incident connected with the affair which will show what cool and expert thieves the Waziris are. They found in our yard a large earthen pot of buttermilk which had been left there to give the calves in the morning. They took away the pot into a field of wheat close by, lit a fire, warmed and drank the milk, and smashed the pot. In the morning we found their tracks through the wheat, the embers of their fire, and the broken pot. My wife was much annoyed at her poor calves losing their breakfast.

The all-important question of the protection of the Maliks who had been instrumental in bringing home the offences to the accused persons again cropped up in this case of the Shakai offenders. Mr. Grant reported that Lalu Khan, the leading Malik of Shakai, had come to his camp for refuge, as he had been threatened by the relations and adherents of the prisoners and that his life was in danger. Mr. Grant recommended that he might be authorised to warn these partisans of the prisoners that they would be severely dealt with if they did any injury to Lalu Khan on account of the part he had taken in the case. The Punjab Government supported Mr. Grant's proposal, drawing attention to the fact of our having allowed the assassination of the three Mahsud Maliks in Mr. Kelly's case to pass, and pointing out that it would be utterly out of the question to condone a second assassination of the kind, as if we were to do so, the practice of murdering those who joined us in obtaining the conviction of criminals would become an established one. That under such circumstances we could no longer hope to get Maliks to go on exposing their lives for us, and we would be compelled to resort again to the primitive system of proceeding against either the tribe, or section of the tribe, as a whole, a system shown by past experience as liable to lead to the punitive expeditions so strongly condemned.

The Government of India, while deprecating any general announcement, concurred in the policy proposed by the Lieutenant-Governor, and directed that the local officers might let the tribes know that any outrage arising from the part played by any member of a jirga would be considered an offence for which we would be entitled to exact retribution, and that in the particular case of Lalu we should take measures to provide for his safety, and that the Maliks should be encouraged to arrest and take adequate security from those who had used threats; that the local officers might support the Maliks in this, and if necessary arrange for the confinement or surveillance of persons suspected of contemplating recourse to violence.

It follows from this that if we are bound to protect the Maliks from retaliation, still more are we bound to protect our own Government servants, the tribal levies, from injury for acts done in the execution of their duty.

But the procedure sanctioned, whether the danger is to the Maliks or to the levies, falls short in its essential part, which is that the onus still lies on the Maliks to take strong coercive action of the same nature as past experience has proved them to be unequal to without that material support to their back the necessity for which I have pointed out. It is easy enough to confine these ruffians if you have caught them, but the difficulty is to catch them unless free to go into the country in support of the Maliks. I have already explained that the strong point in the Beluchistan policy is that the two go hand in hand—first the support of the Maliks within their own country, and secondly the punishment of evil-doers. It is these working harmoniously together under the Sandeman System that have almost completely obviated the necessity for punitive expeditions, or, when undertaken, have made satisfactory settlements without much bloodshed practicable, as in the case of the

Zhob and Khidderzai expeditions. All the same, the procedure laid down by Government constituted a step in advance in our controlling and civilising policy in Waziristan, and as such an instalment of some value. Before dismissing the Waziri Maliks I held a durbar at Dera Ismael Khan and presented *khillats* to those who had rendered good services.

Our negotiations on the Dera Ismail Khan-Gomal side having thus been brought to a close, I was directed by Government to turn my immediate attention to the Bannu-Tochi negotiations and submit a detailed scheme for the opening of the Tochi. (It was decided that the arrangements for the opening of the Thal-Gumatti route were not to be included for the present.) These were of a more far-reaching nature than that concluded with the Mahsuds, as they embraced the occupation of the Tochi, the establishment of a permanent military post in the country, and the taking under our protection of and taking land revenue from the Dauris. I drew up, in consultation with Mr. Anderson, proposals for the entertainment of levies from the Dauris and Derwesh-Khels, the establishment of tribal levy posts on the lines of communication, and the granting of allowances to the leading Maliks for political services. The planning of these and other important connected measures for the occupation of the Tochi involved an immense deal of work and a voluminous correspondence; but as an account of them would to the ordinary reader only seem to be a repetition of what I have previously described with regard to our negotiations with the Beluchistan tribes, the Waziris, and others for the opening of the Bolan and Gomal Passes and Zhob routes, and as I have already had to ask for indulgence in the matter of such repetitions, I shall not venture to enter into a history of them, but shall confine myself to a few remarks as to the cost of this and other

schemes entered into for the opening up of the Derajat hill country by the extension of friendly relations to the Border tribes. The estimate I now submitted, and to which the Government of India accorded their sanction, amounted to 47,872 rs. for Derwesh-Khel Waziris, and to 15,864 rs. for Dauris, or a total of 63,736 rs. per annum for both tribes. They were also informed that, agreeable to their request, a military force would be retained in the Tochi to assist in the protection of Daur and the safeguarding of the routes.

The following is a detail of the expenditure incurred from the lac of rupees per annum sanctioned by Government for 'political developments' in Waziristan:

	Rupees
Increase to Mahsud Waziri service allowances for protection of Zhob frontier, pacification of Upper Gomal, &c.	10,320
Increase to Derwesh-Khel Waziri service allowances in connection with same measures, and with the occupation of Wana.	10,452
Miscellaneous expenses for writers and sanitary establishments for the tribal levy posts	5,520
Service allowances to Dauris in connection with the opening of the Tochi Pass	15,864
To Derwesh-Khel Waziris on same account	47,872
Total	90,028

This left a balance of 9,972 rs. out of the sanctioned lac, of which a sum of 4,500 rs. was set apart for the settlement of the Bhitanni tribe, and the balance to go towards the opening of the Thal-Gumatti or Thal-Daur route.

Former tribal services sanctioned under the Appozai settlement, and previous grants for Waziris and Sheranis, amounted to:

	Rupees
Mahsud Waziris	51,348
Derwesh-Khel Waziris	7,428
Sheranis	6,824
Total	65,600

This added to the lac amounts to 165,600 rs., which sum may be said to represent the tribal cost of the safe-

guarding and maintenance of the Tochi, Gomal, Zao, and Chuar-Khel Passes. The equivalent of this in sterling at the rate of one shilling and fourpence to the rupee is 11,400*l*. To the casual observer this may appear a large sum; but it is only by comparing it with the cost of other factors employed in the great scheme of Imperial Frontier consolidation and defence, and the advantages we secure by it, that we can arrive at a just estimate of the value we get for our money. I would ask my readers to examine the map and consider the extent of the belt of tribal territory and the nature of the tribes influenced by these arrangements. The tracts concerned extend from the Sanghur Pass on the south to the borders of Thal, Kurram, and Kohat, inhabited by tribes as warlike as any on our North-West frontier, numbering some forty thousand fighting men. Regarding them, then, in the first place as a supplementary aid to the military, I would notice that the total cost of the tribal services on this great stretch of country is not as much as the cost of one battalion of native infantry. The average cost of a regiment of native infantry, with its transport, &c., on the frontier is not less, I believe, than 15,000 rs. a month, or at the rate of exchange 12,000*l*. a year, while the cost of a regiment of native cavalry is half as much again. I have before described the numerous posts in Beluchistan and Upper Sind which had been formerly garrisoned by regular troops but which are now all in charge of tribal levies; while the highest authorities, military and civil, have testified to the enormous value of their services in maintaining the safety of the Bolan Pass and other lines of communication during the Afghan War, results that could not otherwise have been secured without a large increase to the military forces. In the same way none will, I believe, venture to assert that, but for the tribal services, the safeguarding of the Tochi, Gomal, and other

important lines of communication with Beluchistan could be provided for without a good many more regiments of regular troops on the Derajat Border than we have at present. Looked at, therefore, from this standpoint alone the cost would appear to be anything but excessive. But apart from this and the great object of the ultimate civilisation of the tribes, the arrangements have only to be persisted in and developed on correct lines to bring, not merely the levies and the Maliks, but the whole tribes, into line with the British Government, securing thereby many other advantages. The chiefs and levies should be regarded merely in the light of a nucleus.

As it may, I hope, be gathered from my narrative showing the results of the Forward Policy what the advantages of close and intimate relations with the tribes are, I will not enter into further details except on one important matter, which may prove useful—namely, that of recruiting. I noticed, in passing, the value of the belt of tribal territory as a recruiting field for the Indian army. I believe this aspect of the question is considered a very important one by the military authorities, and is one which is fully appreciated by those who remember what a difficulty there was in obtaining a sufficient number of recruits of the right stamp during the later phases of the Afghan war. General Chesney, in bidding farewell to India, struck a warning note in this connection in declaring the army to be 'strained to meet the demands made on it at this moment, that are as nothing compared with those which would be made when the great day comes, of which we already had warning, if the deep shadow already cast on our frontier should grow broader.' The 'Civil and Military Gazette,' in commenting on this and the kindred subject of punitive expeditions, wrote:

Our object, moreover, is not to kill off or even decimate these tribesmen, many of whom, under proper training and discipline,

have shown such splendid capacity for soldiering. We want them as certain allies, as loyal subjects, as possible recruits ready in case of need to defend their hills—our outworks—under our training and guidance, against all comers. However fascinating the picture, to suppose unorganised bands of gallant clansmen, always free and always independent, often even of tribal control, is absurd. As events develop, that they should continue to retain this wild independence is not within the bounds of reason. They are not independent of control now, or they would harry the plains, drive the cattle, and loot the Hindu every day of the week. Ultimately they will be absorbed, and the sooner their absorption by us takes place the stronger we make our position, and the more hopeless, and consequently improbable, we make any attempt at an aggressive war. We shall not even hurt their pride by doing so. Their relatives within the Border are more free, much more prosperous, and equally proud.

To the aspect of the question as relating to an extension of our recruiting field, we have on several occasions drawn attention in these columns. We are not among those who think that the advance of civilisation or the enforcement of order has weakened the military spirit of the magnificent races of the Punjab or the North-West. It is quite sufficient to consider the great rise in the labour market to account for the growing difficulty in obtaining recruits. The wages of the labourer and the artizans of almost all classes have enormously increased, those of the soldier have stood still for almost a hundred years. The stalwart Sikhs are in demand for Burmah, for the Straits, China, East Africa, and Australia: even those who stay at home are better off than ever. Their strong military spirit still brings lots of strapping young fellows to our regiments; but if the necessity for a sudden expansion of our native army should arise, we should more than ever feel the want of a good proportion of trans-Border men. Not to speak of the Afridis, there is the material for thousands of the most excellent soldiers among the Bunerwals, Bajauris, Mohmands, Orakzais, and Zaimukhts—men who should be in our army instead of on their hill sides against us. The total fighting strength of the united Orakzai clans behind the Samana range has been estimated at over 20,000 men, good Pathan Highlanders; and nothing could be more unfortunate than continued punitive expeditions against what ought to be an army corps of our own.

As we have already hinted, it is in fact a question whether the time has not come when punitive expeditions as a system should cease, and the tribes be clearly given to understand they must either live in peace with us as good neighbours and afford us the fullest opportunity to arrange defensive measures to protect them as well as ourselves, or they must be brought directly under British rule as subjects. To such as possess so hopeless a spirit of plunder or fanaticism that all arguments are powerless to restrain them, the latter is in every way the most humane, the most reasonable, and, we believe, the only safe policy. The sooner it is recognised and accepted as a definite policy the better. In accepting it there is no necessity to be too rash or too sweeping. To accomplish what we want, it is absolutely necessary to proceed gradually, kindly, and with all possible tact.

In 1891 I drew the attention of Government to the value Waziristan, especially the Mahsud tracts, if pacified and opened up, would prove as a recruiting ground; and advocated that as a stepping-stone to more regular services a Waziri Levy Corps, on a similar footing to that of the Khyber Rifles and the Zhob Levy Corps, should be raised. The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir James Lyall, in noting on this remarked:

It is to be hoped, as Mr. Bruce suggests, that our employing so many Mahsuds and Derwesh-Khels in this way may gradually lead to many of them becoming fit and willing to serve as soldiers in our army away from their own country.

Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick also took much interest in the subject, and asked me to use my influence towards encouraging the Waziris to enlist, which I did. The idea did not, however, at first find favour with the military authorities; and curiously enough it was the attack on my camp at Wana that seemed to bring home to them that the Waziri would make a valuable soldier. Previous to this the popular idea among our officers was that they were a mean-spirited and not a brave tribe; but I never could

understand why such an opinion could have been entertained, as they showed conspicuous courage on former occasions. After the expedition the officer commanding the 24th Bombay Infantry (now the 24th Beluchistan Regiment) at Quetta authorised me to offer a subadarship in his regiment to Adam Khan, brother to the leading Mahsud Malik, Badshah Khan, and to ask him to bring fifty Mahsud recruits with him. The officer in the regiment most eager in the matter was Lieutenant Hornby, who had been himself severely wounded in the Wana fight. I did not succeed in inducing Adam Khan to accept the post, but he got me another good man instead and a number of recruits. One of my sons is now in the regiment, and I lately had a letter from him to say that they have now got a full company of Mahsuds numbering one hundred and thirty, and that they had been out with the regiment on service in East Africa, where they did good work. He said he believed in time they will turn out efficient soldiers. The 24th Beluchistan Regiment enlists Mahsuds, and the 26th Derwesh-Khels.[1] It will be seen from this that Sir James

[1] Since writing the above, the following has appeared in the *Pioneer*: 'The experiment of enlisting Waziris in the Indian army has, we hear, proved very successful. The 24th and 26th (Beluchistan) Regiments of Bombay Infantry have each had one company of these tribesmen for some little time past, and the men have become good soldiers. They are quiet and well-behaved in the lines, and submit willingly enough to discipline, learning their drill and musketry readily enough. The Mahsud recruits now and again cannot forget their old pilfering habits when in the bazaar, but this was only to be expected, for in Waziristan the immemorial custom has been for the strong to plunder the weak. In time, no doubt, the sanctity of property will be recognised by the sepoys, especially when they understand that punishment follows quickly on any offence against the law. Then civilised surroundings in a big cantonment like Quetta will also have a wholesome effect, and the Mahsud may become as well behaved when in *mufti* as the ordinary Indian sepoy. The Waziris are men of exceptionally fine physique, inured to hardships and dangers in their native hills, and as fighting-men they should make their mark in the regiments into which they are enlisted. They are typical Pathans in many ways, and we know that the Pathan under his British officer shows fine dash and courage: the Guides, the 20th Punjab Infantry, and other regiments can vouch for this.'

Lyall's wish that they should be induced to serve as soldiers away from their own country has been realised; but the value of the Mahsud country as a recruiting ground can never be properly utilised until our control extends over the country itself. The illustration facing this page is of a group of British and native officers of the 24th Beluchistan Regiment.

Having concluded all these measures, Government sanctioned my taking three months' privilege leave to England on receiving assurances from Mr. Anderson, who was to hold charge during my absence, and myself that everything was sufficiently quiet in Waziristan to admit of my taking it. Before I started I received the pleasing intelligence that her Majesty's Government had sanctioned the establishment of permanent military posts at Wana and in the Tochi. This I knew would be an intense relief to all those who had committed themselves on the side of the British Government. The details of the Wana garrison were to consist of one battalion of native infantry, four mountain battery guns, and a squadron of native cavalry; and the Tochi force of two battalions native infantry, a mountain battery, and a squadron of cavalry. The reasons which influenced Government in sanctioning these posts were, first, with regard to Wana, that a post there was necessary to secure the safety of Zhob and the Gomal route, and for the control of the tribes in that neighbourhood; and, secondly, in respect of the Tochi and Dawar, that the protection of the tribes in those parts is necessary, and cannot be effected by tribal levies and allowances alone; and the Derwesh-Khels and Dauris had themselves entreated that they should be protected by a military force.

About the latter end of August I set sail for England. Our third son had just passed out of Sandhurst. I applied that he might be appointed to a corps serving in India,

BRITISH AND NATIVE OFFICERS, 24th BELUCHISTAN REGIMENT

which was sanctioned. He was posted to the 2nd Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers stationed at Quetta, and I arrived at home in time to get his outfit and see him safely off. I may add that subsequently, through the kindness of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George White, he was appointed to the Indian Staff Corps and attached to the 24th Beluchistan Regiment. It is a pleasant coincidence that this is the regiment which enlists my friends the Mahsud Waziris, and he is now at Loradai, a tract the settlement and occupation of which I had had so much to do with.

I returned to India on the expiration of my three months' leave, and resumed charge of the division on November 20.

CHAPTER XV

LORD ROBERTS'S SPEECH, 1898

THE last great contribution to the controversy on the Forward Policy was the debate on March 7, 1898, in the House of Lords on Lord Roberts's speech on the subject of British relations with the neighbouring tribes on the North-Western Frontier of India, and the military operations undertaken against them in 1897–98. Probably there is no means by which I could forward the object I have at heart better than by helping to keep before the public the opinions of the great statesmen who took the leading part in that debate, and the conclusions to be drawn from them.

I will not dwell on those parts showing how materially the Forward Policy bears on the great Imperial problems of the most effectual means of checking the advance of Russia, or the nature our relations should take with regard to Afghanistan, but will confine my remarks more particularly to showing how it affects the pacification of our Border-land, the civilisation of the tribes themselves, the bringing of them into line with ourselves, and identifying their interests with our own in the great scheme for the defence, strengthening, and consolidation of our frontier up to the boundary of our ally, the Amir of Afghanistan, as defined under the Durand Agreement. Lord Roberts—after calling attention to the papers presented to Parliament on the subject, and urging that it should not be regarded as a party question—spoke thus about the Forward Policy:

So great has been the divergence of opinion expressed on this question by men whose long connection with India gives them a claim to be listened to, it is no wonder that the public are puzzled with regard to it, and that statesmen should hesitate to commit themselves to any line of action until the subject has been thoroughly thrashed out, and the right course to pursue has been made clear to them and to the nation generally. This divergence of opinion among so-called experts, and which is apparently so unaccountable, is easily explained by the fact that those who oppose what has come to be known as the 'Forward Policy' steadily ignore or treat as chimerical the reason which makes the carrying out of that policy essential if we are to retain our hold over India. The Forward Policy—in other words, *the policy of endeavouring to extend our influence over, and establish law and order on, that part of the Border where anarchy, murder, and robbery up to the present time have reigned supreme*, a policy which has been attended with the happiest results in Beluchistan and on the Gilgit frontier—is necessitated by the incontrovertible fact that a great Military Power is now within striking distance of our Indian possessions, and in immediate contact with a State for the integrity of which we have made ourselves responsible. Some forty years ago the policy of non-interference with the tribes, so long as they did not trouble us, may have been wise and prudent, though selfish and not altogether worthy of a great civilising Power. But during that period circumstances have completely changed, and what was wise and prudent then is most unwise and imprudent now. At that time Russia's nearest outpost was one thousand miles away; her presence in Asia was unheeded by, if not unknown to, the people of India; and we had no powerful reason for anxiety as to whether the two hundred thousand warriors on our Border would fight for us or against us.

RUSSIA OUR NEIGHBOUR

To-day Russia is our near neighbour; her every movement is watched with the keenest interest from Peshawar to Cape Comorin; she is in a position to enter Afghanistan whenever it may seem to her convenient or desirable so to do; and the chance of her being able to attack us is discussed in every bazaar in India. We are bound in honour, bound by a solemn promise made seventeen years

ago, to protect Afghanistan, and between us and that nation are these two hundred thousand fighting men, who may either make the fulfilment of that promise easy or else most difficult if not impossible; for, if we should have to subdue these two hundred thousand warriors before going to the assistance of Afghanistan, any army we could put into the field would be used up before we could reach that country. Throughout the last Afghan war so persistently were we harassed by the tribesmen that the greater number of the troops employed were occupied in keeping open the lines of communication. On the Peshawar-Cabul line alone between eleven thousand and twelve thousand men were required, and, as I told the Viceroy at the time, had there been anything like combination or organisation among the tribes that number would have had to be doubled. The all-important question, therefore, that we have to consider is by what means can we ensure that this enormous military strength may be used for us, and not against us. The opponents of the Forward Policy tell us that this can only be done by continuing the system tried for nearly half a century of letting the tribesmen alone, no matter what atrocities they commit, so long as they do not interfere with us, and, when their conduct necessitates punishment, recurring to the punitive expeditions which have already cost us such a vast expenditure in blood and money, and inflicted such cruel misery on the innocent families of the delinquents. Burning houses and destroying crops, necessary and justifiable as such measures may be, unless followed up by some form of authority or jurisdiction, mean starvation for many of the women and children of the enemy, and for us a rich harvest of hatred and revenge in more daring acts of outrage so soon as the tribesmen recover from their temporary check.

THE FORWARD POLICY

The advocates of the Forward Policy, on the other hand, contend that the system they recommend, and which has also been tried, but with far different results, on the southern and northern frontiers, is the only one which will enable us to gain the confidence and secure the allegiance of the wild and lawless, but brave and manly, inhabitants of the central section of the Border, who have so clearly proved by the part they have taken in the late disturbances the absolute failure of the policy of non-interference.

For so completely was the policy of non-interference tried with the bordermen, especially with the Afridis, that their country was until the other day a *terra incognita* to us; and so anxious were we to avoid giving them the slightest cause for suspicion that we wished to interfere with their independence that the political officer in the Khyber, who also commanded the Khyber Rifles and was responsible for the pass being kept open, was absolutely prohibited from going to the right or left of the narrow road which leads through the pass, and the only British officer who ever ventured to enter Afridiland before Sir William Lockhart's force went there was punished by being removed from his appointment. We gave the Afridis large sums for permitting kafilas to go backwards and forwards once a week through the Khyber Pass for trading purposes, and we paid them an annual subsidy for allowing us to make use of the shortest route between Peshawar and Kohat, which runs for a short distance through a corner of their land, and which they closed against us whenever it pleased them to do so, greatly to our inconvenience and annoyance. Is it possible for non-interference to be carried further? The recent very serious rising, which is still not altogether suppressed, as well as most of the frontier troubles of late years, have not been caused, as is so frequently stated, by the Forward Policy, but by that policy not having been pushed far enough; by our refusing to recognise the responsibilities of our position with regard to India and Afghanistan; and by the half-hearted manner in which we have carried on our dealings with the tribesmen. Not, in fact, by what we have done, but by what we have left undone. The Forward Policy must, in my opinion, be gradually and judiciously but steadily pursued until we obtain political control over the robber-haunted No-man's Land which lies on our immediate frontier, where every man's dwelling is a miniature fortress, fortified against his neighbour, and must be continued until our influence is felt up to the boundary of our ally, the ruler of Afghanistan. When the responsibility for the defence of the North-West Frontier devolved on me as Commander-in-Chief in India I never contemplated any defence being possible along the frontier, as marked on our maps by a thin red line—the haphazard frontier inherited by us from the Sikhs—which did well enough so long as we had only to guard against tribal depredations. A frontier more than one thousand miles in length, with a belt of huge mountains in its front, inhabited by

thousands of warlike men, over whom neither we nor any other Power had control, and with a wide, impassable river in its rear, seemed to me then, as it does now, an impossible frontier, and one on which no scheme for the defence of India could be safely based.

THE ESSENTIALS OF DEFENCE

For that defence it is evident that we must have the command of the most important of the roads which run through those mountains, and, to use a favourite expression of the great Duke of Wellington's, 'we must be able to see the other side of the hill;' for, unless we know for certain what is going on there, it will be impossible to prevent an enemy from making use of them, and debouching on the plains of India when and where he pleases. So satisfied was I as to the weakness and unfitness of our present frontier, that I pointed out to the Government of which I had the honour to be a member that money would be thrown away on fortifications and entrenched positions along such a line, and that, after securing the safety of the two most advanced arsenals, Quetta and Rawul Pindi, we should devote ourslves to improving and extending our frontier roads and, so far as financial considerations would permit, our railway communications, to enable the field army to advance whenever a further movement might be required. I never ceased, at the same time, to reiterate that roads and railways could not be made through a hostile country, and that we should do all in our power to enter into closer and more friendly relations with those tribes through whose lands the roads and railways would have to run. This course will assuredly be forced on us, whether we like it or not, in the interests of civilisation and by circumstances over which we have very little control. It is a great satisfaction, therefore, to know that wherever it has been thoroughly carried out it has proved eminently successful. In support of this statement I would invite attention to the fact that throughout the present unusual frontier excitement not a shot has been fired in that part of Beluchistan which is under our control, or in Chitral, where British officers are in direct communication with the tribes and where our boundary is practically coterminous with Afghanistan. And, as your lordships will doubtless remember, when disturbances broke out in Chitral in the beginning of 1895 the very men who had most strenuously

opposed us in Hunza Nagar three years before actually volunteered to serve under our officers, whom they had learned to know and to trust, and a body of levies drawn from these robber hordes did excellent service for us on that occasion. I trust you will not be persuaded to believe that the tribesmen would fight for us if left to themselves. Why should they? They would have nothing to fear from us and nothing to gain by siding with us, for we should have nothing to offer them in return; while they would be induced to fight against us by the prestige which an advancing force always carries with it, and by promises, which would be freely given, that they should be sharers in the plunder of the riches of India. The question we are discussing is, believe me, of vital importance to our future in India, for the attitude, not only of the Border tribes, but of the whole Afghan nation, will depend on the character of our frontier policy. If we are able to convince them that we have the will and the power to protect them, and are determined to let no other nation interfere with them, we may confidently reckon on their throwing in their lot with us. But this desirable result, my lords, can only be brought about by extending our influence over the tribes in the centre of our frontier, as it has been extended over the people of Chitral and Beluchistan, and by letting the Afghans see that we are prepared to go to their assistance should occasion arise.

SIR R. SANDEMAN'S POLICY

I would point out that the Forward Policy has not been simply a military subjugation; for, although at times force has had to be resorted to to keep the tribesmen in order, the conquest on the north and south has been largely a peaceful conquest. If anyone doubts this statement I would ask him to read the Life of Sir Robert Sandeman, one of the greatest frontier administrators—the very embodiment of the Forward Policy. With very little fighting Beluchistan—an immense tract of mountain and desert country, and inhabited by clans as wild and restless as any on our frontier—was rescued by that practical Border officer from a condition of absolute chaos, and turned into what is now a peaceful and prosperous province, where our officers move about freely escorted by the tribesmen themselves, and are everywhere met by signs of confidence and respect. Sir Robert Sandeman used to describe his

policy as one of 'peace and goodwill,' and that it certainly was. In 1885 Sir Charles Aitchison, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, one of the great Lord Lawrence's most devoted followers, and who as Foreign Secretary in India had been a steady adherent of the policy of 'masterly inactivity,' wrote to the then Viceroy, the Earl of Dufferin, in the following words: 'Sandeman is doing noble work at Quetta. He knows personally all the heads of the tribes and all the leading men, and has great influence over them. The people are rapidly settling down and learning respect for law and order. I believe the change between Quetta now and Quetta five years ago is greater than between the India of to-day and the India as I knew it before the Mutiny, and that is saying a good deal. For this we have mainly to thank Robert Sandeman, whose personal influence is something marvellous. Cultivation is rapidly spreading on the Quetta plateau, and villages with foliage are springing up all round the cantonment. . . . I cannot speak too highly of the work he is doing. It is noble pioneer work.' It is this same system of tribal management that has been so successfully introduced on the Gilgit frontier, where law and order have taken the place of raids, brigandage, and the horrors of the slave trade. The occupation of Gilgit and Chitral and the successful Hunza-Nagar expedition brought about this desirable change, by which numbers of unhappy people who had passed long years in slavery have been restored to their homes. When the expense and loss of life involved in the Chitral expedition are dwelt on, and we are urged to withdraw our troops, these facts should not be forgotten. Moreover, the evacuation of a country which has been the scene of warlike operations is not, as some people imagine, always an advantage to the inhabitants. When Dost Mahomed Khan was allowed to returned to Kabul as Amir he made short work of everyone who had helped us during the first Afghan war. Yakub Khan, in the few months he was ruler after the Treaty of Gandamak, showed that he had every intention of following his grandfather's example, and all who assisted us in Afghanistan in 1879-80 have either been made away with or are obliged to live as exiles in our territory. In considering the question of what advantage we are to gain from the series of extremely difficult operations which have been so successfully carried out by the distinguished officer in charge, General Sir William Lockhart—an officer in whom the country may have every confidence—and by

the loyal and brave soldiers, native as well as British, serving under his command, we must bear in mind that our present frontier position is not due to any desire on the part of the rulers of India to acquire territory or subjugate races for our own aggrandisement.

OUR PRESENT FRONTIER POSITION

We have been constrained to press on, partly by the action of the tribesmen themselves, who have made it impossible for our fellow-subjects to live at peace with them as neighbours, partly by the advance of Russia, and partly at the special request of the Amir of Afghanistan, who, when we objected to his interfering with recalcitrant tribesmen, justly remarked that it would be impossible to maintain peace on his side of the Border unless these men were brought either under his or our control. So anxious was the Government of India not to be drawn on that in some instances positions taken up were abandoned, only to be, of necessity, re-occupied later on; and each successive Viceroy, Liberal and Conservative alike, has been compelled to move forward whether he wished it or not. When we left Candahar in the early days of the Marquis of Ripon's Viceroyalty it was intended to fall back to Jacobabad, if not to the Indus; but with all the will in the world to follow this course it was found impossible to do so, and we were obliged to remain at Quetta, because a further retrograde movement would have endangered the safety of Sind and the Lower Derajat. So nearly, however, was the retirement to Jacobabad carried into effect that the railway which was being laid through the Bolan Pass was taken up, and the material sent to Bombay, only to be brought back again and re-laid at considerable additional expense before the noble Marquis left India. This measure had only just been determined on when the aggressive action of Russia on the northern boundary of Afghanistan necessitated the railway being extended to Chaman, and sufficient material stored there to carry it on to Candahar, if occasion should require.

After describing the humiliating results of our retirement from Kurram, and consequent breach of our promise and obligations to the Kurram tribes and people, he continued:

It is sometimes urged as a reason against our endeavouring to get control over the inhabitants in the central part of the frontier

that they are more difficult to deal with than the people of Beluchistan. Beluchis, no doubt, are less fanatical than Pathans, but they are just as warlike, and were just as much given to pillaging and murdering as their more northern neighbours; moreover, a great number of the inhabitants of Beluchistan are Pathans, while in Gilgit and Chitral the characteristics of the people are infinitely more Pathan than Beluch. The truth is that Pathans—robbers and murderers though they may be, because they know no better—are fine, gallant fellows, and, like Orientals everywhere, are responsive to vigorous and sympathetic treatment, as we know from our experience of those of them who have served in our ranks. If our present operations are followed up by an Administrator of the Sandeman stamp being placed in political charge of the frontier tribes; by the occupation of some commanding position in Afridiland which will ensure our having the control of the Khyber Pass, and will form a much-needed sanatorium for the fever-stricken garrisons in the Peshawar Valley, by giving the tribesmen employment on such roads and railways as may be needed for our requirements; and if we make our influence felt in establishing law and order without interfering with their habits, customs, or religion, the Afridis, and in time the rest of the Border tribes, will settle down and become, not only peaceful neighbours, but as brave and loyal soldiers in our service as the Sikhs, Goorkhas, and other warlike races who have fought against us, have proved themselves to be. It is impossible to doubt this when we call to mind the recent splendid behaviour of the Khyber Rifles, who, even after having been deprived in a most incomprehensible manner of the support of their British officer at the time when that support was most needed, defended Lundi-Kotal against their own kith and kin until overcome by numbers, when they retired to Jamrud, and have since been fighting alongside our regular troops.

Lord Roberts here reviewed the reasons why we cannot disregard the advance of Russia, and pointed out the error of those who contend that she could not again raise up serious complications for us in Afghanistan, and why it is specially incumbent on us to be prepared for such contingencies, and, while the times are favourable, to set our frontier in order. His lordship further explained why it was

not his business to discuss the question from a financial point of view, and wound up his stirring appeal in the following words:

I conceive it to be my duty, as one who has had peculiar opportunities of making himself acquainted with our position on the North-West Frontier of India, to lay before you as clearly as I am able to do the reasons for the policy I advocate, and which seems to me to be the only policy that can ensure the safety of India. And it is for you and the nation to decide on the course to be followed. I can only venture to express my firm conviction that, whatever may be the cost of the measures I propose, the cost, to say nothing of the danger to the Empire, will be infinitely greater if we allow matters to drift until we are obliged, in order to resist aggression in Afghanistan, to hurriedly mobilise a sufficient force to subdue the hostile tribes through whose country we should have to pass before we could reach those strategical positions which it is essential we should be able to occupy without delay if we do not intend India—that brightest jewel in Great Britain's Crown—to pass out of our safe keeping.

Lord Roberts was followed in the debate by the Earl of Onslow, Under-Secretary of State for India, and it can hardly be said that he seriously contested the fundamental principles held by Lord Roberts. The following portions of his lordship's speech are those which I think have the most direct bearing on the question at issue; and they further show the policy the Government of India had resolved to adopt, for the time being at all events. His lordship remarked:

If I understand the proposal of the noble lord to-night, it is that we should assume political control of what he calls 'the robber-haunted No-man's Land' between India and Afghanistan, that we should take up our boundary so as to be coterminous with that of the Amir of Afghanistan, take control of all the roads which lie between the two countries, and construct railways to the frontier of the Amir's territory. Now, my lords, I do not for a moment wish to differ from the noble lord when he says that it is most

desirable that we should have roadways and railways up to the frontier of Afghanistan, but I think the noble lord will agree with me that that can be accomplished on one condition, and one condition only—namely, that we should place these tribes through whose territories these roads and railways would pass under the subjection of the Government of India. There is one feature in the speech of the noble lord which I welcome. There was no attempt to suggest that the military operations which have recently been carried on on the North-West Frontier were due to the action of one party or another party in the State. There has been a good deal too much in the recent controversies we have listened to on this subject of trying to attach blame to one set of her Majesty's Ministers or another. I welcome in the noble lord's speech a contribution towards the attempt to solve a most difficult question, one which has been a perennial embarrassment to successive Governments of India. The noble lord did not suggest to us by what means he would proceed to the subjugation of these independent tribes on the frontier. No doubt it is a fascinating picture to draw that we should occupy the great plateau of the Tirah, standing as it does at considerable elevation above the level of the sea and in marked difference to Peshawar and our cantonments lower down the valley. But though the Tirah commands some of the principal passes, like the Khyber, the Bolan, and the Kohat, it does not command the whole of our North-West Frontier. That frontier is a thousand miles in length. It is obvious that even if we adopted the noble lord's suggestion, and established a sanatorium at Tirah, we should still have a large extent of frontier with which we should have to deal in a different way.

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The noble lord compared the nature of the Beluchis and the Pathans, but I venture to think that the nature of these tribes is essentially different, as is also their system. Among the Beluchis there is a head man of the tribe, and once his consent is obtained to a proposal you have the consent of the whole tribe. That is not so with the Pathans; indeed, there is a system of government among them with which we are not wholly unacquainted in this country. I believe they enjoy what is known there as Party government, and that in no country, not even in France, are such rapid changes made as among those who administer the affairs of their tribes. But when he says we should endeavour to cultivate

more friendly relations with the frontier tribes, that is a very different thing, for his first proposal was that we should occupy that territory and take political control there. The Pathans are not wild animals that you have to seek out in their lairs, or to stalk like deer in the Highlands. They come down and mix with their fellow-subjects in India, and thousands of them spend months among them on the other side of the Indus. They have relations with us that are entirely friendly, and even now when we have been engaged in what some may call bitter warfare with them—though I do not think they would do so—they send down their women to Peshawar to be looked after by the ladies there, satisfied that they would be well treated and cared for, and they have no hesitation in handing their letters to our people for safe delivery. Does that not show a full confidence in our declaration that we will leave them in entire occupation of their country and that we have no desire to interfere with their tribal customs?

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I had the advantage in 1894 of being present at a solemn durbar held by Lord Elgin, in which he made a speech addressed not only to our fellow-subjects there, but to all representatives there from the confines of India and Afghanistan. He said: 'It is our aim and ambition so to regulate our relations with the brave frontier tribes of the North-West Border as at the same time to secure peace and security of life and property, on which all our Treaty obligations, and the dictates of humanity, compel us to insist, and to leave to them the entire occupation of their country, with the fullest measure of autonomy and the most complete liberty to follow their internal affairs and tribal customs.' When this was translated I thought there was a look on the face of the people which showed that it fell on no unwilling ears. That declaration is the policy of her Majesty's Government, and a despatch to which the noble lord has referred lays down that it is the policy of the Government to avoid any extension of administrative control over the tribes, but at the same time the Government recognise the necessity of acting in absolute fulfilment of those responsibilities in which we have concurred. Those responsibilities are that we must protect our own Borders and those who dwell on the Borders in British India. We must fulfil the solemn engagements we entered into with Afghanistan, and with the view of carrying out that policy the Secretary of State has laid down that the roads and

communications necessary for that purpose must be preserved and that posts must be established. But in the establishment of these posts a great deal of limitation is placed in the despatches. Those who have followed the operations on the North-West Frontier will have observed that many of the posts which have been attacked were not sufficiently defensible, and the Viceroy has been enjoined to limit the establishment of posts on the frontiers outside our own Border to those which are sufficiently defensible, and which can promptly and immediately repel attack. He has also been enjoined to weigh financial considerations. Not only must the posts established be desirable, but the gain of them established must be commensurate with their expense.

After referring to the arrangements with the Afridis for the safety of the Khyber Pass, and the reasons why in the late imbroglio the officer commanding the Khyber Rifles had been withdrawn and no troops had been sent to their relief, his lordship continued:

The noble lord has referred to the question of the appointment of a Frontier Commission, but not in great detail, and also to Sir R. Sandeman—and nobody ever served the Crown with greater distinction and success. But I would ask him if he can point at this moment to anyone who has fulfilled the conditions which Sir R. Sandeman fulfilled, and on whom all eyes are concentrated as a man who ought to be appointed. Until he can, I think that is a question which may remain slumbering. I think that in the history of every country, in the history of England, and in the history of Europe, there have been many cases where mountain tribes have maintained their independence and resisted civilisation for a long time. In almost every one of these instances these populations and these mountaineers have ultimately had to accept the civilisation which had been brought to their doors, and had been absorbed in the great States that have grown up round them. I do not think any one of us would predict any other destiny for the barbarous tribes of our North-West Frontier. The time when this should be accomplished seems to be in the hands of destiny. Whether it should be accelerated lies very much with the Government of India and the Government of this country. I submit that the moment is not

opportune for hurrying on this question. The sacrifice of treasure and men involved is not commensurate with the objects. The rapid advance of Russia was referred to by the noble and gallant lord, but I am not going to follow him in that part of his speech. In the past gigantic strides have been made by Russia towards our frontier in India, but at the present moment, however, whatever may happen in the future, Russia seems to be intent on other parts of her empire. The Trans-Continental Railway requires her attention more than Afghanistan. The present moment is not one which has any special reason why we should make advances as rapidly as has been desired by the noble lord. I would rather wish that the matter should be allowed to remain in the condition in which it now is. Let us go on cultivating these friendly relations with the frontier tribes, and do not let us attempt to administer their territory or to obtain greater control over their tribal customs.

THE PRESENT POSITION

The position in which we now stand may be summed up in a very few words. What we have done is to dispel the delusion which seems to be entertained by these tribes that there is any part of their territory inaccessible to us should we choose to go there. We have proved our sincerity that we do not desire to occupy any part of their territory. The terms we have given them are leniency themselves. Just as a Bank of England note is currency in all parts of the world because there is no reason to suppose that the Bank will not carry out the obligations printed on the note, so it is known that the declarations that we would avenge any attempt at inroad upon our own territory is equally certain to be accomplished, and that once accomplished we shall return to the solemn undertaking that we have made in the declaration which I have read to your lordships, that we have no other wish than to cultivate the friendship and goodwill of our neighbours who live on the North-West Frontier of our Indian territory.

The Earl of Northbrook, without giving his own views as to the general results of the Foward Policy, expressed his acquiescence in the present attitude of the Government of

India, chiefly on the grounds that 'he could not help thinking' that the recent troubles on the frontier were produced by a suspicion that an encroachment on the independence of the tribesmen was intended, and commended the principle that there should be 'no interference with them and no permanent control.'

If the cause of the recent troubles was either the apprehension of the tribes as to their independence being tampered with, or of our intervention and control, why did the troubles not extend to Beluchistan proper—to Zhob and Bori, to Wana, the Mahsud country, and to Kurram, where intervention and control was and is an essential factor in the policy pursued? No, believe me, if such apprehensions existed and were due to a Forward Policy, it was not to that policy carried out on the conciliatory lines which proved successful under the Sandeman system; which could, indeed, hardly be deprecated by Lord Northbrook, who proved to be himself one of the chief pioneers of the forward movement in deputing Sandeman on his missions of friendly intervention to the Beluchistan tribes and to Quetta, in 1876–77, and at a later period by establishing a British political officer at Gilgit, the two most forward posts on our North and North-Western Frontiers.

Indeed it might be inferred from the Under-Secretary's most flattering reference to Sir Robert Sandeman's work, and pointed question as to whether at the present time any possible officer could be found to take up his mantle, that he also approved of the Sandeman Forward Policy. But in an important Imperial question like this so intimately affecting the well-being of the frontier, if the thing is the right thing to be done and our duty is plain, it is contrary to the usage and tradition of the British nation that it should remain long undone, either for want of a capable man to carry it out or on account of the cost it might entail.

Lord Northbrook struck a very useful key in reminding us that an important point which should not be lost sight of in the determination of our tribal policy is the using of these Border lands as a recruiting ground for our Indian army. This I believe to be another factor the benefits of which cannot be fully attained or utilised without the extension of our control over the tracts in question. But I shall have another word to add on this subject before I close these Memoirs.

Lord Lansdowne expressed his concurrence in the opinion of Lord Roberts, and as he gave his views fully in his customary clear and straightforward, and to my mind unanswerable, way, I will quote his words nearly at length. His lordship said:

He could not help thinking that those who had listened to the speech of the noble and gallant lord must have felt that the account which he had given of the so-called Forward Policy differed very widely indeed from that which had been presented to the public in the Press and on the platform during the past few months. They had been constantly told that the Government of India had been captured by a little clique of military gentlemen inspired with a desire for wide schemes of annexation, and inspired above all things with a thirst for medals. He could not help thinking that the Under-Secretary had scarcely apprehended the meaning which his noble and gallant friend intended to convey to the House. He (Lord Lansdowne) certainly did not understand him to suggest that what he described as his Forward Policy should be applied in anything but a gradual and most cautious manner. There was no suggestion of an immediate occupation of tribal country, or any immediate advance of boundary in the direction of Afghanistan. In point of fact, he gathered what his noble and gallant friend would advocate was very much what was advocated by the Under-Secretary himself, who told the House how the result of recent operations had been to dispel the delusion of the inaccessibility of the tribes, and that, that result having been achieved, he was in favour of being more friendly with the tribes. That was the policy of the despatch, and

that, he ventured to say, was the policy of every sensible person who had ever considered this matter. He (Lord Lansdowne) had protested against the exaggerated descriptions of the Forward Policy which had been placed before the country of late. All of them knew that the policy of Lord Lawrence, excellent though it was in its day, was one which had been left far behind, and by far the most numerous and largest strides had been taken by the party opposite. What was perfectly obvious was that the advance of Russia to the very gates of Persia and Afghanistan and our own advance to points very far beyond the line of the Indus, and, above all, engagements we had entered into with the Amir, rendered it out of the question that the old policy of Lord Lawrence should be resorted to in the present day. Another thing had, he thought, further accentuated the difference between the old order of things and the order of things in the present day, and that was the conclusion of the Durand agreement. He knew it had been held that one of the results of the Durand Agreement had been to create a feeling of unrest among the tribes. There might be some truth in that assertion, but on the other hand he was convinced that the Durand Agreement was the greatest step for a long time in the direction of placing our relations with the tribes on one hand and the Amir on the other on a satisfactory footing. During these discussions they constantly heard it said that it was desirable to exercise an influence of some kind over those tribes. He doubted if any single speech had been made or any single despatch written in which that expression 'influence' did not occur. He wanted to know what it was they meant when they talked in that way of the tribes. The word was wanting in precision, and they were more likely to arrive at its meaning if they considered what it did not mean. He rather thought that even within our own hearts we carried the plan of extending our provincial administration a little too far. The tribesmen were lawless and rough people and did not understand technicalities and formalities, but valued the substance of justice more than its form. They were not grateful to us for giving them an elaborate code of laws with the right of appealing to a Court hundreds of miles from their homes. The result of this was not advantageous to our own officers, but made them depend rather too much on mere technicalities and forms instead of looking to the substantial justice and effectiveness of their administration. He was there-

fore by no means in favour of bringing the frontiers outside our limits within the scope of our administration. Influence did not mean mere abstention. In private life we could not influence our neighbours by pretending to be unaware of their presence, and if occasionally they varied the procedure by violent assault, they might arrive at some kind of influence, but it would not be what the noble lord called 'friendly influence,' which was what he desired over the tribes. And much as they might wish to maintain the attitude of pure abstention facts would not allow us to do so. Fancy pictures were sometimes drawn which looked as if we had nothing to do with what happened on the other side of the Border. But that was not so. The tribes frequented our territory, and moved backwards and forwards between the plains and the hills, so that we could not ignore their existence.

Thus there was forced on us not a policy of abstention, but a policy of abstention qualified by very severe police methods. Those familiar with India knew the kind of circle round which events travelled. They had months, perhaps years, of lawlessness and misconduct, but the authorities put their blind eye to the telescope; but at last, the raids becoming too numerous, a fine was imposed, which was paid by the most respectable members of the tribes. If it was unpaid then they had a blockade, which injured the laborious and hardworking portion of the community, and then came an expedition, the result being that the troops go away leaving behind them a legacy of hatred and contempt, hatred for the injuries we had done them and contempt because we could not maintain the advantage we had gained. Was such a policy dignified and worthy of a Great Power? Was it an economical policy, judging from the large sums spent on it? And he asked whether we could be surprised that there should have grown up in India a school of public men who, without harbouring sinister designs on the independence of the tribes, desired to see something more worthy of such a Power as ours. He noticed the Leader of the Opposition quoted from a book written by Mr. Thorburn on the subject, which he recommended to his hearers. Mr. Thorburn said that 'to teach the hill tribes a lasting lesson a severe loss must be inflicted on them, by the wholesale destruction of available property such as towers, houses, crops, &c., while territory must be annexed and leading men or families blotted out by deportation if the work is to be

thorough or endurable.' He certainly was not prepared to go as far as that. He believed there were many men in India who were weary of a frontier policy of that kind, and desired to substitute a better policy. If such a feeling was entertained, it was a feeling which originated, not with ambitious soldiers, but with a great many of our best and most intelligent officers and civilian officials, who were convinced it was within our power to manage the tribes on a different principle. The policy which he understood to be advocated by Lord G. Hamilton's despatch was a policy of control over the tribes within our sphere of influence coupled with the minimum of interference with their domestic affairs. To talk of tribal independence was a little misleading. There could be no complete independence in the case of people who had not the power of transferring their allegiance in any direction they pleased. That power was not given to the frontier tribes, and it was better, therefore, not to speak of them as independent. That condition of qualified independence was very common all through the Borders of India. The small frontier tribes were not strong enough to stand alone. They knew they must lean on some stronger Power, and in the case of the tribes in question he took it that it was our intention they should lean on us and not on any other Power. But if that policy was to have any success, he held strongly—and he found nothing in the despatch inconsistent with it—that we must show the tribes that they had something to hope as well as something to fear from us. That, he took it, was the essence of the policy advocated by the noble and gallant lord, and that was the policy which was indicated in the despatch, in which he found that, even in the case of the Afridi tribes, who had most defied our authority, the Government of India was instructed that it was, if possible, to enlist their good will and secure their assistance in maintaining the road through the Khyber Pass. With regard to roads and railways, the noble lord in the matter of railways was always a little ahead of the Indian Government. He desired to see certain strategic lines made, but the Government thought they would be very expensive and bring in little or no return. The case of roads stood on different footing. That the main arterial roads were to be left open was not denied, but in the case of subsidiary roads it was not so clear, though he did not think any money was better spent on the frontier than in encouraging

tribes of their own free will to make and improve roads, which were great civilisers. As to the question of posts, there the policy of the despatch was quite clear. The Government desired to see as few military posts as possible, and those placed in the strongest and most carefully selected positions. The tendency was to concentrate the posts, but there must be some posts to guard the roads. With regard to the question of the frontier officers by whom the tribal affairs were to be regulated, he was in entire agreement with the noble and gallant lord. Sir R. Sandeman's policy was signally successful in Beluchistan. The tribes differed a great deal in organisation and qualities, and where one tribe was found to be peaceful another was warlike. He believed it was possible to administer the frontier in a better manner than by reverting to the old system of inflicting severe punishment on the tribes and then withdrawing altogether from intercourse with them. Among the qualities which distinguished the race to which we belonged stood out conspicuously those qualities of self-reliance and broad sympathy which had enabled us all over the world to win over to ourselves men belonging to races less civilised than our own.

The concurrent opinions of Lord Roberts and the Marquis of Lansdowne should be of themselves sufficient for my purpose, as few will venture to assert that they are not the two greatest living authorities on the subject; but what if I can add to them the agreement of two of the greatest, if not the two greatest, statesmen; which may I think be gathered from the following words of the Duke of Devonshire, speaking for himself and for Lord Salisbury:

The Duke of Devonshire said that, like his noble friend, he very much regretted the absence of the Prime Minister, but he could assure his noble friend that if the Prime Minister had been present there would have been no divergence of opinion between him and the Secretary of State for War. He did not know on what foundation his noble friend formed the inference that there was a divergence of views between the India Office and the Secretary for War, unless it was that the Secretary for War spoke with great respect of the very able speech which had been

delivered by the noble and gallant lord on the cross benches, and pointed out that if it was an exposition of what was called the Forward Policy it was an exposition very different indeed from some they had been accustomed to hear. He had some difficulty in understanding what was the divergence which his noble friend opposite found between the speech of the Secretary for War and the despatch of the Secretary for India. His noble friend the Secretary for War had explained that it was not possible at the present time, after all that had happened, to revert to that policy which was associated with the name of Lord Lawrence in respect to the frontier tribes. That principle is also fully admitted in the despatch of the Secretary of State for India. It was impossible at the present time to revert to what used to be called the aloof policy, and refuse to have anything to do with these tribes unless on occasions when it was thought necessary to have recourse to punitive expeditions. At the conclusion of his observations his noble friend opposite said that he believed the true manner of dealing with these tribes was to cultivate friendly relations with them. There was not a word in the speech of his noble friend the Secretary of State for War which inculcated any other policy. It was admitted by the late Government of India and by the present Government of India that our responsibilities towards these tribes had very greatly increased, and that the system that might have been the best to pursue a few years ago was one which could be no longer pursued. His noble friend opposite said that the Forward Policy was a policy which had led to Afghan wars in the past. He (the Duke of Devonshire) saw no indication of a reversion to that policy. Nothing that had been said by Lord Roberts himself to-night, still less anything that had been said by the Secretary of State for War, could have conveyed to the mind of anyone the idea that any reversion to that policy was intended. That was a policy of aggression on independent tribes. On what independent tribes did we now desire to lay a hand? The only question now was how were friendly relations to be maintained with a certain number of tribes which everyone had admitted we had brought into closer relationship than formerly was the case. The Secretary for War said we could not deal with them exactly on the same principles as used to be adopted, and he (the Duke of Devonshire) failed to see that his noble friend opposite in his very vague references

to the cultivation of friendly relations had indicated any other policy. His noble friend was absolutely mistaken in supposing that if the Prime Minister were present to-night he would have given the slightest shadow of confirmation to the inference which his noble friend had drawn that there was any diversity of opinion between the two departments on this subject. He had heard no word from the Secretary for War to-night which departed in the slightest degree from the principle laid down by Lord Salisbury in his speech in the debate on the Address.

All alike agree that it is essential we should continue to exercise influence over the tribes, all concur that we must bring them under our 'friendly influence,' but those of what may be called the 'aloof policy' say this must be done without intervention and without permanent control. Lord Lansdowne went to the root of the matter when he asked the pertinent question what this influence meant, and when he dissipated the mischievous delusion of the independence of the tribes. The fact is the two things are incompatible, as without intervention and control no friendly influence of any value can be extended. Hence the phrase is a misleading one.

As pointed out by Lord Lansdowne, they are not independent as they cannot transfer their 'allegiance,' and we have bound them in their engagements with us not to transgress the boundary of our friend and ally the Amir. The only 'friendly influence' of value to our Government is that which is founded on respect for the Suzerain power and on mutual intercourse and reciprocal relations, their country being open for us to come and go in, as ours is to them.

As long as there is a *purdah* or screen in their country the Mullahs and other evil-disposed factions will hatch all manner of intrigues and villainies behind it, and we can never really know what goes on or prevent it, while the tribe at

large regard it as an infallible sign of weakness on our part, see that they can utilise it to evade their engagements, and despise us accordingly. They will take our arms, and take our money and arm themselves, without our having one substantial guarantee that they will not turn them on ourselves in the day of our difficulty.

Many years ago, when Sandeman and I were first tackling the Marris and Bugtis, I wrote about these tribes:

> Independence means bloodshed, desolation, risk, and danger in every shape and form, and in the interests of peace and civilisation it is absolutely essential that they be brought under some paramount Power. If the Amir or the Khan of Khelat claim tribes as their own, they should admit and act up to their responsibilities and keep them in order. If they are under no rule, the sooner they are brought under one the better it will be for themselves and all concerned.
>
> The only title to independence they have is that of the pirate or highway robber, having cut themselves adrift from all wholesome governing authority, thereby obtaining a license to cut throats and murder and plunder their neighbours.
>
> There is a natural instinct in the minds of these men that this spurious independence is not permanent, and it is only the evil-doers, who make plunder and bloodshed pay, who resist being brought again under a sovereign authority. The chiefs and men of position who possess landed property and a stake in the country look on the state of affairs as unwholesome, and regard the intervention which restores the country to a healthy condition with gratitude. Nothing has done more mischief than the encouragement of the theory that these tribes are independent, or tends so much to keep them outside the pale of civilisation.

Many years' subsequent work among the tribes has only confirmed me in the opinion I then expressed. The Marris and Bugtis have now got a healthy independence and are a strength instead of a weakness to our frontier, but what I wrote about them in 1884 is equally true about the Mahsud Wáziris to-day.

But there is yet another authority I must quote, and perhaps the most important of all, as with him may rest the practical decision as to whether for the next few years our policy is to be Forward, Backward, or the Slumbering Policy —I refer to the present Viceroy, Lord Curzon of Kedleston.

Not long since he, then the Hon. George Curzon, M.P., wrote an able letter to the 'Times' advocating the retention of Chitral. Space does not permit my quoting the whole of it here, but I will refer to those parts which apply with equal if not greater force to other parts of our frontier, and to Waziristan in particular. In referring to the value of the tribal levies he wrote:

As regards the loyalty and fighting capacity of the tribesmen. Sir James Lyall threw doubt on the probable behaviour of the Hunza and Puniali levies in the recent campaign. We now know that it was largely owing to their gallantry that Colonel Kelly was able to make his famous march which raised the siege of Chitral Fort. What these men who were fighting against us in 1892 have done as our allies in 1895, the Chitralis, who belong to a milder race, will be ready to do in an even less period.

In alluding to the arguments of the advocates of retreat he wrote:

Even, however, if these contentions were sound, it can easily be shown that they cover but a small portion of the ground. Why is it that retreat from Chitral at this moment would be so unwise? The reasons are as follows:

Russia has, by the Pamir Convention concluded with Great Britain, just come into possession of three-fourths of the whole territory known as the Pamirs, and of a position which brings her down to the main stream of the Oxus. Locally this involves a great extension of her military and political prestige. If at the very same moment that she is thus permitted to advance up to the Hindu Kush on the north, Great Britain voluntarily retires from a position which for ten years she has occupied on the south, but one interpretation will be placed upon this coincidence by the natives of those regions. They do not understand high

diplomacy, and they do not read the letters of retired Governors and Generals in the 'Times.' But with one alphabet they are perfectly familiar, and its two symbols are Forward and Backward. They will say that Russia is the winning and Great Britain the receding Power.

By our arrangements with the Amir of Afghanistan—of his belief in the binding nature of which his many conversations with me at Kabul, no less than the presence of his son in this country, have given convincing proof—we have practically guaranteed the integrity of his dominions as delimited by ourselves with the Russians. Now, Afghanistan includes Badakhshan; and the Indian watch-tower for Badakhshan is Chitral. If ever we should be called upon to fulfil our obligations in that quarter, it would be a deplorable mishap if we were found to have previously surrendered the obvious base of action.

The danger to India from a hostile authority in Chitral is not that of military occupation by a declared enemy alone. It is the danger that arises from clandestine influence and intrigue. A native ruler in Chitral who was in secret alliance with, and was, perhaps, subsidised by, another Power would be a more formidable thorn in the side of the British than would be several sotnias of Cossacks on the Dorah Pass. We cannot afford to have upon our flank such a gratuitous source of trouble. And yet if we retire from Chitral we positively encourage it. Retreat will further involve the suffering, if not the sacrifice, of all those who have stood by us in the recent campaign.

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The solution of the problem appears to be in the retaining of the British Political Agent in Chitral with a sufficient escort to insure his safety and command respect; the recognition as Mehtar of some member of the old reigning family other than the despicable youth who murdered his brother, the late Nizam-ul-Mulk; and, lastly, the keeping open of the direct road to Chitral through Dir by the occupation of military posts along it, and the formation of levies under the control of British officers. Under such a system the military strength of these frontier States would be trained and controlled by British officers; new recruiting grounds for the ranks of the Indian army would be available to the Government of India; roads would be opened up, and the entire frontier made accessible for military purposes, and a flow

of trade between the settled districts of India and the remote valleys of the Hindu Kush created. As has happened all over India, the incessant strife of tribe against tribe, of one prince against another, would be put a stop to; an air of security would gradually settle down over these turbulent districts; half the men who have hitherto thought of little else than fighting each other or anybody who attempts to intrude upon them would be tilling their fields as peaceably as the once turbulent men of the Punjab or tribes of Beluchistan are now, and the rest would be fighting as sturdily for the Government of India as that Government's formerly redoubtable foes, the Sikhs, have recently done in the defence of Chitral. All this will not be effected without effort and without temporary checks and difficulties, but there is nothing inherently impossible in it; it is the same kind of work as has been done over and over again in the history of India. . . .

Those of my readers who have had the patience to follow me through these Memoirs—the account of the occupation of Fort Sandeman, and connected opening of the Gomal Pass; the occupation of Jandola, Kajuri-Kach, and Sarwekai, with troops, at the request of the Mahsud Maliks, for the control of hostile and marauding factions; the consequent murder of three of the Maliks; the occupation of Wana at the spontaneous and earnest request of the Wana Waziris; and the opening of the Tochi valley on the invitation of the Dawaris and Derwesh-Khels—will recognise that if we are bound by our obligations not to forsake the Chitralis, and not to forsake the Nawabs of Dir and Nawagai, our engagements and obligations binding us to Waziristan are still stronger; and our own direct advantages from its retention greater in the latter case than those set forth by Mr. Curzon in the former. And again, in a letter to Lady Sandeman referring to Sir Robert Sandeman's valuable work as accomplished in the occupation of Zhob and the opening of the Gomal, Mr. Curzon wrote:

Beluchistan and the frontier fringe as far as the Zhob valley and Gomal Pass are a standing monument to his system. This

consisted in reconciling conflicting local interests under the common ægis of Great Britain; in employing the tribes as custodians of the highways and guardians of the peace in their own districts; in paying them for what they did well (and conversely in fining them for transgression), in encouraging commerce and traffic by the lightening or abolition of tolls and the security of means of communication; in the protection, rather than diminution of tribal and clan independence, subject only to the over-lordship of the British raj; in a word, in a policy not of spasmodic and retributive interference, but of steady and unfaltering conciliation.[1]

To one who so thoroughly understood the Sandeman methods, and appreciated the policy so successfully inaugurated in Waziristan by the opening of the Gomal Pass through the co-operation of the Waziri Maliks, both Mahsud and Derwesh-Khel, we may in confidence look to pressing on systematically to completion the good work until the whole of Waziristan is linked up with Beluchistan in a uniform and civilising policy, with its powerful and warlike tribes ranged on the side of the British Government. We cannot afford to lose time, for if we continue to slumber on, the next imbroglio with Russia or Afghanistan may give us a rude awakening and cause us to pay dearly for lost opportunities.

Sir Robert Sandeman himself wrote:

The Waziri, Mando-Khel, Sherani, and other tribes do not in any great degree differ from the tribes of this Agency, and some do not differ at all. Where difference of race has existed, we have found human nature the same and amenable to like influences. We have made a commencement with the Waziris, and having placed our hands to the plough let us avoid nerveless vacillation and maintain a firm continuity of action. Let us not think of turning back, but let us carry to a successful conclusion what has been begun. If we knit the frontier tribes into our Imperial system in time of peace, and make their interests ours, they will certainly

[1] See Thornton's *Life of Sir Robert Sandeman*, p. 294.

not oppose us in time of war, and as long as we are able and ready to hold our own, we can certainly depend on their being on our side.

For Government to allow matters to stagnate is tantamount to suspending the best education of their frontier civil officers, while at the same time it renders them powerless to prevent affairs drifting into complications which bring about those very punitive expeditions so universally condemned, and which the Government themselves avow it to be their chief object to prevent.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In closing these memoirs I shall in this chapter make a brief summary of those alterations and improvements which recent developments have shown to be called for in our present system of frontier administration. The more important of these have already been advocated by those high in authority; and I hope the exceptional experience of the different systems I have had, having served some twelve years directly under the Government of India in the Political Service and double that length of time under the Punjab Government, may be sufficient to acquit me of presumption in any suggestions I may offer.

To start with it is a *sine quâ non* that the entire North-West Frontier should be directly under one authority, and that that authority should be the Government of India. The present system or systems with differing policies in Beluchistan, Waziristan, Kurram, Afridiland, Malakand, &c. can never be strong or work smoothly and successfully.

The next essential is that in place of the present Punjab Commissioners there should be either, as proposed in Lord Lytton's scheme, a Frontier Province under one Chief Commissioner, in rank 'only beneath that of a Lieutenant-Governor,' or, what may be more convenient now that the Beluchistan administration is developed and consolidated, that Peshawar and the Northern Frontiers should be formed into a second Frontier Chief Commissionership, on precisely

the same footing as Beluchistan. The present two commissionerships of Peshawar and Derajat would then be abolished.

These changes would make it expedient that in the Northern Province, as in the Beluchistan Province, those appointments the duties of which are mainly political, such as those of the so-called 'political officers' of Wana, Tochi, Kurram, Khyber, Samana, and Malakand, should be merged in the general graded Indian Political Service. One of the weak points in the present system, which was brought to notice by Lord Lytton[1] in his scheme for the formation of a new frontier district beyond the Indus, is having no properly organised frontier political service. He wrote thus:

> The Viceroy would, by means of this arrangement, command the services of his own specially selected agent, in whose hands the threads of all our Border politics and tribal relations would be concentrated. The time of such an Agent could be devoted almost entirely to frontier duties. . . . The political and administrative conduct of the frontier would be in the same hands and pass through the same channels. All division of responsibility and all antagonism of schools and systems would thus be eliminated.

There would at all events appear to be a consensus of opinion that the present system of Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, and Political Officers is not conducive to good frontier administration and requires adjustment. If the changes herein proposed were carried out, the duties of the Deputy Commissioners and the Political Agents should be separated, adjusted, properly defined, and made to fit in with the local requirements of the different districts and political agencies; but these are matters of detail which need occasion no difficulty. There are many routine duties which Commissioners in the Punjab are now required to

[1] *Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, by Lady Betty Balfour.

perform, such as inspection of district and tehsil offices, treasuries, record rooms, jails, distilleries, schools, books and maps of revenue and village accountants, for which, with advantage to the public service, Deputy Commissioners might be made responsible if relieved of all tribal work. At present it is quite impossible for the Commissioner to do justice to both; if he gives the frontier its due attention, these district details must be neglected, while the same must happen to the frontier if district details get the attention they require. But as human life is largely involved in all frontier affairs, they must claim first attention, so that, while both suffer, district affairs suffer most. *À fortiori*, it would be out of the question to hold a frontier Chief Commissioner responsible for such duties.

Another point is that the Punjab Commissioners have not rank or status commensurate with the nature of the frontier duties for which they are now responsible, and which counts for so much in the eyes of the tribes; while the division of rank between them and the Deputy Commissioners is not sufficiently real and marked. It has often been said, not altogether inaptly, that Commissioners are mere channels of communication. Deputy Commissioners feel that they are dependent to such a very limited extent on Commissioners in regard to their prospects in the service that it makes them feel inclined to indulge in pet policies of their own, so that Commissioners cannot count on that undivided allegiance and support which contributes so largely to the success of the policy for the working out of which they are responsible to Government. In fact the system should have somewhat more discipline and subordination in it. Thus the status of the Chief Commissioner in Beluchistan in regard to the political agents is much better adapted to frontier requirements than that of a Punjab Commissioner in respect of his Deputy Commissioners. So

it is in other matters. Our warlike Border tribes appreciate having the man who conducts their affairs high in rank and high in authority, who gets guns, salutes, and escorts, and creates a bit of a stir when he moves about among them; and not a man in buckram, who cannot impress or influence them in the same degree.

Important as is the readjustment of the appointments, it is equally essential to the maintenance of the frontier civil service on an efficient footing that Government should recognise that tribal management, like settlement work, requires special training, special aptitude, tried experience, and knowledge of the tribes. These qualifications are essential, and they are not to be acquired except by the adoption of a frontier career, which men will not go in for, as frontier service is most unpopular, unless special inducements in the way of appointments carrying good pay and promotion, and chances of gaining honours and rewards, are open to them. The prospects of officers in this respect are fairly good in Beluchistan; as the political agencies have been merged in the general graded Indian Political Service, the blue ribbon of the Indian Civil Services and special emoluments are attached to them. But this is not the case on the Punjab frontier, where there are only a few nondescript political appointments styled 'political officer' or 'on special duty,' leading to nothing. The result is that officers possessing the essential seniority, knowledge, and experience in tribal matters prefer posts of more ease and less responsibility; so that junior men, who cannot possibly be expected to conduct complicated and delicate negotiations efficiently, have to be appointed—a cruel experiment on the tribes, on whom the brunt of our shortcomings and faulty management in the long run inevitably falls, as well as being prejudicial to our prestige and rule on the frontier. Marris, Bugtis, Kakars, Waziris, Orakzais, Afridis,

Mohmands, and Swatis require skilful handling, and posts such as Wana, Tochi, Kurram, and Malakand should as a rule be in charge of senior officers not less in rank than that of a substantive Deputy Commissioner, while as at present constituted no senior Deputy Commissioner is found willing to accept one of these posts permanently. The result is that just as they gain the necessary experience and become efficient frontier officers they have to be provided for elsewhere. These advanced posts should attract the best men, and should by all means be on precisely the same level and footing as the political agencies of Quetta and Peshin, Fort Sandeman and Thal-Choteali. At present the men of the first class are to be found at Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, and elsewhere, while junior men are at Wana, Tochi, Kurram, and Malakand—an inversion of the proper order of things. It is on these grounds that I urge that all frontier appointments essentially political, especially these advanced posts, should be merged in the Indian Political Service, which would then provide a sufficient number of openings on the frontier itself for the advancement of those who have proved themselves really successful in tribal management, besides avoiding the necessity for constant transfers of civil officers, which have proved so fatally subversive of efficient administration; as it would then afford reasonable inducements, which are now wanting, to men to adopt a frontier career.

Objections would no doubt be raised to this, as was the case with Beluchistan, but they are mostly of a sentimental nature, and must give way to what is best for the frontier and for the public weal.

The weakness of the present Punjab system was brought prominently to notice by the 'Pioneer' last year. In writing on the required readjustment of the frontier administration proved to be necessary by the recent break-down in

our arrangements with the tribes on the northern regions of our frontier, it said :

> If then the Punjab Government is to be eliminated in the system of control of the frontier, a practical difficulty arises in regard to the position of its officers—the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners of frontier districts. The immediate political control of the tribes is in the hands of trans-frontier officers and of Deputy Commissioners. As regards the former, it will not be always feasible to fill the political charges with officers of the seniority and experience of Major Deane. At present many of the frontier appointments are held by officers who, however much endowed with energy and ability, are young and inexperienced ; and it will always be necessary to set over these, for the purpose of local control, an officer of experience of the status of Commissioner. In British Beluchistan the control of the Government of India over the several political agents is exercised through the Chief Commissioner, and a corresponding officer of the status at least of a Commissioner will be essential to the Government of India control of the Punjab frontier.

I have already shown above where in my opinion the remedy lies.

Another circumstance which has handicapped frontier tribal administration is that tribal management pure and simple has never been recognised or accorded honours and decorations in anything like the proportion that has been granted for what should rank with civil officers as very secondary services, either connected with what Lord Lansdowne appropriately named our 'ignoble little wars,' or some other special and temporary duty. Take the case even of Sir Robert Sandeman. Dr. Thornton, in referring to the honours that had been 'showered' on others after the close of the second phase of the Afghan war, and to the services achieved by Sir Robert Sandeman during that period in the management of our relations with the Khan of Khelat, and of the tribes, and which had been referred to in most

laudatory terms by the Marquis of Hartington in the House of Commons, remarked:

> Honours were deservedly showered upon the army. Generals Stewart and Roberts were appointed Knights Grand Cross of the Bath, and the Generals commanding divisions and brigades were made K.C.B.s. Some surprise was felt that Sir Robert Sandeman—the political *adlatus* of the victorious Generals, the protector of communications between Jacobabad and the Khojak Pass, the officer responsible during the entire period for the peace of Beluchistan and the districts of Peshin and Sibi, who had risked his life on more than one occasion in the performance of arduous duties—was not honoured with a K.C.B.ship.

Now that Sir Robert Sandeman's services have come to be estimated at their true value, it is seen that no man who had rendered such conspicuous service to the empire—a service in describing which Lord Lansdowne wrote that 'it stands by itself,' and that no living official 'can point to an achievement so distinct and so complete as his'—has been less generously treated.

It would be invidious to mention names, but I think I am correct in saying that of those civil officers on the frontier who during the last, say, twenty-five years have received honours and decorations for services of one kind or another connected with Border affairs, few, if any, have received them purely for successful peaceful tribal management. It will, on the contrary, be found that the great majority have been bestowed in connection with punitive expeditions. In short, under the present system a frontier civil officer who for whatever cause is obliged to make over the reins of his tribal administration to the military authorities, and take his seat behind the General commanding the troops, is just as likely, if not more so, to receive honours for obtaining intelligence, collecting supplies for the forces, and such like duties, as he would be by a continuance of

quiet, peaceful, and successful tribal management. I do not say for a moment that such duties are not important or that their efficient discharge is not worthy of recognition, but I do say that they are not the class of services to which a frontier civilian should be led chiefly to look for gaining honours. Such a system virtually affords a premium for bad management, and is, to say the least of it, demoralising. Sir Robert Sandeman's policy of 'dealing with the hearts and minds of the people and not with their fears only' is a far more laborious one than the knock-down policy of punitive expeditions; and so long as the interests of civil officers are equally if not better advanced by the latter, so long will they be inclined to put coercion in the forefront of their measures and allow conciliation to occupy the secondary place, and so long there will be a difficulty in finding men to follow out the Sandeman methods. A frontier political officer's first duty is to strive by skilful tribal management to avoid the necessity of punitive military measures, and it is to the attainment of success in this that all his efforts should be directed and by which his honours should be chiefly won. I would go even further than this and say that under the present system there is a danger that really successful tribal management, brought about or maintained by peaceful measures, may consign the officer concerned to oblivion. Take, for instance, the case of Dera Ghazi Khan. The tribes which are managed from there—both those residing in the district, and in the hills up to the boundary of Beluchistan, Mazaris, Drishaks, Gurchanis, Lunds, Legaris, Kosehs, Bozdars, and Kusranis—are as powerful and important as ever they were, perhaps more so; yet, because tribal matters have through successful quiet management been brought on what is regarded as a permanently peaceful basis, it seems to be forgotten that it is an important frontier district, for the continued successful management of which

the civil officer in charge, whoever he may be, is entitled to special recognition. Is there not, therefore, reason to apprehend that Fort Sandeman and Thal-Choteali may lapse into a similar condition? It should be borne in mind that civil officers in charge of such districts as Dera Ghazi Khan, Fort Sandeman, and Thal-Choteali have to carry on continuously in their own line specially arduous and responsible duties, and their being able to do so and make progress in what is a great civilising work by methods of 'peace and goodwill' entitles them to recognition and encouragement. I think the reorganisation of the administration on the lines suggested would afford the Government the necessary means to do this, supplying, as it would, the want now felt of a really well organised and efficient Frontier Political Service.

In the same article as that from which I have quoted above, the 'Pioneer,' after arriving at the conclusion that 'the frontier will have to be surrendered by the Punjab,' suggested a compromise—namely, that the whole of the Trans-Indus tract need not be transferred, but that a line might be drawn from the point of the southern limits of the Waziri tribe to the Indus, the tract south of that line to remain under the Punjab Government while that north of it should be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Government of India. As is often the case with compromises, the effect of such a compromise would be to emasculate and stultify the entire scheme, and it would be better to leave it alone altogether than disturb things to make a patchwork and faulty arrangement. There could not be a greater error than to think that by the consolidation of our authority in Beluchistan our southern Punjab frontier districts have ceased to be part of the frontier. On the contrary, they have by it become more useful than they were before as an important factor and component part of the whole, essential

to any scheme for the formation of a really strong frontier. The frontier tribal hill tracts and the Trans-Indus plains of Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan are, as will be seen from the map, so inextricably bound up together in joint ownership that it would make confusion worse confounded to attempt to exclude any from the proposed frontier provinces. It would lead to unnecessary division of authority, circumlocution, friction, and increase of correspondence. Instead of the Chief Commissioners of Beluchistan and Peshawar being able to settle everything in direct communication between themselves, the settlement of a large portion of their political work would have to be with the Punjab authorities; while numerous cases would of necessity have to be submitted to the Punjab Government before being disposed of by the Government of India—the self-same weak and unnecessary link in the frontier administrative chain which the new scheme is designed to do away with.

First, consider the situation in regard to the tribes themselves. By referring to the 'tribal map' it will be seen that throughout the entire length of this tract from the Gomal Pass to Sind—the tract the 'Pioneer' suggests might remain under the Punjab Government—the estates of our tribes, whose headquarters are in the plains, extend far into the hills beyond the old red frontier line. Thus the hills up to the crest of the Gehundari Mountain belong to the Mazaris. All sections of the Gurchanis hold lands right up to and in the Shum plain, while the most important of them, the Durkanis and Lasharis, reside almost altogether in the hills. It is the same with the Legaris, Kosehs, Kusranis, and Mianis.[1] The only two tribes whose possessions are confined to the hills are the Largha-Sheranis and the Bozdars; but some thousand Sheranis reside in the Dera

[1] North of the Gomal the position is precisely similar with regard to Bhitannis, Waziris, and other tribes.

Ismail Khan district, while the Bozdars have intimate relations with both Beluchistan and Dera Ghazi Khan, their political administration being directed from the latter.

Sir Robert Sandeman contended that in the interests of frontier administration the so-called '*divided tribes*' should be transferred to Beluchistan, and the chief reason adduced against his proposal was that if they were transferred it would necessitate the transfer of the entire tract up to the Indus, which was no doubt correct.

Moreover, our Beluch Sirdars, Mazaris, Drishaks, Gurchanis, and Legaris are intermarried with the families of the Tumandars of the hill tribes, Marris, Bugtis, and Khetrans. It was this blood relationship, and the anomalous position of these '*divided tribes*' under the Close Border System, that first influenced Sandeman in the policy he adopted in 1866–67. These Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan frontier tribes, numbering some thirty thousand five hundred splendid fighting men,[1] comprise a factor of immense strength in the scheme of frontier management and defence, towards the consolidation and maintenance of which the resources of the districts further contribute enormously. The tribesmen would themselves resent being considered as apart from the frontier, and their views should receive consideration in such matters.

Instead of excluding these districts from the Frontier Chief Commissionership I would advocate that the frontier district of Upper Sind might be added to the Beluchistan Chief Commissionership, which would be a great accession of

[1] In 1870 I estimated the fighting strength of these tribes as follows: Mazaris four thousand, Drishaks two thousand three hundred, Gurchanis two thousand seven hundred, Tibi-Lunds one thousand, Legaris four thousand three hundred, Kosehs five thousand four hundred, Sori-Lunds two thousand one hundred, Bozdars two thousand seven hundred, Kusranis one thousand one hundred, Nutkanis one thousand, Sheranis of Largha two thousand, Meanis five hundred, Usteranas one thousand—total thirty thousand one hundred. They are stronger now than they were then.

strength to it. The interests of the Khan of Khelat are closely connected with the Upper Sind district. The Bugtis, Domkis, and Jakranis have valuable possessions both in that district and in the Khan's territories, and the political and military requirements of the two are in all their details closely interwoven.

I must here add a word on the all-important subject of punitive expeditions. Indeed tribal management and punitive expeditions may be considered parts of the same subject. Since the 'unsatisfactory results' of punitive expeditions was commented on by her Majesty's Secretary of State in 1866, when he advocated instead the policy of 'persevering in humanising influences,' up to the present day, the policy which depends on them as their mainstay has been almost universally condemned by those high in authority. Eleven years later Lord Lytton[1] again drew attention to the evils of the system, and wrote of them that, while doing little towards putting 'our relations on a better footing, we injure a whole tribe for the vicarious punishment of an individual;' and again in another place his Lordship described it as a policy of 'alternate vengeance and inaction'—a description concurred in by Lord Roberts, Lord Lansdowne, and Lord Curzon, the present Viceroy, whose views I have already referred to at length.

Again, from another aspect, as acting injuriously on the important field of recruitment for the native army, I alluded in the last chapter to the views of Colonel Chesney and the 'Civil and Military Gazette.' I noticed in this connection how suicidal is the policy of punitive expeditions, in that the hill tribes being now our natural allies it is contrary to all our best interests either 'to kill them off' or alienate their friendship.

[1] *History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, by Lady Betty Balfour, pp. 177, 178.

The experiences of the Tirah and other recent frontier expeditions have shown the tactics of these tribesmen to be very similar to that of the Boers, and, as in the case of the Boers, what a very formidable adversary they become where they can take advantage of the hills and ravines with which they are acquainted, but of which we are ignorant, and which, as they arm themselves better at our expense, grows into a constantly increasing danger. These hills and ravines are the natural outer line of defence of India, and should by no means be allowed to continue independent of our control.

In the face of such overwhelming and continued condemnation the question naturally arises, why is it that we are still obliged to resort so frequently to punitive expeditions? I hope I may not be considered very bold if I answer, what I have already endeavoured to make plain through these Memoirs, that it is because tribal management by peaceful means, and on lines that would—gradually it may be, but surely—obviate the necessity for them, has never received the attention and encouragement that it deserves. If there were in 1866 and 1877 cogent reasons against the policy, there are a thousand times greater reasons now, when the threads of our relationship and connection with the tribes have become so interwoven in the warp and woof of the whole plan of our frontier civil and military administration, by the enlistment of large numbers of them in our tribal levy corps, by the establishment of posts within their limits, by the subsidising of their chiefs and Maliks for all manner of duties, by the more recent inclusion of their hill tracts as fresh recruiting fields for our Indian army, and by many other means. These make it imperative that we should persevere and leave no reasonable means untried.

Sir Robert Sandeman had a most difficult game to play at first, until his successes in the field of tribal manipulation

convinced many that his methods were worthy of support. Subsequently, from the time he gained Lord Lytton's favour, many of his successes in his larger measures may be traced to the valuable material support he received at the hands of Government. Thus I have shown how immensely useful his special military escort, which he was authorised to ask for whenever he wanted it without giving any reasons, proved in the settlement of important tribal cases, and how frequently its judicious employment prevented the necessity of being obliged to resort to punitive measures on a large scale. Similarly, when the Kakars rebelled, at the time of the affairs at Chappar-Rift and Baghao, at the first expedition to Appozai, and for the occupation of Zhob and the opening of the Gomal Pass, still larger military escorts were placed at his disposal by Government. In the first Zhob expedition and in the Sherani expedition the political authority was transferred just for a little while to the Generals Commanding, but virtually the political direction remained in Sir Robert Sandeman's hands, and it was his tribal management that enabled the results aimed at to be secured with little or no opposition or bloodshed. Notwithstanding these eminently successful results, it seems there is an inclination in some quarters to fight shy of affording support of this nature to civil officers. The extension of friendly relations with the tribes during late years makes it expedient that Government should trust their civil officers on the spot more, making at the same time a corresponding modification in the present tendency towards militarism in our frontier arrangements. The present usage was all very well at the time the Close Border System prevailed, when the tribal belt was a *terra incognita*, and civil and military officers were alike ignorant of all that went on in the hill country. But now all that is changed. Close connections have been cemented with most of the quasi-independent Border tribes

and their Sirdars and Maliks, their material interests being closely identified with the civil power. Civil officers of high rank and emoluments are constantly employed in the conduct of our relations with them, whose business and study it is to acquaint themselves with all their factions, feuds, and intrigues, which they should have at their fingers' ends. These developments render the transfer of political administration from the hands of the civil authorities, except on the strongest grounds and some clearly defined issue, inexpedient. Military officers taking over such power temporarily could not by any possibility be acquainted with all that has gone on, the intricacies of tribal affairs, the threads of our relations with the tribes and individuals, and other considerations, which should guide us in our procedure. Consequently the transfer prevents a continuity of policy, thereby affecting injuriously the interests of those who have identified themselves with it. But apart from the question whether the officer commanding the troops is or is not sufficiently well versed in the tribal situation, there are other considerations that should not be entirely lost sight of. The trade of a soldier is soldiering, and when all are eager for active service, and to win promotion, honours, and medals, it is not always as simple a matter as it might appear for the Commander to brush these natural inclinations all aside to enter on the unpalatable and arduous labour which I have shown to be inseparable from the manipulation that would make a settlement with these tribes on peaceful lines practicable.

At a durbar held by Lord Elgin at Quetta on November 6, 1894, after eulogising Sir Robert Sandeman's work, his lordship said: 'We can, in my opinion, find no better means of honouring him than by carrying on what he began.' So would I urge now. Let us carry on. We cannot stand still, we must be either making progress or retrograding. As I have taken the suggestion made by her

Majesty's Secretary of State in 1866 as the true foundation of the Forward Policy, initiated, by a happy coincidence, that very same year by Sandeman, so would I now close these Memoirs with the advice given by Lord Elgin in 1894 to honour him 'by carrying on' the good work. The policy then commenced was the policy of extending our 'sphere of friendly influence' and securing an 'effective control' over the Border tribes. By its intrinsic merits it carried the day, and step by step won for itself the approval of, and was deliberately adopted by, Government, so strongly emphasised in 1890 by the opening of the Gomal Pass and subsequent measures. I hope I may have succeeded to some extent in these pages in showing that the Waziris, Sheranis, Dauris, and other northern tribes are, equally with Kakars, Tarins, and the various Pathan, Beluch, and Brahoe tribes of Beluchistan, open and amenable to its influences when worked on the correct lines; and that it has already done noble work, and secured grand results quite sufficient to determine Government to persevere in their efforts undeterred by any apparent obstacles.

The debate on Lord Roberts's speech in the House of Lords referred to in the last chapter would appear to have made it clear that the only obstacles are the cost and the alleged difficulty of finding the man capable of taking up Sir Robert Sandeman's mantle. As these pages clearly show, no man could admire Sir Robert Sandeman's personality more than I do. But there is a vast difference between initiating and pioneering through its first stages such a policy, encompassed as it was by formidable difficulties, and the carrying on of it on lines proved and defined by long practical working experience; and I should be loth to admit that among the many able men who have been brought up in his school, or have studied and admired his policy and methods, the Government would have any

difficulty in putting their hand on the man who, with their support, would follow successfully in his footsteps and steer the frontier administration to its legitimate goal.

I do not say to go in for hasty subjugation, annexation, or even the occupation of tribal territory before gaining the consent of the loyal and well-disposed majority to such occupation, as all such measures would be contrary to the principles followed and advocated in these pages. But let the pacification of the country, the civilisation of the tribes, and the identification of their interests with those of the British Government, and the carrying of them with us in our measures, be our ultimate objective in all cases.

My experience is, as I think these Memoirs also show, that in most of the important Border tribes there are to be found three factions: (1) the well-to-do, well-disposed faction, who hold a stake in the country and consequently prefer peace to anarchy (fortunately, this is in a large majority and may truly be said to represent the tribe); (2) the predatory faction, who through anarchy make their livelihood by murder, plunder, and other evil courses; (3) the priestly faction, the Mullahs, who rally to their standards all hostile and disturbing elements. Our business is with the first, and to make it prevail, which can be done. But we too often, by faulty management, fail to keep them distinct, and mistake the voice of those hostile for that of the tribe or for that of our friends, thereby committing and stultifying the latter and hindering our own objects.

It is really impossible to speak precisely or to give a definite estimate as to how far the question of cost bears on the matter, because in the first place many of the advantages to be gained are not of a nature that can be measured by figures, while for others which can be so measured the materials and figures whereon to form a correct estimate are not available to the general public. Take as an instance

the cost of punitive expeditions. I have not the means to make an estimate, but Government can do so, and if they will calculate what the punitive expeditions which have taken place on the frontier since and including the Umbeyla campaign have cost the country, and strike a yearly average, the result will show a vast sum of money. If the result of the Forward Policy is—what those who advocate it maintain that it is, and as has been the case in Beluchistan—to do away with punitive expeditions, and that great sum can be wiped off the debit side of the account, may it not in the long run prove that instead of a burden to the empire a saving may be effected, or at least show that the objection is not so formidable that it should be allowed to stop the way of progress? The value of having these warlike tribes ranged on the side of Government, of being able to fully utilise their tracts as recruiting fields for our Indian army, of their aid in maintaining strategic positions and keeping open important military lines of communication and trade routes, though very great, cannot, as I said, be estimated in figures. Lord Lytton, in describing the advantages reaped by Government from the safe guarding of the Bolan Pass and other lines of communication by tribal arrangements during the Afghan war, wrote:[1]

> The Bolan Pass then re-opened has never since been closed. During the Afghan campaign of 1878 not a single British soldier was maintained or a single robbery committed in the pass. . . . Consider how terrible the difficulties, the anxieties, and the expense of the Government of India would have been augmented if the condition of that country, and our relations with it, had been in 1878 or in 1880 such as I found them in 1876!

He would be a rash man who would take on himself to prophesy what the value to the empire would be in our future affairs with Afghanistan and Russia of having the

[1] *History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration*, by Lady Betty Balfour.

Gomal, Tochi, Kurram, and Khyber routes on a permanently sound footing, such as that of the Bolan, described by Lord Lytton. It might probably prove incalculable. Unfortunately many of the more important results of the policy of 'peace and goodwill' do not admit of calculation. If I had the power to set them forth here so clearly and truly that all could understand and appreciate their value, they would, I believe, be worth more than all the arguments I have used in these pages in favour of the Forward Policy and against punitive expeditions.

On the expiration of my three months' privilege leave, I returned to India in November and resumed my appointment as Commissioner of the Derajat, taking over charge from Mr. Anderson who had held it during my absence. The two great schemes, the opening of the Gomal and Tochi Passes, on which my heart had been for so long set and to which I had devoted such a large share of my labours for the past six years, had now become accomplished facts. The future showed no evidence that the Punjab Government contemplated any further important or active development of the Forward Policy within my jurisdiction as the result of the delimitation of the Durand boundary with the Amir and the connected military operations, and as there appeared to be no prospect of any special inducement for my continuing in the service, I resolved to retire in April on the expiration of my year's extension, and not to apply for the second year which the Punjab Government had intimated to me that I might obtain. I had therefore only a few months left, which I employed in making a rapid tour through the districts in my division. Passing from Bannu through Muzaffargarh, I arrived at Rojhan, where I paid a visit to my old friend Nawab Sir Emam Baksh Khan, K.C.I.E., Tumandar of the Mazaris. I found the old gentleman robust and active, but quite blind, as he had been for some years. His eldest



FAREWELL DURBAR, DERA ISMAIL KHAN

son, Sirdar Bahram Khan, is an honorary magistrate of the first class and conducts most of the work of the Tuman very skilfully. He is an exceptionally able man, and promises to turn out a worthy successor to the chieftainship of this powerful and important tribe. At Dera Ghazi Khan and Dera Ismail Khan I held farewell durbars to bid adieu to my friends both from the hills and plains.

All the Beluch Tumandars of the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier were present, and are represented in the illustration facing p. 370. Some of them are the same men who had accompanied Sir Robert Sandeman and myself in our frequent tours through the frontier highlands in 1867 to 1876, and whose grand services to Government have been described in the early chapters of this narrative. Others are the sons and successors of those who have since passed away. The photograph was taken on the verandah steps of the house of Mr. Dames, B.C.S., the Deputy Commissioner, one of Sir Robert Sandeman's oldest and most trusty lieutenants. Mr. Dames is sitting below me on the left in the group, and Nawab Sir Emam Baksh Khan, and his son, Sirdar Bahram, are just below me on my right hand.

Mr. Dames's connection with the Dera Ghazi Khan Border has been of very long standing. His good work in connection with the occupation of Vitakri, to the political charge of which he was appointed, as well as on other occasions, was brought specially to the notice of Government by Sir Robert Sandeman. Yet, notwithstanding this, and that for a long series of years he rendered most valuable service in the successful peaceful management of the Beluch tribes, by whom he was greatly beloved, no honour or reward was ever bestowed on him nor did he receive any special recognition of his services. He was one of those frontier civil officers to whom I have alluded in the beginning of this chapter; and among others I may mention Colonel Gaisford

and Major MacIvor, who by the methods of 'peace and goodwill' through long frontier careers, spent in the extension of civilising and 'humanising influences' to our Border tribes, and attaching them to our rule, rendered to Government distinguished and enduring services, but which passed, either entirely unrecognised, or, like those of their great chief, most inadequately so.'

I have already noted that Colonel Gaisford was murdered on March 16, 1898, by a Ghazi just as he was about to come home to enjoy a well-earned rest. Major MacIvor died of cholera, also on the eve of his coming home on leave.

I have thought it necessary to enter very fully and clearly into all these particulars, because if the want of success in tribal management which has attended our efforts in the past is due to causes which can be remedied, it is essential they should be fully understood, and further that I am from my own experience convinced that those which I have represented are the true causes of failure, and not others to which it is popularly but erroneously attributed.

Those who attended my farewell durbar at Dera Ismail Khan were my friends of later years, commencing from my transfer to the Derajat in 1888. Besides the Nawabs and Sirdars from our districts in the plains, there were present from the Border tracts Mahsud and Darwesh-Khel Waziris, Sheranis, Usteranas, and Kusranis. Every leading Sirdar and Malik of these tribes flocked in to bid me good-bye, and the happiest thought I have brought away on the severance of my long connection with the North-West Frontier is that the efforts I made to win the friendship and confidence of these rough but fine clansmen, and to secure their loyal services and co-operation in the measures adopted for the consolidation and well-being of the frontier, had not proved in vain, and that they each and all regarded me as their true friend and were genuinely sorry at my leaving them.

FAREWELL DURBAR, DERA GHAZI KHAN

On April 28, 1896, I retired from the service. On my retirement the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab in recognition of my services recommended the grant to me of a handsome increase to the ordinary Uncovenanted pension. This did not, however, meet in its entirety with the support of the Government of India, and in lieu they recommended that, instead of increasing my pension to the full amount proposed by Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, a special gratuity should be granted to me, which was sanctioned. The Government of India, in forwarding their recommendation to her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, recorded their opinion in very appreciative terms. They wrote:

> We concur with Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick that Mr. Bruce's services have been of a very exceptional and distinguished character, and we desire particularly to mention that Mr. Bruce's political services, both in Beluchistan and on the Punjab frontier, were undoubtedly of the highest merit.

Just after my arrival in England I received the melancholy intelligence of the death, on June 13, 1896, of my old friend Sir James Browne. Certainly a sad fatality seemed to follow the Viceroy's Agents in Beluchistan, three of whom were within a short time cut off while still in the prime and vigour of their working life—Sir Robert Sandeman on January 29, 1892, Sir Oliver St. John on June 3, 1891, and Sir James Browne on June 13, 1896.

The two latter distinguished officers conducted the administration on the Sandeman System, and their untimely decease were severe blows to the interests and advancement of the Forward Policy on those lines. Notwithstanding such severe checks, or halting or hesitation on the part of those in authority, the policy recommended by Lord Roberts and Lord Elgin will ere long, I am persuaded, carry everything before it, as the principles on which it is founded are the only sure ones on which to build up a safe and strong frontier.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV

It was to me at this time a gratification to receive the thanks of the Government of India for my services in connection with the Mahsud Expedition, which had been brought to their notice by the Military Department, and mentioned in despatches. The Viceroy had further noted on the despatches in the following terms: — 'His Excellency is glad to have an opportunity of expressing his appreciation of the services rendered by Mr. R. I. Bruce, C.I.E., Commissioner of the Derajat, who had full political responsibility in Waziristan before Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart took command.' [1]

[1] See General Order in Military Department of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, No. 734, dated 10 May, 1895.

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
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